FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 22, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JAMES B. McCOY, on behalf of himself,
and LORRAY McCOY, Deceased, as
heirs of Emily M. McCoy, and as
Administrator of the Estate of Emily M.
McCoy; AMERICAN NATIONAL
PROPERTY & CASUALTY No. 05-3337
COMPANY, (D. C. No. 2:02-CV-2064-KHV)
(D. Kansas)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER
Before TACHA, Circuit Judge, EBEL, Senior Circuit Judges, and KANE, Senior
District Judge.*
On December 5, 2007, we issued an order and judgment in this case reversing the
district court’s July 29, 2005 Judgment entered in favor of Defendant Whirlpool
*
The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
Corporation and remanding for entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiffs based on the
February 10, 2005 jury verdict. The opinion contained no instructions to the district
court concerning an award of post-judgment interest. See McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp.,
258 F. App’x 189 (10th Cir. Dec. 5, 2007) (unpublished).
This appeal is presently before the court based on Plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 37(b) to recall the mandate to include instructions for post-judgment
interest, Defendant’s reply in opposition, Plaintiffs’ reply in support of their motion, and
Defendant’s response in opposition.
Upon consideration, the motion to recall is GRANTED. The mandate issued
January 9, 2008 is RECALLED.
The December 5, 2007 order and judgment is amended to instruct the district
court to award post-judgment interest to Plaintiffs from the date of the original judgment
entered on July 29, 2005 by the district court.
This order shall act as a supplement to the mandate issued originally by this court
on January 9, 2008.
Entered for the Court,
Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 5, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JAMES B. McCOY, on behalf of himself,
and LORRAY McCOY, Deceased, as heirs
of Emily M. McCoy, and as Administrator
of the Estate of Emily M. McCoy;
AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY & No. 05-3337
CASUALTY COMPANY, (D.C. No. 02-CV-02064-KHV)
(D. Kansas)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT**
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, EBEL, Senior Circuit Judge, and KANE, Senior
District Judge.***
James B. McCoy and American National Property & Casualty Company brought
this action against Whirlpool Corporation for wrongful death and property loss resulting
from a fire at the McCoy home. Following a trial in which the jury returned a verdict for
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
***
The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
the plaintiffs, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the
defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
reverse.
Background
On the evening of February 16, 2000, Lorray McCoy loaded the dishwasher at her
family’s home and set its timer to start a wash cycle after a delay of five hours.
Mrs. McCoy and her daughter, Shelley, went to bed some hours later. Just as
Mrs. McCoy was falling asleep, she smelled smoke and got out of bed to investigate.
Mrs. McCoy testified at trial that she discovered flames coming out of the dishwasher and
igniting the curtains and wall above it. Mrs. McCoy called to her daughter, but Shelley
was unable to escape and died in the fire. The McCoys’ home was destroyed.
James B. and Lorray McCoy and their insurer, American National Property and
Casualty Company, (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed separate suits against Whirlpool
Corporation (“Whirlpool”) as the manufacturer of the dishwasher.1 The suits alleged the
fire was caused by a manufacturing defect in the dishwasher and sought damages for
wrongful death and property loss based on a strict liability theory. The cases were
consolidated and tried to a jury in August, 2003. After the jury deadlocked, the case was
retried in early 2005. On February 10, 2005, the jury in the second trial returned a verdict
finding for Plaintiffs and awarding them $1,712,914.
1
Mrs. McCoy is now deceased.
2
During the second trial, the district court had taken under advisement oral motions
by Whirlpool for directed verdict and judgment as a matter of law. Whirlpool renewed
these motions following the verdict. On July 29, 2005, the district court granted
Whirlpool’s motions and directed that judgment be entered in its favor. The district court
based its decision on two findings: (1) the testimony of James T. Martin, one of
Plaintiffs’ experts, as to general and specific causation was unreliable and hence
inadmissible under Rule 702; and (2) with or without Martin’s testimony, Plaintiffs had
failed to present sufficient evidence to carry their burden of proving that a specific defect
in Whirlpool’s dishwasher had caused the fire. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge both
findings and the district court’s entry of judgment for Whirlpool.
