Jones v. Salt Lake County

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

September 28, 2007
PU BL ISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

PA UL B. JONES, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 04-4185

v.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic
and corporate of the State of Utah;
AARON KENNARD, Salt Lake
C ounty Sheriff; PA U L
CUNNINGHAM , Captain, Salt Lake
C ounty M etro Jail; JO H N ME RRICK,
Lieutenant, Salt Lake County M etro
Jail,

Defendants - Appellees.

_______________________________

PRISONER’S LEGAL NEW S, a
nonprofit W ashington corporation,
No. 04-4186
Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PETE HAUN, Executive D irector,
Utah D epartment of Corrections;
FRED H. VANDERVEUR, Director,
Institutional Operations, Division of
Institutional Operations, Utah
Department of Corrections; KERRY
 GALETKA; BRYANT HERM AN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D .C . N os. 2:96-CV-637-PGC & 2:98-CV-287-PGC)

Brian M . Barnhard (James L. Harris, Jr. with him on the briefs), Utah Legal
Clinic, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Nicholas M . D’Alesandro, Deputy District Attorney (David E. Yocom, District
Attorney for Salt Lake County, and John P. Soltis, Deputy District Attorney, with
him on the brief) Office of the District Attorney for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for Defendants -Appellees Salt Lake County, Kennard, Cunningham
and M errick.

Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General (M ark L. Shurtleff, Attorney
General, and Alain C. Balmanno, Assistant Attorney General, with him on the
brief) Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Defendants - Appellees Haun, Vanderveur, Galetka and Herman.

Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, M cW ILL IAM S and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.

The district court considered complaints from eleven inmate plaintiffs,

including Paul B . Jones, and one corporate plaintiff, Prisoner’s Legal News

(PLN). The eleven inmate plaintiffs w ere all incarcerated at either the Utah State

Prison, the Salt Lake County Jail or the San Juan County Jail. The inmates and

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PLN filed several lawsuits against these facilities’ officers challenging the

constitutionality of their mail regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The cases

were referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. 1 The district court adopted that recommendation. Three appeals

followed: Appeal Nos. 04-4185 (Jones v. Salt Lake County, et al.), 04-4186

(Prisoner’s Legal News v. Haun, et al.) and 04-4187 (Prisoner’s Legal News v.

Christensen, et al.). The appeals were consolidated. In December 2004, Appeal

No. 04-4187 was dismissed by stipulation. Therefore, only Appeal Nos. 04-4185

and 04-4186 remain.

Because Appeal No. 04-4185 addresses the mail regulations at the Salt

Lake County Jail (County Jail) and Appeal No. 04-4186 addresses the mail

regulations at the Utah State Prison (State Prison), we discuss each appeal

separately. However, before turning to the merits, we address whether it was

proper to dismiss the parties’ complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A, an issue common to both appeals.

I. 28 U .S.C . § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A

The first lawsuit filed in the district court, Farnsworth v. Salt Lake M etro

Jail, was initiated on January 21, 1994. Jones filed his case challenging the

1
The magistrate did conclude the Salt Lake County Jail’s former ban on
new spapers was unconstitutional. This issue is not before us.

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County Jail’s regulations on August 30, 1996. PLN, along with inmate W alter

Thomas, filed their lawsuit challenging the State Prison’s bulk-rate mail policies

on April 23, 1998. The Jones and PLN-Thomas complaints, along with a number

of other related prisoner complaints, were consolidated with Farnsworth. On

October 14, 2003, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation.

Therein, the magistrate listed seventeen pending motions filed by the various

parties. He then stated:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)[] and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this
Court may dismiss a complaint filed if satisfied that the action fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Pursuant to these
motions and the Court’s screening ability, every motion in every case
of this action is before the Court.

(A ppellant’s A pp. Vol. 1 at 41 (citations omitted).) In recommending dismissal,

the magistrate again cited 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. On M arch 29,

2004, the district court adopted (w ith one clarification) the magistrate’s

recommendation “in all respects.” (Id. at 81.)

Jones and PLN argue the district court improperly dismissed their

complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. They claim

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) only applies to in forma pauperis actions and they paid the filing

fees. 2 As to § 1915A, PLN argues it applies only to prisoner complaints and

2
Section 1915 is entitled “Proceedings in forma pauperis” and allow s a
court to authorize the commencement of any suit or appeal without prepayment of
the filing fees if the person is unable to pay such fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Subsection (e)(2)(B) provides:

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therefore its complaint could not be dismissed under § 1915A. 3 W hile Jones

concedes his complaint is a prisoner complaint, he contends § 1915A requires

screening of complaints “before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as

practicable after docketing.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Because his complaint was

not screened until 2003, seven years after its filing, he argues its dismissal was

not authorized under § 1915A and was contrary to the statute’s intent, i.e., to

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have
been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that– . . .

