F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 12, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
D ELA RIC K H U N TER , also known
as Delarick Evans,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-3371
(D.C. No. 05-CV-3074-M LB)
JOEL M . YOUNG, in his official and (D . Kan.)
individual capacity as a Sergeant of
the W yandotte County Detention
Center,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before M cCO NNELL, PO RFILIO, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
Delarick Hunter, formerly a detainee at the W yandotte County Detention
Center in Kansas City and currently a prisoner in the Lansing Correctional
Facility, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
monetary damages against Sergeant Joel M . Young, a sheriff’s officer at the
detention center, in his official and individual capacities. W e exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I.
On February 15, 2004, M r. Hunter was held in the W yandotte County
Detention Center pending sentencing, in lockdown status for disciplinary reasons.
W hile receiving his daily medication in his cell, he was involved in a physical
altercation with deputies not named as defendants in this case. The deputies used
force to subdue and handcuff him. M r. Hunter, who sustained a cut on his upper
lip during the incident, was briefly left in his cell. 1
Shortly afterwards, Sgt. Young arrived to assist the other deputies, who
needed to re-enter the cell to retrieve dropped keys. M r. Hunter was standing and
looking out of his cell window. Sgt. Young ordered M r. Hunter to sit on his
bunk. W hen M r. Hunter did not heed the order, Sgt. Young warned that he would
use a taser gun. In the face of further noncompliance, Sgt. Young opened the cell
and fired the taser twice at M r. Hunter, hitting him in the upper and lower back.
Sgt. Young then recovered the keys and a nurse entered the cell to examine, wash,
1
In connection w ith this incident, M r. Hunter was later convicted of two
counts of battery on a law enforcement officer and sentenced to a term of 152
months of confinement in the Kansas Department of Corrections.
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and bandage the minor wounds M r. Hunter received in the earlier fracas with the
deputies and from the taser hits.
In the wake of the taser deployment, M r. Hunter filed suit against the
Sheriff of W yandotte County, alleging the use of excessive force and also delay
or denial of appropriate medication for his HIV-positive condition. The Sheriff
prepared and filed a report detailing the factual record, pursuant to M artinez v.
Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 319-20 (10th Cir. 1978). M r. Hunter filed a response to the
report, admitting only that the initial altercation took place and that he had been
shot with the taser gun.
Through later filings, M r. Hunter amended his complaint to modify the
claims against the Sheriff and add an excessive-force claim against Sgt. Young.
The Sheriff was dismissed from the case and Sgt. Young moved for summary
judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. The district court granted the motion,
determining that the Eleventh Amendment barred the official-capacity claim and
that qualified immunity shielded Sgt. Young from liability on the
individual-capacity claim. M r. Hunter now appeals the district court’s decision.
II.
“W e review the district court’s holding on summary judgment and the
Eleventh Amendment de novo.” Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1158
(10th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Cooperman v.
David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
“[A] mere factual dispute will not preclude summary judgment; instead, there
must be a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “[T]he substantive law will
identify which facts are material,” and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment.” Id. M r. Hunter is representing himself on appeal
so his pleadings will be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972).
O fficial-capacity claim
It is well-settled that a request for money damages against a state defendant
in his official capacity is generally barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution. See White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996).
Although the “state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity,” the waiver
“must be unequivocal . . . stated by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implication from the text of a state statutory or constitutional
provision as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Johns v.
Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations and alterations omitted).
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M r. Hunter asserts that Kansas w aived its immunity by enacting Kan. Stat.
§ 19-811, which provides that a county sheriff has “charge and custody of the jail
of his county” and that the sheriff and “his sureties shall be liable” for the acts of
“his deput[ies] or jailer[s].” This general language cannot be reasonably
construed as a waiver of Kansas’s immunity against § 1983 prisoner claims in the
federal courts. Because M r. Hunter’s requested relief is for only monetary
damages, sovereign immunity bars his claim against Sgt. Young in his official
capacity.