Discussion
I. Martin’s Expert Testimony
Expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable to be admissible. See Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 594-95 (1993); Fed. R. Evid. 702. The
district court must act as the “gatekeeper” with respect to proffered expert testimony to
ensure that it meets both of these requirements. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Bitler v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004). This role requires the district
court “to assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion, and
determine whether it is both scientifically valid and applicable to a particular set of facts.”
Dodge v. Cotter Corp, 328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003). We review de novo
whether the district court performed this “gatekeeper” function and applied the proper
3
legal standards in doing so. Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1223; see Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1232. We
review for abuse of discretion the procedures utilized by the district court in acting as
gatekeeper, and its ultimate determination on whether to admit or exclude expert
testimony under the proper legal standard. Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1223; see Bitler, 400 F.3d
at 1232. We will not find abuse of discretion, however, unless we are convinced that the
district court’s procedures or ultimate determination were “arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, manifestly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1232; see
Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1223.
In this case, the district court examined Mr. Martin’s expert testimony after the
trial and determined that his opinions as to general and specific causation, that is, whether
the McCoy fire could result from a manufacturing defect and did result from such a
defect, were not sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702. See McCoy v.
Whirlpool Corp., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196-1202 (D. Kan. 2005). Accordingly, our
task is to determine de novo whether the district court applied the proper legal standard in
making its reliability determination, and, if so, whether this determination and the
decision to exclude Martin’s testimony were an abuse of discretion.
Martin’s expert testimony at trial addressed whether the McCoy fire was caused by
a manufacturing defect in the Kenmore New Generation dishwasher in the McCoy home.
The New Generation dishwashers, which are manufactured by Whirlpool, contain a door
latch switch assembly located at the top center of the dishwasher door. The assembly
includes two “microswitches” designed to control electrical current to the dishwasher
4
based on whether the dishwasher door is open or shut. When the dishwasher door is shut
and latched, a plunger within each microswitch is mechanically depressed and allows
electrical contacts inside the microswitch to touch so that electrical current passes to the
dishwasher. In this position, the microswitch is said to be “closed.” When the
dishwasher door is open and unlatched, the plunger retracts to separate the electrical
contacts and automatically turn off the current and hence dishwasher operations. In this
position, the microswitch is said to be “open.”
Each microswitch also includes two metal tabs that extend outside the microswitch
and connect with a flag terminal. Each flag terminal then utilizes a crimp attachment to
connect the terminal to conductors in the wiring harness of the dishwasher. The total
current demand for the dishwasher passes through the microswitches and connectors
when the dishwasher door is closed and the microswitches are in the closed position.
When Whirlpool first began manufacturing the New Generation dishwashers in
1990, it used flag terminals manufactured by AMP in the door latch switch assemblies.
Several years later, after experiencing overheating and fire problems at the AMP flag
terminals, Whirlpool substituted flag terminals manufactured by ETCO. At
approximately the same time that it made this change, Whirlpool also stopped using white
microswitches in some New Generation dishwashers and replaced them with black
microswitches, which are made of a different material than their white counterparts. This
change was not related to overheating problems or safety concerns. The door latch switch
5
assembly in the McCoy dishwasher, which was manufactured in 1996, had black
microswitches and ETCO flag terminals.
Plaintiffs alleged at trial that the McCoy fire resulted from an electrical fire caused
by a manufacturing defect in the family’s dishwasher, specifically a defect in the
electrical circuitry of the door latch switch assembly at either the attachment of the flag
terminals to the microswitches or the flag terminals to the wire conductors. In support of
these allegations, Plaintiffs presented testimony from four fire origin and causation
experts, each of whom investigated the McCoy fire and concluded it originated in the
McCoy’s dishwasher. Three of Plaintiffs’ fire experts further opined that the fire began
in the area of the dishwasher’s door latch switch assembly and that its cause was
electrical in nature. Two of these three described the fire more specifically as resulting
from abnormal electricity or an abnormality in the dishwasher’s electrical system.
Another expert investigated the potential sources of an electrical fire in the McCoy home
and testified that the only potential source that he could not eliminate was the dishwasher.
This testimony was admitted by the court and is not challenged on appeal.
Plaintiffs also presented the expert opinion testimony of James T. Martin, an
electrical engineer with experience in investigating fires involving dishwashers.