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
3
Section 1915A provides in relevant part:

(a) Screening.--The court shall review , before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint
in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

(b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint--

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

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weed out meritless inmate complaints before or immediately after filing. 4

W hile Jones and PLN’s arguments may have merit, we need not resolve

them here because Jones and PLN failed to object to the magistrate’s report and

recommendation on those grounds. W e have adopted a “firm waiver rule”

whereby the failure to timely object to a “magistrate’s findings or

recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.”

M oore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). “This rule does not

apply, however, when (1) a pro se litigant has not been informed of the time

period for objecting and the consequences of failing to object, or when (2) the

interests of justice require review.” M orales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116,

1119 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Neither exception to the firm waiver

rule applies here. First, Jones and PLN did not proceed pro se; they were

represented by counsel. 5 Second, the interests of justice do not require

suspension of the rule. W hile the district court may have inappropriately

dism issed Jones’ and PLN ’s complaints pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A ,

we can simply construe the district court’s actions as a sua sponte grant of

summary judgment to the defendants because it appears both the magistrate and

4
Jones asserts his complaint was not screened until 2004. However, the
magistrate screened his complaint in 2003; its dismissal occurred in 2004.
5
The magistrate only advised the parties they had ten days in which to file
objections to the report and recommendation; he failed to inform them of the
consequences of a failure to object. Therefore, had the parties been pro se, the
firm waiver rule would not have applied.

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district court considered and relied on evidence outside the pleadings. See F ED .

R. C IV . P. 12(b). Although not favored, “a sua sponte order of summary

judgment may be appropriate if the losing party was on notice that [they] had to

come forward with all of [their] evidence. If a losing party was not prejudiced by

the lack of notice, we w ill not reverse simply because the grant of summary

judgment came sua sponte.” Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (10th Cir.

2005) (citation and quotations omitted). There is no indication of prejudice here.

Prior to the district court’s dismissal, Jones had filed a motion for partial

summary judgment on the issue of liability and his request for injunctive relief

and PLN had responded to the Haun Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Additionally, Jones and PLN conceded at oral argument that summary judgment

was the appropriate standard.

W e now turn to the merits of each appeal. W e review de novo a grant of

summary judgment. Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1182 (10th Cir.

1995). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c).

These appeals require us to determine the constitutionality of certain mail

regulations at the County Jail and State Prison. To determine whether the

challenged regulations are valid, we apply the standard set forth in Turner v.

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Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)

(holding Turner analysis applies to prison regulations affecting the sending of a

publication to an inmate, i.e., incoming publications). Under Turner, “when a

prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is

valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at

89. In making this determination, we are guided by four factors. Id. at 89-90.

“First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison

regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” Id.

at 89 (quotations omitted). The logical connection between the regulation and its

asserted goal(s) cannot be so remote as to render the regulation arbitrary or

irrational. Id. at 89-90. The legitimate governmental objective must also be

neutral. Id. at 90. A regulation restricting an inmate’s First A mendment rights

must operate without regard to the content of the expression. Id. W here a

regulation furthers an important or substantial government interest unrelated to

the suppression of expression, the neutrality requirement is met. Thornburgh, 490

U.S. at 415. In other words, where prison officials “draw distinctions between

publications solely on the basis of their potential implications for prison security,

the regulations are ‘neutral’ . . . .” Id. at 415-16.

Second, we ask “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right

that remain open to prison inmates.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “[T]he right in

question must be viewed sensibly and expansively.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417

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(quotations omitted). “W here other avenues remain available for the exercise of

the asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious of the measure of

judicial deference owed to corrections officials in gauging the validity of the

regulation.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (citation and quotations omitted). The

“alternatives need not be ideal[;] they need only be available.” Wardell v.

Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 961 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). Even if the

alternative is not the “best method from the inmate’s point of view, . . . the

second Turner factor does not undercut the challenged restriction.” Id. at 961-62

(quotations omitted).

Third, we examine the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional

right w ould have on guards, other inmates, and prison resources. Turner, 482

U.S. at 90.

In the necessarily closed environment of the correctional institution,
few changes will have no ramifications on the liberty of others or on
the use of the prison’s limited resources for preserving institutional
order. W hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a
significant ripple effect on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts
should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of
corrections officials.

Id. at 90 (quotations omitted); see also Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418 (where the

right in question can only be exercised “at the cost of significantly less liberty

and safety for everyone else, guards and other prisoners alike, the courts should

defer to the informed discretion of corrections officials”) (citation and quotations

omitted).

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 Finally, we determine whether obvious, easy alternatives exist that fully

accommodate inmates’ rights at de m inimis cost to valid penological interests. If

so, the regulation may not be reasonable but an “exaggerated response” to prison

concerns. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418 (quotations omitted); Turner, 482 U.S. at

90. However, “[t]his is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials

do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method

of accomm odating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Turner, 482 U.S. at

90-91. Nevertheless, “if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully

accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de m inimis cost to valid penological

interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy

the reasonable relationship standard.” Id. at 91.

