FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 3, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-5097
RONNIE ALLEN NICHOLS, SR., (D.C. No. CR-06-004-C)
(N. D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
In this direct criminal appeal, defendant Ronnie Nichols challenges only his
sentence. Nichols pleaded guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2),
and was sentenced to concurrent twenty-four month sentences on each count. On
appeal, Nichols argues that the district court should have compelled the
government to move for an additional one-point reduction in offense level for
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). The government, in
addition to responding to the merits of this argument, has moved to dismiss this
appeal, arguing that Nichols waived his appellate rights in his plea agreement.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We
deny the government’s motion to dismiss and affirm Nichols’ sentence.
I.
On January 12, 2006, Nichols was charged in a two-count indictment with
possession of firearms and ammunition after a felony conviction. He was
released on bond on January 17, 2006, on the conditions that he not commit any
offense and that he refrain from using narcotics and other controlled substances
while on release.
While the charges against him were pending, Nichols negotiated a plea
agreement with the government. In the plea agreement, Nichols agreed, among
other things, to waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. The
government, in turn, “agree[d] to file a motion recommending that the defendant
receive an additional one-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) if the
defendant is otherwise eligible therefor.” Plea Agreement, Vol. I, Doc. 46-3, at
2
14. After entering into the plea agreement, Nichols waived his right to a trial and
pleaded guilty to both counts. At the plea colloquy, the presiding magistrate
judge accepted Nichols’ guilty pleas and found Nichols guilty as charged on both
counts. The magistrate judge deferred acceptance of the plea agreement until the
district court had the opportunity to review the Presentence Report (PSR) prior to
sentencing.
The PSR concluded that the base offense level of fourteen should be
increased four levels under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possession of eight to
twenty-four firearms, and that Nichols’ clear acceptance of responsibility entitled
him to a two-point reduction in offense level. The PSR further recommended that
Nichols should be awarded an additional one-point reduction in offense level
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) because he “timely notified the Government of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid
preparing for trial and permitting the Court to allocate its resources efficiently.”
PSR, Vol. II, at 9. The total offense level recommended by the PSR was fifteen,
which, when paired with Nichols’ criminal history category of I, yielded an
advisory sentencing range of eighteen to twenty-four months.
After the PSR was issued, the government filed a sentencing memorandum
requesting that the district court withhold all credit for acceptance of
responsibility. As grounds for this request, the government argued that on March
8, 2007, Nichols assaulted his son after consuming alcohol, and that one month
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later, Nichols tested positive for methamphetamine use. The government further
stated that it would not move for an additional one-point reduction for acceptance
of responsibility under Section 3E1.1(b) based on its belief that Nichols was not
eligible for such a reduction due to his ongoing criminal behavior and substance
abuse while on release. Sentencing Memo., Vol. I, Doc. 73, at 7-8.
The district court held a sentencing hearing on May 23, 2007. At the
hearing, the government argued that the court should grant no credit whatsoever
for acceptance of responsibility, and presented testimony in support of the
position taken in its Sentencing Memorandum. Nichols argued that he was
entitled to the standard two-point reduction in offense level for acceptance of
responsibility, and requested that the court order the government to move for an
additional one-point reduction in accordance with Section 3E1.1(b).
The district court granted a two-point reduction in offense level for
acceptance of responsibility, but declined to order the government to move for a
further reduction. In so doing, the court stated:
Well, I have studied the presentence report. I can understand the
government’s position in not requesting the third reduction. The
Court thinks that, with the three point reduction, it takes it to offense
level of 15. Without the third one, it takes it to point level of 16.
And the Court believes that the facts justify the government’s
position in not filing for the third. . . . I’m going to deny the request
to deny the two point.
Tr. of Sentencing & Revoc. Hr’g, Vol. III, at 25. Without the additional one-
point reduction, the court calculated an offense level of sixteen, yielding an
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advisory sentencing range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months. The court
sentenced Nichols to concurrent twenty-four month terms on each count, and
ordered concurrent three-year terms of supervised release.
II.
Before addressing the merits of Nichols’ arguments on appeal, we must
determine whether the waiver of Nichols’ appellate rights in his plea agreement is
enforceable. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1329 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“If we conclude that the waiver agreement is enforceable, we will dismiss.”).
Nichols argues that the waiver is unenforceable because the district court never
accepted the plea agreement. Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the district court must accept a plea agreement before it becomes
binding. United States v. Novosel, 481 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2007).
Otherwise, it is “a mere executory agreement which . . . does not deprive an
accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest.” Id. (quoting
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984)). We agree with Nichols that the
district court did not accept the plea agreement.
After careful review of the record, we can find no evidence suggesting that
the court accepted the plea agreement. As noted, the magistrate judge who
conducted the plea colloquy deferred acceptance of the agreement until the
district court had the opportunity to review the PSR. At the sentencing hearing,
after reviewing the PSR, the district court made no mention of the plea agreement
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whatsoever. 1 Nor did the court refer to the plea agreement in its written statement
of reasons for the sentence. The absence of any mention of the plea agreement is
particularly noteworthy given that the primary dispute at sentencing focused on
Nichols’ acceptance of responsibility, an issue specifically addressed in the
agreement and which encompassed the bulk of the government’s obligations
under the agreement. This suggests that the court disregarded the agreement in its
sentencing and did not accept it. Further support of our conclusion is the fact that
the district court informed Nichols of his right to appeal, in direct contradiction to
the appellate waiver in the proposed plea agreement, and did not adopt the
specific terms of the proposed plea agreement in fashioning Nichols’ sentence.