Mr. Martin’s testimony was directed at the mechanism by which an electrical fire could
originate in the door latch switch assembly area of the McCoy dishwasher, and whether
such a fire would be the result of a manufacturing defect. Mr. Martin testified he formed
his opinions based on application of electrical engineering principles and standards to
6
information he gathered through a review of thousands of pages of Whirlpool documents
regarding the electrical circuit design of its New Generation dishwashers, the results of
Whirlpool testing of these dishwashers, deposition testimony of Whirlpool engineers and
Plaintiffs’ fire origin and cause experts, and his own inspection of the remains of the
McCoy dishwasher and other Whirlpool dishwashers.
Based on this methodology, Mr. Martin testified that in his opinion an electrical
fire in the door latch switch assembly area would result from excessive resistance heating
occurring at a loose or improper connection in the electrical circuitry of the assembly. He
explained that resistance heating has a cumulative or cascading effect because each
incident of resistance heating changes the physical properties of the heating point, so that
the next incident produces increased heating and higher temperatures. Mr. Martin
identified three connection points in the door latch switch assembly at which excessive
resistance heating might occur – the connections between the microswitch and flag
terminals, between the terminals and conductors, and within the microswitch – but
focused on the potential for resistance heating at the attachments of the flag terminals to
the microswitch and particularly to the conductor. He testified that an improperly sized
or loose crimp in the McCoy dishwasher at these locations was a manufacturing defect
that could result in excessive resistance heating, that this excessive resistance heating
could over time reach temperatures that would ignite surrounding combustibles, and that
he had seen examples of fires caused by this mechanism in dishwashers manufactured by
Whirlpool. Mr. Martin also testified that if the McCoy fire originated in an electrical fire
7
in the dishwasher’s door latch switch assembly, as Plaintiffs’ fire origin and causation
experts had testified, then it was his opinion that the specific cause of the McCoy fire was
excessive resistance heating occurring in the current flow path caused by a manufacturing
defect in the connection between the flag terminal and either the conductor or
microswitch.
At trial, Whirlpool argued that Mr. Martin’s expert opinion testimony that the
McCoy fire could and did result from a manufacturing defect was unreliable and hence
inadmissible under Rule 702 because he had not adequately addressed a countering expert
opinion presented by Whirlpool engineer Ernest Grunewald. Mr. Grunewald agreed with
Mr. Martin that if the McCoy fire originated in the door latch switch assembly area as
opined by Plaintiffs’ fire science experts, then the cause of the fire was a manufacturing
defect in the electrical circuitry in this area.2 He testified further, however, that in his
opinion the McCoy fire could not have originated in this area because the black
microswitches in the McCoy dishwasher’s door latch switch assembly would have acted
as thermal fuses to cut off electricity and thus halt excessive resistance heating in this area
before a fire could ignite.3 Mr. Grunewald based this conclusion on the 160° C
2
Mr. Grunewald testified that something other than a manufacturing defect
in the electrical circuitry of the door latch switch assembly, such as improper servicing of
this assembly, could cause a fire in this area in some circumstances, but acknowledged
that there was no evidence of these circumstances with respect to the McCoy dishwasher.
3
Both Mr. Grunewald and Mr. Martin testified that a thermal fuse is a device
designed to halt the flow of electricity through a circuit when the temperature in the
vicinity of the thermal fuse reaches a specific level.
8
temperature at which he reported the plungers in the black microswitches would melt,
which he testified would cause the electrical contacts in the switches to open and stop
current flowing through the switches well before resistance heating could produce high
enough temperatures to ignite surrounding combustibles. Mr. Grunewald also based his
testimony on his personal experience with black microswitches during his long tenure as
a Whirlpool engineer.
Mr. Grunewald acknowledged in his testimony that the black microswitches were
not designed to serve as thermal fuses and had not been tested or designated as thermal
safety devices by the manufacturer or others. He also testified that Whirlpool had
reported in testing their New Generation dishwashers that the black microswitches
sometimes failed in a closed position (the position that conducts electricity) when the
plunger melted in the presence of excessive heat resistance, and that there were instances
in which fires had ignited in door latch switch assemblies containing black
microswitches. Mr. Grunewald opined, however, that these test and fire reports were
either erroneous, based on his physical inspection of the switches in question in
connection with this litigation, or otherwise could be explained in a manner consistent
with his opinion that a fire could not originate in the door latch switch assembly in the
presence of the black microswitches.
