F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 14, 2007
PU BL ISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff — Appellee,
v.
No. 05-3299
LEO N EL G U ER RER O,
Defendant — Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of K ansas
(D.C. No. 03-CR-10038-02-W EB and 04-CV-3368-W EB)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Leonel Guerrero, Pro Se, for Defendant — Appellant.
Brent I. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney (Eric F. M elgren, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), W ichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff —
Appellee.
Before L UC ER O, M cKA Y, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
*
At the parties’ request, the case is unanimously ordered submitted without
oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
L UC ER O, Circuit Judge.
Leonel Guerrero, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. Guerrero filed an unverified memorandum in support of his verified
§ 2255 motion. In the memorandum, he asserted a claim not included in the
motion: that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal at his
request. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we VAC ATE the
district court’s judgment and R EM AND to the district court. Upon remand, the
court should give Guerrero an opportunity to file an amended § 2255 motion
and/or a memorandum signed under penalty of perjury.
Guerrero pled guilty to two counts of interstate travel in aid of a
racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), and the district
court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. Under his plea agreement, he
waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter connected to his
prosecution, conviction, or sentence, so long as the sentence did not depart
upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range as determined by the district court.
Guerrero did not appeal.
He did, however, file a timely § 2255 motion, signed under penalty of
perjury, asserting that: (1) His guilty plea and waiver of appellate rights were
neither knowing nor voluntary; (2) H is counsel was ineffective by inducing him
-2-
into pleading guilty, by failing to explain the nature of the charges against him,
and by failing to explain how the Sentencing Guidelines operate and apply to his
case; and (3) H is sentence must be vacated in light of United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), Blakely v. W ashington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In an unverified memorandum in support of
the motion, Guerrero asserted an additional claim that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to file an appeal at his request. The district court dismissed the § 2255
motion primarily on the ground that Guerrero waived his right to collaterally
attack his conviction and sentence. However, the court did reach the merits of the
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file an appeal. It rejected
the claim, stating that:
[Guerrero] does not provide any details regarding the issues he asked
counsel to appeal. This is problematic for [his] claim as the manner
to determine ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise an
issue on appeal is to examine the merits of the omitted issue. If the
omitted issue is meritless, counsel’s failure to appeal is not a
constitutional violation. Because he has not stated what issues his
counsel failed to appeal, the Court is unable to determine the merits.
[Guerrero’s] claim fails because he has not provided facts to
overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
In addition to dismissing his § 2255 motion, the district court also denied
Guerrero’s request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
On Guerrero’s renewed request to this court, we granted a COA on his
claims. W e did so based on the holdings in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470
-3-
(2000), United States v. Snitz, 342 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2003), and United States
v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2005). In Flores-Ortega, the Court applied
the established rule that “a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally
unreasonable.” 528 U.S. at 477. It held that a defendant who requests that
counsel file an appeal is entitled to a new appeal and is not required to show that
the appeal would likely succeed. Id. at 484, 486. Following Flores-O rtega, this
court held in Snitz that a defendant is entitled to an appeal if he told his counsel
that he wanted to appeal, even if counsel argued that the appeal was without
merit. 342 F.3d at 1155-59. In Garrett, this court applied Flores-Ortega and
Snitz to a case in which the district court dismissed a § 2255 motion asserting
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file an appeal, on the ground that
the defendant had waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence in
his plea agreement. Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1265-66. This court recognized that the
defendant’s “appellate rights have been significantly limited by his waiver, but
[that] the waiver does not foreclose all appellate review of his [conviction and]
sentence.” Id. at 1266-67. W e held that if the defendant “actually asked counsel
to perfect an appeal, and counsel ignored the request, he will be entitled to a
delayed appeal.” Id. at 1267. This is true “regardless of whether, from the
limited perspective of collateral review, it appears that the appeal will not have
any merit.” Id. (citations omitted).
-4-
The government concedes that this legal authority requires remand for an
evidentiary hearing when a defendant claims in a sworn § 2255 motion that he
directed counsel to file a notice of appeal and counsel failed to do so. It argues
that this court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of the § 2255 motion
because Guerrero did not raise this ineffective-assistance claim in his motion.
Instead, he raised the issue only in the unsworn memorandum, filed in support of
the motion. See United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1413 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that § 2255 relief cannot be predicated on an unsworn memorandum),
rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 751 (1997).
