MacArthur v. San Juan County

F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 18, 2007
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
T E N T H C IR C U IT

STEVEN M ACARTHUR;
NA THA NIEL PENN ; M ICH ELLE
LYM AN ; HELEN VA LDEZ;
C AN D A CE LA WS; LIN D A No. 05-4295, 05-4310
CACAPARDO; SUE BURTON; AM Y
TER LA AK ; C AN D A CE H O LIDAY,
NICO LE R OBERTS,

Plaintiffs,

and

A LISO N D IC KSO N ; D O N N A
SINGER; FRED RIGGS,

Plaintiffs - Appellants/Cross-
Appellees,

v.

SA N JU A N CO U N TY ; SA N JUAN
HEALTH SERVICES DISTRICT; J.
TYRON LEW IS, Commissioner; BILL
REDD, Commissioner; CRAIG
H A LLS; R EID M . WO O D ; C LEAL
B RA D FO RD ; R OG ER ATC ITTY;
JO H N LEWIS; JO H N
HOUSEK EEPER; KAREN ADAM S;
PA TSY SH U MW A Y ; JA M ES D.
REDD; L. VA L JON ES; M AN FRED
R . N ELSO N ; R IC HA RD BA ILEY;
M AR ILEE BAILEY; OR A LEE
BLACK; GARY H OLLADA Y; LORI
W ALLACE, also known as Laurie
 W alker; ST. PAUL’S INSU RA NC E;
CARLA GRIM SHAW ; GLORIA
YAN ITO; JULIE BRONSON; R.
DENNIS ICKES; LAURIE SCHAFER;
LYN STEVENS, San Juan County
C om missioner; M A N U EL M O RGAN,
San Juan County Commissioner;
NETTIE PRACK; GLEN IM EL,

Defendants - Appellees/Cross-
Appellants.

A PPE A L FR O M T H E U N IT ED ST A T ES D IST R IC T C O U R T
FO R T H E D IST R IC T O F U T A H
(D .C . N o. 2:00-C V -584-B SJ)

Susan Rose, Sandy, Utah, for Plaintiffs - Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Carolyn Cox (and Blaine J. Benard, with her on the brief), Holme, Roberts &
Owen, L.L.P., Salt Lake City, Utah, for D efendants - A ppellees/Cross-Appellants
San Juan Health Services D istrict, Reid W ood, and Lauren Schafer.

Jesse C. Trentadue, (M ichael W . Homer with him on the brief), Suitter Axland,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants - Appellees/Cross-Appellants San Juan
County, J. Tyron Lewis, Bill Redd, Craig Halls, and Richard Bailey.

Before K E L L Y , E B E L, and M cC O N N E L L, Circuit Judges.

K E L L Y , Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs in this case seek enforcement of several preliminary injunction

orders issued by a court of the Navajo Nation. Although the decision to enforce a

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non-final tribal court judgment is a matter of discretion, federal courts w ill

ordinarily err on the side of enforcement of such judgments in the name of

comity. W e will not enforce a tribal court judgment, however, when the tribal

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In the realm of tribal court jurisdiction,

the regulatory authority of the tribe is often the issue which looms largest, and

this case is no exception. Among other things, these appeals require us to

examine the regulatory authority of the Navajo Nation over the activities of a

nonmember of the tribe when the regulated entity is another independent

sovereign acting in its governmental capacity.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Donna Singer, Fred Riggs, and Alison Dickson

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal the federal district court’s refusal to enforce

three preliminary injunction orders issued by a Navajo district court against San

Juan County, San Juan Health Services District (“SJHSD ”), and numerous

employees of those entities (collectively “Defendants”). Although the district

court’s judgment was ultimately in their favor, SJH SD and certain of its

employees involved in the litigation also cross-appeal from the district court’s

judgment that the Navajo Nation possessed civil jurisdiction over several of the

claims asserted against SJHSD , Roger Atcitty, and Reid W ood. In its opinion

below , the district court explained that it would not enforce the preliminary

injunction orders because, inter alia, the Navajo Nation lacks regulatory authority

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over many of the Defendants, the preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature,

much of the preliminary injunction is now moot, and Defendants are nearly all

entitled to sovereign immunity. See M acArthur v. San Juan County, 391 F. Supp.

2d 895, 1056-57 (D. Utah 2005). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we reverse the district court insofar as it held that the Navajo Nation

possessed regulatory and adjudicative authority over Plaintiffs’ employment-

related claims against SJH SD and M r. Riggs’s defamation claim against Reid

W ood. W e do, however, ultimately affirm the district court’s judgment refusing

to enforce the tribal court’s preliminary injunction orders.

Background

Because Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge the federal district court’s

factual recitation, we rely primarily on its version of the facts. Donna Singer,

Fred R iggs, and A lison D ickson brought suit against San Juan County, SJHSD,

and several employees of those entities in Navajo district court in August 2000.

The specific defendants in that case relevant to these appeals were as follows: San

Juan County, Utah; SJHSD ; San Juan County Commissioners J. Tyron Lewis and

Bill Redd, in their individual and official capacities; San Juan County Attorney

Craig Halls, in his individual and official capacity; San Juan County

Administrator Richard Bailey, in his individual and official capacity; Roger

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Atcitty, John Lewis, and Karen Adams, members of SJHSD’s Board of Trustees,

in their individual and official capacities; Patsy Shumway, member of SJHSD’s

Board of Trustees, in her official capacity only; Reid W ood, SJHSD ’s Chief

Executive O fficer, in his individual and official capacity; and Lauren Shafer,

SJHSD’s Personnel Director of Nursing, in her individual and official capacity.

SJHSD is a special service district organized pursuant to Utah Code § 17A -

2-1304 (1999), and is tasked with providing health care services to the citizens of

San Juan County, Utah. At all relevant times, SJHSD operated the M ontezuma

Creek Health Clinic (“the Clinic”), which is located in San Juan County and

within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Nation. The record indicates that the

land on which the Clinic is located is fee land owned by the State of U tah as part

of the Navajo Trust Fund. SJHSD relinquished operation of the Clinic as of

January 1, 2000, at which time Utah Navajo Health Systems, an entity affiliated

with the Navajo tribe, took over operation.

