FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 21, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 07-2028
ALFREDO HERNANDEZ-
HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CR-06-1539 WPJ)
Jerry A. Walz (Alfred Dale Creecy with him on the briefs), Walz and Associates,
Cedar Crest, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
Roberto D. Ortega, Assistant United States Attorney (Larry Gomez, Acting
United States Attorney with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
At a bar in Palomas, Mexico, Alfredo Hernandez-Hernandez, a Mexican
citizen twice deported from the United States, consumed a sufficient amount of
alcohol and marijuana to blackout. The next thing he knew, Mr. Hernandez was
in the United States without any recollection how he got there and, in short order,
arrested for illegally reentering the country. Today, we are asked to decide
whether the district court’s decision to exclude from trial evidence of Mr.
Hernandez’s intoxication and resulting amnesia violated his constitutional right to
present a defense. We hold that it did not, and so affirm the district court’s
judgment.
***
According to Mr. Hernandez, he consumed more than a fifth of a quart of
liquor, as well as some marijuana, at a bar in Palomas and promptly blacked out.
When Mr. Hernandez regained his faculties, he found himself in the United States
and confronted by a United States Border Patrol Agent. In response to the agent’s
questions, Mr. Hernandez admitted that he was a Mexican national and
acknowledged that he had no documentation allowing him to be legally present in
the United States.
Mr. Hernandez was taken to a Border Patrol Station in Columbus, New
Mexico, where an agent ran Mr. Hernandez’s name through a law enforcement
database. This background check revealed a somewhat lengthy criminal history –
including convictions stemming from various fights Mr. Hernandez engaged in
while intoxicated. As a result of these convictions, Mr. Hernandez already had
been twice deported from the United States.
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Rather than simply deporting him again, this time authorities indicted Mr.
Hernandez for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b), and, more specifically,
under the provision making it unlawful to be “found in” the United States
illegally after a prior deportation. 1 In pre-trial proceedings, the government filed
a motion in limine, seeking to exclude from trial any evidence that Mr. Hernandez
might present regarding his voluntary intoxication. 2 Mr. Hernandez opposed the
government’s motion, arguing that he should be allowed to show that “he has
absolutely no memory of taking any actions to illegally cross the border” and
“does not know whether his subsequent presence in the United States was
voluntary and knowingly made. If [he] was brought to the United States and
1
8 U.S.C. 1326(a) provides:
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who (1) has been
denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the
United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is
outstanding, and thereafter (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation
at a place outside the United States or his application for admission
from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has expressly
consented to such alien’s reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect
to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless such alien
shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance consent
under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under Title 18, or
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
2
On appeal, Mr. Hernandez asserts that the government sought to preclude
him from presenting any and all evidence as to the voluntariness of his reentry.
Op. Br. at 4. Although that is a fair reading of the motion in limine, the motion
was granted only with respect to the defense of voluntary intoxication, R., Vol. IV
at 9, and that is the only issue remaining before us.
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dumped on the United States side while he was passed out, clearly such an act
would be a viable and acceptable defense to the crime charged.” Defendant’s
Opp. to the Govt’s Motion In Limine at 2. In aid of this argument, Mr. Hernandez
proffered not just his own testimony but also offered Dr. Orrin McCleod, who
sought to testify that Mr. Hernandez’s history of alcoholism caused him to suffer
“intoxicant amnesia” from the consumption of large amounts of alcohol, and
Eugenio Vergara-Sosa, a fellow detainee who was prepared to testify that Mr.
Hernandez was highly intoxicated and disoriented the day of his arrest.
The district court granted the government’s motion and excluded Mr.
Hernandez’s proffered evidence. The court reasoned that Section 1326 creates
only a “general intent” crime, that as a rule voluntary intoxication is not a defense
to such crimes, and that Mr. Hernandez’s evidence amounted to little more than
an effort to effect an end-run around this rule. Following the district court’s
ruling, Mr. Hernandez entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to
challenge the district court’s evidentiary ruling, and was sentenced to 21 months
imprisonment.
***
On appeal, Mr. Hernandez argues that the district court’s refusal to
entertain evidence about his blackout violated his Fifth Amendment right to due
process and his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. The right to
defend oneself in a criminal trial by presenting witnesses and other forms of
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evidence is, of course, a keystone of our legal system. See, e.g., Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
But we have held that this right, while fundamental, is “not absolute,” and surely
a defendant cannot present testimony willy nilly that has nothing to do with the
crime charged. United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1151-52 (10th Cir.
1998). Accordingly, we have held that the district court enjoys substantial
discretion in deciding whether to receive or exclude evidence at trial. Id. And
when it comes to assessing whether the constitutionally protected right to call
witnesses and produce evidence has been trenched upon, we have indicated that
we will reverse a district court’s decision excluding evidence if, but only if, the
proffered evidence is both relevant and material (that is, of such an exculpatory
nature that its exclusion can be said to affect a trial’s outcome). Richmond v.
Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Dowlin, 408
F.3d 647, 659 (10th Cir. 2005). In this case, we believe Mr. Hernandez’s
evidence fails at the first step because he has not established its relevance.
Mr. Hernandez, of course, contests this, suggesting his proffered proof
bears on the mens rea element of the crime. But the mens rea required to secure a
Section 1326 conviction for being unlawfully “found in” the United States is
limited. In the past, we admit, the mental elements associated with Section 1326
were sometimes shrouded by reference to vague concepts like “general” and
“specific” intent. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Morel, 118 F.3d 710, 716
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(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Miranda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d 1211, 1212 (10th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Hernandez, 693 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1982).
But in this area, as in many others, see, e.g., United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d
1230, 1233-35 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1319
(10th Cir. 2006), we have sought to follow the thrust of modern American
jurisprudence and clarify the required mens rea, often by reference to the Model
Penal Code’s helpfully defined terms, rather than persist in employing opaque
common law labels that sometimes blur the line between distinct mental
elements. 3
Accordingly, fully twenty years ago, we announced that the only mens rea
required to establish a violation under Section 1326’s provision prohibiting those
previously denied the right to be in the United States from “enter[ing]” the
country is a showing “that the defendant’s acts were intentional. No intent to
break the law – whether characterized as ‘specific intent’ or ‘general criminal
intent’ – must be proved. ” Miranda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d at 1212. A decade later,
3
See, e.g., Wayne G. Lafave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2 (2d ed.
2003) (“The modern view [in the United States] . . . is that it is better to draw a
distinction between intent (or purpose) on the one hand and knowledge on the
other.”); Model Penal Code § 2.02 (distinguishing between intent or purpose and
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence); Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709,
2729 (2006) (“[T]he modern tendency has been toward more specific
descriptions” of mens rea); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)
(distinguishing between species of mens rea “is no provincial or transient notion.
It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil”).
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in Martinez-Morel, we added that this same intent – “the intent to do the act of
entering the country” – will suffice to support a conviction under Section 1326’s
provision, now before us, making it unlawful to be “found in” the United States
after a prior deportation. 118 F.3d at 713, 717; see also United States v. Meraz-
Valeta, 26 F.3d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the actus reus for a
prosecution under Section 1326’s “found in” language is “return[ing] to the
United States without the permission of the Attorney General”), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004). 4
Simply put, we have recognized that laws pertaining to border control are
matters over which Congress holds plenary power, are generally subjected by
Congress “to stringent public regulation,” Martinez-Morel, 118 F.3d at 716
(quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 71 (1994)), and are
4
The government’s proposed jury instruction in this matter suggested that
it had to prove that the defendant “knowingly was found.” We are unsure what it
would mean to be “knowingly found.” The government cites to two cases in
support of employing that formulation, United States v. Anaya, 117 F.3d 447, 449
(10th Cir. 1997) and Meraz-Valeta, 26 F.3d at 997, neither of which includes such
language. The government also cites to the 10th Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction
§ 2.05 (2005), which appears to use “knowing” to modify the act of being found
in the United States. The Pattern Jury Instruction, in turn, indicates that it is
based on Martinez-Morel, 118 F.3d 710. Yet, Martinez-Morel merely quotes the
district court’s jury instruction in that case; it did not analyze or approve the
instruction, and it ultimately held that the mens rea element of the offense can be
satisfied by showing that the defendant had “the intent to do the act of entering
the country,” id. at 717. Whether there may be some additional way of satisfying
the mens rea associated with Section 1326’s “found in” provision – such as by
simply proving that the defendant knew he or she was physically within the
United States – is not before us.
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often treated as nearly (though not quite, given that a mens rea element is
required) matters of “strict liability,” id. As the Supreme Court has instructed,
“[u]nder such [regulatory] statutes we have not required that the defendant know
the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.” Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994). 5
For his part, Mr. Hernandez, although contending that his intoxication has a
relationship to the necessary mens rea, does not argue that his alcohol- and drug-
induced blackout is sufficient to negate the limited mens rea required by the
statute. To the contrary, he “has maintained since this issue has arisen that the
Government is correct that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to this crime,”
Opening Br. at 13, and that voluntary intoxication provides a defense only when
“specific” intent – or, a bit more precisely, an intent to do something more than
just the physical act the crime requires – is necessary. See United States v.
Hatatley, 130 F.3d 1399, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) (intoxication not a defense to
5
While we have done much to clarify the issue of the requisite intent
under Section 1326, we do not doubt that some issues remain unresolved. For
example, in United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th 2000) (en
banc), the Ninth Circuit held that the mens rea in a prosecution under Section
1326 for attempted reentry of a deported alien differed from the mens rea for a
completed reentry in that an attempted reentry prosecution requires the
government to prove the defendant “had the purpose, i.e., conscious desire, to
reenter the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General,”
id. at 1196, while the latter does not. But see United States v. Rodriguez, 416
F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting, and collecting cases rejecting, Gracidas-
Ulibarry’s holding as to the mens rea for attempted reentry); see also supra n.4
(highlighting another mens rea ambiguity). We need not resolve such issues
today, however.
