FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 18, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
ALLIANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-1061
RICHARD C. STEM, in his official
capacity as Deputy Regional Forester of
the Rocky Mountain Region of the United
States Forest Service; UNITED STATES
FOREST SERVICE, a Federal Agency
within the United States Department of
Agriculture,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 04-CV-01816-JLK)
John E. Arbab, Attorney (David C. Shilton, Attorney, Matthew J. McKeown, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Capps, of Counsel, Appellate Section of the
United States Department of Justice, with him on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellants.
Matt Kenna, Western Environmental Law Center, Durango, Colorado (Brad A. Bartlett
and Travis Stills, Durango, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.),* HENRY, Chief Circuit Judge, and
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.).
The United States Forest Service appeals from the district court’s award of
attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d) to
plaintiff Biodiversity Conservation Alliance (“BCA”). Because we hold that plaintiff was
not a “prevailing party” in the underlying litigation, we reverse the district court’s award
of fees and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and
other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action.” 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d).
BCA claims it is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA as a “prevailing party”
because of victories it obtained in a dispute over defendant United States Forest Service’s
proposed usage of land in the Black Hills National Forest.
In 2003, the Forest Service came up with several proposals for the management
and future development of the Black Hills National Forest. One of the proposals, called
the Cement Project, included a sale of timber in the Cement Area of that forest. The
Forest Service sought an environmental assessment of this sale and concluded that there
* The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court (Ret.), sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294(a).
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would be no significant environmental impact. As a result, the Forest Service authorized
the sale of several thousand acres of timber in the Cement Area.
BCA, who had registered its opposition to the Cement Project before the agency,
filed suit in 2004. It claimed that the Forest Service’s actions with regards to the Cement
Project violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”) because the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
failing to evaluate a reasonable range of alternatives, failing to take a hard look at the
direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the Cement Project. BCA also claimed that
the Forest Service violated the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) and the APA
by failing to comply with NFMA’s regulations governing viable populations of sensitive
and indicator species.
After filing suit, BCA moved for a preliminary injunction in order to halt the
imminent timber sale. The district court granted the motion. In so doing, it explained
that “as a preliminary matter, the Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury” due to the
possibility of permanent species loss. Because “the equities tip[ped] heavily towards the
movant,” the district court only required that plaintiff “raise questions going to the merits
so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation
and thus for more deliberate investigation.” It concluded that plaintiff had raised such
doubts, and therefore granted a preliminary injunction “in order to maintain the status quo
antebellum” during the pendency of BCA’s suit.
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While discovery was still going forward, however, a forest fire—caused by a
lightning strike—ravaged the Cement Project area. Several thousand acres of forest were
burned, including around ten percent of the planned Cement Timber sale.
The Forest Service subsequently withdrew the Cement Project. It cited, as reasons
for its withdrawal, two recent changes. First, the Forest Service issued a new set of
regulations in January of 2005, which constituted a “paradigm shift” away from the
regulations governing forest planning under which the plan had originally been proposed.
The Forest Service suggested that its use of the Black Hills National Forest would be
reevaluated under those new regulations. Second, the Forest Service claimed the
lightning-caused fire undermined the viability of the proposed timber sale, and so new
plans would need to be drawn up to assess the proper course of action.
Based on the Forest Service’s representation that the Cement Project had been
withdrawn and would not be resuscitated, the district court dismissed plaintiff’s cause of
action as moot. In so doing, it stated that its determination of mootness was “conditioned
upon the government’s representation that the Cement Project has been permanently
withdrawn and will never be revived. Any new project must begin anew to comply with
the mandates of all applicable statutes, including NFMA and NEPA.”
After the case was dismissed, BCA moved for attorneys’ fees. It argued that it was
entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA as a “prevailing party” because the order
dismissing the case as moot was conditioned upon the government’s representation that
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the Cement Project had been permanently withdrawn, and because it had prevailed over
the government when it obtained a preliminary injunction.
The district court agreed with BCA, and awarded $175,569.24 in attorney’s fees.
The Forest Service appealed.
II.
The district court determined that BCA was a prevailing party for two reasons.
First, the Forest Service represented that the project had been permanently withdrawn and
would never be revived. The district court conditioned its dismissal of the case as moot
based on that representation, and found that Plaintiff had thus “prevailed” because it had
secured “a binding commitment from the government not only to withdraw the project,
but never to revive it.” Second, the district court claimed BCA had obtained affirmative
relief in the form of a preliminary injunction against the Forest Service, which put a stop
to the imminent sale of timber on Forest Service lands.
Neither reason is sufficient to support a finding that BCA is a “prevailing party.”
We address each in turn.
A. The Conditional Mootness Order
BCA claims that the district court’s conditional mootness order, which rested on
its receiving a “binding commitment” from the government not to revive the Cement
Project, justifies a finding that it prevailed.