M s. Singer is the non-Indian spouse of an enrolled member of the Navajo

Nation. She lives outside, but near, the Navajo reservation. M s. Singer was

employed as the manager of the Clinic from 1995 until her termination in

December 1998. In the Navajo district court, M s. Singer alleged that although

she was an exempt employee, she was required to keep time cards, allegedly in

violation of SJHSD policies. She claimed that on November 13, 1998, a mistake

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was made on her time card but that she promptly provided a written explanation

for the error. Shortly thereafter, she was handed a memorandum by Reid W ood,

CEO of SJHSD , referring to allegations of time card fraud and informing her that

she w as being placed on administrative leave. A second memorandum from M r.

W ood accused her of employment-related misconduct— namely that the number of

hours worked, as reflected on her time cards, was inflated— and notified her of

the scheduling of a pre-disciplinary hearing. Follow ing a meeting with M s.

Singer on December 4, 1998, M r. W ood prepared yet another memorandum to her,

dated December 7, explaining that due to the inconsistencies in her time cards,

she was being terminated. M s. Singer later filed a complaint with the Office of

Navajo Labor Relations (“ONLR”) seeking reinstatement. Eventually, M s. Singer

was rehired at the Clinic after its operation was handed over to Utah Navajo

Health Systems.

M r. Riggs is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation who resides w ithin

the exterior boundaries of the Navajo reservation in New M exico. SJHSD

terminated his employment on November 4, 1998 as part of a reduction in force,

but immediately rehired him in a lesser position and at a lesser rate of pay on the

condition that he keep time cards. According to M r. Riggs, he was unaware that

on his very first time card he underreported the number of hours of leave taken.

As with M s. Singer, M r. W ood advised M r. Riggs in writing that he was accused

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of time card fraud and placed M r. Riggs on paid administrative leave. M r. Riggs

likewise had a pre-disciplinary hearing with M r. W ood on December 4, 1998, but,

unlike M s. Singer, who was terminated, M r. W ood placed M r. Riggs on probation

for thirty days. M r. Riggs alleges, however, that he was kept on probation longer

than thirty days. On or about December 15, 1998, M r. Riggs filed a grievance

with SJHSD regarding M r. W ood’s disciplinary action, and on February 12, 1999,

a grievance hearing was held (the record is unclear as to what the result of this

hearing was), but M r. Riggs avers that the grievance process w as tainted by M r.

W ood’s influence and lacked impartiality. M r. Riggs also later filed a grievance

with the ONLR. M r. Riggs remained an employee of the Clinic after Utah Navajo

Health Systems assumed operation.

M r. Dickson, the third plaintiff, is an enrolled member of the Navajo

Nation residing within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Reservation in Utah.

M r. Dickson was initially hired by SJHSD in M arch 1998 as a full-time,

temporary office clerk. He applied for full-time, permanent employment in

November or December of 1998 but was refused. M r. Dickson claims that the

refusal to make him a permanent employee violated internal SJHSD policies. H e

also alleges he was denied a hearing on his grievance. In the Navajo district

court, M r. Dickson also complained about racially insensitive and derogatory

remarks allegedly made by M r. W ood. Like M s. Singer and M r. Riggs, M r.

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Dickson was permanently employed by Utah Navajo Health Systems at the Clinic

after its takeover.

In their complaint filed in the Navajo district court, Plaintiffs asserted

numerous claims arising primarily out of their employment at the Clinic. Those

claims included the following: violation of the right to free speech as protected by

the Navajo Nation, the United Nations, and the United States; violation of the

right to freedom of assembly as protected by the Navajo Nation, the United

Nations, and the United States; violation of the right to due process as protected

by the Navajo Nation, the United Nations, and the United States; wrongful hiring;

defamation and tortious interference with future contractual relations; theft;

violation of the right to equal protection as protected by the Navajo Nation, the

United Nations, and the United States; discrimination as part of an ongoing

pattern; intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; violation of

fiduciary duties; misfeasance; malfeasance in office; obstruction of justice;

misuse of judicial process; defamation per se; and the endangerment of Navajo

patients.

On December 28, 1999, after holding at least one evidentiary hearing, the

Navajo district court found that Plaintiffs’ claims had a high likelihood of success

on the merits and issued a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to

undertake the following actions: reinstate M s. Singer and M r. Riggs to their

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former positions w ith full back-pay; offer M r. Dickson full-time employment with

full back-pay and benefits; delete and expunge all disciplinary comments

regarding the incidents at issue from Plaintiffs’ personnel files; refrain from

placing all Physician Assistants on time card requirements; refrain from

interfering with clinic operations or moving clinic personnel; pay all attorney’s

fees, costs, and expenses related to the litigation; and assist, in any manner

necessary, diabetic patients’ return to the Clinic for treatment. The court also

prohibited Defendants from eliminating emergency medical technician services

within the Navajo Nation or interfering with laboratory or pharmaceutical services

to the Clinic.

Following Defendants’ submission of a motion to dissolve/modify the

preliminary injunction, the tribal court issued another order on M arch 1, 2000,

which reiterated the conditions of the prior preliminary injunction and also

required Defendants to carry out the conditions of the prior injunction by M arch

3, 2000, to immediately make payment of past due billings of the Clinic, to refrain

from interfering with any form of patient care being provided at the Clinic, and to

immediately cease billing eligible IHS patients for medical services. In an effort

to further enforce its order, the court informed the parties that Defendants w ould

be required to pay $10,000 per day for every day after M arch 3, 2000 that

Defendants failed to comply with its order, and that the individual defendants and

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their counsel would be personally liable for $1,000 of the $10,000 daily amount.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a special order, and, in

response, the tribal court issued a third order on M arch 6, 2000. That order

required Defendants to take the following additional actions: refrain from

alienating any money, property, or assets of any type until the relief granted in the

preliminary injunction was satisfied; provide an accounting of all Defendants’

assets to Plaintiffs; list Plaintiffs first in order of priority as secured creditors on

Defendants’ files with the County Recorder of San Juan County; and provide

Defendants’ 1998 and 1999 tax returns to Plaintiffs. The court further explained

that any disobedience of the order would result in the issuance of arrest w arrants

for Defendants, and it also granted Plaintiffs leave to seek enforcement of the

court’s orders in Utah or federal court.

Plaintiffs accepted the tribal court’s invitation to seek enforcement of the

orders and filed suit in federal district court on July 25, 2000. They sought both a

declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction enforcing the tribal court’s

orders. Less than two months later, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claims on grounds of sovereign immunity and

Plaintiffs filed a cross-claim for summary judgment. The district court granted

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on October 30, 2000, reasoning that Defendants

enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit in tribal court and that their sovereign

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immunity had not been waived vis-à-vis the Navajo Nation. For the same reason,

the district court also denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and

their cross-claim for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed from that order.