W ith these principles in mind, we address each appeal.

II. Appeal No. 04-4185 (Jones v. Salt Lake County, et al.)

In 1996, Jones w as a federal pre-trial detainee at the Salt Lake County Jail,

having been incarcerated there since December 1994. On August 30, 1996, he

filed suit against Salt Lake County, Aaron Kennard (the County Sheriff), Paul

Cunningham (the County Jail’s captain), and John M errick (the County Jail’s

lieutenant) challenging the jail’s policies regarding inmate access to newspapers,

magazines, catalogs, technical publications, sexually explicit material and

paperback books under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution. The magistrate recommended dismissal of Jones’ complaint.

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Because Jones was no longer an inmate at the jail at the time of the report and

recommendation, the magistrate concluded his claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief were moot. He also determined (relevant to Jones’ appeal): (1)

the jail’s ban on sexually explicit material is not unconstitutional because it is

rationally related to the goals of prison security and inmate rehabilitation, (2) the

jail’s ban on paperback books is not unconstitutional because it contains an

exception for books sent directly from the publisher and allows inmates to receive

books from the jail library and (3) the jail’s ban on catalogs is not

unconstitutional.

Jones agreed his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot.

However, he objected to the magistrate’s remaining conclusions adopted by the

district court. On appeal, Jones challenges the constitutionality of the County

Jail’s regulations regarding (1) sexually explicit material/technical publications,

(2) paperback books and (3) catalogs. He claims these regulations infringed on

his constitutional rights during his incarceration at the jail and he is entitled to

monetary damages for that infringement. W e address each regulation separately.

A. Sexually Explicit M aterial/Technical Publications

On June 11, 1995, Jones filed a grievance stating he wished to subscribe to

several magazines. He requested jail personnel to indicate w hich m agazines were

not allowed and to provide him the jail’s policy concerning incoming

publications. On June 13, 1995, Lieutenant M errick responded to Jones’ request,

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granting it as to N ational Geographic, Newsweek, U.S. News, Reader’s Digest

and New Era but denying it as to Playboy, Easyrider, In the W ind, Tattoo,

Penthouse, Soldier of Fortune, Guns-n-Ammo, Combat Auto and M other Earth

News. It also referred Jones to the jail’s policy regarding publications and

attached that policy. On June 20, 1995, Jones requested a more detailed

explanation of the jail’s guidelines on inflammatory, technical and sexually

explicit materials. The next day, Lieutenant M errick responded, “W hile I

appreciate your input you have received the policy you requested.” (R.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 235.)

The jail’s policy in effect at the time of Jones’ request was Special Order

No. 94-14. Sometime between June 1994 and June 1995, Special Order 94-14

was incorporated into the Salt Lake County M etro Jail Policy & Procedure

M anual. This manual states in relevant part:

(10) Publications

(a) Prisoners will be allowed reading materials subject to restrictions
consistent with Jail security concerns.

(b) M agazines and/or newspapers will only be accepted when mailed
directly from the publisher.

(c) Publications permitted

(I) M agazines meeting policy guidelines.

(ii) Newspapers.

(d) Publications not permitted

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 (I) Calendars, free samples, sweepstake type application forms,
and/or any other junk mail will be refused or discarded.

(ii) Catalogs, technical publications, and/or any sort of
sexually explicit material.

(R . Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 202.)

Lieutenant M errick testified the policy manual did not define “consistent

with Jail security concerns,” “catalogs,” “technical publications” or “sexually

explicit material.” Although there were no written definitions, he stated “sexually

explicit material” meant pictures of “breasts and genitals” and “technical

publications” meant reading material containing “information on weapons,

escapes, how to make alcohol, how to hide contraband, [and] how to move

contraband.” 6 (R. Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 205, 220, 227.)

Jones argues the County Jail’s ban on sexually explicit material and

technical publications is unconstitutional based on its use of vague and general

terms. Specifically, he contends the policy does not define “technical

publications,” “sexually explicit material” or “consistent with Jail security

concerns.” He also argues it does not provide any criteria for jail officials to use

when applying this policy. He claims such vague and unwritten rules grant prison

officials unbridled discretion to refuse certain reading materials based on their

6
David Hanson, the County Jail’s mail clerk, also defined “sexually
explicit m aterial” as photographic representations of breasts and genitals. He
defined technical publications as those oriented toward violence but admitted his
understanding of technical publications may “need some upgrading.” (R.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 229.)

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own interpretation of these terms. He alleges this constitutes prior restraint and

runs the risk of unconstitutional censorship. In support of this argument, Jones

cites City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), and

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).

