Shero v. City of Grove, Okl.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

December 17, 2007
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID EARL SHERO,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 06-5222

CITY OF GROVE, OKLAHOMA,
subdivision of the State of Oklahoma;
GROVE CITY COUNCIL, subdivision
of the State of Oklahoma; WILLIAM
GALLETLY, also known as Bill
Galletly; DOROTHY PARKER;
IVONNE BUZZARD, also known as
Bonnie Buzzard; CAROLYN
NUCKOLLS; RANDY JOBE; DAVID
ADZIGIAN; DAVID HELMS,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

CHARLES ROWE; ROBERT NOLD,

Defendants,

----------------------------

JACK L. SMITH,

Movant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 05-CV-137-CVE-PJC)
Mark T. Hamby, Bonham & Howard, P.L.L.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff -
Appellant.

Thomas A. LeBlanc, (Matthew B. Free, and J. Spencer Bryan, Best & Sharp, and
James C. Hodges, Eller & Detrich, on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants
- Appellees.

Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant David Earl Shero appeals from the district court’s grant

of qualified immunity to Defendants-Appellees Dorothy Parker (city attorney),

William Galletly (city manager), and Ivonne Buzzard (city clerk) (collectively

“City employees”). He also appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor

of Defendant-Appellee City of Grove, Oklahoma (“the City”). The district court

granted qualified immunity to the above City employees on a motion to dismiss,

essentially finding the absence of a constitutional violation. In a later opinion,

the district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that it had not

violated any constitutional right, notwithstanding Mr. Shero’s claims that the City

denied him certain records, limited his speaking time at a city council meeting,

and filed a state declaratory judgment suit against him allegedly in retaliation for

requesting records. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

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 Background

In early 2003, Mr. Shero attended a Grove city council meeting and spoke

in defense of a fired city employee. III Aplt. App. tab 16C at 34-35. He returned

in the fall of 2003 to refute that the local airport board and a local contractor were

engaging in criminal activity by removing dirt from airport property. Id. tab 16E

at 84. He requested a copy of Ms. Parker’s resume that same fall and Ms.

Buzzard, the city clerk, denied his request after being instructed to do so by Mr.

Galletly. Aplt. Br. at 4.

On January 2 and January 30, 2004, Mr. Shero requested a “council

packet,” a packet of information individually prepared for council members

before each meeting containing agenda items and other information, from Ms.

Buzzard. See III Aplt. App. tab 16 at 3; tab E at 66-68. He was denied each

time, although previously he had been given copies. III Aplt. App. tab 16 at 3; IV

Aplt. App. tab F at 19-20; Aplee. Br. at 4. Ms. Buzzard was following the advice

of Ms. Parker who determined that the packets were not public after learning that

Mr. Shero was receiving copies of council packets intended for a specific

individual. III Aplt. App. tab 16 at 4-5; IV Aplt. App. tab F at 19-20; VI Aplt.

App. tab 22 at 2. In between these denials, on January 6, 2004, Mr. Shero again

spoke at a city council meeting, this time to voice his objections to being denied

council packets and to allege that the council violated the Oklahoma Open

Meetings Act (“OOMA”), Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 301. II Aplt. App. part 2, tab 14K

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at 1; Aplt. Br. at 9. Immediately after the January 30 denial, Mr. Shero’s attorney

informed Ms. Buzzard that Mr. Shero would pursue legal action to get the

packets. III Aplt. App. tab 16 at 12.

On February 2, 2004, Ms. Parker (on behalf of the City) filed a state

declaratory judgment action naming Mr. Shero as the defendant pursuant to the

Oklahoma Declaratory Judgment Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1651. I Aplt. App. tab

2, part 2 at 1-3. Ms. Parker titled the pleading a “Motion for Protective Order and

Order Determining Certain Materials Exempt from Public Disclosure” and asked

for declaratory relief and a protective order pursuant to the Oklahoma Open

Records Act (“OORA”), Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 24A.1. Id. The state court ordered

a hearing on the request for a protective order that same day. Id. part 2 at 4. Mr.