On appeal, we vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further

proceedings. 1 See M acArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir.

2002) (hereinafter M acArthur I). W e held that the district court erred in deciding

the sovereign immunity issue before first determining whether the Navajo Nation

possessed adjudicative authority over the activities of Defendants, who are nearly

all nonmembers of the Navajo Nation. See id. at 1227. W e explained that

sovereign immunity and tribal regulatory authority are distinct legal doctrines

and, pursuant to Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), the adjudicative authority

of tribal courts is a threshold question that must be answered before a court may

consider the merits of the underlying action. See id. at 1226-27. W e therefore

directed the district court, on remand, to conduct an analysis of the Navajo

Nation’s adjudicative authority over Defendants pursuant to M ontana v. United

1
In a separate order, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against
Truck Insurance and R. Dennis Ickes on grounds that the Navajo Nation did not
possess regulatory authority over their activities. W e affirmed that decision on
appeal. See M acArthur I, 309 F.3d at 1222-25. Plaintiffs dedicate significant
portions of their brief on appeal arguing why those claims should not have been
dismissed. Under the law of the case doctrine, however, we are not free to
reconsider the district court’s dismissal of those claims or the prior panel’s
subsequent affirmance of that decision. See Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v.
W agnon, 476 F.3d 818, 823 (10th Cir. 2007).

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States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), before reaching the separate issue of sovereign

immunity. See id. at 1227.

That is exactly what the district court did. In a published order dated

October 12, 2005, the district court rendered judgment in Defendants’ favor. In

doing so, the district court held that the N avajo N ation possessed civil regulatory

and adjudicatory authority over the claims of M r. Riggs and M r. Dickson arising

out of their consensual employment relationships with SJHSD . See M acArthur v.

San Juan County, 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 1056 (D. Utah 2005) (hereinafter

M acArthur II). It also held that the N avajo N ation possessed adjudicatory

authority over M r. Riggs’s defamation claim against M r. W ood and all three

Plaintiffs’ employment-related claims against M r. Atcitty, who is an enrolled

member of the Navajo Nation. See id. The district court held that the Navajo

Nation did not possess regulatory or adjudicatory authority over the activities of

the remaining Defendants. See id. Despite the fact that the district court

determined that the Navajo Nation possessed subject matter jurisdiction over

some of Plaintiffs’ claims, it nonetheless refused to issue an injunction or

declaratory judgment to enforce the tribal court’s orders as to those claims

because the orders were non-final and interlocutory in nature, most of the relief

granted in the orders has since been rendered moot, Plaintiffs had not properly

exhausted their claims, and most of the claims were barred by sovereign

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immunity. See id. at 1056-57.

Although deciphering Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal is an extremely

difficult task, 2 they appear to argue that: (1) Defendants may not challenge the

propriety of the Navajo district court’s orders because they failed to exhaust their

remedies in tribal court; (2) the Navajo district court’s preliminary injunction is

entitled to full faith and credit; (3) federal courts lack the authority to question

whether the N avajo district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction and must

enforce its preliminary injunction orders without independent review; (4) laws

enacted, and policies followed, by Congress and the President subsequent to

M ontana nullified its framew ork for defining the inherent sovereignty of Indian

tribes; and (5) sovereign immunity does not apply to shield Defendants from

liability.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

W e review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same legal standard as below. Jencks v. M odern W oodmen of Am., 479 F.3d

2
W e note that Plaintiffs’ briefing in this case has in comm on many of the
problems identified w ith regard to the briefing in appeal 05-4317. Nonetheless,
we reach the merits because we are able to sufficiently decipher Plaintiffs’
arguments, and those arguments are non-frivolous enough to warrant full review
and response.

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1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is only appropriate where “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

W e also review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de

novo. Lovell v. State Farm M ut. Auto Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 893, 898 (10th Cir.

2006). W e may uphold the grant of a motion to dismiss if, view ing the well-

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 1974 (2007) (explaining that the pleading standard by

which courts look to whether the plaintiff can prove “no set of facts” giving rise

to a claim “has earned its retirement”); see also The Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v.

Schneider, – F.3d –, 2007 W L 1969681, at *3 (2007).

II. Enforcement of the N avajo D istrict Court’s Preliminary Injunction Orders

W hile Plaintiffs have sought both a declaratory judgment and a preliminary

injunction, their primary objective in this litigation is to enforce the Navajo

district court’s preliminary injunction orders granting them broad relief. The

primary issue on appeal, therefore, is whether there is anything to prevent us from

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recognizing and enforcing those orders. But before we address that question

head-on, there are a number of threshold issues to be resolved.

To begin, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants may not challenge the

enforceability of the tribal court orders because they failed to exhaust available

tribal court remedies. “The Supreme Court . . . has required litigants to exhaust

their tribal court remedies before a district court may evaluate the existence of a

tribal court’s jurisdiction.” Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir.

2006) (citing Iowa M ut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987)).

Ordinarily, however, it is federal court plaintiffs, not defendants, who are

required to exhaust. Also, Defendants no longer had tribal court remedies

available to them once Plaintiffs sought enforcement in federal court. W e think

that he who defeats another’s ability to exhaust cannot then assert failure to

exhaust as a defense. M oreover, the remedy for a litigant’s failure to exhaust is

not enforcement of the tribal court’s judgment, as Plaintiffs seek, it is a dismissal

or abeyance of the action until exhaustion has occurred, see Nat’l Farmers Union

Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)— neither of which

Plaintiffs request. Finally, we possess all the facts necessary to conduct our

jurisdictional inquiry and thus exhaustion would serve no purpose other than

delay. See Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1168 (listing five exceptions to the exhaustion

requirement).

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 Next, we must determine the proper mechanism by which we might enforce

the Navajo district court’s orders. Plaintiffs assert that the proper mechanism is

the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1,

and the full faith and credit principles found within 28 U.S.C. § 1738. W hile the

Constitution only requires that states grant full faith and credit to the judgments

of sister states, § 1738 extends that requirement to the courts of the United States

and its territories and possessions. See U.S. Const. art. IV , § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

As we noted in our prior decision in this case, the Supreme Court has broadcast

mixed signals as to whether the tribes are to be considered territories or

possessions of the United States and thus included within the language of § 1738.