Jones’ reliance on City of Lakewood and Cornelius is misplaced. These

cases have no application to the prison setting. As stated above, Turner sets forth

the law for determining the constitutionality of a prison regulation and the County

Jail’s policy banning receipt of “sexually explicit material” and “technical

publications” satisfies Turner. 7

The jail’s ban on inmate access to “sexually explicit material” and

“technical publications” is expressly aimed at advancing jail security and the ban

on “sexually explicit material” also protects the safety of jail personnel and other

inmates. 8 Prison security and safety are legitimate governmental objectives. See

7
The Second Circuit does not apply Turner to jail regulations, limiting it to
prison regulations. See Iqbal v. H asty, 490 F.3d 143, 170-72 (2d Cir. 2007);
Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2001). W e, as well as other circuits,
have not made such distinction and have routinely applied Turner to jail
regulations. See, e.g., M auro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1999);
Barney v Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1313 n.17 (10th Cir. 1998); Bedford v. Sharp,
120 F.3d 270, No. 96-6230, 1997 W L 413166, at *1-2 (10th Cir. July 23, 1997)
(unpublished); Siddiqi v. Leak, 880 F.2d 904, 908-10 (7th Cir. 1989). The parties
have not argued otherwise.
8
Lieutenant M errick testified: “W e have a fair amount of sexual assaults
that occur in jail already, and sexually explicit material may inflame a prisoner,
excite a prisoner, perhaps assault another prisoner, force him to perform a sex
act.” (R. Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 223.)

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Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415 (prison security is a legitimate governmental

purpose “central to all other corrections goals”) (quotations omitted); M auro v.

Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no doubt that protecting

the safety of guards in general is a legitimate interest, and that reducing sexual

harassment in particular . . . is legitimate.”). The ban is rationally related to these

objectives. Further, despite the ban on “sexually explicit material” and “technical

publications,” the jail’s regulations allow a broad range of publications to enter

the facility. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418 (“As the regulations at issue . . . permit

a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read, [the second Turner

factor] is clearly satisfied.”). Indeed, the ban on “sexually explicit material” does

not prohibit sexually explicit prose or pictures of clothed women/men. 9 M auro,

188 F.3d at 1061 (finding second Turner factor met where prison regulation did

not ban sexually explicit letters between inmates and others or sexually explicit

articles or photographs of clothed females). M oreover, to allow inmates to

possess “sexually explicit material” and “technical publications” concerning

9
In his brief, Jones alleges Captain Glad testified the ban on “sexually
explicit material” included written descriptions of sexual acts or conduct. The
record reference for this statement is Jones’ reply to the County Defendants’
response to his objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendation.
B ecause Jones failed to include a transcript of Glad’s testimony in the record, w e
decline to consider it. It appears other potentially relevant and helpful testimony
and trial court documents concerning these appeals could have been, but was not,
included in the parties’ appendices. Because the parties failed to include these
items, we will not consider them in our discussion. See 10 TH C IR . R. 30.1(A)(3)
(“The court need not remedy any failure of counsel to provide an adequate
appendix.”).

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weapons, contraband and escapes w ould have a significant impact on the safety

and security of prison personnel and other inmates. Lastly, Jones points to no

alternative that fully accommodates his rights while at the same time imposing de

minimis cost to valid penological interests. Therefore, the jail’s ban on “sexually

explicit material” and “technical publications” passes constitutional muster.

B. Paperback books

The County Jail prohibits inmates from possessing hardback books and

ordering paperback books from the outside. Jones does not contest the jail’s ban

on hardback books. He does, however, challenge the paperback book policy.

Under that policy, inmates can obtain paperback books through the jail library,

which contains thousands of books. 10 The jail librarian pushes a book-laden cart

through the jail “[a]s often as [she] can.” (R. Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 241.)

An inmate is permitted to select four books from the cart each time the librarian

visits his cell. 11 (An inmate is allowed to possess no more than four books in his

cell at one time.) In addition to obtaining books from the jail library, an

unwritten rule allows inmates to seek permission to order a paperback book from

a publisher. Captain Glad testified such requests would be granted if reasonable,

which turned on the jail’s safety and security needs. Specifically, he stated he

10
Lieutenant M errick testified inmates can obtain books from the jail
library as w ell as the Salt Lake County Library System. However, the jail’s
librarian testified inmates cannot receive books from the County Library System.
11
Jones admitted the jail’s librarian obtained specific books for him.

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approved every request that did not pose a threat to another person.

Starting in April or M ay 1996, inmates could also obtain paperback books

from the local Barnes & Noble bookstore under a “Public Donation Procedure.”

(R . Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 236.) The procedure permits “interested parties . .

. to make monetary gifts and donations of materials to the jail library collections.”

(Id.) It also allows parties to make book donations to a specific prisoner.

Donations to specific prisoners are required to be purchased through the local

Barnes & Noble bookstore and must meet the jail library’s selection guidelines. 12

Once the book is ordered, the jail librarian picks up the book and delivers it to the

inmate. Under this policy, all book donations, whether to the jail library or to a

specific prisoner, “become the immediate property of the jail librar[y].” (Id.)

