FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 16, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
SCOT HOLLONBECK; JOSE
ANTONIO INIGUEZ; JACOB
WALTER JUNG HO HEILVEIL; VIE
SPORTS MARKETING, INC., a
Georgia corporation, No. 07-1053 and 07-1056
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE, a federally-chartered
corporation; U.S. PARALYMPICS,
INC., f/k/a United States Paralympic
Corporation, a Colorado non-profit
corporation,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
MARK E. SHEPHERD, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE, a corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
---------------------------
DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION
AND DEFENSE FUND; DISABILITY
RIGHTS ADVOCATES; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF THE BLIND;
LEGAL CENTER FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES; RAFAEL
IBARRA; KARIN KORB; TATYANA
McFADDEN,
Amici Curiae.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. Nos. 03-cv-1364-JLK and 99-CV-02077-JLK)
Amy Robertson of Fox & Robertson, P.C., Denver, Colorado (and Timothy P. Fox
of Fox & Robertson, P.C., Denver, Colorado; Kevin W. Williams, Legal Program
Director of Colorado Cross Disability Coalition, Denver, Colorado, with her on
the briefs), for Plaintiffs - Appellants.
Christopher Handman of Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. (Jeffrey S.
George, John W. Cook, and Anne H. Turner of Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P.,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Defendants - Appellees.
Samuel R. Bagenstos, St. Louis, Missouri, filed a brief for Amici Curiae.
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
In these consolidated appeals, paralympic athletes appeal the district
court’s dismissal of their claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the
United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”). In 07-1053, Plaintiffs-Appellants
Scot Hollonbeck, Jose Antonio Iniguez, and Jacob Walter Jung Ho Heilveil appeal
the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss in favor of the USOC on their §
504 claim. In 07-1056, Plaintiff Mark Shepherd appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the USOC on his § 504 claim. As both cases
raise identical legal issues, we consolidated the cases for briefing and submission.
Prior to our disposition, Mr. Shepherd and the USOC stipulated to a dismissal of
the appeal in 07-1056 under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). Our jurisdiction arises under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
The USOC is a federally-chartered corporation that has exclusive
jurisdiction over U.S. participation in three athletic competitions: the Olympic
Games, the Paralympic Games, and the Pan American Games. 36 U.S.C. §§
220502, 220503(3)(A). Under the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act
(“ASA”) as amended, id. §§ 220501–220529, Congress has charged the USOC to
“obtain for the United States, . . . the most competent amateur representation
possible in each event of the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, and the
Pan-American Games.” Id. § 220503(4).
The first Paralympic Games were held in 1960. Now the Paralympic
Games immediately follow the Olympic Games in the same host city and involve
between 1,100 and 4,000 athletes. Plaintiffs are all elite paralympic athletes who
have competed in at least one Paralympic Games. Plaintiffs are wheelchair racing
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paralympians. U.S. Paralympians have been very successful compared to their
Olympic counterparts with 42% of the Paralympians winning medals in 2000 and
75% winning medals in 2002 (compared to 16% of Olympians winning medals in
both 2000 and 2002). Aplt. App. at 241.
To achieve its mission under the ASA, the USOC provides Athlete Support
Programs which include various types of grants, tuition assistance, and health
insurance benefits. The criterion that the USOC uses to distribute the benefits
under its Resource Allocation Policy is that the applicant must be an athlete who
is “eligible to represent the United States and who intend[s] to compete, if
selected, in the next Olympic or Pan American Games.” Id. at 110.
Plaintiffs challenge the USOC’s policy of providing Athlete Support
Programs only to Olympic team members, to the exclusion of Paralympic team
members, as violating § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court
consolidated two separate cases for oral argument which the parties and the court
agreed raise identical legal issues under Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Hollonbeck v.
USOC, No. 07-1053, on a motion to dismiss; and Shephard v. USOC, No. 07-
1056, on cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled for the
USOC on the Title III and § 504 claims in both cases and entered final judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on those claims. Prior to our disposition, Mr.
