FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 7, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JACKIE R. WILKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 06-3400
v. (D.C. No. 04-CV-4024-KGS)
(D. Kan.)
PACKERWARE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
Jackie Wilkins, formerly a print operator with PackerWare Corporation,
sought medical attention for what he thought was a work-related injury to his
right arm. His doctor advised him to rest his arm for an extended period, advice
that meant Mr. Wilkins would be unable to perform his regular job duties. Mr.
Wilkins’s employer gave him the option either to take unpaid leave or pursue
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
light-duty work that would not interfere with his doctor’s orders. Mr. Wilkins
opted for light-duty work, but then repeatedly failed to show up or call in before
his shift started. Eventually, PackerWare fired him for excessive, unexcused
absences; Mr. Wilkins sued, alleging that PackerWare had violated the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA” or “the Act”) and Kansas workers’
compensation law. The case went to trial, and a jury returned a verdict in favor
of PackerWare on all counts.
On appeal, Mr. Wilkins challenges the propriety of the district court’s jury
instructions and special verdict form. He argues, among other things, that the
district court erroneously required him to establish that he was eligible for leave
under the FMLA as a precondition to bringing a retaliation claim, incorrectly
defined a “serious health condition” under the Act, and wrongly instructed the
jury under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting rubric. Discerning no
reversible error in the district court’s conduct of the trial, however, we affirm.
I
A
Mr. Wilkins worked as a print operator at PackerWare from 1989 until he
was fired on March 15, 2002. During the entire tenure of his employment,
PackerWare maintained a written attendance policy. Under that policy, an
employee’s unexcused absences resulted in the assessment of various numbers of
“points.” For example, failure to show up for a shift earned an employee one
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point. Failure to report an absence before the beginning of a missed shift added
two more points to the tally. Leaving early meant a half-point. Accumulating 9
or more points in one year was grounds for dismissal.
During most of Mr. Wilkins’s employment, PackerWare also maintained a
leave of absence policy, which included a provision for leave under the FMLA.
Prior to the incidents that gave rise to this lawsuit, Mr. Wilkins took periods of
FMLA leave, without incident, for his own medical conditions and to care for his
wife. Mr. Wilkins also received workers’ compensation benefits for various,
minor, job-related injuries. Following all such past instances of leave, he
returned to his regular job duties.
During the evening shift on March 4, 2002, Mr. Wilkins reported that his
ongoing wrist pain, which he believed to be work-related, had become acute. He
sought treatment at a hospital that night and saw a doctor the next day. The
doctor ordered Mr. Wilkins to restrict movement of his right arm and scheduled a
follow-up appointment. Mr. Wilkins promptly met with PackerWare’s benefits
coordinator, Deanna Hemming, who determined that Mr. Wilkins could not
perform his regular job duties consistent with the doctor’s advice, and therefore
offered Mr. Wilkins the choice of a different, light-duty position in another
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department or leave without pay until he could return to his regular job. 1 Mr.
Wilkins chose to take the light-duty shift.
On Thursday, March 7, 2002, the day he was supposed to begin light-duty
work, Mr. Wilkins telephoned Ms. Hemming an hour after his shift started. Mr.
Wilkins left a message saying that he was not coming to work and that he would
begin light-duty work the following Monday, March 11, 2002. Mr. Wilkins
neither called nor worked on Friday, March 8. On March 11, Mr. Wilkins again
called Ms. Hemming approximately an hour after his shift began and left a
message saying that he was not coming to work. In neither that message, nor the
message of March 7, did he explain the reasons for his absence. Mr. Wilkins
reported to work on Tuesday, March 12 on time, but he clocked out early for a
doctor’s appointment three hours later.