In response to Mr. Grunewald’s testimony, Mr. Martin testified it would be a
totally by-chance event for a microswitch to function as a thermal fuse, that it was not
good engineering science to suggest that a switch that had not been designed or tested as
9
thermal fuse in fact reliably functioned as one, that Whirlpool tests had shown that the
black microswitches did not always shut off electricity when temperatures reached the
plungers’ melting point, and that if Plaintiffs’ fire and origin experts were correct that the
McCoy fire originated as an electrical fire in the door latch switch assembly area of the
McCoy’s dishwasher, then the black microswitch, by definition, had not functioned as a
thermal fuse.
At trial, the district court rejected Whirlpool’s challenge to Mr. Martin’s testimony
and admitted it upon finding that the scientific methodology Mr. Martin had employed in
reaching his opinions was customary and generally accepted in the electrical engineering
field.4 Whirlpool’s arguments concerning the black switch-thermal fuse theory and
Mr. Martin’s response to it, the district court found, went only to the weight the jury
might accord Mr. Martin’s testimony. After trial, however, the district court reversed
itself, holding that Mr. Martin’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted
under Rule 702.5
The role of the district court in assessing the reliability of an expert’s opinion
under Rule 702 is simply to determine whether the methodology “employed by the expert
in reaching the conclusion is scientifically sound and that the opinion is based on facts
4
In so holding, the district court accepted Mr. Martin’s testimony that it was not
standard practice in the field, or even possible in many instances, to do physical testing to
confirm that a particular defect had caused an electrical fire.
5
There is no dispute on appeal that Mr. Martin’s expert opinion testimony met the
other requirements for admission under Rule 702.
10
which sufficiently satisfy Rule 702's reliability requirements.” Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1233.
Here, there is no question that Mr. Martin, in relying on electrical circuitry information,
test results and other materials provided by Whirlpool, as well as his inspection of the
McCoy and other Whirlpool dishwashers, based his conclusions on facts satisfying
Rule 702's reliability requirements. The district court also found at trial and reiterated in
its post-trial decision that the method employed by Mr. Martin in reaching his conclusions
about the potential causes of excessive resistance heating in the door latch switch
assembly was generally accepted and scientifically reliable. Aplt. App. at 2099; McCoy,
379 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. The only basis cited by the district court for nonetheless finding
Mr. Martin’s methodology insufficiently reliable for admission of his causation opinions
was that Mr. Martin had not explained how excessive resistance heating could cause a fire
in a New Generation dishwasher equipped with black microswitches. McCoy,
379 F. Supp. 2d at 1198-99.
Excluding Mr. Martin’s testimony on this basis was an abuse of discretion. The
linchpin of the district court’s analysis is its acceptance of Mr. Grunewald’s opinion
testimony that black microswitches always function as thermal fuses. See, e.g., McCoy,
379 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 n.14 (describing black microswitches as “thermal protective
devices”), 1199 (criticizing Mr. Martin for ignoring “undisputed and known evidence
about the thermal properties of black microswitches”), 1201 (holding Mr. Martin’s
testimony was not sufficiently reliable because it did “not address the thermal protective
function that black microswitches perform.”). In so doing, the district court necessarily
11
assessed Mr. Grunewald’s testimony on this issue and found it credible and persuasive.
Such determinations, however, are reserved for the finder of fact, and may not be relied
upon by a district court in deciding whether to admit or exclude an opposing expert’s
conflicting testimony. See Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1293 n.7 (11th Cir.
2005); Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 391 (6th Cir. 2000).
