UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-50212
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE TRINIDAD DIAZ-DE LA O,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(EP-97-CR-623-DB-ALL)
February 4, 1999
Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:*
Jose Trinidad Diaz-De La O (“Diaz”) appeals his conviction and sentence for attempted illegal
reentry into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We affirm.
I
Customs Inspectors pulled Diaz out of a line of people waiting to approach the turnstiles at
the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry on the Mexico-United States border. They seized him after a
narcotics-detecting dog alerted to him. At the time he was seized, Diaz had not applied to enter the
United States, nor had he entered the primary inspection area. Inspectors searched Diaz, and
although they found no narcotics, a record check revealed that Diaz had previously been deported
from the United States. Diaz was charged with illegal reentry and attempted illegal reentry in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. A jury found Diaz guilty of attempted illegal reentry, but acquitted him
*
Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth Circuit Rule
47.5.4.
of illegal reentry. The district court sentenced Diaz to ninety-two months of imprisonment and three
years of supervised release.
Diaz appeals on two grounds. First, he argues that the district court erred in refusing to give
his proposed jury instruction on attempt. Second, he contends that the district court misapplied the
Sentencing Guidelines in denying Diaz a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
II
It is a crime for an alien who has been deported from the United States to “enter[] or attempt
to enter . . . the United States” without proper approval. 8 U.S.C. § 1326. To be guilty of any
attempt crime, a defendant must have (1) “‘act[ed] with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
the co mmission of the crime,’” and (2) “‘engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step
toward commission of the crime,’ i.e., conduct ‘strongly corroborative of the firmness of the
defendant’s criminal intent.’” United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426, 433 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974)). The district court instructed the
jury that to find Diaz guilty of attempted illegal reentry, the jury must find:
First: that the defendant intended to enter the United States without the permission
of the Attorney General, after being arrested and deported at some earlier time; and
Second: that the defendant did an act constituting a substantial step towards the
commission of that crime which strongly corroborates the defendant’s criminal intent.
Diaz asked the court to add the following instruction: “Third: That the substantial step or steps taken
by the Defendant must be unique rather than so commonplace that they are engaged in by persons
not in violation of the law.” His proposed instruction mimicked our decision in United States v.
Oviedo, in which we held:
[I]n o rder fo r a defendant to be guilty of a criminal attempt, the objective acts
performed, without any reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant’s
conduct as criminal in nature. The acts should be unique rather than so
commonplace that they are engaged in by persons not in violation of the law.
United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1991). Typically, a trial court’s refusal to
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include a requested instruction is reversible “only if the requested instruction is substantially correct,
the actual charge given the jury did not substantially cover the content of the proposed instruction,
and the omission of the proposed instruction would seriously impair the defendant’s ability to present
a defense.” United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1510 (5th Cir. 1996). Diaz argues that the
omission of his requested instruction improperly hampered his defense. He contends that standing
in line at a port of entry is a commonplace activity, and that under Oviedo, such behavior alone
cannot form the basis of an attempt conviction. Without his requested instruction, Diaz submits, the
jury was unable to consider that aspect of his defense.
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion, because the district court’s jury
charge “substantially cover[ed]” Diaz’s proposed instruction. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d at 1510.
Specifically, the content of Diaz’s requested instruction was adequately covered by the district court’s
charge that a defendant must take “a substantial step towards commission of that crime which
strongly corroborates his criminal intent.” Diaz is correct that under Oviedo, a defendant’s acts must
be “unique rather than so commonplace that they are engaged in by persons not in violation of the
law.” Oviedo, 525 F.2d at 885. This begs the question, however, of precisely what distinguishes acts
that are “unique” from those that are “commonplace.” Oviedo answered this query by reaffirming
the well-established principle that “the objective conduct of the defendant must strongly corroborate
the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.” Id. at 886 (citing Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376). In
an opinion decided shortly after Oviedo, we acknowledged that “[w]hat the court did in Oviedo was
to require that the objective acts of the defendant, taken as a whole, strongly corroborate the required
culpability.” United States v. Korn, 557 F.2d 1089, 1091 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus what separates acts
that are unique and therefore criminal in nature, from acts that are so commonplace that they are
engaged in by persons not in violation of the law, is whether those acts, taken as a whole, strongly
corroborate the required culpability.
Our reasoning in United States v. Woolery, 735 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1984), bolsters this
conclusion. There, we wrote:
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The goal in Oviedo is that objective acts of the defendant without regard to mens rea
“mark the defendant’s conduct as criminal in nature. The acts should be unique rather
than so commonplace that they are engaged in by persons not in violation of the law.”
Only then may an attempt conviction stand.