Individual-capacity claim
The district court also determined that Sgt. Young was entitled to qualified
immunity on M r. Hunter’s claim that the use of the taser gun amounted to
excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. W hen a defendant invokes the defense of qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must “satisfy a heavy two-part burden to avoid summary
judgment: (1) that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory
right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s
unlawful conduct.” Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 455 F.3d 1146, 1150
(10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). The district court resolved the matter at the
first step, holding that M r. Hunter had not demonstrated any constitutionally
prohibited conduct.
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W hether force is constitutionally excessive depends upon the circumstances
confronting the officer and the nature and amount of force applied by the officer.
See W hitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). W hether an officer’s conduct
was reasonable is evaluated from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer at the
scene. M edina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2001). As the district
court noted, “[t]he ‘core inquiry’ . . . is ‘whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm.’” Serna, 455 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Hudson v. M cM illian, 503 U.S.
1, 7 (1992)). “W e can infer malicious, sadistic intent from the conduct itself
where ‘there can be no legitimate purpose’ for the officers’ conduct.” Id.
(quoting Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Federal courts have held that the use of a taser or similar stun gun is not
per se unconstitutional when used to compel obedience by inmates. See Draper v.
Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a “single use of the
taser gun causing a one-time shocking” against a “hostile, belligerent, and
uncooperative” arrestee in order to effectuate the arrest w as not excessive force in
the totality of the circumstances); Jasper v. Thalacker, 999 F.2d 353, 354
(8th Cir. 1993) (using stun gun to subdue an unruly inmate did not violate Eighth
Amendment where plaintiff failed to prove that the officers used the stun gun
“sadistically or maliciously” to cause harm); Caldwell v. M oore, 968 F.2d 595,
602 (6th Cir. 1992) (use of stun gun against disruptive prisoner to restore
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discipline and order does not violate Eighth Amendment); M ichenfelder v.
Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (policy of allowing use of taser guns
on inmate who refuses to submit to a strip search does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment). And “this is so whether the inmate is locked in his prison
cell or is in handcuffs.” Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984)
(discussing use of “mace, tear gas, or other chemical agents” against inmates).
Courts “should . . . be extremely cautious before attempting to prohibit or limit
the necessary means” prison officials use to carry out their responsibilities. Id.
The evaluation of M r. Hunter’s excessive-force claim, as considered from
Sgt. Young’s vantage point, is not dependent upon a resolution of disputed facts. 2
Both M r. Hunter’s submissions and the M artinez report indicate that Sgt. Young
sought to enter M r. Hunter’s cell with an awareness that a physical altercation had
just taken place and that M r. Hunter was in lockdown. Sgt. Young ordered
M r. H unter to go to his bunk and M r. H unter did not comply.
M r. Hunter alleges that the other officers were responsible for the initial
altercation, that he was asking for a jail supervisor, and that his physical
condition prevented him from following Sgt. Young’s orders. He does not allege,
however, that Sgt. Young was aware of M r. Hunter’s version of the preceding
2
For this reason, we need not reach M r. Hunter’s argument that the district
court improperly relied on the version of the facts presented in the M artinez
report.
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incident or that he perceived M r. H unter’s allegedly impaired physical condition.
Instead, M r. Hunter suggests that Sgt. Young should “have asked [him] why [he]
didn’t sit, once [Sgt. Young] opened the door,” so that he “could have told him
the pains [he] w as having in [his] hip and legs.” Reply Br. at 5.
W e decline to second guess Sgt. Young’s “split-second judgments” about
the necessary amount of force made in these “tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving” circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
M r. Hunter has not demonstrated that use of the taser was objectively
unreasonable and therefore violated his constitutional right under the Eighth
Amendment. As a result, qualified immunity shields Sgt. Young from
M r. Hunter’s pursuit of an excessive-force claim.
III.
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRM ED. M r. Hunter is reminded that
he is obligated to continue making partial payments toward the balance of his
assessed fees and costs until they are paid in full.
Entered for the Court
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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