FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 10, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 06-8148
v. (D.C. No. 05-CR-299-W FD)
(D . W yo.)
JEFFREY KIM RO BERTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey Kim Roberts appeals his sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment
imposed following his guilty plea on charges that he was a felon in possession of
a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). In a brief filed
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Roberts’ counsel moves
for leave to withdraw and raises the sole of issue of whether Roberts’ four prior
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
burglary convictions were properly classified as “violent felon[ies]” under the
A rm ed C areer C riminal A ct (“A CCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Because we
conclude that the district court properly applied ACCA, we AFFIRM Roberts’
sentence, DISM ISS the appeal, and GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that Roberts w as involved in
a methamphetamine distribution ring and that Roberts illegally possessed
firearms, state law enforcement officers executed a search w arrant at Roberts’
trailer home near Rock Springs, W yoming, on September 15, 2005. W hen the
officers arrived with the warrant, they found a resistant Roberts wielding what
appeared to be a three-foot stick with knife blades protruding from it. Roberts
initially refused to drop the homemade weapon, and the officers w ere forced to
set off a flash-bang device so that they could distract and detain him. Once inside
the home, the officers discovered that the confidential informant was at least
partially accurate in his allegations— Roberts was armed with more than a stick.
He also had a .22 caliber Ruger revolver stashed near the front entryway of the
home, less than an arm’s length aw ay from where he stood w hen the officers first
approached him. In addition to the gun, the officers’ search revealed ammunition,
a loaded crossbow, multiple knives, body armor, a gun-cleaning rod, a used gun-
cleaning kit, a small amount of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. W hat the
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officers failed to locate, however, was any meaningful quantity of
methamphetamine.
On November 16, 2005, a federal grand jury issued a two-count indictment
against Roberts, alleging that he unlawfully possessed a firearm and ammunition
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Roberts initially pleaded
not guilty to both counts, but later entered into a written plea agreement with the
government in which he agreed to plead guilty to the firearms charge. In
exchange for that plea, the government agreed to drop the ammunition charge.
Roberts’ Presentence Report (“PSR”) calculated an initial 32-point base
offense level because he was alleged to have possessed the firearm in connection
with another felony offense— the distribution of 453.6 grams of
methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(5), (b)(1), and 2K2.1(c)(1)(A).
After adding two points for Roberts’ four prior burglary convictions and
subtracting three points for his acceptance of responsibility, the PSR calculated a
final adjusted offense level of 31. It also indicated a criminal history category of
VI. Taken together, the offense level and criminal history category provided a
sentencing range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. Because he had
previously been convicted of four burglaries in W yoming, however, the PSR also
classified Roberts as an “armed career criminal” subject to a statutory minimum
sentence of 180 months under A CCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
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Responding to the PSR, Roberts advanced two substantive arguments: (1)
there was no evidence in the record to support a nexus between his possession of
the firearm and his alleged involvement in the distribution of methamphetamine;
and (2) he should not have been classified as an “armed career criminal” under
ACCA because the government had failed to provide any evidence that his prior
burglary convictions constituted violent crimes in accordance with Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575
(1990).
Finding that ACCA applied to Roberts, the district court sentenced Roberts
to the mandatory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment. This timely appeal
followed.
II
If an attorney conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous, counsel may “so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel must submit a brief
to both the appellate court and the client, pointing to anything in the record that
would potentially present an appealable issue. Id. The client may then choose to
“raise any points that he chooses” in response to counsel’s brief. Id. If, upon
complete examination of the record, the court determines that the appeal is in fact
frivolous, it may grant the request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id.
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Acting pursuant to Anders in the present case, counsel provided Roberts
with a copy of the appellate brief, and Roberts has declined the opportunity to file
a pro se brief in response. Counsel’s brief raises only one arguably appealable
issue: Do Roberts’ four prior burglary convictions qualify as “violent felon[ies]”
for purposes of ACCA, such that Roberts is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of 180 months? This issue presents a purely legal question that we
review de novo. United States v. Nevels, 490 F.3d 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2007).
ACCA defines a “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, . . . [including] burglary . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). To determine whether a particular defendant’s state
burglary conviction meets this definition, we apply the categorical approach set
forth by the Supreme Court in Taylor. Under this approach, we must ascertain
whether the elements of the statute under w hich the defendant was convicted are
consistent with the basic elements of “generic burglary,” id. at 599, which is
defined as a burglary committed in either a building or an enclosed space, but not
a burglary committed in a boat or motor vehicle. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15-16. If
the statute at issue criminalizes more than generic burglary, we may look beyond
the statute to the “charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the
defendant assented,” to discern the type of burglary for which the defendant was
convicted. Id. at 16.
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Roberts was convicted under a W yoming statute that provides: “A person
is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building,
occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof,
with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.” W yo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a).
Because this statute allows for a defendant to be convicted of burglary within a
“vehicle,” it criminalizes more than generic burglary. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at
16. W e thus turn to the record before us to determine whether any of the relevant
documents introduced by the government disclose the specific location in which
Roberts comm itted the burglaries at issue.
At the defendant’s sentencing hearing, the government introduced certified
copies of each of Roberts’ four burglary convictions to prove that he had been
convicted of generic burglary. Included within those certified copies were
charging documents that indicate that three of the crimes were committed when
Roberts entered commercial buildings and that one was comm itted when he
entered a residence. Given that Roberts has not provided any evidence to
challenge the accuracy of those documents, we do not hesitate to conclude that his
prior crimes constituted “generic burglaries” within the meaning of Shepard and
Taylor and are thus “violent felonies” under ACCA. W e therefore hold that the
district court appropriately classified Roberts as an “armed career criminal”
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment.
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Because Roberts fails to present us with any meritorious grounds for
appeal, we A FFIR M his sentence, DISM ISS the appeal, and GR ANT counsel’s
m otion to w ithdraw .
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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