Jones claims the jail’s paperback book policy is unconstitutional. He

asserts inmates have a constitutional right to purchase books from publishers,

book clubs and bookstores. He asserts the jail’s unwritten and unpublicized rule

“allowing some inmates to purchase some books some times” does not com port

with the First Amendment. (Appellant Jones’ Reply Br. at 16.) He also contends

the jail’s policy that paperback books purchased by and shipped to inmates from

Barnes & Noble become the jail’s property violates due process.

In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court addressed a rule at the M etropolitan

12
In November 1996, the jail’s librarian was in the process of creating
those guidelines.

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Correctional Center (M CC) which permitted inmates to receive hardback books

from outside the institution only if they were mailed directly from the publisher, a

bookstore or a book club, i.e., a “publisher-only rule.” 441 U.S. 520, 549-50

(1979) (quotations omitted). It concluded the publisher-only rule for hardback

books did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 550. Although Turner had not

yet been decided, the Court essentially applied its factors. Id. at 550-51. It stated

the rule was a rational response to an obvious security problem as hardback books

could be used to smuggle contraband into the prison, are hard to search

effectively and allowance of them from any source would impose an

administrative burden on prison staff to carefully inspect each book. Id. at 550-

51. The Court also considered the following factors: (1) the rule operates in a

neutral fashion without regard to the content of the expression; (2) the brief terms

of confinement for most inmates at the facility (which was mainly a pre-trial

detention center); and (3) inmates had alternative means of obtaining reading

material, specifically, (a) hardback books could be received from publishers,

bookstores and book clubs, (b) magazines and paperback books could be obtained

from any source and (c) the facility had a relatively large library for use by

inmates. Id. at 551-52.

W hile Bell’s holding is limited to hardback books, several circuits have

extended it to paperback books and magazines. For example, in Kines v. Day, the

First Circuit addressed a prison rule allowing inmates to receive newspapers and

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hardback and paperback books only from a book club, bookstore or news store but

allowed the superintendent of the prison to permit visitors to bring in paperback

books. 754 F.2d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 1985). Relying on Bell, the court upheld the

rule. Id. at 29-30. W hile recognizing that Bell considered only hardback books,

the court concluded many of the security issues posed by hardback books also

applied to paperback books. Id. at 30. It also determined inmates had alternative

means of obtaining reading material, in particular, the prison had a library with an

inter-library loan procedure and the regulation itself provided an exception for

visitors. Id.; see also Ward v. Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 881 F.2d 325,

328-30 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding publisher-only rule as applied to magazines);

H urd v. W illiam s, 755 F.2d 306, 307-09 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding publisher-only

rule as applied to newspapers, periodicals and paperback books where plaintiff

failed to refute w arden’s affidavit justifying rule); Cotton v. Lockhart, 620 F.2d

670, 671 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding publisher-only rule as applied to hardback

and paperback books, magazines and newspapers); but see Keenan v. Hall, 83

F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996) (suggesting a publisher-only rule as applied to

books, magazines and newspapers may violate the First A mendment); Pratt v.

Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 819-20 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding prisoner’s complaint

challenging prison’s publisher-only rule for paperback and hardback books was

not frivolous).

W e conclude the C ounty Jail’s paperback book policy, which allows

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inmates to obtain paperback books from the jail library and, with permission, the

publisher, is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of prison

security. 13 Allowing inmates to purchase paperback books only from the

publisher prevents contraband from being smuggled into the jail and lessens the

administrative burden on jail personnel who must inspect each book. Inmates

also have alternative means of obtaining reading material because they can obtain

books from the jail library and are permitted to have newspapers and certain

magazines. After April/M ay 1996, inmates could also receive donated books

from the local Barnes & Noble bookstore. The fact these books automatically

become the jail’s property is irrelevant; purchasers are warned the books w ill

automatically become jail property, which is consistent with the fact it is a

13
The fact the jail’s publisher-only paperback book policy was unwritten
and unpublicized is irrelevant to our analysis. W e have found no cases, and Jones
points to none, requiring prison regulations to be written and publicized in order
to meet constitutional requirements. Rather, the constitutionality of a prison
regulation, whether written, unwritten, publicized or unpublicized, is governed by
Turner. Indeed, we and other circuits have applied Turner to unwritten prison
policies and other prison actions. See Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th
Cir. 1990) (“Although Turner addresses prison rules and regulations, we see no
reason why the Turner principle should not apply to other prison actions, such as
the transfer here.”); see also Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 479, 483-86
(5th Cir. 2004) (applying Turner to unwritten prison policy requiring inmates who
wish to obtain an elective medical procedure to obtain a court order); Shimer v.
Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508-10 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Turner to unwritten
policy prohibiting prison employees from writing Prison Review Board directly);
Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting Turner “has
been applied to unwritten prison policies as w ell as prison regulations”); c.f.
Faustin v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 423 F.3d 1192, 1196 n.1 (10th Cir.
2005) (“Our precedent allows [First Amendment] facial challenges to unwritten
policies.”).