Shepherd and the USOC stipulated to the dismissal of the appeal in 07-1056
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pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). Plaintiffs Hollonbeck, Iniguez, and Heilveil
only appeal the district court’s dismissal of their § 504 claims.
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that (1) the relevant universe for analysis should
be all amateur athletes over which the USOC has responsibility; (2) they are
“otherwise qualified” for the Athlete Support Programs; (3) the USOC’s policy
discriminates against them; and (4) the USOC’s policy has the effect of screening
out amateur athletes with disabilities.
Discussion
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard as the district court. Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d
1106, 1112–13 (10th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss de novo as well, considering whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). All facts alleged in
the Hollonbeck complaint are assumed to be true in reviewing the motion to
dismiss. The parties stipulated to a set of facts in Shepherd for the purpose of the
cross-motions for summary judgment. Aplee. Br. at 5 n.1. Because the facts are
undisputed, we consider whether Plaintiffs state a claim or whether the USOC is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states: “No otherwise qualified
individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). A prima facie case under § 504 consists of
proof that (1) plaintiff is handicapped under the Act; (2) he is “otherwise
qualified” to participate in the program; (3) the program receives federal financial
assistance; and (4) the program discriminates against plaintiff. Powers v. MJB
Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs first argue that the relevant universe for analysis is all amateur
athletes over which the USOC has responsibility, and the district court erred in
restricting its discrimination analysis to the Olympics. Plaintiffs argue that the
ASA’s use of the term “amateur athlete” and § 504’s definition of “program or
activity,” in light of the history of the definition and precedent applying Title IX,
compel an analysis of the USOC programs for Olympic, Pan American, and
Paralympic athletes as a whole. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that we should compare
the USOC’s treatment of all amateur athletes, no matter the competition in which
they compete.
The ASA defines “amateur athlete” to be “an athlete who meets the
eligibility standards established by the national governing body or paralympic
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sports organization for the sport in which the athlete competes.” 36 U.S.C. §
220501(b)(1). In 1998, the ASA was amended to give the USOC jurisdiction and
responsibility over United States participation in the Paralympic Games in
addition to the Olympic and Pan American Games. See 36 U.S.C. § 220503; S.
Rep. 105-325 (1998). However, the ASA as amended does not direct the USOC’s
activities in any detail with respect to Olympic or Paralympic athletes other than
requiring it to “obtain . . . the most competent amateur representation possible in
each event” of the three competitions. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4). The mere use of
the term “amateur athlete” in the statute does not enlarge the relevant universe to
include all athletes under the USOC’s purview.
The cases that Plaintiffs rely upon also do not support analyzing the
USOC’s three programs as a whole. First, Plaintiffs rely on Klinger v.
Department of Corrections, where women prisoners sued the Nebraska
Department of Corrections under Title IX for failing to provide equal educational
opportunities for male and female prisoners. 107 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1997).
The prisoners compared the educational opportunities available at their facility
with the opportunities available at one specific male facility. Id. at 612. The
court rejected the comparison holding that Title IX requires comparison of
opportunities for male and female prisoners within the entire prison system taking
into account the objective differences between the two populations and other
relevant penological and security considerations. Id. at 615–16.
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Plaintiffs’ reliance on Klinger to alter § 504’s definition of “program or
activity” is misplaced. 1 The case only holds that, under Title IX, the comparison
between only the female facility and one specific male facility is not meaningful.
See id. 615–16. A meaningful comparison requires viewing the jails in the
context of the security, penological, and size differences among the various
facilities. This holding does not support Plaintiffs’ theory, and the reasoning in
Klinger contradicts Plaintiffs’ argument. The court noted that differences in
programs between jails are permissible when considering the different
circumstances in each jail. See id. at 616. Thus, the case’s reasoning suggests
that the USOC’s three programs should only be compared considering the
significant distinctions between each program in purpose, scope, success, and all
other relevant differences.
Plaintiffs also rely on two ADA cases to suggest an analysis of the USOC
as a whole: Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2004), and Concerned Parents
to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.