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“general intent” crimes); United States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058, 1064 (10th Cir.
1992) (same); see also United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing general and specific intent). 6
Instead, while the mens rea required under Section 1326 is limited, Mr.
Hernandez emphasizes that, under the theory the government pursued in this case,
it does require at least an intent to undertake the physical act that results in the
defendant crossing the border. And Mr. Hernandez argues that, because of his
blackout, there is a “complete vacuum in his memory,” Opening Br. at 17, so that
it is possible he was abducted and did not enter the United States of his own
volition. Toward this end, Mr. Hernandez highlights our case law holding that “if
appellant was drugged and carried across the line, he would not be guilty of the”
mens rea required by Section 1326. Miranda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d at 1212
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In approaching this argument, we agree with our sister circuits that an
alien’s presence in the United States gives rise to a natural, common sense
inference that his or her presence was intentional in the very limited, Section
1326 sense. After all, those crossing the border usually do so intending their own
physical actions. See United States v. Quintana-Torres, 235 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th
6
Though some commentators have “suggested eschewing” the “mechanical
formulation” that voluntary intoxication can negate only “specific intent” crimes,
see United States v. Abeyta, 27 F.3d 470, 474 n.8 (10th Cir. 1994), that issue is
not before us today.
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Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Rivera-Sillas, 417 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir.
2005) (“We are comfortable presuming that a defendant who is found in the
United States willfully and knowingly acted in order to enter this country.”).
Still, this inference can be overcome; while most border crossings are surely
intentional in the Section 1326 sense, neither can we deny that the trafficking of
human beings against their will across international boundaries is a reality. 7 But,
“[t]o dispel the inference, the alien would have to demonstrate that one of the
speculative possibilities of involuntary entry had actually taken place.”
Quintana-Torres, 235 F.3d at 1200. And our test for assessing the relevance of
evidence seeking to dispel this inference, as always, turns on whether the
proffered proof makes a “fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.
So, Mr. Hernandez was surely entitled to produce evidence making it “more
probable” that he was taken across the border against his will. The problem is
that Mr. Hernandez’s proof in this case does no such thing. An ordinary
intoxication defense, where permissible, is relevant only because it makes it less
likely the defendant possessed the mental state the government is required to
prove. Here, however, Mr. Hernandez does not seek to argue that his intoxication
would have negated the requisite mens rea under Section 1326. Instead, he
7
See, e.g., Department of Justice, Report on Activities to Combat Human
Trafficking, Fiscal Years 2001-05.
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wishes to offer his intoxication as evidence that his lack of memory is credible,
and it is his lack of memory, Mr. Hernandez submits, that goes to the requisite
mental state. Because he cannot remember anything after he blacked out, Mr.
Hernandez seems to suggest, anything is possible. Maybe he was kidnapped.
Maybe he was dragged across the border by a drinking pal. Maybe someone was
playing a practical joke and transported him in a catatonic state into the United
States. The difficulty lies in the fact that Mr. Hernandez’s lack of memory leaves
equally open the possibility that he walked across the border under his own steam.
Or hitched a ride. Or paid to be driven. Simply put, Mr. Hernandez’s proof does
not make it any more or less likely that he was (innocently) carried across the
border against his will or (culpably) intended the physical actions that transported
him to the United States.
Had Mr. Hernandez’s proffer included any evidence suggesting that he was
taken across the border against his will, that would be one thing. But inviting the
jury to guess about the mode of Mr. Hernandez’s arrival in the United States
based on the absence of proof (a “complete vacuum in his memory”) is another,
and the district court properly ruled it out of bounds. Relevant evidence does not
include the suggestion of speculative possibilities. See Holmes v. South Carlona,
547 U.S. 319, 327 (2006) (evidence may be permissibly excluded “where the
evidence is speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material
fact in issue at the defendant’s trial”) (internal quotation omitted); United States
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v. Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A] jury will not be
allowed to engage in a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders its
finding a guess or mere possibility.”) (internal quotations and alterations
omitted).
Indeed, we have upheld analogous decisions excluding evidence in Section
1326 prosecutions in the past. In Martinez-Morel, for example, the defendant
wished to testify in response to the charge that he was unlawfully found in the
United States that he had believed in good faith, albeit erroneously, that he had
entered the country legally. The district court refused to entertain the evidence
and we affirmed, explaining that it simply “is not relevant to a prosecution for
illegal reentry after deportation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding” it. 118 F.3d at 714; see also Miranda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d at 1212.
Exactly the same might be said here.
***
The Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to produce witnesses on one’s behalf,
while fundamental, does not extend to irrelevant (or immaterial) matters. The
testimony excluded here simply was not relevant to any fact at issue in the
defense Mr. Hernandez pursued – making it neither more nor less probably true.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision to exclude it was appropriate.
Affirmed.
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