The next day, PackerWare suspended Mr. Wilkins and, two days after that,
on March 15, it terminated his employment. According to PackerWare’s records,
Mr. Wilkins had accumulated 14.5 attendance points, well more than the 9 that
supplies grounds for dismissal under the company’s policy. Of these 14.5 points,
6.5 were incurred in the final days of Mr. Wilkins’s employment – 3 for failing to
come to work without advance notification on March 7; 3 for failing to come to
work without advance notification on March 11; and 0.5 for leaving early on
1
Under the FMLA, leave may be without pay, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c), and
Mr. Wilkins does not argue that PackerWare violated either the FMLA or the
Kansas Workers Compensation Act by offering him unpaid leave.
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March 12. Mr. Wilkins was assessed no attendance points for the absence of
March 8, which Ms. Hemming treated as an exercise of the option to take unpaid
leave. On March 19, Mr. Wilkins participated in a termination review arranged
by PackerWare and conducted by two of its managerial employees. Those
managers concluded that Mr. Wilkins was properly assessed points for his
absences and that the company’s policies had been followed.
B
Following PackerWare’s internal review, Mr. Wilkins brought this suit in
the District of Kansas. Eventually, the case went to trial on three counts, with
Mr. Wilkins asserting that PackerWare unlawfully (1) retaliated against his
decision to take leave, in violation of the FMLA; (2) denied him leave under the
FMLA; and (3) retaliated against him for asserting his rights under the Kansas
Workers Compensation Act. In turn, PackerWare defended its actions primarily
on three grounds. First, it argued that Mr. Wilkins did not qualify for FMLA
leave, and that he was therefore neither denied a statutory right nor retaliated
against for exercising one. Second, PackerWare asserted that Mr. Wilkins was
fired not for taking or attempting to take any sort of protected leave, but for
violating its attendance policy. Finally, PackerWare argued that, even if Mr.
Wilkins was entitled to leave, it had no notice that he wished to take such leave,
as Mr. Wilkins had volunteered to take an alternate, light-duty position, rather
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than the unpaid leave offered him, and then simply did not show up for work as
promised.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of PackerWare on all counts. Mr.
Wilkins filed timely motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.
The district court denied those motions and this appeal followed. In it, Mr.
Wilkins challenges certain aspects of the district court’s jury instructions as
legally erroneous and certain aspects of the jury’s verdict as internally consistent;
we here address the most material of Mr. Wilkins’s challenges.
II
Beginning with Mr. Wilkins’s challenge to the district court’s jury
instructions, we are obliged to note at the outset that only a few of his arguments
were ever presented to the district court for its consideration. Where Mr. Wilkins
did raise an objection before the district court, we may review the contested
instruction de novo to determine whether the instructions, when viewed as a
whole, properly advised the jury of governing law. We will reverse under this
standard “when (1) we have substantial doubt whether the instructions, considered
as a whole, properly guided the jury in its deliberations; and (2) when a deficient
jury instruction is prejudicial.” Williams v. W.D. Sports, 497 F.3d 1079, 1093
(10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). To be prejudicial, the
error must be more than what we have described as “harmless” or “immaterial”;
that is, it must be of sufficient import that it fairly could be described as having
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changed the trial’s result. See Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 796 F.2d 1307,
1310 (10th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; 11 Wright
& Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.2d § 2886.
By contrast, where Mr. Wilkins failed to object before the district court, we
may reverse the district court’s instructions only in the presence of plain error.
W.D. Sports, 497 F.3d at 1094; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 51(d)(2). Under that standard,
we will disturb the district court’s judgment only if Mr. Wilkins can (1) show
error that was (2) plainly evident, (3) affected his substantial rights, and
(4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings. United States v. Torres-Laranega, 476 F.3d 1148, 1154 (10th Cir.
2007).
A
Instruction 15 advised the jury that in order to succeed on his FMLA
retaliation claim Mr. Wilkins had to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that: (1) he suffered from a “serious health condition”; (2) he gave PackerWare
“proper ‘notice’ of the need to be absent from work”; (3) he was discharged from
employment; and (4) his absence from work was a substantial or motivating factor
that prompted PackerWare to take action. Aplt’s App. at 381.