1
In Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court held that receipt of
federal funds by a college’s financial aid office did not trigger institution-wide
Title IX coverage because the financial aid office was the “program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 465 U.S. 555, 570–72 (1984) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a)). The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
259, 102 Stat. 28, abrogated the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell and broadened
the Court’s narrow definition of “program or activity” to expand the application
of Title IX, the Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, and the Age Discrimination Act to an
entire institution if any part of the institution receives federal funds. There is no
dispute that the Rehabilitation Act applies to all of the USOC’s programs, so this
analysis is inapposite here.
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Fla. 1994). Both cases are readily distinguishable because they involve the
consolidation of services for the disabled at a single facility and then cancellation
of those services. See Rodde, 357 F.3d at 998 (noting these similarities in two
cases). These cases did not involve separate programs with separate eligibility
requirements—they involved the provision of health and recreation services and
the cancellation of those services for the disabled on a county-wide basis. Cf.
Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a
Hawaii general assistance program is functionally two programs—one for needy
families and one for the needy disabled—and holding that “[t]he ADA does not
require equivalent benefits in different programs”). Nothing in the analysis of
these two cases supports a conclusion that the USOC’s programs should be
analyzed as a whole.
The additional Title IX precedent cited by Plaintiffs is not applicable here
because it is based on a regulatory framework unique to the Title IX context.
Title IX regulations recognize that separation based on gender may be necessary
thus requiring an institution-wide analysis to determine whether a Title IX
violation has occurred. See e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b), (c); Roberts v. Colo.
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829–32 (10th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the
relevant universe for analysis under § 504 is the individual programs under the
USOC’s umbrella. Plaintiffs must show that they are otherwise qualified for the
Athlete Support Programs and that the program discriminates against them.
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Second, Plaintiffs argue that they are “otherwise qualified” for the Athlete
Support Programs because they are amateur athletes under the ASA. A plaintiff
is “otherwise qualified” under the Rehabilitation Act if he “is able to meet all of a
program’s requirements in spite of his [disability].” Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 406 (1979). Normally, if a plaintiff is unable to meet a program’s
requirements, a court must consider whether reasonable modifications or
accommodations may be made that do not fundamentally alter the program. See
Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 n.17 (1987);
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). Plaintiffs’ argument requires us
to accept a premise that we already rejected, namely, that the relevant universe
for analysis is all amateur athletes. In the alternative, Plaintiffs contend that the
requirement of being on the Olympic team is not an “essential eligibility
requirement” to qualify for the Athlete Support Programs. 28 C.F.R. § 41.32(b).
Plaintiffs argue that the USOC could open the benefits to Paralympic athletes and
that doing so would further the USOC’s program as a whole. However, § 504 is
not the vehicle to compel discretionary acts of administrators absent
discrimination.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the USOC’s policy of excluding Paralympic
athletes from Athlete Support Programs is both facially discriminatory and
discriminatory by proxy. Even if Plaintiffs were “otherwise qualified” for the
benefits, the USOC’s policy does not discriminate against Plaintiffs by reason of
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their disability. First, Plaintiffs err in contending that the eligibility requirements
for the Athlete Support Programs are intentionally discriminatory. The criterion
that the USOC uses to distribute the benefits under its Resource Allocation Policy
is that the athlete must be “eligible to represent the United States and . . . intend
to compete, if selected, in the next Olympic or Pan American Games.” The
policy, on its face, clearly does not contain an explicit requirement of not being
disabled. Cf. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995)
(considering a city zoning ordinance for group homes for the disabled that
“facially single[d] out the handicapped and appl[ied] different rules to them”).
Plaintiffs also contend that the program discriminates against Paralympic
athletes by proxy as the policy specifically excludes Paralympic athletes and the
term “Paralympic athletes” is a proxy for amateur athletes with disabilities. The
designation of “Olympic athlete” as a requirement for Athlete Support Programs
is not a proxy for non-disabled athletes because there is no fit between being an
Olympic athlete and not being disabled. The requirement of being an Olympic
athlete is not “directed at an effect or manifestation of a handicap.” McWright v.
Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus, the requirement to be an
Olympic athlete to be eligible for the Athlete Support Programs is not
discriminatory to Paralympic athletes “by reason of [their] disability.” See 29
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U.S.C. § 794(a). 2
Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that the USOC’s policy has the effect of screening
out amateur athletes with disabilities. Plaintiffs’ argument appears to allege that
the USOC’s policy impermissibly creates a disparate impact on disabled athletes,
thus violating § 504. The Supreme Court has held that disparate impact, by itself,
does not state a prima facie case under § 504. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299. Rather,
actionable disparate impact requires analysis of whether the individual is
otherwise qualified and whether reasonable accommodations may provide
meaningful access. See id. at 299–301. Plaintiffs raise no additional argument
here that we do not address above.
The dissent concludes that Plaintiffs are “otherwise qualified” for the
Athlete Support Program because § 504 defines “program or activity” to include
“all of the operations of” a covered entity. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). However,
Congress included the phrase “all of the operations of” a covered entity in § 504
to ensure that § 504 applies to an institution as a whole once any part of the
institution receives federal funds. See supra note 2; see also DeVargas v. Mason
& Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1384–85 (10th Cir. 1990). The phrase
does not create a parity requirement across an institution’s individual programs
2
Plaintiffs also refer in their briefs to a “separate benefit” regulation in 28
C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(1)(iv), and note that it is irrelevant to our analysis. We agree
that it is irrelevant to our analysis for a different reason—Plaintiffs are not
“qualified” as required by the regulation.
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(unlike the requirements under the specialized Title IX regulations). Further, the
dissent’s reading of the statute would change the eligibility requirements set by
the USOC—being an Olympic team member—altering the nature of the program.
Courts are not free to rewrite eligibility requirements but must analyze whether a
plaintiff is “otherwise qualified” against the requirements set by the covered
entity. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 413–14 (rejecting a challenge to a nursing program
because the requested modifications would have fundamentally altered the
purposes and eligibility requirements of the program set by the college). Courts
must ask whether reasonable modifications or accommodations may be made that
do not fundamentally alter the program, see Choate, 469 U.S. at 300, or whether
the requirement is not an “essential eligibility requirement” to qualify for the
benefits or program, 28 C.F.R. § 41.32(b).
The dissent also argues that only extending the benefits at issue to Olympic
athletes “has a discriminatory effect” against Paralympic athletes. However,
disparate impact, by itself, does not state a prima facie case under § 504. Choate,
469 U.S. at 299. Further, our holding clearly does not permit denying benefits
on the basis of gender, as the dissent suggests, because such a classification
would be facially discriminatory. Here, the classification is facially neutral and is
not “directed at an effect or manifestation of a handicap” as required for proxy
discrimination. McWright, 982 F.2d at 228.
We sympathize with Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain benefits similar to those
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received by their Olympic counterparts. However, we cannot modify the
Rehabilitation Act to reach a result in their favor absent statutory or regulatory
authority to import, wholesale, Title IX regulations and precedent into § 504. See
Choate, 469 U.S. at 293 n.7. Plaintiffs should seek a remedy with the legislative
or executive branches, not the courts.
AFFIRMED.
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Nos. 07-1053 & 1056, Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that a
qualified individual with a disability may not, solely because of his disability, be
“excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). What the statute forbids is exactly what has
occurred and is occurring here. This defiance of plain legislative intent is crystal-
clear from the congressional statement that the Paralympics are “the Olympics for
disabled amateur athletes.” S. Rep. No. 105-325 at 2, 1998 WL 604018 (1998).
The issues presented.
A prima facie case under section 504 requires proof (1) that the plaintiff
has a disability; (2) that plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in the
program; (3) that the program receives federal money; and (4) that the program
discriminated against the plaintiff. Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d
1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 1999). In these appeals it is not contested that Plaintiffs
have disabilities and that the USOC receives federal money. Therefore, the
questions before us are whether the Plaintiffs are “otherwise qualified” to
participate in the program and whether the USOC discriminated against the
Plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs are qualified to participate in the program.