Rules 2(b)(1), (2), and (5) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for
the U. S. District Courts (“§ 2255 Rules”) require that a § 2255 motion “specify
all the grounds for relief,” “state the facts supporting each ground,” and “be
signed under penalty of perjury.” W e agree with the government that Guerrero’s
§ 2255 motion, which was signed under penalty of perjury, did not include an
ineffective-assistance claim alleging that counsel failed to file a notice of appeal
as Guerrero had requested. Instead, he raised that claim only in his unverified
memorandum in support of his § 2255 motion. Thus, the Rule 2(b) requirements
were not met. 1
1
Although the memorandum in support of the § 2255 motion was not
executed under “penalty of perjury,” his certificate of service for that
memorandum was properly signed. It appears that the failure to properly execute
the memorandum may have been an inadvertent oversight.
-5-
W e review Guerrero’s pro se pleadings under a liberal standard. Jones v.
Cowley, 28 F.3d 1067, 1069 (10th Cir. 1994). If a district court can “reasonably
read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it
should do so.” Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quotation and alteration omitted). W e may construe a pro se motion so that it
conforms to the appropriate procedural rule. See United States v. Rourke, 984
F.2d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 1992) (construing an improper Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a)
motion as a § 2255 motion). However, a court “may not rewrite a petition to
include claims that were never presented.” Barnett, 174 F.3d at 1133 (quotation
omitted). Construing Guerrero’s pro se submission liberally, we interpret his
contem poraneously-filed memorandum as an amended § 2255 motion. Yet this
relaxed standard neither requires the trial court, nor the appellate court, to dig
through the record, like a hound to a truffle, in search of a claim. On the other
hand, it is both reasonable and appropriate for both courts to fully consider
contem poraneous memoranda in support of motions in order to fully interpret a
movant’s claim. Today’s holding is limited to the latter.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course prior to response by the opposing party. Guerrero filed his
memorandum before the government responded, so it is timely with respect to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”), a § 2255 motion must be made within one year from the date
-6-
Guerrero’s conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 6. W hen a § 2255
movant seeks to amend his pleading to include a new claim, we will only
entertain this claim if the amendment is made within the one-year time limit set
by AEDPA . See United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 504-05
(10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a § 2255 movant cannot assert new claims in a
motion to amend a § 2255 motion filed after A EDPA’s time limit has expired).
Guerrero’s conviction became final on October 16, 2003. 2 Guerrero submitted his
original § 2255 motion on October 9, 2004 and the memorandum on O ctober 14,
2004. Because the memorandum was submitted less than one year after his
conviction became final, the amended claim is timely under A EDPA.
However, because the amended claim was included in an unverified
memorandum, it nonetheless fails to comply with the procedural requirements of
§ 2255 Rule 2(b). Pursuant to the A dvisory Committee N otes to Rule 2, however,
Guerrero should have an opportunity to conform his motion to Rule 2(b)’s
procedural requirements. See § 2255 Rules, Advisory Committee Notes, 2004
amendments (noting that court should allow movants to submit corrected motions
2
Final judgment was entered against Guerrero on October 1, 2003. The
conviction became final ten days after the time for appeal had run, excluding
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays. See Clay v. United States,
537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003) (“conviction becomes final when the time expires for
filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the
conviction”); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A )(I) (notice of appeal must be filed within
ten days after the entry of judgment); 4(b)(6) (judgment is entered when it is
entered on the criminal docket); 26(a)(2) (excluding intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays or legal holidays if the period is less than eleven days).
-7-
conforming to Rule 2(b)); see also Kafo v. United States, 467 F.3d 1063, 1069-71
(7th Cir. 2006) (allowing movant opportunity to conform to Rule 2
requirements). 3
Accordingly, we VAC ATE the judgment of the district court and
R EM A N D the case with instructions directing the court to give Guerrero the
opportunity to file an amended § 2255 motion including the claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to file an appeal. If he makes the proper filing,
we direct the district court to conduct further proceedings consistent with
Flores-Ortega, Snitz, and Garrett. W e DENY as moot Guerrero’s motion for
appointment of counsel to represent him on this appeal.
3
Remand to allow conformity to Rule 2(b) is particularly appropriate in
light of the strenuous requirements for filing a second or successive § 2255
motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 8; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
-8-