On appeal, Mr. Wilkins argues that the district court should not have
required him to establish elements (1) and (2). To be sure, Mr. Wilkins does not
dispute that his eligibility for FMLA leave was dependent on the presence of both
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a serious health condition and proper notice to his employer. Rather, he contends
that he should not have been required to prove his eligibility for leave in order to
pursue a claim for retaliation. As a matter of law, he claims, an employee
engages in “protected activity” for purposes of an FMLA retaliation claim
whenever he or she asserts an FMLA right, even if it later emerges that the
employee is not actually eligible for leave.
Mr. Wilkins did not raise this argument before the district court, so we may
reverse only in the presence of plain error. But far from being an obvious or
evident point of law, the legal position Mr. Wilkins advances appears to implicate
what is very much an open question in this circuit.
On the one hand, in a somewhat analogous context we have held the law to
be as Mr. Wilkins proposes – namely, that “in order to prosecute an [Americans
with Disabilities Act] retaliation claim, a plaintiff need not show that she suffers
from an actual disability. Instead, a reasonable, good faith belief that the statute
has been violated suffices.” Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249,
1264 (10th Cir. 2001). And such an approach might be argued to make sense in
the FMLA context as well. If, for example, an employee took time off to care for
an ailing spouse, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), only to discover that the spouse had
been misdiagnosed and did not suffer from a serious health condition, it would
arguably serve to defeat the purpose of the statute to allow the employer to fire
the employee on the basis of a doctor’s misdiagnosis.
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On the other hand, it is not unlawful under the FMLA for an employer to
fire an employee for requesting or taking leave for purposes other than those
described by the Act. The FMLA protects an employee’s leave only (A) for the
birth of, and to care for, a child, (B) for the adoption or assumption of foster care
of a child, (C) to care for an immediate family member suffering from a serious
health condition, or (D) for the employee’s own serious health condition, which
makes it impossible for him or her to work. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). And this
leave is limited to “eligible employees,” who have worked for the employer for at
least 12 months and have worked at least 1,250 hours in those 12 months. Id.
§ 2611(2)(A). An employee thus cannot claim protection under the Act merely by
asserting that he or she wishes to take FMLA leave, and then, say, be free to
vacation in Hawaii, without fear of adverse consequences. Our precedent may
also be read to prefigure the conclusion that the lawful taking of FMLA leave is a
prerequisite to a retaliation claim, see Campbell v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 478
F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007) (“a retaliation claim may be brought when the
employee successfully took FMLA leave . . .”) (emphasis added), as might the
decision of at least one of our sister circuits, see Walker v. Elmore County Bd. of
Educ., 379 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that the
“FMLA protects a request for FMLA leave regardless of whether the employee
would be eligible for the leave,” and expressly holding that “the statute does not
protect an attempt to exercise a right that is not provided by FMLA”).
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As these competing arguments for and against Mr. Wilkins’s position
suggest, the question whether the district court’s instruction was erroneous is
open and contestable – which by its very definition cannot qualify as plainly
evident error. Accordingly, under our standard of review, we are in no position to
disturb the district court’s judgment on the guidance provided to the jury in
Instruction 15, see Torres-Laranega, 476 F.3d at 1154, and we need not decide
whether one must actually be eligible for FMLA leave to bring a claim for
retaliation under the Act.
B
Mr. Wilkins next complains about two definitions offered by the district
court in Instruction 16. Seeking to elucidate certain of the terms employed in
Instruction 15, the court fashioned Instruction 16 to clarify for the jury that, in
order to show that he provided the “proper notice” required by Instruction 15,
“Plaintiff is required to provide such notice as practicable.” Aplt’s App. at 383.
Separately, in order to establish that he suffered from a “serious health
condition,” Mr. Wilkins had to prove he suffered from “an illness, injury,
impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either inpatient care in
a hospital, hospice, or residential medical facility or continuing treatment by a
healthcare provider.” Id. at 382. The court added that the serious health
condition “must have resulted in plaintiff having an inability to perform assigned
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work for a period of more than three consecutive calendar days.” Id. (emphasis
added).