Woolery, 735 F.2d at 822 (quoting Oviedo, 525 F.2d at 885) (citations omitted). Applying this test,
we upheld the attempt conviction in Woolery, because the defendant’s actions “constitut[ed] precisely
the type of ‘objective acts’ which mark [his] conduct as criminal in nature, and evidence ‘commitment
to the criminal venture and corroborate the mens rea.’” Woolery, 735 F.2d at 823 (quoting Oviedo,
525 F.2d at 885). Thus, Woolery equates Oviedo’s “unique rather than . . . commonplace” test with
the well-established requirement that a defendant’s acts strongly corroborate a defendant’s criminal
intent.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court’s jury charge, which required the
government to prove “that the defendant did an act constituting a substantial step towards the
commission of that crime which strongly corroborates the defendant’s criminal intent,” substantially
covered Diaz’s requested instruction. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to include Diaz’s requested instruction on attempt.
III
Diaz also argues that the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines in denying Diaz’s
request for a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The district court denied Diaz
a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility because he “put the government through a
trial.” Diaz contends that the district court erred in reading the Guidelines to preclude a finding of
acceptance of responsibility solely because he went to trial. We review the district court’s application
of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Gross, 26 F.3d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 1994).
The Sentencing Guidelines authorize the district court to decrease the offense level by two
if “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1. “This adjustment is not intended t apply to a defendant who puts the government to its
o
burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then
admits guilt and expresses remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). Nonetheless, as explained
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in the commentary to the Guidelines:
In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility
for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial.
This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve
issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a
statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct).
Id.
Diaz argues that his is the “rare situation[]” in which a defendant may demonstrate an
acceptance of responsibility even though he or she proceeds to trial. Id. He contends that he did not
deny any factual elements of his guilt. According to Diaz, his sole defense at trial was a legal
argument that he could not be guilty of an attempt to illegally enter the United States where he never
advanced to the primary inspection area, never applied for admission, and never proceeded past the
turnstile at the port of entry. Thus he claims to have asserted a purely legal defense, one which
merely “challenge[d] . . . the applicability of the statute to his conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment.
(n.2).
This characterization, however, defies the actual events at trial. Diaz did contest “essential
factual elements of guilt.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). Specifically, Diaz contested whether
he intended to enter the United States.1 Diaz’s attorney argued to the jury that Diaz may have been
standing in line merely t o ask border officials a question, not to procure illegal admission into the
United States. He then asserted that if any juror thought it possible that Diaz intended to do
something other than to gain illegal entry into the United States, then he or she would have a
reasonable doubt and could not find that Diaz had criminal intent.2
1
To be guilty of an attempt, a defendant must have “intended to commit the underlying offense.”
United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.
Ct. 2307, 141 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1998).
2
At closing argument, Diaz’s attorney argued:
Is it possible my client was going to go up and ask a question? You bet it’s possible.
Okay. We’ll never know, because they pulled him out of line. Okay. But it’s
certainly possible he could have been going up to ask for a question. . . . If you think
that it’s a possibility that he could have gone up and asked for permission, or asked
a question and not applied for admission, ladies and gentlemen, that’s a reasonable
doubt. If it causes you to pause, if it causes you to think, “Well, maybe that’s what
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By contesting whether he intended to enter the United States illegally, Diaz disputed an
“essential factual element[] of guilt.” Id. He did more than merely “challenge . . . the applicability
of the statute to his conduct.”3 Id. Therefore, this case does not present one of the “rare situations”
where a defendant who puts the government through a trial might nonetheless demonstrate an
acceptance of responsibility. Id. The district court did not err in reading U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 to
preclude a downward departure because Diaz went to trial.
IV
Accordingly, we affirm Diaz’s conviction and sentence.
he was doing,” that’s a reasonable doubt. And that’s enough to find there wasn’t
intention here.
3
To be sure, it would have been possible for Diaz to present a purely legal defense at trial. He
could have conceded that he intended to enter the United States, and argued solely that his conduct
did not constitute a “‘substantial step toward commission of the crime.’” United States v. Stone, 960
F.2d 426, 433 (5th Ci r. 1992) (quoting United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.
1974)). Such a defense would not have denied “essential factual elements of guilt,” and thus might
not have precluded a finding of acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). As
discussed above, however, Diaz did contest whether he intended to enter the United States. In fact,
when arguing to the jury that Diaz may have lacked criminal intent, Diaz’s attorney noted that this
was a separate argument from Diaz’s claim that he did not take a substantial step towards committing
the offense. He argued:
[L]et’s say that some of you may find that he did have the intent. Some of you—let’s
say that some of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, okay, that he did have
the intent to enter. Okay. If you’re convinced of that, okay, you have to ask
yourselves, “Did he act out on it? Did he do—did he take enough of a significant
step?”
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