IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-50479
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUAN ESTRADA, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-97-CR-62-1
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January 25, 1999
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Juan Estrada, Jr., appeals his guilty-plea conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Estrada argues that
the district court erred in denying his motion for suppression of
evidence seized after his automobile was stopped by an officer of
the San Antonio Police Department. He contends that he did not
violate a Texas traffic statute. The district court did not err
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-50479
-2-
in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable because the
police officer had probable cause to believe that Estrada
committed a traffic violation of changing lanes without using a
turn signal. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 545.104 & 545.106
(Vernon 1999); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 277 (5th
Cir. 1998).
Estrada argues that the district court erred in basing its
decision primarily on information obtained from first-time
informants whose reliability and credibility were not properly
established. Estrada is apparently referring to a prior police
report that a man named Juan Estrada, who drove a car matching
the description of the car Estrada was driving when stopped for
the instant traffic violation, had committed an aggravated
kidnapping. As noted above, the district court did not err in
holding that the initial traffic stop was reasonable. The
subsequent arrest and search of Estrada was based on his failure
to obey the police officers’ lawful command to stop the engine of
the automobile and for his subsequent assaultive behavior. The
district court did not base its decision primarily on information
of first-time informants whose reliability had not been
established.
Estrada argues that the inventory search of his automobile
was unconstitutional because it was not conducted pursuant to a
standardized policy of the San Antonio Police Department. The
district court did not err in holding that the evidence presented
at the hearing concerning the motion to suppress, including the
testimony of two police officers and the supervisor of the
No. 98-50479
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property room, indicated that the San Antonio Police Department
has an unwritten policy of opening closed or locked containers
during inventory searches to determine the contents and protect
property and officers’ safety. See United States v. Hope, 102
F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1996).
AFFIRMED.