1. Mr. Wilkins asserts that, even if the district court was right to give a
notice instruction to the jury at all, Instruction 16 erred in describing the sort of
notice he was required to give in order to become eligible for FMLA leave.
Because he did not challenge the instruction on this score before the district court,
we can review the claim only for plain error.
The notice language about which Mr. Wilkins complains in Instruction 16
largely tracks Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations implementing the
FMLA. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (requiring that notice be given “as soon
as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case,” when
advanced notice is impossible) with Instruction 16 (requiring “such notice as
practicable,” when advanced notice is impossible). While this circuit does not
appear to have passed on this particular regulation, we have previously held that
challenged DOL regulations implementing the FMLA are entitled to Chevron
deference, as the DOL is charged with administering the statute. See Hackworth
v. Progressive Cas., Ins. Co., 468 F.3d 722, 726-27 (10th Cir. 2006). Because
Mr. Wilkins does not challenge the relevant regulation, we assume without
deciding for the purposes of this case that the regulation is a permissible
implementation of the Act and is entitled to deference.
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Nevertheless, Mr. Wilkins asserts the district court should have advised the
jury that notice was required “within one or two working days except in
extraordinary circumstances.” Aplt’s App. at 351; Aplt’s Op. Br. at 42. And, to
be sure, the DOL regulation itself does indicate that practicable notice will
usually come “within no more than one or two working days.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.303(a). But confining the period for notice to one or two working days may
actually be less favorable to a plaintiff than the instruction actually given,
focusing more broadly as it does on the question whether notice would have been
practicable. Further, Mr. Wilkins’s proposed instruction actually contradicted the
“one or two working day” policy advanced by DOL. Under the DOL policy, the
“one or two working day” window commences after the time the employee learns
of his or her need for leave – not after the employee has already begun taking
leave, as Mr. Wilkins argues. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (“within no more
than one or two working days of learning of the need for leave . . .”) (emphasis
added) with Aplt’s App. at 405 (“proper notice during a period of up to two days
after the absence”) (emphasis added). Unable to point to the DOL regulation for
support, Mr. Wilkins likewise points us to no other legal authority in the FMLA
or elsewhere to suggest that his proffered instruction would have been legally
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appropriate. Accordingly, we are given no reason to find error, let alone plain
error, in the district court’s chosen path. 2
2. With respect to the district court’s definition of “serious health
condition,” Mr. Wilkins argues primarily that the relevant inquiry should not have
been whether his medical condition was so serious that it precluded him from
performing “assigned work,” but whether it was sufficiently grave that it
precluded him from performing his usual work, i.e., the work required for his
normal position before his (voluntary) reassignment to light-work duty. Mr.
Wilkins contends that the FMLA’s focus is and should be on his ability to
perform his own job, and that any other rule would penalize him for voluntarily
assuming alternative work. Mr. Wilkins objected to Instruction 16 on this basis
before the district court and so our review is de novo.
We need not, however, pass today on the legal question presented by Mr.
Wilkins. Even assuming, without deciding, that the district court’s definition of
serious health condition was in error, Mr. Wilkins cannot be said to have been
prejudiced by it. We have already found no reversible error in the district court’s
notice instructions, instructions that treated notice as an independent and essential
2
Separately, Mr. Wilkins argues, as he did in his post-trial motions, that
PackerWare “did not dispute that it had proper notice within the meaning of the
FMLA,” and therefore it was error to include the second element of Instruction
15. Aplt’s Op. Br. at 43-44. But, as the district court concluded, notice was in
fact highly contested at trial, with the witnesses for each side giving very
different accounts of what notice was actually provided and when. See Sept. 29,
2006 Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order at 24 (Aplt’s App. at 613).