Shero filed an answer and counterclaim on February 9, 2004, seeking a ruling that

the council packets and Ms. Parker’s resume are open records not subject to any

exception under OORA. Id. part 2 at 5-10. On March 23, 2004, the state court

denied the City’s request for a protective order, held that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the declaratory action, and concluded that Mr. Shero’s

counterclaim could proceed to trial. I Aplt. App. tab 2, part 4 at 33-34.

Mr. Shero attended another city council meeting on February 17, 2004. V

Aplt. App. tab 17 at 11. During the portion of the meeting devoted to public

comments, the mayor informed Mr. Shero that he would be limited to three

minutes. Id. There were no other speakers present. Aplt. Reply Br. at 16. Mr.

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Shero used his time to speak in opposition to the lawsuit against him and to speak

about a district attorney opinion letter identifying the City as violating the OORA

and the OOMA. II Aplt. App. tab 15E at 3. The parties dispute whether the City

had a preexisting practice of limiting speakers during the public comments

portion of city council meetings on February 17, 2004. See Aplt. Br. at 6; Aplt.

Reply Br. at 17-18; Aplee. Br. at 15.

On April 26, 2004, the state court ruled that the council packets and Ms.

Parker’s resume are open records under state law and permanently enjoined the

City from denying requests for these items. I Aplt. App. tab 2, part 6 at 3-5. Mr.

Shero sought attorney’s fees and on May 25, 2004, the parties entered into a

settlement agreement wherein the City agreed to pay Mr. Shero approximately

$28,000 in settlement of his claim for attorney’s fees incurred in the state action.

I Aplt. App. tab 2, part 6 at 37-38.

In March 2005, Mr. Shero brought this federal action against the City and

some of its employees urging various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the

Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 151.

On September 20, 2006, the district court dismissed the City employees based

upon qualified immunity and ruled that Mr. Shero’s claims are not barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. VI Aplt. App. tab 21 at 15. In a subsequent ruling dated

November 2, 2006, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on

both sets of claims, including those pursuant to the GTCA. VI Aplt. App. tab 22

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at 18-19. The judgment concerning the GTCA claims is not on appeal.

Mr. Shero argues on appeal that the district court improperly granted

summary judgment on his First Amendment claims that the City denied him

certain records, limited his speaking time at a city council meeting, and filed a

state declaratory judgment suit against him allegedly in retaliation for his

expressive activities. He contends that even if these actions do not amount to

First Amendment deprivations, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to

whether these actions chilled his First Amendment rights. Finally, he argues that

the City employees are not entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that we

conclude that he has raised a viable constitutional claim.

Discussion

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City de

novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Darr v. Town of

Telluride, Colo., 495 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007). Under Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c), summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Judgment as a matter of law is

appropriate when the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on

an essential element of his or her case with respect to which he or she has the

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burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). The

question then is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-

52 (1986). “[O]n summary judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the

underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

This court uses the same standard in evaluating dismissals in qualified

immunity cases as to dismissals generally. Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d

444, 455 (10th Cir. 2006). Our review is de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);

Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).

In reviewing a dismissal, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as

distinguished from conclusory allegations, and those facts must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moya, 465 F.3d at 455. The

complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide “plausible

grounds” that discovery will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegations.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).

We first review the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the

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City. 1 This review requires us to analyze whether Mr. Shero was deprived of any

constitutional right when he was denied council packets by the City and when the

mayor imposed a three-minute time limitation on his speech at the February 17,

2004 council meeting. We also analyze whether the City unconstitutionally

retaliated against Mr. Shero’s speech at council meetings by denying him council

packets, imposing the time limitation, and filing the declaratory judgment action