The Supreme Court has clearly spoken on the standards for determining when a
litigant should be granted “prevailing party” status. Buckhannon Board & Care Home,
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Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598 (2001).
Buckhannon involved a challenge to state law brought by assisted living facilities in West
Virginia. The plaintiff there alleged that state codes, which required that residents of
assisted living facilities be capable of “self-preservation” in the event of a fire or some
other danger, ran afoul of the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Id. at 601. While the case
was pending, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills that eliminated the “self-
preservation” requirement, rendering the plaintiff’s claim moot. Id.
The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, on the grounds
that even though plaintiff’s suit may have been a catalyst for the West Virginia
legislature’s actions, the legislative change did not confer prevailing party status upon
plaintiff.
The Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that it had found parties prevailed when
they obtained enforceable judgments on the merits or court-ordered consent decrees. Id.
at 604. But “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary
judicial imprimatur on the change.” Id. at 605. The Court thus held that an award of
attorneys’ fees was improper when the plaintiff had “simply fil[ed] a nonfrivolous but
nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), [and had] reached
the ‘sought-after destination’ without obtaining any judicial relief.” Id. at 606.
BCA argues that it is a prevailing party under the standard issued by Buckhannon
because the Forest Service withdrew the Cement Project, and the district judge
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conditioned his mootness order on the Forest Service’s representation that it would not
reinstate the project. But while the district judge stated that BCA had obtained a “binding
commitment” from the Forest Service not to reinstate the Cement Project, the
commitment made by the Forest Service is not sufficient to qualify BCA for prevailing
party status.
In finding the case moot, the district court explained: “[T]his determination of
mootness is conditioned on the government’s representation that the Cement Project has
been permanently withdrawn and will never be revived. Any new project must begin
anew to comply with the mandates of all applicable statutes.” The representation that the
government made in withdrawing the project was as follows: “I am withdrawing the
[Cement Project] decision notice and I will make a new decision that takes these changed
conditions into account after conducting a supplemental environmental assessment. . . .
[I]t is clear that whatever management action is selected, it will not be the same as [the
Cement Project].”
Certainly, as plaintiff argues, the district judge’s mention of the Forest Service’s
action constitutes a form of judicial recognition. But Buckhannon’s requirement that a
prevailing party receive some form of judicial imprimatur, see 532 U. S. at 605, requires
more than a mere judicial statement favoring one party. Instead, in order for a party to
prevail, the court’s statement must lend judicial teeth to the merits of the case. More
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specifically, a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees only if it could obtain a court order to
enforce the merits of some portion of the claim it made in its suit.
To illustrate this point, consider the position that the plaintiffs in Buckhannon
would have found themselves in had the state legislature in West Virginia reversed course
and reinstated the disputed “self-preservation” rule. Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs in
Buckhannon would be able to challenge this new rule once again in court. They would
not, however, have the right to ask the court to intervene on their behalf and declare that
the new rule violated the FHAA. Having won no judgment on the merits in their previous
suit, the plaintiffs in Buckhannon could at most hope for another chance to present their
case on the merits to a court.
This example illustrates why the Buckhannon court emphasized the need for
judicial imprimatur. A judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree
indelibly alters the legal landscape between parties. Once such a judgment has been
obtained, a party cannot simply change its mind and turn back to its old ways. A party
who chose to do so might well be subject to contempt proceedings. Judicial imprimatur,
of the sort required in Buckhannon, gives a plaintiff substance it can rely on in enforcing
the merits of its case. That is why it is crucial to prevailing party status.
Here, the district court’s order conditionally dismissing the case as moot gives
BCA no rights to enforce the merits of the decision. If the Forest Service were to revive
the Cement Project, no portion of the district court’s order gives the BCA the ability to
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enforce the contempt decree. The best BCA could hope is that the district court would
withdraw its mootness decision, as that order was “conditioned” on the government’s
representation. But the withdrawal of that order would not give BCA the right to seek an
injunction or a court order blocking reimplementation of the plan. Instead, if the Forest
Service reinstated the Cement Project, BCA would get only a chance to address the Forest
Service’s claims on the merits.
By contrast, a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree would
provide BCA with precisely the ammunition that it currently lacks. Under Buckhannon, a
court order that favors one party but does not entitle that party to some method of
enforcing the merits of the claim is insufficient to qualify that party for attorneys’ fees as
a “prevailing party.” The district court’s conditional mootness order thus fails to qualify
BCA as a prevailing party.
B. BCA’s Efforts in Obtaining a Preliminary Injunction
BCA also claims its success in obtaining a preliminary injunction should confer
upon it prevailing party status.
In Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188, the Court addressed the question of whether a
party had prevailed because it succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction. The
plaintiff there had filed a lawsuit claiming the state’s “Bathing Suit” rule, which required
all patrons of state parks to wear, at a minimum, a thong and (if female) a bikini top,
violated the First Amendment. The plaintiff wanted permission to create artwork in the
form of nude bodies arranged into a peace sign on the following day, and so the district
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judge held a hasty hearing. The judge found that the Bathing Suit rule was not narrowly
tailored, because the state could put up a barrier to shield beachgoers who did not wish to
see the artwork. The district judge granted a preliminary injunction allowing plaintiff’s
demonstration to go forward, but did not rule on the merits of her First Amendment
claim.
After the peace symbol display took place, however, participants came out from
behind the barrier and went into the water in the nude. In ruling on the final merits of the
plaintiff’s case, the judge found the Bathing Suit rule constitutional, claiming that the
actions of the participants in flouting the barrier during the previous display demonstrated
that the prohibition on nudity was essential to protect the public. Plaintiff lost, but the
judge nonetheless awarded her attorneys’ fees for her success in obtaining a preliminary
injunction.
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that “[a] plaintiff who achieves a transient
victory at the threshold of an action can gain no award under that fee-shifting provision if,
at the end of the litigation, her initial success is undone and she leaves the courthouse
emptyhanded.” 127 S. Ct. at 2192. However, the Court explicitly refused to address the
question at issue here, stating that it “express[ed] no view on whether, in the absence of a
final decision on the merits of a claim for permanent injunctive relief, success in gaining a
preliminary injunction may sometimes warrant an award of counsel fees.” Id. at 2196.
We thus must decide whether BCA’s preliminary injunction entitles it to
prevailing party status. Unlike the injunction in Sole, the preliminary injunction here was
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not undone by a final decision on the merits. See id. at 2196. It is thus in the area
explicitly left open by Sole.
“The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry is the material alteration of the
legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee
statute.” Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782,
792-93 (1989) (emphasis added). In order for an alteration of legal relationships to be
considered material, however, a plaintiff must “receive at least some relief on the merits
of his claim.” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 760 (1987) (emphasis added). See also
Sole, 127 S. Ct. at 2194.
In concert with these cases, the Tenth Circuit has held that a preliminary injunction
that achieves the full relief on the merits sought by the suit justifies prevailing party
status. In Dahlem v. Board of Education of Denver Public Schools, 901 F. 2d 1508 (10th
Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit conferred prevailing party status on a student who obtained a
preliminary injunction allowing him to participate in gymnastics classes at his high
school. The case was mooted by plaintiff’s graduation, but because the preliminary
injunction awarded plaintiff precisely the relief he sought on the merits, the Tenth Circuit
deemed plaintiff a “prevailing party.”
While Sole explicitly declined to decide the question in that case, its reasoning
sheds some light on our case. In Sole, the Court explained that although the petitioner
received preliminary relief allowing her to engage in protected conduct on one occasion,
that relief did not make her a prevailing party because she failed to achieve the final relief
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she sought: a determination that “the state law banning nudity in parks was
unconstitutional as applied to expressive, nonerotic nudity.” Sole, 127 S. Ct. at 2196. By
contrast, in Dahlem, the final relief plaintiff sought—being able to participate in
gymnastics classes for the duration of his high school career—was precisely what he
gained via preliminary injunction.
We need not decide whether Dahlem survives Buckhannon and Sole. But given
the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in recent years, if Dahlem is still good
law, it at best stands for the proposition that a preliminary injunction cannot serve as the
basis for attorneys’ fees if it does not meet the stringent standards set forth in Texas State
Teachers Association and Hewitt: A preliminary injunction that does not provide a
plaintiff with relief on the merits of her claim cannot serve as the basis for prevailing
party status.
BCA fails to meet this standard. Here, the district judge’s preliminary injunction
required the Forest Service to refrain from going forward with the Cement Project, and
“from taking actions such as constructing or reconstructing new roads and/or . . . selling
or awarding such timber by contract.” The injunction did not prevent the Forest Service
from continuing to meet and plan in regards to the Cement Project.
Nor did the preliminary injunction grant the relief that BCA sought. BCA sought a
determination that the Cement Project was issued in violation of NEPA, NFMA, and the
APA. But no portion of the district court’s order issuing the injunction addressed whether
the Cement Project was arbitrary and capricious.
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Instead, it granted preliminary relief in part because “the equities of [potential
species loss] tip[ped] heavily towards the movant.” The relief BCA obtained in the
preliminary injunction was not the relief it sought in its complaint. It won the right to
have the status quo preserved, so that had it prevailed on the merits, its victory would
have meaning. The preliminary injunction thus did not serve to make BCA a “prevailing
party.”
III.
Because plaintiff is not a “prevailing party,” we need not address the Forest
Service’s other arguments. We REVERSE the award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff and
REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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