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donation policy. 14 The jail’s paperback book policy also satisfies the third and

fourth Turner factors. To allow inmates to possess paperback books from non-

publishers would have a significant impact on jail resources. Lastly, we see no

indication the policy is an “exaggerated response” to the jail’s concerns.

The County Jail’s paperback book policy is constitutional.

C. Catalogs

As stated above, the County Jail bans all catalogs. Lieutenant M errick

testified catalogs are banned for “space, health and safety” reasons. (R.

Appellant’s A pp. Vol. 1 at 220.) Jones argues the jail’s catalog ban is

unconstitutional as it furthers no legitimate penological interest and any such

interest could be accomplished with less restrictive alternatives such as making

select retail catalogs available to inmates or allowing them to request them. He

also claims there should at least be an exception for catalogs offering reading

materials so inmates can order reading materials from the outside.

Relying on Berger v. White, an unpublished case, and without conducting a

Turner analysis, the magistrate concluded a ban on catalogs failed to raise an

issue of constitutional magnitude. 12 Fed. App. 768 (10th Cir. 2001)

(unpublished). The district court adopted this conclusion. In Berger, the plaintiff

14
Because books purchased from Barnes & N oble automatically become
jail property, the inmates do not have a property interest in the books. Therefore,
due process is not implicated and Jones’ due process argument fails. See
Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 1998).

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alleged jail employees violated his First Amendment rights by returning a catalog

to the sender on the ground it w as not pre-approved. W e concluded: “[A]

‘complaint about undelivered catalogues fails to raise an issue of constitutional

magnitude.’” Id. at 771 (quoting Smith v. M aschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir.

1990)); see also Foster v. Nelson, 153 F.3d 727, No. 98-3069, 1998 W L 422030,

at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (rejecting inmates’ claim that prison officials

violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to deliver certain

comm ercial catalogs featuring automotive racing and airplane parts which had

been sent to him in the mail).

At first blush, Berger, Smith and Foster may seem to support the jail’s total

ban on catalogs. However, none of them involved a challenge to a prison

regulation and none applied Turner. Rather, these cases were limited to a prison

official’s one-time failure to deliver catalogs to an inmate. Here, Jones is not

challenging the constitutionality of the County Jail’s failure to deliver mail but

rather the constitutionality of its mail regulations. Thus, these cases do not

control and a Turner analysis is necessary.

It appears Jones has not met his burden under Turner to establish the jail’s

catalog ban is unconstitutional. See Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1200

(10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the burden is not on the state to prove the validity of

a prison regulation, but rather on the prisoner to disprove it). “Space, health and

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safety” 15 are legitimate and neutral penological interests and the catalog ban is

rationally related to those interests— these factors weigh in favor of the

constitutionality of the ban. Jones makes no mention of either the second or third

Turner factors— whether there is an alternative means of exercising his right to

receive printed materials and the impact of accommodating the right on guards,

other inmates, and jail resources. Regarding the fourth Turner factor, Jones does

mention a few alternatives to a total ban, but nowhere does he provide evidence

that these alternatives come with only de m inimus costs to the interests of jail

administrators and guards. For example, Jones mentions that one alternative

would be to permit an inmate to possess only one catalog at a time and a

screening process could be used to enforce the rule. But Jones fails to argue— let

alone provide evidence— that such a screening process would not unduly burden

jail resources. Similarly, Jones suggests the jail could allow inmates to seek

permission to obtain a catalog. Again, however, this w ould require officials to

consider such requests on a case-by-case basis and Jones does not offer any

evidence or argument that such a process might be implemented with only de

minimus costs. 16 These observations aside, the district court did not conduct a

15
Lieutenant M errick did not elaborate on the meaning of “space, health
and safety.” It appears Captain Cunningham submitted an affidavit expounding
on the jail’s justifications for the catalog ban. However, this affidavit was not
included in the appellate record and we decline to consider it.
16
Our case law is not to the contrary. In Allen v. Deland, for example, w e
upheld a prison regulation that prohibited prisoners from receiving mail-order

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Turner analysis and it should be afforded that opportunity in the first instance.

Therefore, we remand to the district court to evaluate the jail’s catalog ban under

Turner.

III. Appeal No. 04-4186 (Prisoner’s Legal News v. H aun, et al.)

PLN is a non-profit W ashington corporation which publishes and

distributes Prison Legal News, a monthly magazine containing news articles

regarding inmate litigation, including litigation trends and recent court decisions.