in state court. We address each issue in turn. 2

1
The concurring and dissenting opinion suggests that Mr. Shero did not
properly raise several of the claims we address. The City has not made such an
argument. Part of the district court’s rationale for granting summary judgment in
favor of the City, urged by the City given its interpretation of the first amended
complaint, II Aplt. App. tab 15 at 16-18, was that Mr. Shero had no First
Amendment right to information. VI Aplt. App. tab 22 at 6. Plainly, this issue
was developed before the district court, raised on appeal, and should be addressed
by this court. With respect to the three-minute time limitation, it was plainly
addressed by the district court in the context of forum analysis on summary
judgment, VI Aplt. App. tab 22, 12-15, and we think it adequately, if not artfully,
raised here. Aplt. Br. at 42; Aplt. Reply Br. at 15-19. The First Amendment
retaliation claim based on the denial of information and the three-minute time
limitation was not raised below; we exercise our discretion to reach it, however,
because the facts are sufficiently developed and its lack of merit is obvious. See
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976).
2
The City, in addition to its other arguments, urges us to affirm the district
court’s judgment with respect to any of Mr. Shero’s claims relating to the denial
of council packets based upon the doctrine of res judicata. Aplee. Br. at 20-23;
see Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1088 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting “we have discretion to affirm on any ground adequately supported
by the record, so long as the parties have had a fair opportunity to address that
ground”) (internal quotations omitted). Any of Mr. Shero’s claims relating to the
denial of council packets, it argues, are barred because the denials have already
been litigated in state court. See Aplee. Br. at 23. The district court rejected the
Defendants’ res judicata argument, but invited the Defendants to apply issue
preclusion “to narrow the issues in this case to ones that have not been previously

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I. Denial of Council Packets

Mr. Shero urges the court to reverse the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for the City because the City violated his First Amendment rights when

it refused to provide him with council packets as required by state law. Aplt. Br.

at 19. The City, Mr. Shero argues, interfered with his First Amendment right to

gather news by means within the law. Id. At oral argument, Mr. Shero’s counsel

stated that the two best cases in support of this theory are Houchins v. KQED,

Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion) and Capital Cities Media, Inc. v.

Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc). We do not think either

establishes this point, nor does any other case that we can find. Both, in

actuality, lead to the opposite conclusion.

The Supreme Court in Houchins recognized that “[t]here is an undoubted

right to gather news from ‘any source by means within the law.’” 438 U.S. at 11

(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972)). The Court tempered

this language, however, by stating that this right “affords no basis for the claim

that the First Amendment compels others—private persons or governments—to

supply information.” 3 Id. In addition, we have previously acknowledged that

litigated.” At best, affirming the judgment on this basis would only resolve part
of Mr. Shero’s appeal, and because we wholly affirm the district court on First
Amendment grounds, we need not accept this invitation.
3
Although Houchins is a plurality opinion of a seven-member Court joined
by three members, Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment and wrote that
“[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of

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“[a]ny reference in Supreme Court precedent to constitutional entitlement of the

public to information held by the government ‘mean[s] no more than that the

government cannot restrain communication of whatever information [is in fact

acquired].’” Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir.

1994) (quoting Houchins, 438 U.S. at 10) (alterations in original). Clearly, then,

Mr. Shero has no First Amendment right to receive the council packets from the

City, but rather only a state right under the OORA as the state court held. The

City is not compelled by the First Amendment to provide information to Mr.

Shero but must only provide the council packets to him under state law, and Mr.

Shero has already received his remedy in state court.

Nothing the Third Circuit said in Chester changes the interpretation of

Houchins. Although the Chester court noted that the First Amendment Free

Speech Clause “bar[s] government interference with the flow of information and

ideas to the public” and that “[t]here is an undoubted right to gather news from

any source by means within the law,” it qualified this language by stating that

“[i]t simply does not seem reasonable to suppose that the free speech clause

would speak, as it does, solely to government interference if the drafters had

thereby intended to create a right to know and a concomitant governmental duty

to disclose.” 797 F.2d at 1167-68 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations

access to information generated or controlled by government” and he “agree[d]
substantially” with what the plurality opinion said on that topic. 438 U.S. at 16
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).