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element of Mr. Wilkins’ claim. See supra Parts II.A & B.1. With the jury’s
express finding against him on that element, reflected in its answer to the court’s
special interrogatory, there was no need for the jury to reach the analytically
subsequent question whether Mr. Wilkins suffered from a serious health
condition. That is, having failed on what was lawfully treated by the district
court as a distinct and antecedent element, any putative error in an instruction on
a later element is simply beside the point. 3
C
Instruction 17 advised the jury that, even if Mr. Wilkins proved the
elements for a retaliation claim set forth in Instruction 15 by a preponderance of
the evidence, the jury must find for PackerWare on the retaliation claim if the
company “articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse
employment action taken,” and Mr. Wilkins could not show that explanation to be
“merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation.” Aplt’s App. at 384. Mr. Wilkins
objected to this instruction at trial on the same basis that he now argues it was in
error: namely that it confused the jury by describing the McDonnell Douglas
3
Separately, Mr. Wilkins argues that the district court erred in instructing
the jury that “Plaintiff cannot rely solely on his own assessment of his health” to
demonstrate that he suffers from a serious health condition. Aplt’s Op. Br. at 19-
20; Aplt’s App. at 382. But Mr. Wilkins not only did not object to this portion of
Instruction 16, he actually argued for it. See Aplt’s App. 541-42. Accordingly,
any error is invited error and cannot be challenged on appeal. United States v.
Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007).
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burden-shifting framework. We review the district court’s decision to instruct the
jury in this manner de novo.
In doing so, we readily acknowledge that Mr. Wilkins is correct that we
have previously criticized charging a jury on the intricacies of McDonnell
Douglas “jargon.” Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997-98
(10th Cir. 2005); see also Wells v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-
28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring); MacDonald v. E. Wyo. Mental Health
Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1122 (10th Cir. 1991) (Seth, J., concurring). While
McDonnell Douglas provides a legal analytic tool for assessing pre-trial
discrimination challenges, at trial the question “is discrimination vel non,” and
introducing the intricacies of the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting framework
to jurors risks causing them “to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon
poorly understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimination.”
Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Systems, Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation omitted).
Still, we have indicated that the problem is not that the McDonnell-Douglas
framework is unduly prejudicial to one party over another. Rather, “[i]t is that it
unnecessarily complicates the jury’s job, and unnecessary complexity increases
the opportunity for error.” Whittington, 429 F.3d at 998. Because the
introduction of the framework is not per se prejudicial to either side, the “use of
such an instruction does not automatically require reversal.” Id. Instead, we will
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reverse only when there is evidence that the instruction, as given, was misleading
to the jury or otherwise prejudicial. Id. After reviewing Mr. Wilkins’s briefs and
the record, we are afforded no reason to think that the use of the McDonnell
Douglas framework misled the jury or otherwise proved prejudicial in this case.
Accordingly, without some reason to differentiate this trial from the many in
which we have allowed the jury verdict to stand in spite of the introduction of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, we are bound by our precedent to treat the error
as harmless. 4
D
Turning to Mr. Wilkins’s state law workers’ compensation claim, the
district court indicated in Instruction 19 that Mr. Wilkins had to satisfy four
elements – namely that (1) he sustained a compensable injury on the job;
(2) PackerWare knew about it; (3) PackerWare fired Mr. Wilkins; and (4) there
was a causal connection between his termination and his exercise of statutory
rights. See Aplt’s App. at 386; Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator, 35 P.3d
892, 899 (Kan. 2001). Mr. Wilkins argues that the district court should have
4
Our holding on this score applies with equal force to Mr. Wilkins’s
complaint about the district court’s use of the McDonnell Douglas framework
when advising the jury about his state law workers’ compensation claim
(Instruction 20), and his complaints about the special verdict form relating to
Instructions 17 and 20. Though Mr. Wilkins charges that the district court
erroneously instructed the jury pursuant to McDonnell Douglas on his FMLA
interference claim (Instruction 18), as well, this is simply not the case; Instruction
18 merely (and correctly) announces the elements of a FMLA Interference claim
with no traces of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
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instructed the jury only on the final element because PackerWare did not “dispute
the first three elements of the prima facie showing of retaliatory discharge.”