As a non-profit organization, PLN has been granted I.R.S. § 501(c)(3) status by

the Internal Revenue Service. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c). Based on that status, the

United States Postal Service has authorized PLN to send its magazines using the

Non-Profit Organization rate, often referred to as bulk-rate.

catalogs. 42 F.3d 1406, No. 94-4067, 1994 W L 593917, at *1-2 (10th Cir. Oct.
26, 1994) (unpublished). In making this determination, we concluded: (1) the
prohibition served a legitimate interest and (2) other alternatives existed that
allowed inmates to receive printed material. Id. But we did not hold that the
prohibition would have been unconstitutional but for the existence of other
alternatives. Similarly, in Dixon v. Kirby, the Southern District of W est V irginia
also concluded that a prohibition on inmates receiving catalogs passed
constitutional muster under Turner. 210 F. Supp. 2d 792, 794, 800-01 (S.D. W .
Va. 2002). In that case, each of the four Turner factors weighed in favor of the
state, with the court noting that the prison provided an alternate method of
receiving catalogs because catalogs were available at the commissary. Id. at 800-
01. Again, however, the court did not conclude that the existence of an
alternative per se validated the regulation, nor did it conclude that the regulation
would have been unconstitutional had prison officials not made catalogs available
at the commissary. It is Jones’s burden to establish the unconstitutionality of the
jail’s catalog ban, and although he has pointed to a few alternatives to the ban, he
has not demonstrated that the alternatives could be easily implemented and he has
not meaningfully addressed the other three Turner factors.

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 In M arch 1996, several issues of Prison Legal News were returned to PLN

from the Utah Department of Corrections (U DOC) marked “Return to

Sender/Contents Not Authorized” and stamped “REFUSED.” (R. Appellant’s

App. Vol. 2 at 623.) PLN wrote to the UDOC concerning the problem. At the

bottom of this letter, it wrote “cc: Jason Cohen #23651.” (Id.) On April 17,

1996, Bryant Herman, the U DOC’s M ail/Property Supervisor, responded to PLN’s

letter. This letter stated in relevant part:

I will address the issues specific to inmate Cohen because I don’t
have other names to research those cases individually. For your
monthly magazine to be refused, it would have to [have] been sent
bulk rate mail. Generally, bulk rate mail is not accepted. If your
magazine was sent bulk rate mail and/or “Address Correction
Requested” to the Draper Facility and the inmate housed was at the
Gunnison Facility (Cohen is housed at the Gunnison Facility), the
magazine would have been returned to the sender. The US Postal
Service will not forw ard Bulk Rate mail . . . .
To avoid any further problems, you may wish to send your magazines
some other way than bulk rate mail.

(Id.)

In early 1998, W alter Thomas, an inmate at the Utah State Prison in

Draper, Utah, received a paid subscription for Prison Legal New s. On February

26, 1998, the M arch 1998 edition of Prison Legal News was mailed to Thomas at

the prison. Thomas never received it and it was never returned to PLN. On

M arch 19, 1998, the April 1998 edition of Prison Legal News w as mailed to

Thomas at the prison. It was returned to PLN stamped: “RETURN TO

SEN D ER,” “B ULK RA TE M A IL NOT ACCEPTED AT UT STATE PRISON”

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and “REFUSED.” (R. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 558.) According to K erry

Galetka, the State Prison’s mail unit supervisor since 1991, the prison’s mailroom

attempted to deliver the April 1998 edition of Prison Legal N ews to Thomas.

However, the mailroom erroneously and inadvertently believed Thomas was

housed in Uintah 5, where inmates are not allow ed to have subscriptions. 17

On April 23, 1998, PLN and Thomas filed suit against Pete Haun

(Executive Director of the UDOC), Fred Vanderveur (Director of Institutional

Operations at the UDOC) and John Does I and II, later named as Herman and

Galetka. They alleged the State Prison’s bulk-rate m ail regulations between July

30, 1987, and M ay 15, 1998, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution. The magistrate recommended dismissal, concluding

the bulk-rate mail regulations were constitutional because they allowed authorized

subscriptions under the publisher-only rule and non-profit mailings. He also

found Thomas’ claims could be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies. PLN and Thomas conceded Thomas’ federal claims could be dismissed

17
Other prisoners with subscriptions to Prison Legal News have also not
received certain issues. Roy Don Juan Droddy and Richard Sw art were to receive
Prison Legal News from November 1997 to April 1998. Droddy only received the
December 1997 and January 1998 editions; Sw art never received the February
1998 edition. Aaron Lee Curtis and Eric Lee Piper did not receive their M ay
1998 editions of Prison Legal News. They were returned to PLN bearing stamps
similar to those appearing on Thomas’ April 1998 edition. According to Galetka,
Curtis and Piper did not receive the M ay 1998 editions because they were no
longer housed at the State Prison and had not been there since 1991 and 1993,
respectively. Because the United States Postal Service and the State Prison do
not forw ard bulk-rate mail, the prison mail room returned the magazines to PLN.

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for failure to exhaust. However, PLN objected to the magistrate’s conclusion that

the bulk-rate mail regulations were constitutional. The district court adopted the

magistrate’s recommendation.