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omitted). As Mr. Shero has shown no “interference” by the City other than its

actual denial of his requests for the council packets–and there is no constitutional

“duty to disclose”–he has no actionable claim under § 1983 on this basis.

II. Speech Limitation

Mr. Shero next argues that the three-minute time limitation on his speech

imposed by the mayor during the public comments portion of the February 17,

2004 city council meeting constituted a prior restraint in violation of his First

Amendment rights and that the district court erred when it ruled otherwise. Aplt.

Br. at 43.

Under our precedent, it is not entirely clear whether a city council meeting

should be treated as a “designated public forum” or a “limited public forum.” A

“designated public forum” is created when the government “intentionally open[s]

a nontraditional public forum for public discourse.” Ark. Educ. Television

Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). The

government’s action in excluding a member of a class to which a designated

forum is made generally available is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. A “limited

public forum,” on the other hand, “arises where the government allows selective

access to some speakers or some types of speech in a nonpublic forum, but does

not open the property sufficiently to become a designated public forum.”

Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1002 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation omitted). Any government restriction on speech in a limited public

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forum must only be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and be

viewpoint neutral. Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.

819, 829 (1995). We need not decide whether a city council meeting is a

designated public forum or a limited public forum, however, as the time limitation

on Mr. Shero’s speech satisfies the more stringent strict scrutiny standard.

In a designated public forum, “the government may only impose content-

neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that: (a) serve a significant

government interest; (b) are narrowly tailored to advance that interest; and (c)

leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” PeTA v. Rasmussen,

298 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491

U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The three-minute time limitation imposed on Mr. Shero’s

speech was a restriction appropriately designed to promote orderly and efficient

meetings. See Rowe v. City of Cocoa, Fla., 358 F.3d 800, 803 (11th Cir. 2004);

Wright v. Anthony, 733 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1984); V Aplt. App. tab A at 1.

In addition, Mr. Shero had ample alternative channels of communication available

to him and utilized them by, among other things, appearing in a local newspaper

and circulating flyers. V Aplt. App. tab 17E at 1-2; tab I at 1; Aplee Br. at 9.

III. Retaliation

Mr. Shero next challenges the district court’s determination that he did not

experience any unconstitutional retaliation by the City for exercising his First

Amendment rights. Aplt. Br. at 46. Mr. Shero alleges that the City retaliated

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against and attempted to chill his speech about government corruption at city

council meetings by rejecting his requests for council packets, placing a time

limit on his speech at the February 17, 2004 city council meeting, and filing a

declaratory judgment suit against him. Id. at 19-20. The district court analyzed

whether the City retaliated against Mr. Shero for requesting council packets and

not whether it retaliated against him for his speech about city corruption. Even

expanding our analysis to recognize, however, that the City’s acts could have

been in response to Mr. Shero’s constitutionally protected speech at the city

council meetings, we conclude that Mr. Shero has not demonstrated

unconstitutional retaliation. The district court’s decision was essentially correct

on this issue.

In Worrell v. Henry, we considered the elements necessary for a

retaliation claim where the governmental defendant is not the plaintiff’s employer

nor a party to a contract with the plaintiff. See 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir.

2000). Government retaliation against a plaintiff for exercising his or her First

Amendment rights may be shown by proving the following elements: (1) that the

plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the

defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a

person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3)

that the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to

the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Id. (quotations

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omitted). “[W]hen the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s action was taken in

retaliation for protected speech, our standard for evaluating that chilling effect on

speech is objective, rather than subjective . . . a trivial or de minimis injury will

not support a retaliatory prosecution claim.” Eaton v. Meneley, 379 F.3d 949,

954-55 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).

Although Mr. Shero was engaged in constitutionally protected activity

when he alleged government corruption during the public comments portion of the

city council meetings, see Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v.

Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982), the City’s actions would not,

as a matter of law, chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to speak

out. See Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1212. Indeed, the City’s denial of his requests for

council packets and the mayor’s implementation of a time limitation on his speech

are, at best, de minimis injuries. See Eaton, 379 F.3d at 954-55. Mr. Shero has

not shown that his discourse with the council was inhibited in any way by the

denials of the council packets or the three-minute speech limitation. He remained

“free to express [his] views publicly and to criticize” the city council, id. at 956

(internal quotation omitted), and, in fact, he did.

Furthermore, being properly named as a defendant in a declaratory

judgment suit, however styled, would not chill a person of ordinary firmness from

continuing to engage in constitutionally protected activity. See Worrell, 219 F.3d

at 1212. “The nature and purpose of a declaratory judgment is to declare rights,”

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not to attack the opposing party. Degarza v. Okla. City Univ., 20 P.3d 152, 153

(Okla. Civ. App. 2000). In particular, under Oklahoma’s Declaratory Judgment

Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1651, the state court was prohibited from awarding

damages against Mr. Shero.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Mr. Shero urges us to reverse the district court’s grant of qualified

immunity to Ms. Parker, Mr. Galletly, and Ms. Buzzard because they violated his

constitutional rights. Aplt. Br. at 57. Our conclusions above require us to affirm

the district court.

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The privilege is an immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability. Serna v. Colo. Dept. of Corrections, 455

F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). This court uses a step-by-step, three-part test

in analyzing a qualified immunity defense: (1) whether the plaintiff’s allegations,

if true, establish a constitutional violation (if not, the claim is dismissed); (2)

whether the law was clearly established at the time the alleged violations

occurred; and (3) whether extraordinary circumstances–such as reliance on the

advice of counsel or on a statute–so prevented the official from knowing that his

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or her actions were unconstitutional that he or she should not be imputed with

knowledge of a clearly established right. Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134

(10th Cir. 2006).

We have held above that, as a matter of law, the City and its employees’

actions in rejecting Mr. Shero’s requests for council packets, limiting his

speaking time at a city council meeting, and filing a declaratory judgment suit

against him did not violate Mr. Shero’s First Amendment rights or constitute

unconstitutional retaliation. As there was no constitutional violation, see id., the

district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the City employees was

appropriate.

AFFIRMED.

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No. 06-5222, Shero v. City of Grove, et al.

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The majority affirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment in its

entirety. Although I concur in the judgment affirming the ruling against Shero

with regard to his claims arising out of the denial of the city council packets and

the time limitation, I conclude that the majority unnecessarily addresses the

merits of those claims. With regard to Shero’s claim that the filing of the

declaratory judgment action against him constituted retaliation for exercising his

First Amendment rights, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand this

issue for further proceedings.

I. The city council packets

The majority concludes that the defendants could not have violated Shero’s

First Amendment rights by denying him the city council packets. Because Shero

relied on a different theory before the district court, I would not address the

merits of this claim.

Shero argues before this court that the defendants interfered with his “First

Amendment right to seek information” by denying him the city council packets.

Aplt.’s Br. at 37. The right to seek information is a corollary to the freedom of

the press. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), the Supreme Court

remarked that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the

press could be eviscerated.” Accordingly, the Court has noted that “[t]here is an
undoubted right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the law.’”

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at

681-82). Shero relies on these cases to support his First Amendment claim that

he had a right to the city council packets.

Shero asserts this theory for the first time on appeal. In his complaint

before the district court, Shero relied on the First Amendment right to petition the

government for redress. See Compl., Vol. I, ex. 4, ¶ 31. In later filings, Shero

purported to rely on “the rights to Free Speech [and] to Petition the Government

for Redress . . . .” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Vol. III, ex.16, at 6; see also Pl.’s

Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Vol. VI, ex. 18, at 9-13. Shero based his

claim on the theory that the documents were necessary for him to exercise his

right to petition the government effectively. Whether Shero’s right to petition the

government was violated was the issue the district court addressed when it

identified Shero’s claim in its ruling: “Shero claims that his requests for council

packets were in furtherance of his right to petition the government, because the

information in the council packets was necessary for him to present informed

arguments to the City Council.” Op. & Order, Aplt.’s Br., Appx. B, at 6. All of

the arguments he made to the district court were tailored to this theory. Shero

never argued that the defendants’ actions denied him his rights under the First

Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press. He never referenced a “right to

seek information” or a “right to gather news from any source by means within the

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law” apart from his invocation of the right to petition. Although the defendants,

in their motion for summary judgment, cited several cases on this point, see

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Vol. II, ex. 15, at 16-18, Shero never relied on these

cases, and he continued to maintain that denial of the packets violated his First

Amendment right to petition the government for redress. As a result, this

argument was neither squarely presented to the district court, nor addressed by the

district court.

“Absent compelling reasons, we do not consider arguments that were not

presented to the district court.” Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir.

1994). Although we have discretion to address arguments raised for the first time

on appeal, we generally exercise that discretion only “where the jurisdiction of a

court to hear a case is questioned, sovereign immunity is raised, or when the

appellate court feels it must resolve a question of law to prevent a miscarriage of

justice.” Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir. 1991). The

first two exceptions clearly do not apply here, and there is no reason to believe

that a miscarriage of justice would result from a refusal to consider this issue.

Shero has been represented by counsel throughout this litigation. He has had a

number of opportunities to advance this theory before the district court: in his

initial complaint, his amended complaint, his motion for summary judgment, his

response to the opposing parties’ motion to dismiss, and his response to their

motion for summary judgment. Despite these opportunities, Shero never

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mentioned the “right to seek information” or to “gather news” now claimed in his

brief.

The danger of permitting an appellant to raise even a related issue on

appeal is evident here: although the defendants address this argument in their

brief, they are understandably confused about what Shero is arguing, and they

devote the bulk of their arguments to rebutting any claim that they violated

Shero’s right to petition the government for redress. See Aples.’ Br. at 23-26. By

considering this issue, the majority “run[s] the risk of an improvident or ill-

advised opinion, given our dependence as an Article III court on the adversarial

process for sharpening the issues for decision.” Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236,

1251 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]o avoid error,

we are dependent on the full development of issues through the adversarial

process and the initial testing of ideas in trial courts where advocates have an

opportunity to present more than thin briefs and fifteen minute oral arguments.”

Id. While Shero’s theory may have little merit, I am hesitant to foreclose relief

to litigants in future cases with similar facts by ruling on this issue without the

benefit of the district court’s insight and full, well-reasoned argument by the

parties. Because Shero failed to argue that his “right to seek information” was

violated before the district court, I would not now consider it.

II. The time limitation at city council meetings

The majority also concludes that the defendants could not have violated

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Shero’s First Amendment rights by limiting his speaking time at city council

meetings to three minutes. Because Shero has failed to present a clear

enunciation of the issue or authority to support it, I would not address the merits

of this argument either.

The majority assumes that Shero is challenging the district court’s

application of First Amendment forum analysis, and affirms the district court on

this basis. (Maj. Op. at 10-12.) It is not apparent that Shero has reasserted the

same argument that he made to the district court. On appeal, he often appears to

be arguing that the time limitation supports his claim for retaliation. This is

clearest in his reply brief, in which Shero devotes an entire section to arguing that

the “unprecedented limitation by Grove was in retaliation for Shero publicly

speaking out against corruption.” Aplt.’s Reply at 15. Shero also failed to argue

this aspect of his retaliation claim before the district court, and for the same

reasons already stated, we should not now consider it.

As for the district court’s forum analysis, Shero purports to “concur[] with .

. . the District Court’s conclusion on allowing members of the public to speak”

and its “conclusion about opening facilities to speakers,” but nonetheless argues

that it “erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, Shero’s First Amendment rights

were not implicated by the limitation.” Aplt.’s Br. at 42-43. If this language in

fact challenges the district court’s forum analysis, Shero has not provided us with

any reason to question the district court’s ruling. He cites only four cases in the

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section of his brief devoted to the time limitation, see id. at 42-45, and two of

these cases simply provide broad statements of the purposes behind the First

Amendment. While the other two cases might conceivably apply, Shero provides

no discussion of whether they apply, and if so, how they should be applied. He

provides no guidance as to what type of forum a city council meeting is, what

standard we should apply here, how we should apply the standard to these facts,

or whether we should even apply forum analysis at all.