See M acArthur I, 309 F.3d at 1225. M oreover, “[t]his court has not yet decided

whether a tribal court’s judgment is entitled to preclusive effect under the Full

Faith and Credit Clause or as a matter of comity.” Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1176

(M cConnell, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also M acArthur I,

309 F.3d at 1225. R egardless, w e need not resolve the issue because even if we

were required to enforce tribal judgments as a matter of full faith and credit, only

final judgments are subject to enforcement pursuant to full faith and credit

principles, see Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963); Felix S. Cohen,

Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 7.07[2][a], at 658 (2005 ed.) (hereinafter

Handbook), and the preliminary injunction orders sought to be enforced in this

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case hardly constitute final judgments, see Sole v. W yner, 127 S. Ct. 2188, 2195

(2007) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, the court is called upon to assess the

probability of the plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits.”); Kiernan v. Utah

Transit Auth., 339 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2003) (“A preliminary injunction

serves to preserve the status quo pending a final determination of the case on the

merits.”). 3 Therefore, if w e are to enforce the preliminary injunction orders, it

must be as a matter of comity.

Plaintiffs also argue that we have no power to do anything other than

enforce the N avajo district court’s orders. In other w ords, once the tribal court

issued its preliminary injunction orders and Plaintiffs arrived at federal court to

enforce them, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to enforcement,

which is mandatory on our part. This argument misunderstands federal court

jurisdiction and the discretion we possess under the doctrine of comity. The

question of the regulatory and adjudicatory authority of the tribes— a question

bound up in the decision to enforce a tribal court order— is a matter of federal law

giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 4 See Nat’l

3
Although the orders at issue did award attorney’s fees, back-pay, and
other monetary awards, the amount of those awards was never reduced to a sum
certain and thus the orders are not final with respect to those awards. See Harbert
v. Healthcare Servs. Group, 391 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n order
that determines liability but leaves damages to be calculated is not final.”).
4
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that federal law has not divested the Navajo
Nation of its civil jurisdiction over Defendants’ activities— in fact, they allege

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Farmers U nion, 471 U.S. at 852; W ilson v. M archington, 127 F.3d 805, 813 (9th

Cir. 1997). Additionally, we proceed cautiously and carefully when called upon

to enforce foreign judgments. W hile there is no doubt that “[t]ribal courts have

repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication

of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and

non-Indians,” Santa Clara Pueblo v. M artinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978), the

decision whether to enforce non-final orders of a tribal court is left primarily to

our discretion under the doctrine of comity, see Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1168, 1171;

W ilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (“[C]omity . . . affords the best general analytical

framew ork for recognizing tribal judgments.”).

The basic dilemma the doctrine of comity is meant to solve is that “[n]o

law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from

which its authority derived.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U .S. 113, 163 (1895). Thus,

federal law has granted it such jurisdiction and seek a declaratory judgment
saying as much. As a result, we agree with the district court’s observation that
“the action . . . is one arising under federal law because it turns on substantial
questions of federal law.” M acArthur II, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 987-88 (internal
quotations and modifications omitted); see also Superior Oil Co. v. United States,
798 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[I]n cases encompassing the federal
question whether a tribal court has exceeded its lawful limits of jurisdiction
involving an exercise of civil subject-matter jurisdiction . . . the federal district
court is empowered to review a tribal court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”);
W ilson v. M archington, 934 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (D. M ont. 1995), reversed on
other grounds at 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997). This is especially true considering
the prior panel’s holding that the M ontana analysis is a threshold issue. See
M acArthur I, 309 F.3d at 1226-27.

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comity “is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the

legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to

international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of

other persons who are under the protection of its law s.” 5 Id. at 164. Comity is

not an inexorable command, see id., and a request for recognition of a foreign

judgment may be rebuffed on any number of grounds, see Wilson, 127 F.3d at

810; Handbook § 7.07[2][a], at 658 (“In contrast to the full faith and credit rule,

the comity doctrine allows the receiving court greater discretion to determine

whether to enforce the foreign judgment.”).

Although recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments as a matter

of comity also lies within our discretion, “[t]he importance of tribal courts and the

dignity we accord their decisions will weigh in favor of comity.” Bird v. Glacier

Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, recognition

of a tribal court judgment must be refused where one of tw o circumstances exist.

First, comity must not be granted where the tribal court lacked either personal or

subject matter jurisdiction. Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1171. Second, a tribal court

judgment must not be enforced where the party against whom enforcement was

sought was not afforded due process of law . Id. Apart from those two mandatory

5
Under Utah law , foreign judgments not entitled to full faith and credit
may only be enforced under the doctrine of comity. See M ori v. M ori, 931 P.2d
854, 856 (U tah 1997) (citing Hilton).

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grounds on which to refuse enforcement, there are several grounds on which a

court may exercise its discretion to refuse enforcement of a tribal judgment. See

W ilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (listing several possible discretionary reasons for the

non-enforcement of tribal judgments).

In this case, we must refrain from enforcing much of the Navajo district

court’s orders because that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction (i.e.

adjudicatory authority) over nearly all of Defendants’ activities. Additionally,

under the unique circumstances of this case, we will exercise our discretion to

similarly refuse to enforce the tribal court judgment even as to those claims over

which the tribal court arguably had subject matter jurisdiction (those asserted

against M r. Atcitty).

A. Tribal Court Subject M atter Jurisdiction - The A nalytical Framew ork

“Originally the Indian Tribes were separate nations within what is now the

United States.” W illiams v. Lee, 358 U .S. 217, 218 (1959). As separate nations,

they enjoyed the same degree of sovereignty as that enjoyed by all other sovereign

nations the world over. Through their original incorporation into the United

States as well as through specific treaties and statutes, however, they have lost

several important aspects of their inherent sovereignty. Id. As to which aspects

of inherent sovereignty have been retained and which have been divested, “[t]he

areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have

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occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and

nonmembers of the tribe.” United States v. W heeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).

But the Indian tribes’ status as dependent nations has not divested them of “the

powers of self-government.” See id.

Despite the fact that the Navajo Nation retains control over its self-

government, “[i]t is true that in the exercise of the powers of self-government, as

in all other matters, the Navajo Tribe, like all Indian Tribes, remains subject to

ultimate federal control.” Id. at 327. This is because “the Constitution grants

Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that

[the Supreme Court has] consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”

United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). Congress’s “plenary and

exclusive” powers in respect to the tribes derive from the Indian Commerce

Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3), treaties entered into by the Executive

Branch, and preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any federal

government. See id. at 200-01. The upshot of Congress’s plenary power over the

tribes is that it may “enact legislation that both restricts, and in turn, relaxes . . .

restrictions on tribal sovereign authority.” Id. at 202.