Whirlpool and the district court assert that our decision in Truck Insurance
Exchange v. Magnetek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), is factually on “all fours”
with this case and requires exclusion of Mr. Martin’s testimony. We disagree. In
Magnetek, the plaintiff alleged that defective ballast in a fluorescent light fixture had
ignited a fire that destroyed the plaintiff’s building. It was undisputed that the ballast
contained a thermal protective device specifically designed to shut off power to the
fixture if the temperature exceeded 232° Fahrenheit, well below the approximately 400° F
temperature generally believed necessary to ignite the wood in the fixture’s vicinity. Id.
at 1208. The parties in Magnetek further stipulated that the thermal protective device in
the ballast functioned properly throughout the fire, meaning that it cut off current to the
fixture before the generally accepted ignition temperatures were reached. Id. In order to
prove causation, therefore, the plaintiff was required to present evidence that ignition
could have occurred in the lower temperature range allowed by the thermal protective
device. See id. at 1209, 1211. The plaintiff produced expert evidence that the ballast
could have ignited the fire even at these lower temperatures, but the district court
excluded the expert’s testimony after determining, based on review of relevant scientific
12
literature, that the scientific theory underlying this low-temperature ignition hypothesis,
the theory of pyrolysis, was insufficiently reliable to form the basis of expert testimony.
Id. at 1211. See id. We affirmed on appeal.
In this case, there is no stipulation that the door latch switch assembly contained a
thermal protective device of any kind. Nor can it be said that Whirlpool’s black switch-
thermal fuse theory was undisputed or that Plaintiffs failed to produce sufficiently reliable
evidence that the McCoy fire was ignited by the specific manufacturing defect they
alleged. Plaintiffs presented evidence, through Mr. Martin, that manufacturing defects in
the crimps or connectors in the door latch switch assembly could lead to excessive
resistance heating that would reach temperatures high enough to ignite the surrounding
plastics. Whirlpool did not challenge the scientific basis of this ignition theory, but rather
presented countering evidence, in the form of Mr. Grunewald’s black microswitch-
thermal fuse testimony, that excessive resistance heating could not have reached ignition
temperatures because the black microswitches would cut off the electrical current before
these temperatures were reached. Plaintiffs responded by pointing to Whirlpool test
results indicating that the black microswitches did not always function as thermal fuses,6
to evidence that fires had ignited in the door latch switch assembly area of dishwashers
6
This evidence consisted of both written reports by Whirlpool technicians stating
that the microswitches had failed (melted due to excessive resistance heating) in the
closed (electricity conducting) position during testing and evidence that several of these
dishwashers continued operating through additional cycles even with the melted switches
in place, something that could only occur if the switches had failed in the closed position,
i.e., were still conducting electricity.
13
containing black microswitches, and to Mr. Martin’s testimony that it would be bad
engineering science to assume that a device that was not designed to function as a thermal
fuse reliably served this function. Although Mr. Grunewald responded with explanations
and counter arguments in support of his opinion that the black switches always acted as
thermal fuses and would have prevented excessive resistance heating in the door latch
switch assembly from starting the McCoy fire, he also testified that he did not know
whether the microswitches in the McCoy dishwasher functioned as a de facto thermal
fuse on the night of the fire. Whether the black microswitch in the door latch switch
assembly of the McCoy dishwasher functioned as a thermal fuse that would have
prevented ignition was, therefore, very much disputed, and it was the jury’s province to
decide this issue based on its assessment of the evidence and the credibility of
Mr. Martin’s and Mr. Grunewald’s conflicting testimony.
The district court’s reliance on Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878
(10th Cir. 2005), to support its decision was also misplaced. In Norris, we found no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of expert witness testimony in part because it
completely ignored or discounted without explanation a significant body of scientific
research that had concluded there was no reliable basis for finding that the product at
issue, silicone breast implants, caused injuries of the type suffered by the plaintiff. Id.
at 884-86 (experts’ testimony “scientifically unreliable because [experts] assume what
science has largely shown does not exist – a causal connection between silicone breast
implants and disease.”). The record here does not demonstrate the existence of a body of
14
established scientific study supporting Whirlpool’s contention that the door latch switch
assembly in the McCoy dishwasher could not have caused the McCoy fire because of the
thermal protective properties of the black microswitches. Mr. Grunewald’s opinion in
support of this contention is just that, an opinion, and should not have been elevated to the
level of established scientific fact.
II. Judgment as a Matter of Law
The district court granted Whirlpool’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
upon finding that Plaintiffs, even considering Mr. Martin’s testimony, had failed to
present sufficient evidence for the jury to find that a specific manufacturing defect had
caused the McCoy fire. McCoy, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. We review de novo a district
court’s disposition of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same legal
standard as the district court. Snyder v. City of Moab, 354 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir.