Quite obviously, this court cannot answer the first question without
determining what “the program” is in this case. Indeed, resolution of these
appeals turns on whether the USOC is operating one “program” or separate
programs, one for the disabled and one for the able-bodied. The clear answer to
that question has been provided by Congress. Section 504 defines “program or
activity” to include “all of the operations of” the covered entity. 29 U.S.C. §
794(b). 1 Plaintiffs are qualified to participate in the program; they are recognized
as elite paralympic athletes whose competition in the Paralympic Games is,
Congress has mandated, to be promoted by the USOC.
Thus, this case can and should be resolved by simple application of the
plain language of the statute, and this court should reverse the judgment of the
district court. The majority reaches the wrong result because its analysis goes off
the track at the outset by failing to follow the statutory definition of “program.”
As noted by the majority, Congress specifically amended the Rehabilitation Act
and other statutes to broaden the definition of “program or activity.” Maj. op. at
8, n.2. But the majority inexplicably ignores the definition, insisting that the
definition is of no moment because it is undisputed in this appeal that the Act
1
The district court expressed substantial doubt about whether the USOC is a
“covered entity.” That question is not before this court, however, as the USOC
has not argued that the judgment should be affirmed on the alternative ground that
it is not subject to the Act.
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“applies to all of the USOC’s programs . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 2
This use of the plural reveals the circular nature of the majority’s analysis.
The underlying issue (easily resolved by the plain language of the statute) is
whether, in examining the USOC’s challenged activities, we should consider the
USOC as operating a single program or several separate ones. The majority
incorrectly assumes – there is certainly no explanation for the approach – that we
are dealing with separate programs. And it is only by ignoring the statutory
definition and making this assumption of dealing with separate programs that the
majority is able to assert that the unequal treatment afforded to the Plaintiffs is
permissible.
Not only does the majority ignore the statutory definition of “program,” but
its assumption that separate programs are involved exonerates the USOC for
doing just what the Supreme Court instructs must not be done – defining the
benefit “in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped
individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled . . . .” Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
The USOC’s program discriminates against the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are subject to discrimination by being denied access to benefits
2
Indeed, the majority even accuses Plaintiffs of trying to “alter” section
504’s definition of “program or activity” by discussing the reasoning of Klinger v.
Dept. of Corrections, 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997). I fail to see how Plaintiffs
are trying to “alter” the definition. Plaintiffs rely on the legislative definition of
“program,” while the majority ignores it.
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that are provided to Olympic and Pan American Games athletes who are not
disabled. The USOC’s practice of providing health insurance and other benefits
to Olympic and Pan American Games athletes, but not Paralympic athletes,
clearly has a discriminatory effect. Section 504 prohibits not only intentional
discrimination but, I am satisfied, also the use of criteria or methods of
administration such as those involved here that have the effect of subjecting
people with disabilities to discrimination. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3)(1). See also
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299. 3
Denying benefits to Plaintiffs because they are athletes training for the
Paralympic Games, and not the Olympic or Pan American Games, is a proxy for
discriminating against them because of their disabilities. The majority’s assertion
that “there is no fit between being an Olympic athlete and not being disabled,”
maj. op. at 11, demonstrates the faulty aim of its analysis. Presumably the
majority would not countenance the denial of equal benefits based on gender.
Yet, if such blatant discrimination existed, even then it could be said that there
was “no fit” between being an Olympic athlete and being male. The USOC has
shown four examples in one hundred years of disabled athletes who have
competed in the Olympics or Pan American Games. The exceptions prove the
3
In Choate, the Court assumed without deciding that section 504 reaches
conduct that has a disparate impact on the disabled, after having noted compelling
reasons to conclude that Congress intended such an interpretation and that all the
circuits that have reached the issue had reached that conclusion. 469 U.S. at 295-
97 & n.17. In the instant appeal, the defendants do not contend otherwise.
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rule: The policy of awarding benefits to athletes training for the Olympics or the
Pan American Games while excluding those training for the Paralympic Games
discriminates against the disabled. The reason that courts inquire about the “fit”
between a practice and a class of protected individuals is because the fact that a
practice does not discriminate against every member of a protected class is not
sufficient to show that members of the protected class have the meaningful access
to which they are entitled. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1054 (9th Cir.
2002).
For these reasons I am compelled to respectfully but emphatically dissent.
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