FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 20, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
TODD JAY SCHOENROGGE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 07-3145
v.
(D.C. No. 07-CV-1032-MLB)
(Dist. of Kan.)
KEVIN D. ROONEY,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Todd Jay Schoenrogge, appearing pro se, files this
appeal following the denial of his request for a writ of mandamus from the
District Court for the District of Kansas. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. Reviewing Mr. Schoenrogge’s filings liberally 1, we conclude that the
*
This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. After examining
the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that
oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without
oral argument.
1
Because Mr. Schoenrogge is proceeding pro se, we review his
pleadings and filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(continued...)
district court was correct in its findings, and those findings do not constitute an
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Schoenrogge’s request for a
writ of mandamus and AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Schoenrogge sought a writ of mandamus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361,
to compel Kevin D. Rooney, the Director of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
Executive Office for Immigration Review, to remove several named employees
for alleged violations of federal law committed at a facility that houses federal
prisoners. 2 Mr. Schoenrogge principally alleged that the employees unlawfully
brought alcoholic beverages onto the facility. Further, Mr. Schoenrogge alleged
that Mr. Rooney was “guilty of the crime of misprision of a felony,” and asked
the district court to “request a full investigation of Mr. Rooney’s conduct.” R.,
Vol. I, Doc. 1 at 3.
The U.S. Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal, finding the action
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and concluding that Mr. Schoenrogge
failed to establish the necessary factors for issuance of the writ. The district court
agreed and dismissed Mr. Schoenrogge’s action.
1
(...continued)
(1972); Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 815 (10th Cir. 2007).
2
This case is similar to a separate mandamus action Mr. Schoenrogge
brought, Schoenrogge v. Brownback, No. 07-3217, which this Court disposed of
by an order dated November 6, 2007.
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II. DISCUSSION
Section 1361 grants district courts authority “to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Grant of mandamus relief is a matter of
judicial discretion, but a plaintiff must first show eligibility by establishing “(1)
that he has a clear right to relief, (2) that the [defendant’s] duty to perform the act
in question is plainly defined and peremptory, and (3) that he has no other
adequate remedy.” Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005). “[W]e
consider de novo whether the legal requirements for such relief are present.”
Marquez-Ramos v. Reno, 69 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1995).
Our cases, moreover, have underscored that the action requested must be “a
nondiscretionary, ministerial duty.” Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498,
500 (10th Cir. 1991); see Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers, Local Union
No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1981) (“This . . . oft-cited
ministerial-discretionary dichotomy which permeates the jurisprudence of
mandamus is merely shorthand for the well-taken rule that to the extent a statute
vests discretion in a public official, his exercise of that discretion should not be
controlled by the judiciary.” (footnote omitted)). Because Mr. Schoenrogge has
failed to demonstrate the first two prongs of the mandamus analysis, we need not
address the third issue regarding adequate remedy.
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As to the first prong, Mr. Schoenrogge contends that he has a clear right to
relief that arises from his status as a U.S. citizen and Mr. Rooney’s status as a
federal government employee. Specifically, Mr. Schoenrogge argues that Mr.
Rooney is required to answer to U.S. citizens, like Mr. Schoenrogge, who in
effect are his employers. Therefore, Mr. Schoenrogge reasons that he has a clear
right to demand that Mr. Rooney act to remove employees who have violated
federal law. We disagree. Such a generalized assertion cannot be a “clear right”
sufficient to be the basis for a mandamus action.
As to the second prong, Mr. Schoenrogge essentially relies upon the same
rationale, arguing that Mr. Rooney owed him a nondiscretionary duty due to Mr.
Schoenrogge’s U.S. citizenship. The district court properly concluded that Mr.
Schoenrogge’s assertions did not establish that the alleged duties of Mr. Rooney
are clearly ministerial and nondiscretionary.
As a DOJ official, Mr. Rooney is ultimately subject to the supervision and
control of the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 509 (with limited exceptions,
vesting in the Attorney General “[a]ll functions of other officers of the
Department of Justice”). Any decision-making authority on the part of Mr.
Rooney that would permit him to remove federal employees from their positions
would have been conferred upon him by the Attorney General. See id. § 510
(stating that the Attorney General may authorize the “performance by any other
officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the
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Attorney General”). And the Attorney General’s responsibility to enforce the law
is a matter of discretion. Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(1996) (“The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad
discretion to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, Mr. Rooney’s alleged refusal to take punitive actions against the employees
here would fall within the grant of discretion delegated to him by the Attorney
General.
We conclude, as a matter of law, that Mr. Schoenrogge has failed to satisfy
the threshold requirements for mandamus relief and that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the writ. See Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 479
(stating “once a party seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus meets its burden of
showing the prerequisites have been met, a court still exercises its own discretion
in deciding whether or not to issue the writ”). Furthermore, the district court
properly rejected in summary fashion Mr. Schoenrogge’s contentions relating to
Mr. Rooney’s alleged misprision of a felony violations. 3
3
For the reasons that we outlined in rejecting Mr. Schoenrogge’s
similar contentions in his mandamus action against Senator Brownback, Mr.
Schoenrogge’s entreaties to the district court and this court to initiate law
enforcement action against Mr. Rooney and to report his alleged criminal conduct
(including supposed violations of 18 U.S.C. § 4) to federal prosecutors are
without legal foundation and, at the very least, out of place in this mandamus
action. See also Brownback, No. 07-3216, at 4 n. 2 (questioning “the notion that
such requests for judicial action are legally cognizable in [Mr. Schoenrogge’s]
mandamus case (if ever)). Furthermore, insofar as Mr. Schoenrogge’s appellate
filings ask this court to initiate similar law enforcement action against Mr.
(continued...)
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Accordingly we AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal and DENY
Mr. Schoenrogge’s request for a writ of mandamus.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
3
(...continued)
Rooney’s subordinates, we likewise decline the request.
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