FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 13, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CRAIG LAFRANZ TAYLOR,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-6211
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
ERIC FRANKLIN, Warden, (D.C. No. CIV-07-283-R)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Craig L. Taylor, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. §
2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Before this court, Mr. Taylor also
seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation suggested dismissal of five of the nine claims because they were
procedurally defaulted. It recommended denial of habeas relief on the remaining
claims on grounds that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The federal district
court adopted the report and recommendation, and denied the habeas petition.
Based substantially upon the reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, we deny Mr. Taylor’s request for a COA, deny his request to
proceed IFP, and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2004, a jury convicted Mr. Taylor of robbery with a
dangerous weapon after former conviction of two or more felonies, and the jury
recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) determined that Mr. Taylor was entitled to
relief on his contention that the jury received outside information regarding his
arrest on another charge. Acting under its discretionary statutory authority
provided under Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1066, the OCCA modified Mr. Taylor’s
sentence to twenty years’ imprisonment.
Mr. Taylor sought post-conviction relief, which the district court and the
OCCA denied. The OCCA determined that Mr. Taylor had procedurally defaulted
his claims because none had been raised in his direct appeal.
In his federal petition filed under § 2254, Mr. Taylor asserted nine claims:
(1) his right to due process was violated when the jury received outside
information (the same claim on which the OCCA granted relief); (2) Mr. Taylor’s
identification was unreliable and the procedures underlying the identification
were improperly leading and suggestive; (3) the court erred in denying a mistrial
or questioning the jurors after at least one juror saw him in leg irons and
handcuffs; (4) prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial; (5) and (6)
-2-
the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction or the sentence; (7) and
(8) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (9) the trial court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury that Mr. Taylor would have to serve 85% of his sentence before
he would be eligible for parole.
II. DISCUSSION
The magistrate judge recommended the dismissal of the first claim as moot,
because the OCCA had already granted Mr. Taylor relief. It considered the
OCCA’s disposition of the second, third, and fourth claims (pre-trial
identification, juror(s) viewing him shackled, and prosecutorial misconduct) and
concluded that the OCCA’s analysis of each contention was not an unreasonable
application of federal law, and recommended the denial of relief. As to the fifth
through ninth contentions (insufficiency of evidence to support the conviction and
to support the sentence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure to instruct
regarding the length of the sentence to be served), the magistrate judge
determined these claims to be procedurally barred. The district court considered
Mr. Taylor’s objections to the report and recommendation de novo, and adopted it
in its entirety.
The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is detailed, accurate,
and complete. Thus, having reviewed the report and recommendation, the district
court’s order, the record on appeal, Mr. Taylor’s submissions, and the relevant
-3-
legal authority, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same
reasons as those set forth in its order.
III. CONCLUSION
Because jurists of reason would not find the district court’s conclusions
debatable, we DENY Mr. Taylor’s request for a COA, DENY his request to
proceed IFP, and DISMISS the matter.
Entered for the Court,
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
-4-