In the absence of congressional legislation, however, tribal governments

retain regulatory authority over all matters falling within their inherent

sovereignty. In M ontana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Supreme

- 21 -
Court laid down a general rule that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian

tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” Id. at 565.

There are, nevertheless, two narrow exceptions to the general rule against tribal

authority over nonmembers. First, “[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation,

licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual

relationships with the tribe or its members, through comm ercial dealing,

contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Id. Second, “[a] tribe may . . . exercise

civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation

when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,

the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 566.

Although M ontana dealt exclusively with the tribes’ regulatory authority

over non-Indians, see Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)

(“M ontana immediately involved regulatory authority . . . .”), the Supreme Court

has since announced that “a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its

legislative jurisdiction,” id. It has also since explained that it has left “open the

question whether a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants

equals its legislative jurisdiction.” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001).

Thus, our analysis must proceed as follows: initially, we must determine whether

each party’s status is such that M ontana’s general rule against regulatory authority

over nonmembers is implicated; in other words, we must determine whether the

- 22 -
party over whom the tribe is seeking to assert regulatory authority is a nonmember

of the Navajo Nation. If the party in question is a nonmember, then we must

decide whether either of the two exceptions identified in M ontana applies. If one

of the two M ontana exceptions applies and the tribe therefore possesses

regulatory authority over the nonmember, we must determine whether the

nonmember’s activities also fall within the Tribe’s adjudicative authority.

Before conducting this analysis, we must resolve two matters. First, there

does not appear to be, and Plaintiffs have not identified any, congressional

legislation expressly authorizing the N avajo N ation to exercise regulatory

authority over Defendants in this case. Stated slightly differently, Congress has

passed no law which permits the Navajo Nation to exercise regulatory authority

over nonmember entities or individuals w ho employ members of the tribe within

the confines of the reservation; nor has it passed a broader statute w hich arguably

encompasses nonmember employers. Consequently, any regulatory authority the

Navajo Nation might possess is strictly a byproduct of its retained inherent

sovereignty.

Second, Plaintiffs contend that laws and/or policies enacted by Congress

and the Executive Branch subsequent to M ontana nullified its framew ork for

defining the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes. This argument is unavailing.

M any of the sources on which Plaintiffs rely predate M ontana and thus cannot

- 23 -
serve as the basis for overturning that decision. W e have, nonetheless, reviewed

each policy, statute, treaty, and contract relied upon by Plaintiffs and can find no

indication whatsoever that M ontana has been altered in any way. 6 Finally, as

recently as 2001, the Supreme Court applied the M ontana framework in

determining whether the Navajo Nation possessed regulatory authority over

nonmembers of the tribe, see Adkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 654-57— a strong

indication that the M ontana framework remains alive and well. Consequently, w e

will proceed to apply the M ontana framew ork.

B. W hether M ontana’s General Rule Applies

As previously stated, M ontana only applies insofar as the tribe in question

is seeking to assert regulatory authority over the activities of a nonmember. See

450 U.S. at 565-66. For a long while, however, M ontana’s applicability seemed

to hinge not only on the status of the party over whom authority was exercised but

also on the character of the property on which the regulated activities occurred.

This stemmed from the fact that “in M ontana, as in later cases following

6
At oral argument, and in a motion for summary disposition filed since,
Plaintiffs primarily relied upon a Bureau of Indian Affairs contract with the
Navajo Nation in arguing that the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts has been
expanded and M ontana no longer controls. W e have carefully reviewed the copy
of that contract provided by Plaintiffs, see Aplt. App. at 178-92, and find no
mention of M ontana, the inherent sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, or the
jurisdiction of its courts, and thus Plaintiffs’ reliance on that contract is
misguided.

- 24 -
M ontana’s instruction . . . the challenged tribal authority related to nonmember

activity on alienated, non-Indian reservation land.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 454.

Litigants began noticing this common denominator, and in Strate the tribal

petitioners argued that M ontana was inapplicable because the land on which the

regulated activity— an auto accident— occurred was not traditional non-Indian fee

land due to the fact that, like here, it was held in trust for the tribe and its

members. See id. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, acknowledged “that

tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land,” but

held that the nature of the land in question was more akin to alienated, non-Indian

land because the Tribe could not “assert a landowner’s right to occupy and

exclude.” See id. at 454-56. Thus, M ontana applied.

The notion that M ontana’s applicability turns, in part, on whether the

regulated activity took place on non-Indian land was finally put to rest in Hicks.

In that case, the Navajo Nation attempted to assert regulatory authority over

nonmembers’ activities unquestionably occurring on Indian land. See Hicks, 533

U.S. at 359. Because the activities occurred on Indian land, Hicks argued that

M ontana had no relevance. In rejecting that argument, the Court explained that

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)— the case upon which

M ontana primarily relied in defining the scope of the tribes’ inherent sovereign

powers— drew no distinction between Indian and non-Indian land. See Hicks, 533

- 25 -
U.S. at 359. It also noted that language from M ontana itself clearly implied that

the general rule announced in that case applies to Indian and non-Indian land

alike. See id. at 359-60. Thus, while the nature of the property is a factor— and

possibly a dispositive one— to consider in determining whether the regulated

activity falls within either of M ontana’s tw o exceptions, see id. at 360, the only

relevant characteristic for purposes of determining M ontana’s applicability in the

first instance is the membership status of the individual or entity over which the

tribe is asserting authority, see id. at 388 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part)

(“[T]he majority is quite right that M ontana should govern our analysis of a

tribe’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers both on and off tribal land.”).

M ontana’s presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers

applies nearly across the board in this case because, with the exception of M r.

Atcitty, Defendants are all nonmembers of the Navajo Nation. 7 M r. Atcitty, who

was a member of SJHSD ’s Board of Trustees, is an enrolled member of the

Navajo Nation and resides within the borders of the Navajo reservation. As a

result, while it is unclear whether the Navajo Nation possessed civil jurisdiction

over M r. Atcitty’s activities, given that they were undertaken exclusively in his

7
Even assuming the rule laid down in Strate were still operable, M ontana
would nevertheless apply because Plaintiffs have made no showing that the
Navajo N ation could “assert a landowner’s right to occupy and exclude” others
from the trust land on which the Clinic sits. See 520 U.S. at 456.

- 26 -
capacity as a state official, cf. id. at 362 (“W hen . . . state interests outside the

reservation are implicated, States may regulate the activities even of tribe

members on tribe land . . . .”), it is clear that he does not fall within the ambit of

M ontana. W e, therefore, proceed to apply M ontana to all Defendants except M r.

