FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 27, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
WILLIAM M. LEE,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-1072
v. D. Colorado
GARY WAKINS; THE ATTORNEY (D.C. No. 03-cv-00072-MSK-PAC)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on William M. Lee’s pro se request for a
certificate of appealability (“COA”). Lee seeks a COA so he can appeal the
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)
(providing that no appeal may be taken from a “final order in a habeas corpus
proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a
State court,” unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). Because Lee has not
“made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” this court
denies his request for a COA and dismisses this appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
Following a jury trial, Lee was convicted in Colorado state court of first-
degree extreme-indifference murder, three counts of attempted first-degree
murder, second-degree assault, conspiracy to commit first-degree assault, and
conspiracy to commit menacing. As set out at length in both the magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation and the district court’s Order, the events
underlying Lee’s convictions arose out of a gun battle, initiated by Lee and his
brother Brian, between the “Gangsters of Love” and “Crips” street gangs. The
nine-year procedural history of this case in state court is both lengthy and
complex, including a trial, direct appeal, and two Colorado state actions for post-
conviction relief occurring over a nine-year period. Because that history is
thoroughly recounted and reviewed in both the Report and Recommendation and
the district court’s Order, it will not be repeated here. Suffice to say that after he
failed, for the most part, to obtain relief from the Colorado courts, both on direct
appeal and in the two post-conviction actions, Lee filed the instant § 2254 habeas
corpus petition raising the following claims for relief: (1) the trial court’s refusal
to grant a mistrial after the mid-trial disappearance of a prosecution witness
violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation; (2) the trial court’s refusal to read to the jury a note written to the
court by the missing witness violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process
and Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (3) trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance in tendering a “flawed” theory-of-the-case
instruction; (4) he was denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when his
attorney failed to request that he be present for the charging conference; (5) the
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trial court’s erroneous complicity instruction rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause; (6) the jury’s inconsistent verdicts
on murder and conspiracy to commit murder violated his right to due process; and
(7) his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.
In an exhaustive Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge
recommended that Lee’s § 2254 petition be denied. The magistrate judge first
concluded Lee had failed to exhaust the following claims because he had not
properly raised them in his state court proceedings: (1) his claim relating to his
presence at the charging conference; (2) his claim relating to inconsistent jury
verdicts; and (3) all aspects of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims excepting
the claim his first-degree murder conviction was not supported by sufficient
evidence. The magistrate further concluded, however, that these claims were
subject to an anticipatory procedural bar because if raised in state court at this
late date the Colorado courts would hold the claims procedurally defaulted.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991); People v. Rodriguez, 914
P.2d 230, 253-54 & nn. 20, 22 (Colo. 1996). The magistrate judge then
recommended resolving the remainder of Lee’s claims on the merits on the basis
that the Colorado courts’ resolutions of the claims were not contrary to clearly
established Supreme Court precedent, based on an unreasonable application of
such precedent, or based on a clearly unreasonable finding of fact. 28 U.S.C. §
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2254(d). In an equally thorough and well-stated Order, the district court adopted
the Report and Recommendation and denied Lee’s § 2254 petition.
To be entitled to a COA, Lee must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite
showing, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotations
omitted). In evaluating whether Lee has satisfied his burden, this court
undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal]
framework” applicable to each of his claims. Id. at 338. Although Lee need not
demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must “prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.”
Id.
Having undertaken a rigorous review of Lee’s application for a COA and
appellate filings, the district court’s Order, the magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation, and the entire record before this court pursuant to the
framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El, this court concludes Lee is
not entitled to a COA. The district court’s thorough and well-stated resolution of
Lee’s § 2254 petition is not reasonably subject to debate and the issues Lee seeks
to raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve further proceedings. Accordingly,
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for those reasons set out in both the district court’s Order and the magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation, this court DENIES Lee’s request for a
COA and DISMISSES this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk
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