F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 10, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
R EV . ED WA R D ALLA N BU CK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-4236
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-876-TC)
A LLEN RA N D MY E RS; WILLIAM (D. Utah)
H. BARRETT, Utah 3rd D istrict Court
Judge; TRACY BOUGHN, Salt Lake
County Sheriff Deputy; SCOTT
BANNON, Sergeant, Salt Lake County
Sheriff D eputy; PA U L B REN NEM AN,
Sergeant, Salt Lake County Sheriff
D eputy; JO H N TH O RN TO N ,
Detective, Salt Lake County Sheriff
D eputy; DA V ID E. Y O CO M ,
Salt Lake County District Attorney;
N. M . D’ALESA NDRO, Salt Lake
County Deputy District Attorney;
KIM COW LEY, Salt Lake County
Sheriff D eputy D etective; LO RIN K.
PU GH, Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, Sandy Crescent
Stake President; B REN T W. R ICH,
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints Bishop,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
(continued...)
Before M cCO NNELL, PO RFILIO, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Edward Allan Buck appeals from the district court’s
order dismissing his civil rights complaint. The district court dismissed the
complaint on multiple alternate grounds, including Younger abstention, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, judicial immunity, and failure to state a claim. W e
affirm the order of dismissal in part, vacate in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
Buck brought his complaint pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), and 1986. In the complaint, he alleged that
until August 23, 2005, he resided at the home of defendant Allen Rand M yers.
W hen he left M yers’ home, Buck took w ith him a computer he used for business
matters. M yers filed a complaint against Buck with the Salt Lake County
Sheriff’s Department, accusing Buck of stealing the computer and other items
from M yers’ home. As a result of this complaint, the Salt Lake County District
*
(...continued)
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Attorney filed felony charges against Buck in state court. Buck contended that
M yers’ allegations of theft were false.
Buck alleged that after the charges were filed, Defendant Tracy Boughn, a
Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Deputy, came to Buck’s house and seized the
computer at issue, without a warrant. At the time of the seizure, Boughn
allegedly failed to disclose to Buck that criminal charges were pending against
him for the theft of the computer. He allegedly gained entrance to Buck’s house
and access to the computer by telling Buck that it was a civil matter and “he just
wanted to see the computer for himself.” R., Vol. I, doc. 3-1, at 10.
Buck sued Boughn and other deputy sheriffs, along with two Salt Lake
County district attorneys, charging that they failed “to thoroughly investigate
claims made by . . . M yers prior to taking any of the illegal actions against [Buck]
which include illegal search and seizure.” Id. at 12. He accused the defendants
of conspiring together to deprive him of his civil rights. Finally, he sued state
court judge W illiam H. Barrett, alleging that Judge Barrett “willfully,
intentionally, and maliciously” interfered with Buck’s attempts to pursue a
concurrent civil rights action in state court by denying his motions for a fee
waiver. Id. at 14. Buck’s complaint sought millions of dollars in damages
against the various defendants.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. Buck was permitted
to add additional defendants to the suit. These included officials of the Church of
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Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Church) Lorin K. Pugh and Brent W . Rich, who
allegedly violated Buck’s civil rights by failing to convene a church tribunal or
take other measures to discourage M yers (a member of the Church) from
continuing to falsely accuse Buck of theft. Buck also added Salt Lake County
Sheriff’s D epartment Detective Kim Cowley, who he accused of falsely
presenting felony charges against Buck, and of joining in the conspiracy to
deprive Buck of his civil rights. Finally, Buck moved to add the Church and a
deputy district attorney who represented some of the defendants; however, his
motions to add these defendants were denied.
Approximately one month prior to his filing of this complaint in federal
court, Buck filed a similar complaint in Utah state court. In his state court
complaint, he named M yers, Boughn and two “John Doe Salt Lake County
Sheriff’s Department Officers” as defendants. R., Vol. II, doc. 80-5. He charged
that M yers lied to the officers, stole Buck’s property, and “obstruct[ed] the
administration of justice” by obtaining the seizure of his computer, which
prevented Buck from proceeding pro se in other federal court matters. Id. at 2.
He made similar allegations against Boughn and the other officers, contending
also that they were guilty of official misconduct and illegal seizure of his
property.
The magistrate judge assigned to this case concluded that since state
proceedings were ongoing, including a parallel civil rights action that Buck
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brought against some of the defendants in state court, and also the Utah criminal
prosecution of Buck for theft, the court should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Alternatively,
even if Buck’s parallel action had ended, the district court would lack jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16
(1923). Finally, even if Buck could surmount the obstacles posed by Younger
abstention and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the case should be dismissed based
on the defenses defendants had raised, including judicial immunity and failure to
state a claim. After considering Buck’s objections, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, and dismissed the complaint.
ANALYSIS
W e review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006).
“W e may affirm the district court's dismissal on any basis supported by the record
and the law.” Weaver v. United States, 98 F.3d 518, 519 (10th Cir. 1996).
1. Rooker-Feldm an Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a narrow one, which “prevents the lower
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers
challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
comm enced.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1199, 1201 (2006)
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(per curiam; quotation omitted). As the Supreme Court has recently explained,
the doctrine does not apply to parallel state and federal litigation. See id. at 1201.
M ore specifically, it does not deprive lower federal courts of jurisdiction if the
federal court suit w as filed before the end of the state court’s appeal process.
Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1031-32 (citing Exxon M obil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 290-91 (2005)). At the time Buck filed this case, there is no
indication that the Utah courts had yet reached a final judgment in either his
criminal case or his parallel civil litigation. Therefore, a dismissal under
Rooker-Feldman would be inappropriate. See Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1032 (holding
that federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear case,
notwithstanding Rooker-Feldman doctrine, where plaintiff filed federal suit while
certiorari petition to New M exico Supreme Court was pending in similar state
court action).
2. Younger Abstention
Alternatively, the district court dismissed based on Younger abstention.
“The Younger doctrine requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a case
where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) [that] implicate an
important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate
opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues.” Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v.
Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003). “O nce these three conditions are
met, Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary
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circumstances, a district court is required to abstain.” Crown Point I, LLC v.
Interm ountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003).
There can be no serious question that each of the Younger factors is met in
this case. At the time of dismissal, both the criminal case against Buck and his
state civil case were ongoing. W here the Younger factors are met, abstention
protects the pendency of both state-court criminal and civil proceedings. D.L. v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). The state of
Utah has an important interest in its criminal proceedings. Buck fails to show
that he does not have an adequate opportunity in state court to litigate federal
constitutional issues; indeed, he has raised such issues in his parallel civil
complaint.
Buck argues, however, that Younger should not apply here, because he does
not seek to enjoin the prosecution from proceeding in state court. Instead, he
only seeks damages for illegal search and seizure and for the improper filing of
criminal charges against him. 1 This argument is unavailing. “[T]he Younger
doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment for the
plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.”
1
In his request for relief, Buck also asked the district court to order the
United States Department of Justice to prosecute the defendants. The Department
of Justice is not a party to this action. Buck’s frivolous and non-colorable request
for an order instructing the Department of Justice to prosecute the defendants may
safely be ignored for purposes of our analysis.
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D.L., 392 F.3d at 1228. A finding in this case that the defendants violated Buck’s
constitutional rights would have a preclusive effect in the state-court proceedings.
Therefore Younger abstention is appropriate.
The district court erred by dismissing Buck’s damage claims, however.
W here the plaintiff in the federal suit seeks damage relief and the Younger factors
are met, the district court should stay federal proceedings on the damage claims,
not dismiss the action altogether. Id.; see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996). W e must therefore vacate the order of dismissal, and
remand. If, on remand, the state proceedings are ongoing, the district court
should stay this action until they are complete. Once the state proceedings are
complete, the district court may proceed to further adjudication of Buck’s claims
in this action.
3. O ther Bases for Dismissal
As noted, the district court dismissed Buck’s claims in the alternative on
various other theories, including immunity and failure to state a claim. Can
dismissal be upheld on these bases, notwithstanding abstention? A s a general
matter, it cannot. “Younger abstention is jurisdictional.” D.L., 392 F.3d at 1228.
Having determined that abstention was necessary, the district court therefore
lacked jurisdiction to reach the m erits of Buck’s damage claims. See id. at 1232
(vacating summary judgment order in favor of defendants, where Younger
abstention required instead that claims be stayed).
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This general rule, however, admits of a significant exception. “W e may
address jurisdictional issues in any order we find convenient.” Id. at 1229. To
the extent that dismissal of a particular defendant or claim was appropriate on an
alternate jurisdictional ground, we may uphold the dismissal on that ground. In
other words, the district court did not need to “abstain” from dismissing a
particular claim or defendant where it could do so without reaching the merits.
See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. M alaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184,
1191-92 (2007) (stating federal courts may choose among threshold grounds for
refusing to reach merits of a controversy, including abstention, because
jurisdiction is only vital where court seeks to enter judgment on the merits).
Some of B uck’s claims were properly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,
separate and apart from any question of Younger abstention. Buck’s claims
against Church officials Pugh and Reich, based on their alleged failure to convoke
an ecclesiastical tribunal against M yers or otherwise to use their spiritual
authority to pressure M yers into dropping his criminal complaint against Buck,
are wholly insubstantial and frivolous. These claims therefore failed to invoke
the jurisdiction of the district court, and were properly dismissed. See Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 n.10 (2006) (“A claim invoking
federal-question jurisdiction . . . may be dismissed for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is . . . ‘wholly insubstantial and
frivolous.’”).
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A similar analysis applies to Buck’s claim against Judge Barrett. The only
specific deprivation of civil rights asserted in Buck’s complaint lay in Judge
Barrett’s denial of Buck’s requests for a fee waiver to proceed in state court
“because [Barrett] did not like the fact that the Plaintiff has only $250 actual
monthly income received from the person to whom Plaintiff is the care giver.”
R., Vol. I, doc. 3-1, at 14. This assertion, taken as an alleged violation of Buck’s
constitutional rights, is also wholly insubstantial and frivolous, and was properly
dismissed. 2
The damage claims against the remaining defendants, whatever their merit,
do not appear to suffer from jurisdictional defects. They should therefore be
stayed under Younger pending completion of the state court litigation.
C ON CLU SIO N
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of
Buck’s claims against defendants Lorin K. Pugh, Brent W . Rich, and Judge
W illiam H. Barrett. W e VACATE the dismissal as to the remaining defendants,
2
Judge Barrett may also be entitled to dismissal on another, non-merits
ground: judicial immunity. In light of our disposition, we need not reach the
issue of judicial immunity.
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and REM AND for further proceedings in accordance with this order and
judgment.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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