Atcitty.

C. Application of M ontana

The starting point under M ontana is, of course, with the general rule “that

the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of

nonmembers of the tribe.” 450 U.S. at 565. The general rule remains in effect

unless a nonmember enters into a consensual relationship with the tribe or its

members, or the activities of a nonmember threaten the tribe’s right to self-

government. Id. at 565-66. Because all Defendants, with the lone exception of

M r. Atcitty, are nonmembers, one of these two exceptions must apply in order for

the Navajo Nation to assert regulatory authority over their actions.

1. M s. Singer

M s. Singer’s status as a nonmember of the N avajo N ation renders

application of the two M ontana exceptions exceedingly straightforward in her

case. There is no indication, and Plaintiffs do not contend, that any of the

Defendants in this case entered into a consensual relationship with the Navajo

Nation itself, and accordingly we are only concerned here with consensual

- 27 -
relationships between D efendants and the tribe’s members. Because she is a

nonmember, however, there is no possibility that Defendants’ actions with respect

to M s. Singer could have resulted in a consensual relationship with a member of

the Navajo Nation. M oreover, Defendants’ employment-related activities in

regard to another nonmember on non-Indian land in no way affects the Navajo

Nation’s right to govern itself. Thus, neither M ontana exception applies and the

Navajo Nation did not possess regulatory authority over Defendants’ activities

vis-à-vis M s. Singer.

2. M r. Riggs and M r. Dickson

The fact that M r. Riggs and M r. Dickson are enrolled members of the

Navajo Nation renders application of the M ontana exceptions more complicated

than in M s. Singer’s case.

a. The Consensual Relationship Exception

Our first task is to determine whether any of the Defendants entered into a

consensual relationship with M r. Riggs or M r. Dickson “through comm ercial

dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Id. at 565. The district court

below held that SJHSD had entered into such a relationship with M r. Riggs and

M r. Dickson via its employment relationship with them. See M acArthur II, 391 F.

Supp. 2d at 1011-12. Plaintiffs do not appear to argue that a consensual

relationship w as formed in any other manner.

- 28 -
 There is no doubt that an employment relationship between two parties is

contractual in nature. See, e.g., Perry v. W oodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th

Cir. 1999) (“[T]he employment-at-will relationship encompasses sufficient

contractual rights to support section 1981 claims for wrongful termination.”);

Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 23 P.3d 1022, 1026 (Utah 2001) (“[A ]n

employment relationship entered into for an indefinite period of time is presumed

to be at-will and gives rise to a contractual arrangement . . . .”) In fact, the

comm on law tort cause of action for interference with contractual relations

encompasses interference with employment, even where the employment is at-

will. See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 126 (1998) (“The kind of

interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of

the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and

intentional interference with prospective contractual relations.”). Consequently,

M ontana’s consensual relationship exception applies to a nonmember w ho enters

into an employment relationship with a member of the tribe.

But not just any consensual employment relationship w ill do. Rather,

Supreme Court precedent clearly limits the regulatory authority of tribes— at least

that which is derived solely from their inherent sovereignty— to the reservation’s

borders. See A tkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001) (“An

Indian tribe’s sovereign power to tax— whatever its derivation— reaches no

- 29 -
further than tribal land.”); Strate, 520 U.S. at 446 (“M ontana thus described a

general rule that, absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack

civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a

reservation, subject to two exceptions . . . .”) (emphasis added); M ontana, 450

U.S. at 565 (“To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise

some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations . . . .”)

(emphasis added). The notion that inherent sovereignty ceases at the

reservation’s borders is consistent with the Court’s statement in W heeler that “the

dependent status of Indian tribes w ithin our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily

inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external

relations.” 435 U.S. at 326. It would simply strain credulity to hold that the

Navajo Nation may exercise regulatory authority over any employer in the United

States so long as the individual or entity employs an enrolled member of the tribe.

Therefore, we hold that a tribe only attains regulatory authority based on the

existence of a consensual employment relationship when the relationship exists

between a member of the tribe and a nonmember individual or entity employing

the member within the physical confines of the reservation.

Applying the foregoing principles to this case, the only Defendant arguably

falling within the consensual relationship exception is SJHSD itself. SJHSD

entered into contractual employment relationships w ith M r. Riggs and M r.

- 30 -
Dickson, and they were employed at the Clinic within the exterior boundaries of

the Navajo reservation. M r. Riggs and M r. Dickson did not enter into a

contractual employment relationship with any other Defendant. W hile some of

the Defendants admittedly played a tangential role in SJHSD ’s employment

relationships with the two, none of the Defendants, other than SJHSD , entered

into the type of consensual relationship with M r. Riggs or M r. Dickson sufficient

to fall within the exception. In other words, it is self-evident that none of them

entered into “commercial dealing, contracts, [or] leases” with either M r. Riggs or

M r. Dickson. And being one’s coworker or superior standing alone cannot

possibly constitute the type of “other arrangements” the Supreme Court had in

mind in M ontana. If those relationships w ere sufficient, “the exception would

swallow the rule.” Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655.

Apart from finding that SJH SD fell within the consensual relationship

exception, the district court also held that Reid W ood was subject to the

regulatory authority of the N avajo N ation at least insofar as M r. Riggs’s

defamation claim was concerned. 8 See M acArthur II, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.

The district court came to this conclusion because M r. W ood “was a central

character in the events . . . that form the factual basis for plaintiffs[’] . . .

8
Both SJHSD and M r. W ood have cross-appealed the district court’s
judgment holding that the Navajo Nation possessed regulatory authority over each
of them.

- 31 -
employment-related claims,” and because the Navajo district court did not clearly

err in finding that M r. W ood’s characterization of M r. Riggs’s time card errors as

fraudulent may make out an actionable defamation claim. See id. The primary

fault with the district court’s holding lies in the lack of a “central character”

exception to the general presumption against the exercise of tribal regulatory

authority over nonmembers. M oreover, hanging regulatory authority on the fact

that M r. W ood’s statements may constitute actionable defamation places the cart

before the horse. That a cause of action may successfully be asserted against M r.

W ood says nothing about the Tribe’s ability to regulate M r. Wood’s activities in

the first place. W ithout civil jurisdiction the cause of action is null and void,

regardless of whether it might result in a successful judgment if there was

jurisdiction. Properly applying M ontana, it is clear that M r. W ood did not enter

into the type of consensual relationship required for the Navajo Nation to obtain

regulatory authority over him— only SJHSD , as the employer of M r. Riggs and

M r. Dickson, arguably did.

