FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 23, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
PAUL D. WADE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-6154
(D.C. No. 06-CV-785-M)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner (W.D. Okla.)
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Paul D. Wade appeals from a district court order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of his application for Social Security disability benefits.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we
reverse and remand.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Wade’s application for disability benefits was denied initially and on
reconsideration, after which he requested a hearing before an administrative law
judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Mr. Wade had the following severe
impairments: a history of on-the-job injuries to his head, neck, back, and
shoulder; diabetes; three surgeries on his left shoulder; carpal tunnel surgery;
asthma; hypertension; and right knee surgery. The ALJ determined that he had a
residual functional capacity (RFC) for a wide range of light work, based on which
he could no longer perform his past relevant work. But the ALJ found that there
were other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that
Mr. Wade could perform, consistent with his RFC, age, education, and work
experience. Thus, the ALJ denied his claim for benefits. The Appeals Council
denied review and the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.
Mr. Wade filed a timely appeal in this court, in which he raises three claims
of error: (1) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence,
specifically the opinion of one of his treating physicians; (2) the ALJ failed to
properly evaluate his credibility; and (3) the ALJ’s RFC determination is not
supported by substantial evidence. “We review the Commissioner’s decision to
determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in
the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Watkins v.
Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2003). Because we conclude that the
ALJ did not follow the correct legal standards in considering the opinion of one
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of Mr. Wade’s treating physicians, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
“Under the regulations, the agency rulings, and our case law, an ALJ must
give good reasons in the notice of determination or decision for the weight
assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.” Id. at 1300 (quotation and brackets
omitted). First, the ALJ must determine whether the treating physician’s opinion
is entitled to controlling weight. Id. If it is not, the ALJ still must assign a
weight to the opinion based on the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 1
Id. “After considering the pertinent factors, the ALJ must give good reasons in
the notice of determination or decision for the weight he ultimately assigns the
opinion. Finally, if the ALJ rejects the opinion completely, he must then give
specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1301 (quotations, citation, and
brackets omitted).
1
These factors are:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,
including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or
testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is
supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion
and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a
specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and
(6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to support
or contradict the opinion.
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301 (quotation omitted).
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Mr. Wade argues that the ALJ failed to follow this protocol with respect to
an opinion of one of his treating physicians. In a letter dated April 1, 2003,
Dr. Christopher M. Herndon stated:
Paul Wade is a 34-year-old white male who was involved in a motor
vehicle accident March 21, 2002. He suffered significant injuries
with the most serious being herniated disk in his lower back. He was
seen by Dr. Tom Eiser, our local Orthopedic Surgeon, who evaluated
him and did perform a laminectomy with fusion. In spite of
significant post-operative physical therapy and rehabilitation he has
had no significant relief of the symptoms in his left leg or the
significant recurrent intractable pain.
Because of the pain and numbness in his low back and left leg he is
currently unable to perform any type of work.
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 471. The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Herndon’s letter in her
discussion of the medical evidence, but she made no finding whatsoever regarding
the weight, if any, that she assigned to his opinion. After noting that a state
agency medical consultant stated that Dr. Herndon’s conclusion was not
supported by the medical evidence, the ALJ never again addressed his opinion in
her decision.
The Commissioner argues that Dr. Herndon’s opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight because his conclusion that Mr. Wade is unable to perform any
type of work is tantamount to an opinion that he is disabled, which is an issue
reserved to the Commissioner. We agree. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) & (3)
(providing that an opinion the claimant is “unable to work” is not entitled to any
“special significance”); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (stating medical
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source opinion that claimant is “unable to work . . . . can never be entitled to
controlling weight”). However, the ALJ was still required to assess the weight of
Dr. Herndon’s opinion, applying the factors in § 404.1527(d). See SSR 96-5p,
1996 WL 374183, at *3 (“[O]pinions from any medical source on issues reserved
to the Commissioner must never be ignored.”).
Conceding that the ALJ failed to make an explicit finding regarding
Dr. Herndon’s opinion, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s finding regarding
the ultimate weight assigned to the opinion is implicit. The Commissioner
attempts to illustrate why Dr. Herndon’s opinion is inconsistent with the medical
evidence. The Commissioner then concludes, based upon the ALJ’s RFC
determination, that it appears the ALJ did give Dr. Herndon’s opinion some
credence. But the ALJ herself provided no such analysis. We recently held that
an ALJ’s failure to explicitly discuss all of the § 404.1527(d) factors with respect
to a medical opinion does not prevent this court from performing a meaningful
review. Oldham v. Astrue, No. 07-1087, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 4285156, at *3
(10th Cir. Dec. 7, 2007). But here the ALJ discussed none of the factors and
made no finding as to weight. “We cannot simply presume the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards in considering Dr. [Herndon’s] opinion. We must remand
because we cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s determination absent findings
explaining the weight assigned to the treating physician’s opinion.” Watkins, 350
F.3d at 1301.
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Mr. Wade also contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated his credibility
and his subjective allegations of pain. The ALJ set forth the proper criteria for
evaluating his subjective complaints, discussed some of the medical evidence and
portions of Mr. Wade’s testimony, and concluded that “his subjective complaints
suggest a greater severity than can be proven by the objective medical evidence.”
Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 25. We note, however, that in support of her conclusion the
ALJ mischaracterized Mr. Wade’s testimony in at least two respects. See Talbot
v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1464 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting ALJ did not challenge
claimant’s reports of his activities, but instead mischaracterized their nature).
First, the ALJ considered the fact that Mr. Wade uses a TENS unit when his pain
is severe, which she said “is not often.” Id. But when the ALJ asked him how
frequently his pain was severe, he replied, “It depends on my level of activity.
The more I do, the more I hurt usually,” and he proceeded to describe his normal
level of activity as very limited, including lying down at least once a day for two
to three hours. Id., Vol. 2 at 607-08, 611. Second, the ALJ noted that Mr. Wade
said he could occasionally lift his 50-pound daughter, but failed to mention that
he also said he would have to take pain medication and lie down after doing so.
In light of the ALJ’s mischaracterization of Mr. Wade’s testimony, we direct the
ALJ on remand to reevaluate the credibility of his subjective complaints of pain.
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We decline to address Mr. Wade’s final claim of error with respect to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC determination, as that may
be affected by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on remand.
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED. We REMAND this case
to the district court with instructions to REMAND to the Commissioner for
further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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