FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 26, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
W ILLIA M SA M U EL M C LEA N,
JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 07-1094
(D. Colorado)
v. (D.C. No. 04-cv-02440-ZLW -M JW )
DR. STEVEN R. CLOUGH, O.D.,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, T YM KOV IC H, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges,
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G).
W illiam M cLean, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his complaint filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971). M r. M cLean
alleged that Dr. Steven Clough, O.D., during a routine eye examination, acted
with deliberate indifference when he administered a visual field test that caused
M r. M cLean to suffer permanent stroke-like symptoms. The magistrate judge,
after reviewing the opinion of Dr. Clough’s expert witness, recommended that the
district court grant his motion for summary judgment. The district court accepted
this recommendation. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
M r. M cLean has epilepsy, and, according to his complaint, has suffered
seizures that trigger stroke-like symptoms. Before the actions underlying this
complaint, M r. M cLean suffered such a seizure on July 8, 2002.
On M arch 16, 2004, while housed at the United States Penitentiary,
Administrative M aximum (“A DX”), in Florence, Colorado, M r. M cLean saw Dr.
Clough for an eye appointment. M r. M cLean contends that Dr Clough had
reviewed his medical records, which explained his history of epilepsy and stroke-
like symptoms. M r. M cLean also contends that he discussed his medical
condition, including his medications, with Dr. Clough.
As part of the examination, Dr. Clough performed a visual field mapping
test on M r. M cLean. The computerized test, which involves flashes on a
computer screen, measures peripheral vision. M r. M cLean contends that while
-2-
taking the test on his left eye, he recalls saying, “I can’t do this” and laying his
head in his lap and hands. R ec. vol. I, doc. 3, at 4-D.
M r. M cLean next recalls waking up from a seizure and being treated by
ADX’s clinical director Dr. Lawrence L. Leyba. M r. M cLean contends that the
seizures resulted in stroke-like symptoms to his left side, including the
requirement of a left leg brace, weakness in his left arm, decreased control over
his bowel and bladder, impotence, and pain and numbness in his left hip. After
exhausting his administrative remedies as to his claims against Dr. Clough, M r.
M cLean filed a complaint seeking $1,000,000 in damages. Before us, M r.
M cLean maintains he has also suffered brain damage and is mentally deficient as
a result of the seizure.
The district court denied Dr. Clough’s motion to dismiss, appointed
counsel, and the parties proceeded through discovery. M r. M cLean became
dissatisfied with his appointed counsel, and the court granted counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
The magistrate judge determined that the Eighth Amendment claim was
“sufficiently sophisticated such that expert testimony is required.” Rec. vol. II,
doc. 150, at 12. Thomas A. Politzer, O.D., Dr. Clough’s expert witness, opined
that “[v]isual field testing is generally regarded as safe” and that “there is no
evidence, or history of automated visual field testing causing a seizure reported in
the literature.” Id. vol. I, doc. 115, ex. B. Dr. Politzer concluded that “D r.
-3-
Clough . . . provided appropriate medically indicated care, and he met [the]
standard of care.” Id.
Dr. Leyba also testified that he recommended visual field testing as part of
a thorough ophthalmologic examination to help determine whether there was an
embolic phenomena or vascular problem that might contribute to M r. M cLean’s
seizures. Id. doc. 124, ex. A at 6. M r. M cLean did not put forth any experts.
The magistrate judge recommended granting Dr. Clough’s motion for summary
judgment. After giving M r. M cLean extra time to file objections to the report and
recommendation, the district court reviewed the objections, and adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation. M r. M cLean timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
W e review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standards as the district court. Hackworth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
468 F.3d 722, 725 (10th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only
where there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c).
The Eighth Amendment creates an obligation on the part of prison officials
to provide adequate health care to inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976). This does not mean, however, that a mere complaint that a physician has
been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition states a valid claim
of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 105-06. “[A]
-4-
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106.
The test for constitutional liability of prison officials “‘involves both an
objective and a subjective component.’” M ata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)).
To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff must show that the “medical need
is sufficiently serious,” M ata, 427 F.3d at 751, “and that the D efendant[’s]
[inadequate care or] delay in meeting that need caused him substantial harm[.]”
Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (10th Cir.2001) (quotations and
footnote omitted). A medical need is sufficiently serious “if it is one that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Hunt v. U phoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting Ramos
v. Lam m, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (further quotation omitted)). “The
substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent
loss, or considerable pain.” M ata, 427 F.3d at 751 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test requires the
plaintiff to present evidence of the prison official’s culpable state of
mind. The subjective component is satisfied if the official “knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inm ate health or safety; the official
m ust both be aware of facts from which the inference could be draw n
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [s]he must also draw
the inference.
-5-
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
W e affirm the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Clough for substantially
the same reasons as set forth in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. Recognizing that M r. M cLean has suffered substantial harm,
the likelihood for that harm to result from the administration of the visual field
test was not obvious and there is no evidence that Dr. Clough was deliberately
indifferent. As the magistrate judge noted:
The doctor reviewed the complaints plaintiff presented to Dr.
Clough, the exam notes, and plaintiff’s history. In addition, he stated
the factors which are appropriate criteria for conducting the test and
opined that the testing is generally regarded as safe and that there are
no contra-indications with the possible exception of patients with a
known history [of] reflex photo-sensitive seizure during automated
visual field testing, which plaintiff did not possess. Furthermore, he
stated that there is “no evidence, or history of automated visual field
testing causing a seizure reported in the literature.” In fact, he reported
that visual field testing is protocol prior to starting certain new
generation anti-seizure medications and is done at regular, frequent
intervals during their use. Finally, he noted that during the examination
by Dr. Clough, plaintiff presented with a history of head injury, stroke,
and migraine, and the exam was noteworthy for narrow angles. Dr.
Politzer opined that “[a]ny one of these significant issues alone would
mandate visual field testing.”
Rec. vol. II, doc. 150, at 12-13.
Thus, even construing M r. M cLean’s pleadings liberally as we must, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and view ing the well-pleaded facts
in his favor, he cannot establish that Dr. Clough was deliberately indifferent to
his medical needs w hen he administered the field vision test.
-6-
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Dr. Clough. M r. M cLean is reminded to continue making partial
payments of his appellate filing fee until the entire balance is paid.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
United States Circuit Judge
-7-