Because Shero fails to present reasoned argument on this point, I would not

consider it. Where “there are a few scattered statements” in an appellant’s brief

that “suggest dissatisfaction” with the district court’s ruling, as there are here, we

have held that “such perfunctory complaints fail to frame and develop an issue

sufficient to invoke appellate review.” Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2

(10th Cir. 1994). The reason is clear. In order to reverse the district court’s

determination, we would have to fashion an argument in Shero’s favor ourselves.

However, “the court will not construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in

the absence of any discussion of those issues.” Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927

F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991). Further, as is the case with issues that were not

argued below, to rule on this issue “would run the risk of an improvident or ill-

advised opinion[.]” Kemp, 478 F.3d at 1251.

The danger of rendering an ill-advised opinion is particularly prevalent

with regard to this claim, which presents legal issues of first impression in this

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circuit. See (Maj. Op. at 11.) The majority may be correct that in most cases, a

limitation on speaking time at a public meeting is a permissible restriction on

speech—at least when that limitation is imposed pursuant to an official policy

established prior to the meeting. In this case, however, there are additional

allegations that no official policy was in place prior to the meeting and that Shero

was the only speaker subjected to a time limitation. According to Shero, no

official policy of limiting speakers was imposed until long after the challenged

time limitation was imposed. The cases cited in the majority’s opinion dealt with

limitations imposed pursuant to an official policy that was already in place at the

time of the meeting. See Rowe v. City of Cocoa, Fla., 358 F.3d 800, 803 (11th

Cir. 2004); Wright v. Anthony, 733 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1984). They provide

no clear guidance as to how the very different facts presented in this case may

affect our decision.

By considering this issue, the majority has not only run the risk of an ill-

advised opinion, but has also addressed an issue that Shero may not have even

raised. I would not address the merits of this issue.

III. Shero’s retaliation claim

The majority concludes that there is no merit to Shero’s claim that because

he spoke out at city council meetings and expressed concern about the actions of

city council members, the defendants retaliated by filing a declaratory judgment

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action against him. 1 I disagree.

The majority applies our three-factor test for the likely success of a

retaliation claim, considering whether (1) Shero was engaged in constitutionally

protected activity; (2) the defendants’ action caused Shero to suffer an injury that

would chill a person of ordinary fitness from continuing to engage in that

protected activity; and (3) the defendants’ action was substantially motivated as a

response to Shero’s constitutionally protected conduct. (Maj. Op. at 13 (citing

Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000)).) As the majority

correctly notes, Shero claims that the alleged retaliation resulted from his

continued criticism of members of the city council, both at city council meetings

and in other fora. This is an unquestionably protected activity, and the first prong

of the test is therefore satisfied. The majority does not believe, however, that the

filing of the action against Shero can meet the second prong of the test. The

majority reaches this conclusion because, first, the purpose of a typical

declaratory judgment action is to declare rights, and second, Shero could not be

ordered to pay damages. (Maj. Op. at 14.)

We have previously recognized that “a governmental lawsuit brought with

the intent to retaliate against a citizen for the exercise of his First Amendment

1
The majority also addresses Shero’s claim that the document denials and
time limitation were in retaliation for his constitutionally-protected speech.
Because these claims were not presented to the district court, I would not consider
them for the same reasons stated above.

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rights is itself a violation of the First Amendment and provides grounds for a §

1983 suit.” Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that

libel action by county hospital was sufficient injury to chill exercise of rights).