Aplt’s Op. Br. at 27. Mr. Wilkins did not object to Instruction 19 on this ground
in the district court, so our review is for plain error only.
There was no error at all. In support of his contention that PackerWare
conceded away all but one of the elements in Instruction 19, Mr. Wilkins cites
only to an oral statement made by counsel in the context of PackerWare’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in which counsel made, at most, a concession that a triable question of
fact existed on one element of the prima facie case. See Aplt’s App. at 507
(PackerWare conceding, “for the purposes of [it’s Rule 50] motion that probably
temporal proximity alone has raised a jury issue as to liability”). During the trial
itself, PackerWare did not remotely concede away any of the elements listed in
Instruction 19, and the district court’s instruction thus properly held Mr. Wilkins
to his proof. To acknowledge that a jury issue has been raised is hardly a
concession that the jury need not make a factual finding on an essential element
of plaintiff’s claim. On top of all this, Mr. Wilkins’s own proposed jury
instruction contains virtually the same four elements as those in the instruction
actually given to the jury, compare Aplt’s App. at 342 with id. at 386, with the
one small difference in verbiage being nothing to which Mr. Wilkins objected,
either before us or below. Accordingly, any conceivable error associated with the
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district court’s introduction of those elements (and we see none) would be invited
error. Shaffer, 472 F.3d at 1227.
III
Beyond his challenges to the district court’s jury instructions, Mr. Wilkins
contends that the jury’s verdict contains internally inconsistent answers.
Specifically, Mr. Wilkins asserts that the jury’s answer to the first special
interrogatory on his state law workers’ compensation claim – finding that he had
not sustained an injury for which he could assert a future claim for workers’
compensation – is inconsistent with its subsequent answer that PackerWare had
knowledge of Mr. Wilkins’s injury. To the question whether or not Mr. Wilkins
“sustained an injury on the job for which he could assert a future claim for
worker’s compensation benefits,” the jury answered “no.” Aplt’s App. at 413.
To the question whether PackerWare “had knowledge of [Mr. Wilkins’s] injury,”
however, the jury answered “yes.” Aplt’s App. at 413.
When faced with answers to a special verdict form that might be in
conflict, our precedent obliges us when possible to reconcile them rather than
assume an internally inconsistent verdict. Harvey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d
1343, 1347 (10th Cir. 1989) (“It is the duty of the court to attempt to harmonize
the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of them. Where there is a view
of the case that makes the jury’s answers to special interrogatories consistent,
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they must be resolved that way.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). We
are able to do so in this case.
It seems to us entirely plausible that the jury believed that Mr. Wilkins had
some injury of which PackerWare had knowledge, but did not believe that the
injury was one for which he could assert a future claim for compensation under
the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. Indeed, it appears undisputed that Mr.
Wilkins injured his arm and that PackerWare knew of this injury. What was
disputed was whether this injury entitled to him to workers’ compensation. In
this case, the jury could well have found that Mr. Wilkins could not be
compensated under the Kansas compensation scheme after he voluntarily assumed
light-duty work, but still find that PackerWare knew Mr. Wilkins had an injury
(though not one that precluded him from performing the light-duty work for
which he volunteered). When he failed to show up for work after choosing to
assume a new position, Mr. Wilkins would not have been fired for taking
protected leave – the ultimate issue to be decided in this case, Aplt’s Op. Br. at 45
– but for being absent without leave. While certain of the questions on the special
verdict form may be assailed with the benefit of hindsight, the jury’s responses to
them can fairly be reconciled.
***
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Because we discern no reversible error in the district court’s instructions
and no barrier to reading the jury’s verdict harmoniously, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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