See Tr. of Sentencing & Revoc. Hr’g, Vol. III, at 28-29.
Because the district court did not accept the plea agreement, we conclude
that the waiver of appellate rights under the agreement is not enforceable. 2 We
thus proceed to consider the merits of Nichols’ arguments.
1
We note that the district court’s acceptance or rejection of a plea
agreement will often be more apparent because in some cases, the district court is
required under Rule 11 to inform the defendant of the consequences of its
acceptance or rejection of the agreement. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4)-(5).
However, this requirement only applies to agreements “of the type specified in
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C).” Id. The plea agreement here is not of this type, so the
court had no specific duty under Rule 11.
2
Because we conclude that the plea agreement is unenforceable, we need
not consider Nichols’ alternative argument that the waiver is unenforceable
because the government breached its obligations under the plea agreement.
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III.
We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines
de novo, and review its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Walters,
269 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001). The evidence and any inferences that may
be drawn from it are construed in the light most favorable to the district court’s
determination. Id. We conclude that the district court did not err in declining to
compel the government to move for an additional one-point reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility may receive a two-point reduction in
offense level. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). An additional one-point reduction may be
granted under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b):
If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the
offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is
level 16 or greater, and upon motion of the government stating that
the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of
his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the
government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the
government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently . . . .
As this language suggests, a defendant may, under ordinary circumstances, only
receive the additional one-point reduction on motion of the government. United
States v. Moreno-Trevino, 432 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2005). The
government has “considerable discretion” in determining whether to file such a
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motion. Id. at 1186. There are, however, limits to the government’s discretion.
Id. “[A] court can review the government’s refusal to file a Section 3E1.1(b)
motion and grant a remedy if it finds the refusal was ‘(1) animated by an
unconstitutional motive, or (2) not rationally related to a legitimate government
end.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 2001)).
We conclude that neither circumstance is present in this case. Nichols does
not allege that the government’s refusal to file a 3E1.1(b) motion was based on an
unconstitutional motive. He argues instead that the government’s refusal was not
rationally related to a legitimate government end. In Nichols’ view, once the
district court determines that a defendant has clearly demonstrated acceptance of
responsibility for his actions, the government’s discretion is limited to
determining whether “the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Nichols argues that the
government’s decision to not move for an additional one-point reduction was
“based on an independent assessment that the Defendant did not meet the basic
requirement for acceptance of responsibility,” and that the government’s
conclusion on this issue, contrary to that of the district court, was not a
“legitimate government end.” Aplt. Br. at 9-10.
Nichols’ argument is foreclosed by our decision in Moreno-Trevino, 432
F.3d at 1184-87. The defendant in that case also argued that “once a district court
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finds a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility under subsection (a) [of Section
3E1.1], the government’s discretion to file a motion under subsection (b) is
limited to a determination of whether his acceptance was timely.” Id. at 1184.
We rejected that argument, explaining that under Section 3E1.1(b), the
government has “‘a power, not a duty,’ to file a motion when a defendant has
timely notified prosecutors of an intention to plead guilty,” and that the timeliness
of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is necessary, but not the sole
condition which would automatically trigger the government’s motion. Id. at
1186 (quoting Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992)).
The government articulated a valid reason for its refusal to move for the
additional one-point reduction in Nichols’ offense level. It noted that while he
was released on bond, Nichols assaulted his son after consuming alcohol and
tested positive for methamphetamine use. See Sentencing Memo., Vol. I, Doc.
73, at 6-7. These actions were specifically prohibited by the conditions of his
release, and we reaffirm the government’s “legitimate interest in reinforcing the
principle within the criminal community that prosecutors will file acceptance-of-
responsibility motions only for defendants who fully cooperate and intend to
abide by their plea agreements, supervised release conditions, and federal law
relating to their offenses of conviction.” Moreno-Trevino, 432 F.3d at 1187
(quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d
940, 949 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that government’s legitimate interest in
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“cessation of all further criminal activity by the defendant” justifies refusal to file
a motion for reduction for substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1). That
this interest may be characterized as the government’s “independent assessment”
of Nichols’ acceptance of responsibility does not undermine its legitimacy. See
Moreno-Trevino, 432 F.3d at 1186-87 (holding that government was justified in
refusing to file motion even where it argued that defendant’s actions were “totally
inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility”); United States v. Sloley, 464 F.3d
355, 360 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder [Section 3E1.1(b)] both the court and the
government must be satisfied that the acceptance of responsibility is genuine.”).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in declining to compel the
government to move for an additional one-point reduction for acceptance of
responsibility under Section 3E1.1(b).
IV.
We DENY the government’s motion to dismiss this appeal on the basis of
an appellate waiver. We AFFIRM Nichols’ sentence, concluding the district court
did not err in denying Nichols’ request to compel the government to move for an
additional one-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1(b).
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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