While this lawsuit may differ from others because Shero could not be held liable

for monetary damages, there are other disadvantages to being named as a

defendant in a declaratory judgment action. Shero was forced to devote time and

effort to the defense of the action, and although he was eventually awarded

attorney’s fees, this result was not known until after he had utilized his own

assets in order to pay his initial costs. See Aplt.’s Br. at 49. Looking at the suit

prospectively, moreover, he may have been unaware of the possibility or

likelihood of recovering attorney’s fees. The prospect of having to pay one’s own

costs may alone be enough to dissuade a person from continuing to engage in

constitutionally protected speech. Further, the filing of a lawsuit, while a matter

of course for attorneys, is a significant matter for private citizens. Cf. Bell v.

School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 734 F.2d 155, 158 (4th Cir. 1984) (Rosenn, J.,

concurring) (noting that a plaintiff who is “untutored in the niceties of the law”

might feel threatened by a lawsuit in which no damages could be awarded “to the

extent of being reluctant to speak quite as freely with the suit hanging over her

head as she would have been without it”). A reasonable factfinder could

conclude that the filing of the state court action, if in fact undertaken in

retaliation for Shero’s criticism of city council members, was sufficient to “chill a

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person of ordinary fitness from continuing to engage in that activity,” thus

satisfying the second prong.

Moreover, in concluding that the purpose of this declaratory judgment

action was to declare the respective rights of the parties, the majority

impermissibly resolves an issue of material fact regarding the third prong, the

defendants’ intent in filing the action. Although the declaratory judgment action

might have been nothing more than a good-faith attempt to resolve a controversy,

this appeal is taken from a grant of summary judgment, and we must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to Shero. Even in the absence of direct

evidence of a retaliatory intent in the record, circumstantial evidence may very

well support a finding that the defendants intended to retaliate and to dissuade

Shero from speaking out against the city council. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d

673, 682 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[P]roof of an official’s retaliatory intent rarely will be

supported by direct evidence of such intent.”).

For example, in her deposition, Grove’s city attorney, Dorothy Parker,

explained why she had filed the action, stating that “Mr. Shero had begun calling

attention to himself and to his complaints against the City.” Vol. III, ex. 16-E, at

83. She explained that in filing the action, she sought to “reduce . . . some of the

covert hostility that appeared to be simmering below the surface and was starting

to bubble up based on the public expressions at the council meetings, public

expressions on the street.” Id. She continued:

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 [P]eople were being embarrassed because, number one, they were not
drawing attention to themselves. Mr. Shero was seeking and getting
attention. And it was. He was saying things. He was saying things
about me that were not true. Absolutely he would say things at me
that were just absolutely not true . . .

I don’t know how Mr. Shero got all this media attention. But he was
on the local radio. He was in the local papers. He managed to get an
interview on television. And in these publicity events that he would
have, he would make statements either about myself or about the
City manager or about the elected officials that were not necessarily
supported by fact. And it did cause embarrassment, because as soon
as this case out, you know, our phones started ringing . . .

And his comments to the press, his comments on the radio, his
comments to the newspaper and his comments on the television. He
just didn’t limit his comments to City Council meeting[s]. And all of
these comments did result in embarrassment to the – – to my client.

Id. at 84-87.

As Parker’s testimony indicates, Shero’s public comments had been a

source of some consternation and embarrassment for city officials, and a

factfinder could reasonably infer that the filing of the action was in retaliation for

Shero’s criticism of city council members and other public commentary. That

there is another, perfectly legal explanation for the filing of the lawsuit does not

prevent Shero from recovering. “An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a

constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when

taken for a different reason, would have been proper.” DeLoach v. Bevers, 922

F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Because there is evidence in the record that would support all three prongs

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of the test for retaliation, I would hold that the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the defendants on Shero’s retaliation claim was in error, and reverse. 2

2
The majority also affirms the district court’s dismissal of Shero’s claims
against the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, because it
does not believe there has been any constitutional violation. I would also reverse
this judgment as to the individuals involved in the retaliation claim against Shero.
I think it is premature to grant qualified immunity by assuming the defendants’
actions were not in retaliation for expressing protected speech.

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