Although at first blush it appears that SJHSD ’s consensual employment

relationships with M r. Riggs and M r. Dickson fall within M ontana’s consensual

relationship exception, this case is unique in that the consensual relationship at

issue involves a political subdivision of the State of Utah, and it was entered into

pursuant to an exercise of the police power on non-Indian land. Relying upon

- 32 -
Hicks, SJHSD contends its status as a state entity removes it from M ontana’s first

exception. In Hicks, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated in a footnote

that, “Read in context, an ‘other arrangement’ is clearly another private

consensual relationship, from which the official actions in this case are far

removed.” 533 U.S. at 359 n.3. SJHSD seizes upon this statement and argues

that an employment relationship between a member of a tribe and a governmental

entity on non-Indian land (even within the exterior boundaries of the reservation)

cannot meet M ontana’s first exception, even if a similar private employment

relationship would.

SJH SD’s argument finds strong support in Hicks. In her concurrence in

that case, Justice O’Connor read the majority opinion as disavowing civil

jurisdiction based on non-private consensual relationships. She further expressed

reservation that the Court’s disavowment created a per se rule that consensual

relationships entered into between state governments and tribes, “such as

contracts for services or shared authority over public resources,” could no longer

give rise to tribal civil jurisdiction. See id. at 393-94 (O ’Connor, J., concurring).

Justice Scalia responded in kind with the following:

The [M ontana] Court . . . obviously did not have in mind States or state
officers acting in their governmental capacity; it was referring to private
individuals who voluntarily submitted themselves to tribal regulatory
jurisdiction by the arrangements that they (or their employers) entered
into. This is confirmed by the fact that all four of the cases in the
immediately following citation involved private commercial actors. See

- 33 -
 Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S., at 152 (nonmember purchasers of
cigarettes from tribal outlet); W illiams v. Lee, 358 U.S., at 217 (general
store on the Navajo reservation); M orris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384
(1904) (ranchers grazing livestock and horses on Indian lands “under
contracts with individual members of said tribes”); Buster v. W right, 135
F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905) (challenge to the “permit tax” charged by a
tribe to nonmembers for “the privilege . . . of trading within the
borders”).

Id. at 372.

Justice Scalia is not the only one to have observed that the cases relied

upon in support of M ontana’s consensual relationship exception dealt exclusively

with private conduct. Three years prior to Hicks, the Ninth Circuit observed that

all of the cases cited to support M ontana’s first exception “involve either direct

regulation by a tribe of non-Indian activity on the reservation or lawsuits between

a private party and the tribe or tribal members arising from an on-reservation

transaction or agreement.” County of Lew is v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc). As a result of that observation, the en banc court held that an

agreement between the State of Idaho and the Nez Perce Tribe did not qualify as a

consensual relationship of the type giving rise to tribal regulatory authority. See

id.

W e too adhere to the distinction between private individuals or entities who

voluntarily submit themselves to tribal jurisdiction and “States or state officers

acting in their governmental capacity.” The power to exercise regulatory

authority over another independent sovereign on that sovereign’s land, even

- 34 -
where a consensual relationship is involved, closely resembles the “freedom

independently to determine their external relations,” which the tribes necessarily

relinquished as a result of their dependent status. See W heeler, 435 U.S. at 326.

Thus, we hold, in the absence of congressional delegation, the tribes may not

regulate a State qua State on non-Indian land 9 (even within the exterior

boundaries of the reservation) based only on a consensual relationship between

members of the tribe and the State. 1 0

In the instant case, the employment relationships at issue involved two

members of the Navajo Nation and SJHSD , a political subdivision of the State of

Utah. SJHSD is strictly a creature of Utah law, see Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-

1304 (1999), and nearly all of its board members were state employees. The

employment relationships at issue w ere entered into exclusively in SJHSD’s

governmental capacity, and those relationships w ere part and parcel of SJHSD’s

duty to provide medical services to residents of San Juan County. See Pueblo

9
W hen we use the term “non-Indian land,” we use it in the sense that the
Supreme Court does: The land involved is non-Indian fee land or akin to non-
Indian fee land in that the tribe may not “assert a landowner’s right to occupy and
exclude” others from the land. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456.
10
As a result of our limited holding, we need not decide whether
M ontana’s first exception encompasses consensual agreements between tribal
members and governmental entities acting in a proprietary, rather than a
governmental, capacity. W e also express no opinion regarding the ability of the
tribes to exercise regulatory authority over States qua States when the regulated
activity occurs on Indian land.

- 35 -
Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 810 (10th Cir. 1982) (“In its

‘governmental capacity’ a municipality acts as an arm of the state for the public

good on behalf of the state rather than itself.”). The provision of medical services

is unquestionably an exercise of the police power. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.

703, 715 (2000) (“It is a traditional exercise of the States’ police powers to

protect the health and safety of their citizens.”) (internal quotations omitted); see

also M etro. Life Ins. Co. v. M assachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (explaining

that a mandated-benefit law was a “valid and unexceptional exercise of the . . .

police power” where “[i]t was designed in part to ensure that . . . less wealthy

[M assachusetts] residents . . . would be provided adequate mental-health

treatment should they require it”). Accordingly, the employment relationships

between SJHSD and M r. Riggs and M r. Dickson were not “private consensual

relationships” in any sense of the term and do not fall within the first M ontana

exception.

b. The Right to Self-Government Exception

This brings us to M ontana’s second exception. Again, the exception

requires that “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [the] reservation . . .

has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the

health or w elfare of the tribe.” M ontana, 450 U.S. at 566. W hen view ed in

isolation, the exception appears broad in scope. The Supreme Court has

- 36 -
cautioned, however, that:

Read in isolation, the M ontana rule’s second exception can be
misperceived. Key to its proper application, however, is the Court’s
preface: “Indian tribes retain their inherent power [to punish tribal
offenders,] to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic
relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for
members. . . . But [a tribe’s inherent power does not reach] beyond what
is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations.” 450 U.S., at 564. Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory
authority over the state highway accident at issue is needed to preserve
“the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.” W illiams, 358 U.S., at 220. The M ontana rule, therefore, and not
its exceptions, applies to this case.

Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (alterations in original). In framing the second exception,

the Court also later added: “Tribal assertion of regulatory authority over

nonm em bers must be connected to th[e] right of the Indians to make their own

laws and be governed by them.” Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361.

