FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 12, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JAVIER SA LAZAR, also known as
Javier Zapata,
Petitioner - A ppellant, No. 07-1208
v. D. Colo.
M ILY A RD ; A TTO RN EY G EN ERAL (D.C. No. 07-cv-579-ZLW )
O F TH E STA TE O F C OLO RA DO,
Respondents - Appellees.
OR D ER D EN YING LEAVE TO PROCEED
ON APPEAL IN FORM A PAUPERIS,
D EN Y IN G C ER TIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
A ND DISM ISSIN G A PPLIC ATIO N
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Javier Salazar, a/k/a Javier Salazar Zapata (Salazar), was convicted by a
jury of two counts of distribution of a schedule I controlled substance and one
count of possession of a schedule I controlled substance. He was sentenced to
twenty-four years in prison in a judgment entered on February 14, 2001. The
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the
Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari in September 2003. Salazar then filed
a state post-conviction motion in M ay 2004, which was also denied by the trial
court. The denial was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari in M ay 2006.
Salazar brought this federal habeas petition, appearing pro se, 1 in February
2007. The court required him to show cause why his petition should not be
dismissed as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Salazar responded
with an argument on the merits of his claim, but did not address the timeliness
issue. The district court then dismissed his petition as untimely, denied Salazar’s
application for COA, and denied his motion to proceed ifp finding the “appeal is
not taken in good fath because [Salazar] has not shown the existence of a
reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues
raised on appeal” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). (R. Doc. 15.)
Salazar now applies for a COA and seeks leave from this Court to proceed
ifp on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A ); F ED . R. A PP . P. 22(b)(1). 2 In
response to the timeliness issue, he says: “the one year limitation period for him
to file a federal habeas corpus claim started at the time the Colorado Supreme
Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari on his post conviction motion
35(c), on M ay 08, 2006, and ended on M ay 08, 2007. M r. Salazar filed his claim
on February 22, 2007, well within the time frame.” (Petitioner’s Application &
1
W e liberally construe Salazar’s pro se pleadings. See Ledbetter v. City of
Topeka, Kan., 317 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
2
His original filing was incomplete due to circumstances beyond his
control. W e permitted Salazar to re-file his application for COA, motion for ifp
and brief, which he did on October 4, 2007.
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M otion at 5.) H e is incorrect.
Salazar had one year after his conviction became final to file his federal
habeas petition. Excluded from that year is the time a state post-conviction
proceeding is pending. The district court correctly concluded his direct appeal
became final on December 1, 2003 (a fact he does not dispute). It then computed
the time, saying “M r. Salazar asserts that he filed a Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)
postconviction motion, which was pending in state court from M ay 17, 2004, until
M ay 8, 2006. Nonetheless, from December 2, 2003, until M ay 16, 2004, and from
M ay 9, 2006, until February 21, 2007, a period of more than one year, M r. Salazar
did not have a postconviction or collateral proceeding pending in state court.” (R.
Doc. 6 at 4.) The district court’s conclusions are not reasonably debatable. Slack
v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Salazar was well advised of his erroneous reading of applicable law by the
magistrate judge (in an order requiring him to show cause why his petition ought
not be dismissed as untimely) and the district judge (in the order dismissing his
habeas petition). Nevertheless, and without presenting any authority calling those
rulings into question, he seeks leave to appeal ifp. His motion to proceed ifp on
appeal is DENIED because he has not shown “the existence of a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on
appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991).
W e D EN Y Salazar’s request for a COA and DISM ISS his application.
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Salazar must pay the full amount of the filing fee. Dismissal of an appeal does
not relieve a litigant of his obligation to pay the filing fee in full. Kinnell v.
Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001).
FOR TH E CO UR T:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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