FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 21, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ALVIN LYNN ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 07-6106
HONORABLE TOM A. LUCAS;
(D.C. No. CV-06-1386-HE)
HONORABLE GARY L. LUMPKIN;
(W.D. Okla.)
CLEVELAND COUNTY DISTRICT
COURT; and OKLAHOMA COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Alvin Lynn Alexander, a state prisoner in Oklahoma, claims that the
Oklahoma state courts acted unconstitutionally in applying procedural bars under
state law to preclude Mr. Alexander’s petition for post-conviction relief, and he
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
court dismissed Mr. Alexander’s action for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Mr.
Alexander’s suit is either an improper Section 1983 suit because it seeks to
invalidate the underlying conviction, or it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine because it seeks direct review of a state court’s final judgment. For
substantially the same reasons expressed by the district court, we affirm the
dismissal of Mr. Alexander’s suit.
* * *
In 1995, Mr. Alexander pled guilty to a charge of second degree murder in
the District Court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma, and was sentenced to fifty
years’ imprisonment. Although Mr. Alexander did not appeal his conviction, he
has, while incarcerated, submitted several petitions for post-conviction relief in
Oklahoma state court, all of which have been denied. In the most recent state
court petition, Mr. Alexander argued that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
convict him because the district attorney failed to plead and prove the felony DUI
conviction underlying the felony-murder charge on which Mr. Alexander was
convicted; (2) the district court failed to make a determination of Mr. Alexander’s
competency to enter a plea; and (3) the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction
to accept Mr. Alexander’s plea. The District Court of Cleveland County denied
Mr. Alexander’s petition for relief, citing Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1080 et seq., as well as state court precedent interpreting
that Act, which preclude petitions for post-conviction relief based on arguments
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that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment on the same grounds.
Unsuccessful in seeking relief from the Oklahoma state courts, Mr.
Alexander brought suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as
defendants the judges presiding over his trial court and appellate proceedings, as
well as their respective courts. In his complaint, Mr. Alexander argues that the
Oklahoma courts incorrectly applied state law to preclude consideration of his
petition for post-conviction relief, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to
due process. Along the way, Mr. Alexander’s complaint also recounts and re-
argues the claims for relief underlying his state petition.
The case was referred to a magistrate judge for initial consideration,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). The magistrate judge construed Mr.
Alexander’s suit as essentially attacking the constitutionality, and thus validity, of
his conviction. As such, the magistrate recommended that the district court
dismiss the case, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), for
improperly using Section 1983 as a vehicle to challenge the validity of a
conviction. In a footnote, the magistrate also stated that, to the extent Mr.
Alexander’s suit can be construed as challenging an unfavorable state court
decision (referring to the decision on Mr. Alexander’s most recent post-conviction
relief petition), such a suit is foreclosed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Jan. 19, 2007, Report and Recommendation. The district court accepted the
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magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the case, stating that it was
barred either under Heck or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, depending on how the
suit is construed. See Apr. 9, 2007, Dist. Ct. Order. Mr. Alexander filed a timely
notice of appeal.
* * *
Affording solicitous consideration to Mr. Alexander’s pro se court filings,
as we are bound to do, see Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th
Cir. 2007), we acknowledge the ambiguity of Mr. Alexander’s complaint before
the district court. At some points, the complaint seems to focus on the
constitutionality and validity of the Oklahoma state courts’ application of
procedural bars to Mr. Alexander’s post-conviction petitions for relief. See
generally Dec. 15, 2006, Complaint. At other points, it seems to contest the
constitutionality and validity of the conviction itself. See id. We need not
conclusively determine the actual nature of Mr. Alexander’s complaint for,
construed either way, we are constrained to affirm the district court’s dismissal.
If Mr. Alexander’s suit is meant to directly attack the validity of his
conviction, then we must dismiss the suit as an improper use of Section 1983. In
Heck, the Supreme Court stated that, if judgment in favor of the prisoner plaintiff
in a Section 1983 damages suit “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence[, then] the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”
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512 U.S. at 487; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997)
(extending the rule in Heck to Section 1983 claims that, like Mr. Alexander’s,
seek declaratory relief). In his complaint, Mr. Alexander makes a number of
arguments that would, if accepted by a court, clearly indicate the invalidity of his
conviction. For example, Mr. Alexander argues that the state trial court never had
jurisdiction to accept a plea and enter a judgment of conviction. Moreover, Mr.
Alexander has never demonstrated that his conviction has already been
invalidated. As such, Mr. Alexander’s suit, construed in this way, has no proper
basis as a Section 1983 claim.
Mr. Alexander, however, argues emphatically in his brief on appeal that his
suit does not challenge the validity of his conviction but instead only challenges
the Oklahoma courts’ application of procedural bars to dismiss his post-
conviction petitions for relief. Such an interpretation of his complaint is
confirmed in part by the complaint’s request for relief, which expressly seeks
only a declaration that the state courts’ review procedure is unconstitutional and
an injunction ordering a re-hearing on his post-conviction petition and ordering
the courts to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment. Nowhere does Mr.
Alexander specifically ask for the court to declare his conviction unconstitutional
or invalid, even if his complaint includes arguments that seek to demonstrate such
invalidity. If we accept Mr. Alexander’s contention on appeal, we must agree
with him that his suit is not precluded under Heck or its progeny. But construed
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in this way, Mr. Alexander’s suit must be dismissed on the other grounds stated
by the district court – namely, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Under this doctrine, federal district courts have no jurisdiction to consider
suits “that amount to appeals of state-court judgments.” Bolden v. City of Topeka,
441 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court has stated, the
doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the [federal] district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). 1 Mr. Alexander readily acknowledges that his suit seeks review and
rejection of the Oklahoma state courts’ judgments regarding his post-conviction
petitions for relief. In essence, he asks that we vacate the state courts’ dismissal
of his petition and order a re-hearing. Neither we nor the district court have
jurisdiction to do so. The only federal review that Mr. Alexander can seek is by
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 285-86; 28
1
We note that the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been clarified
in recent years and that we no longer apply it unless the federal suit commenced
after the state court appeals process had run its full course. See Guttman v.
Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2006). In Oklahoma, the Court of
Criminal Appeals is the state’s highest court for criminal matters. See Okla.
Const. art. 7 § 4; Okla.Stat. tit. 20 § 40. Its judgment on Mr. Alexander’s appeal
was entered on November 21, 2006, and Mr. Alexander filed his complaint in
federal court on December 15, 2006. As such, Mr. Alexander’s suit clearly falls
within the scope of Rooker-Feldman.
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U.S.C. § 1257. We are therefore bound to affirm the district court’s dismissal
even if we construe Mr. Alexander’s complaint exactly as he contends.
* * *
Because Mr. Alexander’s appeal fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted, we assess, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), one strike in addition
to the strike assessed by the district court. We note that the district court granted
Mr. Alexander’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, but we wish to remind Mr.
Alexander of his obligation to continue making partial payments until the entire
filing fee for this appeal is paid. See id. § 1915(a), (b). The appeal is dismissed. 2
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
2
In his brief on appeal, Mr. Alexander asks that a certificate of
appealability be granted. Because a certificate of appealability is not necessary
for a prisoner civil rights appeal, we need not consider that request. See, e.g.,
Lawson v. Engleman, 67 Fed. Appx. 524, 527 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003).
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