The proper question in this case, then, is whether regulatory authority over

Defendants’ activities, with the exception of those of M r. Atcitty, is needed to

preserve the Navajo Nation’s right to make their own laws and be governed by

them. In regard to the County defendants, the district court accurately noted that

the Navajo district court “did not find facts showing conduct on the part of any

County defendant that threatened or had some direct effect on the political

integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the Navajo Nation.”

M acArthur II, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. The Navajo district court did not find

(and neither do we) that the County defendants— including San Juan County, the

- 37 -
San Juan County Commissioners, County Attorney Halls, and County

Administrator Bailey— had any role in the complained of activities, other than

that they exercised some control over, and provided advice to, SJHSD.

Additionally, M r. Bailey had some role in Plaintiffs’ grievance process— he sent

grievance decision letters and served as the grievance hearing officer. All of

these actions, however, relate exclusively to the governance of SJHSD ; they in no

way impact the Navajo Nation’s ability to make its own laws and be governed by

them.

SJHSD ’s activities also do not affect the Navajo Nation’s right to self-

government. Despite Plaintiffs’ attempts to make more of it, this case essentially

boils down to an employment dispute between SJHSD and three of its former

employees, two of whom happen to be enrolled members of the Navajo Nation.

W hile the Navajo Nation undoubtedly has an interest in regulating employment

relationships between its members and non-Indian employers on the reservation,

that interest is not so substantial in this case as to affect the Nation’s right to

make its own laws and be governed by them. This is particularly evident here,

when only two members of the Nation were involved and the employment

relationships at issue were carried out on non-Indian land. The right at issue in

this case is the Navajo Nation’s claimed right to make its own laws and have

others be governed by them, not the right to self-government.

- 38 -
 W e are therefore left with M s. Lauren Schafer (SJHSD Personnel Director

of Nursing), members of SJH SD’s board, and M r. W ood. Plaintiffs’ only

complaint about M s. Schafer is that she failed to do enough to help them in their

conflict with SJHSD and M r. W ood. M oreover, in its orders, the Navajo district

court stated only that M s. Schafer wrote a letter critical of M s. Singer and that she

testified she had discovered only one piece of evidence as to M s. Singer’s intent

to commit time card fraud. Failing to help others may violate the “golden rule,”

but it in no way constitutes an affront to the Navajo Nation’s self-governance; and

M s. Schafer’s actions vis-à-vis M s. Singer are irrelevant due to M s. Singer’s lack

of membership in the tribe. Next, because the Navajo district court’s orders make

no mention of the individual members of SJHSD ’s board and Plaintiffs make no

attempt to explain how their activities pose a threat to the tribe’s right to make its

own law s, it follows that the individual members of the board fall squarely within

M ontana’s general rule. Finally, as previously detailed, the federal district court

held that the Navajo Nation possessed authority over M r. W ood’s alleged

defaming of M r. Riggs. To be sure, that alleged defamation may have had a

negative impact on M r. R iggs individually, but based on the record before us w e

fail to see how it, or any other of M r. W ood’s actions, negatively affected the

tribe as a whole or its ability to self-govern.

In sum, with the arguable exception of M r. Atcitty, the Navajo Nation did

- 39 -
not possess regulatory authority over any of D efendants’ activities. Because there

exists no adjudicatory authority in the absence of regulatory authority, Strate, 520

U.S. at 453 (“As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does

not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”), the N avajo district court did not possess

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims unrelated to the activities of M r. Atcitty.

D. Discretionary Enforcement W ith Respect to M r. Atcitty

Although the Navajo district court arguably possessed regulatory authority

over M r. Atcitty as a member of the Navajo Nation, as previously emphasized, the

decision whether to enforce the tribal court orders in regard to M r. Atcitty lies

entirely w ithin our discretion. Under the limited circumstances of this case, we

choose not to enforce the tribal court orders in this respect. 1 1 Several

considerations guide our decision.

First, as the district court observed, Utah N avajo H ealth Systems’s

assumption of control over the operations of the Clinic and Plaintiffs’

employment there mooted much, though not all, of the relief afforded in the

preliminary injunction orders. Also, while we are not required to refrain from

enforcing interlocutory foreign judgments, see Remington Rand Corp. v. Bus.

11
As a result of our refusal to enforce the Navajo district court’s orders on
other grounds, the portion of M r. Atcitty’s cross-appeal arguing that the Navajo
N ation did not possess regulatory authority over him is moot. Nonetheless, we
vacate that portion of the federal district court’s decision issuing a declaratory
judgment that the Navajo district court possessed jurisdiction over M r. A tcitty.

- 40 -
Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[J]udicial acts need not always be

final judgments to be granted comity.”) (citing In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d

463, 469 (10th Cir. 1976)); Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 92 and cmt.

c, § 98 (1971), the amorphous and incomplete nature of the orders at issue renders

them nearly incapable of enforcement. M uch of the relief that is not now moot

has not been reduced to a sum certain; consequently, determining what portions of

the orders are amenable to enforcement would be impracticable.

Third, despite the fact that M r. Atcitty’s status as an enrolled member of

the Navajo Nation arguably imbued the Navajo district court with civil

jurisdiction, the activities for which he was sued have little or nothing to do with

his status as an enrolled member of the tribe. Normally the lack of a nexus

between tribal membership and the claims at issue will not necessarily pose an

impediment to enforcement, but here the lawsuit against M r. Atcitty stems

completely from his status as a government employee of the State of U tah. Thus,

the same considerations which lead us to conclude that the tribes do not possess

jurisdiction over States qua States on state land lead us to conclude that

enforcement against M r. Atcitty should be refused. Finally, it appears that M r.

Atcitty played an extremely minor role in the incidents at issue. His role was

confined to membership on SJHSD ’s board, and he is not even mentioned by

name in any of the preliminary injunction orders. Thus, it would be inequitable to

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enforce the Navajo district court’s extremely broad orders against him alone. 1 2

In sum, we REVERSE the federal district court insofar as it issued a

declaratory judgment that the Navajo Nation possessed civil jurisdiction over the

employment-related claims of M r. Riggs and M r. Singer against SJHSD. W e also

REVERSE the district court insofar as it issued a declaratory judgment that the

Navajo Nation possessed civil jurisdiction over M r. Riggs’s defamation claim

against Reid W ood. W e V ACATE the district court’s issuance of a declaratory

judgment that the Navajo Nation possessed civil jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

claims against Roger Atcitty. Finally, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment

refusing to enforce the N avajo district court’s orders.

12
Because w e decide the case on alternative grounds, we need not address
the parties’ arguments regarding Defendants’ sovereign immunity.

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