2003). “Such a judgment is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is
susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion.” Id.
We must view the evidence and inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, Snyder, 354 F.3d at 1184, and may not weigh the evidence,
judge witness credibility or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury, Deters v.
Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). In a diversity
case such as this, the substantive law of the forum state governs our analysis of the
underlying claims, including specification of the applicable standards of proof, but federal
law controls the ultimate, procedural question of whether judgment as a matter of law is
15
appropriate. Haberman v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 443 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir.
2006).
Plaintiffs’ product liabilities claim is governed by Kansas law. It provides that a
plaintiff must produce proof of three elements to present a prima facie case of strict
product liability: (1) the injury resulted from a condition of the product; (2) the condition
was an unreasonably dangerous one; and (3) the condition existed at the time it left the
defendant’s control. Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 886 P.2d 869, 886 (Kan. 1994);
Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 360 (Kan. 1983). “For circumstantial evidence
to make out a prima facie case, it must tend to negate other reasonable causes, or there
must be an expert opinion that the product was defective.” Mays, 661 P.2d at 360.
“[T]he circumstances shown must justify an inference of probability as distinguished
from mere possibility.” Id. The plaintiff is not required, however, “to eliminate all other
possibilities, and so prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. As on other issues in civil
actions, it is enough that he makes out a preponderance of probability. It is enough that
the court cannot say that reasonable men on the jury could not find it more likely than not
that the fact is true.” Id. at 358 (quoting William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 102, at 672
(4th ed. 1971)).
The district court vacated the jury verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor and entered judgment
as a matter of law upon finding that Plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that a specific defect in the McCoy’s Whirlpool dishwasher had caused the fire that
16
injured them.7 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and
without weighing it or passing on the credibility of the parties’ witnesses, we must
disagree.
Plaintiffs presented evidence from four fire science experts, Michael J. Schultz,
Daniel E. Anderson, Davis L. Yates and James Kuticka, who testified, based on their
separate investigations, that the fire originated in the dishwasher in the McCoy house.8
Three of the four further specified that the fire began in the area of the door latch switch
assembly and that it was caused by the electrical system in this area. Plaintiffs also
presented expert testimony from Dr. Byron Wesley Sherman, an electrical engineer, that
his investigation of potential electrical causes of the McCoy fire had ruled out all
potential causes except the family’s dishwasher.
There was additional evidence in the record from both Mr. Grunewald and
Mr. Martin that excessive resistance heating in the electrical connections in the door latch
switch assembly of Whirlpool’s New Generation dishwashers could reach temperatures
sufficient to ignite surrounding combustibles, and that such excessive resistance heating
would result from a manufacturing defect in the electrical connections in the assembly.
There was also evidence that excessive resistance heating in this area had caused fires in
7
There is no dispute on appeal regarding the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ evidence on
the other elements of its claims.
8
The testimony and opinions of two of these experts, David L. Yates and Daniel
E. Anderson, was entered into the record by stipulation of the parties rather than by live
testimony.
17
New Generation dishwashers that differed from the McCoy’s dishwasher only in the type
of terminals used in the door latch switch assembly and the material from which the
microswitches there were constructed. Plaintiffs further presented evidence, through
Mr. Grunewald, that manufacturing defects could and had occurred in crimp connections
in assemblies using ETCO terminals, the type present in the McCoy dishwasher, and that
fires had actually ignited in the door latch switch assembly area of dishwashers
containing the same black microswitches as the McCoy dishwasher. Finally, Plaintiffs
presented expert testimony from both Mr. Martin and Mr. Grunewald that if the fire
originated in the McCoy dishwasher’s door latch switch assembly area as opined by
Plaintiffs’ fire experts, then it was caused by excessive resistance heating resulting from a
defective connection in the electrical circuit in the assembly. Mr. Shultz and Mr. Kuticka,
two of Plaintiffs’ fire origin experts, concurred that the fire originated in an abnormality
in the assembly’s electrical circuitry.