PLN argues the court erroneously found the State Prison’s bulk-rate mail

regulations constitutional. It contends the State Prison informed PLN by letter it

would not deliver editions of Prison Legal News if mailed to inmates by bulk-rate

mail. It also claims the prison rejected editions of Prison Legal News in 1998

simply because they were mailed bulk-rate without considering whether they were

authorized subscriptions. PLN argues the prison’s rejections of specific editions

of Prison Legal News state a cause of action, as well as its claim that the prison

allowed its mail room employees complete and unfettered discretion to reject

bulk-rate mail. PLN also challenges the prison’s policy to not provide notice to

the sender when its bulk-rate mail is refused.

B etw een July 30, 1987, and M ay 15, 1998, the State Prison had two

different bulk-rate mail regulations in effect. 18 From July 30, 1987, to December

16, 1997, the bulk-rate mail regulation provided: “Bulk-rate mail shall be refused

except for authorized subscriptions” and “Bulk-rate mail shall be refused.

18
In the district court, PLN referred to three bulk-rate m ail regulations in
effect between July 30, 1987, and M ay 15, 1998: (1) the regulation in effect from
July 30, 1987, to December 16, 1997, (2) the regulation in effect from December
17, 1997, to February 28, 1998, and (3) the regulation in effect from M arch 1,
1998, to M ay 15, 1998, referred to as Exhibits X, Y and Z, respectively. Because
Exhibits Y and Z are, in all relevant respects, the same, we refer to two
regulations.

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Exceptions shall include, but are not limited to, non-profit as listed in the [United

States Postal Service Domestic M ail M anual] and subscription material as defined

under the publisher-only rule.” 19 (R. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 631-32.) The

regulation did not define “authorized subscriptions” but defined the publisher-

only rule as “a rule limiting books, cassette tapes, magazines, newspapers, etc[.]

to those sent directly from the publisher, a book or tape club or a licensed book

store; . . .” (Id. at 629.) From December 17, 1997, to M ay 15, 1998, the prison’s

bulk-rate mail regulation stated: “Bulk-rate mail may be refused. Exceptions

include, but are not limited to, religious mail, non-profit mail as listed in the

[United States Postal Service Domestic M ail M anual], and subscription material

as defined under the Publishers-Only Rule.” (Id. at 643, 656) The publisher-only

rule remained the same.

PLN has a First Amendment interest in providing its magazine to inmates

who subscribe to it. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408 (“[P]ublishers w ho wish to

comm unicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their point of

view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners.”).

However, PLN’s claim fails because it was defendants’ negligence, as opposed to

the prison’s bulk rate-mail regulations, which caused its injuries. Because Prison

Legal News is a paid subscription and non-profit mail, the prison’s bulk-rate m ail

19
At all relevant times, bulk-rate mail was defined as “a large mass or
volume of mail sent at a set rate of postage (for this policy referring to only 3rd
and 4th class bulk mailings).” (R. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 628, 637, 651.)

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regulations did not apply to it. Galetka testified that because Prison Legal News

is a paid subscription and non-profit mail, the prison normally delivers it to

inmates. The fact certain editions of Prison Legal News w ere not delivered to

Thomas and other inmates was the result of human error or the fact the inmate

was no longer housed at the State Prison. 20 Such negligence does not state a §

1983 claim. Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Liability under

§ 1983 must be predicated upon a deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights

by the defendant, and not on negligence.”) (quotations omitted); Woodward v.

City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The Supreme Court has

made it clear that liability under § 1983 must be predicated upon a deliberate

deprivation of constitutional rights by the defendant. It cannot be predicated

upon negligence.”) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Smith, 899 F.2d at

944 (finding prison official’s opening of inmate’s legal mail by accident did not

give rise to a constitutional violation because it was an isolated incident and there

was no evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with the inmate’s

right to counsel or access to courts).

PLN’s due process claim suffers the same fate. W hile w e recognize both

inmates and publishers have a right to procedural due process w hen publications are

rejected, Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 433 (10th Cir. 2004), Jacklovich

20
W e reject PLN’s claim that the mailroom acted intentionally in failing to
deliver certain editions of Prisoner Legal N ews to Thomas and other inmates.
There is absolutely no evidence supporting this claim.

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involved the prison’s deliberate rejection of publications pursuant to policy. Here,

the prison’s rejections of PLN’s magazines was unintentional based on the

negligence of its mailroom personnel. Therefore, due process is not implicated.

Daniels v. William s, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause [of the

Fourteenth Amendment] is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official

causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”).

IV. Conclusion

W e construe the district court’s dismissal of Jones and PLN’s complaints as a

sua sponte grant of summary judgment to the County Defendants and Haun

Defendants. In Appeal No. 04-4185, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to

the County Defendants concerning the County Jail’s paperback book policy and its

regulations banning inmate access to sexually explicit and technical publications but

REVERSE as to the jail’s catalog ban. W e REM AND to the district court to

evaluate the jail’s catalog ban under Turner. In Appeal No. 04-4186, we AFFIRM

the grant of summary judgment to the Haun Defendants.

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