Viewing the totality of this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and
drawing all reasonable inferences from it in the same light, there was more than sufficient
evidence tending to negate other reasonable causes and supporting an inference of a
defect in the electrical circuitry of the door latch switch assembly for the jury to infer, as a
matter of probability and not mere possibility, that the fire in the McCoy home was
caused by a manufacturing defect in the door latch switch assembly of the family’s
Whirlpool dishwasher. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence in the record to
support the jury’s verdict.
18
The district court held otherwise and entered judgment as a matter of law in
Whirlpool’s favor upon concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to present evidence of a
“scientifically plausible cause” of the fire in light of Mr. Grunewald’s opinion that the
black microswitches in the McCoy dishwasher would have prevented excessive resistance
heating in the door latch switch assembly from reaching ignition temperatures. It was not
Plaintiffs’ burden to disprove Mr. Grunewald’s testimony and Whirlpool’s defensive
theory based on this testimony. “Evidence offered by [the defendant] that is contrary to
the evidence offered by the plaintiff creates a question for the jury.” Workman v. AB
Electrolux Corp., 2005 WL 1896246 *15 (Aug. 8, 2005). As described above,
Mr. Grunewald’s testimony was disputed, and it was the jury’s province to assess
Mr. Grunewald’s credibility and determine the weight of his testimony. The jury was free
to disbelieve Mr. Grunewald’s testimony, and it apparently did so.
The district court also erred in reading Magnetek as establishing that “evidence
that a fire originated at or within a certain product is insufficient by itself to establish that
a product defect caused the fire.” McCoy, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (citing Magnetek,
360 F.3d at 1213). The cited discussion in Magnetek does not state this or any other rule
regarding the sufficiency of evidence to prove causation. Instead, the question addressed
there was whether the expert evidence in question was reliable enough to be admitted
under Rule 702. See 360 F.3d at 1211-13 (analyzing whether the reasoning and
methodology underlying challenged expert testimony was sufficiently reliable for
testimony to be admitted). Whether expert evidence is admissible under Rule 702 is a
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distinct and separate question from whether it and plaintiff’s other evidence is sufficient
to prove causation or another element of the plaintiff’s claim under the governing
substantive law. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132
(2nd Cir. 1995) (distinguishing between inquiry into admissibility of expert evidence and
“[a] sufficiency inquiry, which asks whether the collective weight of a litigant’s evidence
is adequate to present a jury question.”). Maintaining the distinction between a court’s
reliability determination under Rule 702 and a sufficiency or merits determination is
“indeed significant as it preserves the fact finding role of the jury.” In re TMI Litig.,
193 F.3d 613, 665 n.90 (3rd Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs also presented sufficient evidence of the manufacturing defect that
caused the McCoy fire: a defective connection in the electrical circuitry of the door latch
switch assembly of the McCoy dishwasher. Kansas law does not require that the
manufacturing defect be specified any more precisely than this. The district court in fact
acknowledged as much when it held, in denying Whirlpool’s motion for summary
judgment, that Plaintiffs’ evidence identifying the door latch switch assembly as the
defective component of the dishwasher satisfied the legal requirement that they identify
the product defect responsible for their injuries. Aplt. App. at 363 (Memorandum and
Order at 14, 2003 WL 21554950 *7 (D. Kan. July 8, 2003)).9
9
In holding that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a defect, we are not
suggesting that Kansas law requires plaintiffs to prove a specific manufacturing defect.
See Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 360 (Kan. 1983) (holding a plaintiff may
prove a manufacturing defect caused the injury by circumstantial evidence that tends to
eliminate causes other than a product defect). Rather, we conclude that, even if Kansas
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The district court’s concern that the jury may have speculated that the fire
originated in a defective microswitch rather than a defective connection between the flag
terminal and the microswitch or the conductor as alleged by Plaintiffs provides no basis
for rejecting the jury’s verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor. Even if this degree of specificity were
required by Kansas law, Mr. Martin’s testimony and the other evidence cited above,
considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, was sufficient for the jury to infer as a
matter of probability that the specific defect alleged by Plaintiffs was the cause of the fire.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is reversed. This
action is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict.
Entered for the Court
John L. Kane
Senior District Judge
law requires a degree of specificity, the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a
manufacturing defect in this case.
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