FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 13, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-5101
FABIAN PASILLAS-CASTANON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. CR-06-175-HDC)
John D. Russell, Fellers, Snider, Blankenship, Bailey & Tippens, P.C., Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for Appellant.
Timothy L. Faerber, Assistant United States Attorney (David E. O’Meilia, United
States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, with him on the brief), Office of
the United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellee.
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
The question raised in this appeal is whether the Speedy Trial Act is
violated when law enforcement officials detain a person for civil deportation
proceedings to facilitate a federal criminal investigation.
Fabian Pasillas-Castanon appeals his indictment and subsequent conviction
for knowingly possessing a counterfeit green card, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1546(a). Pasillas-Castanon alleges the district court erred by not dismissing the
indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), because more than
thirty days elapsed between his civil arrest for illegal entry on August 5, 2006,
and his indictment for possession of a counterfeit green card on October 4, 2006.
He argues the government wrongfully detained him for deportation proceedings as
a ruse to facilitate its investigation into the counterfeit charges.
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude neither the
Speedy Trial Act nor the ruse exception applies to Pasillas-Castanon’s civil
deportation arrest. We therefore AFFIRM.
I. Background
The arrest and detention of Pasillas-Castanon arise from a series of events
between August and October 2006. On August 5, 2006, Officer Leland Ashley
and Detective Shawn Hickey of the Tulsa Police Department stopped a Ford
Mustang illegally making a turn without signaling. At the time of the stop, there
were three occupants inside the car, with Pasillas-Castanon occupying the front
passenger seat. When Ashley approached the car, he noticed the backseat
passenger was laying down inside the vehicle. Because Ashley and Hickey did
not know if the passenger was dead or alive, they removed Pasillas-Castanon and
the driver from the car and handcuffed them as a precautionary matter.
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Eventually, Ashley and Hickey awakened the backseat passenger and determined
he was drunk.
Checking for identification, Ashley received a green card from the driver
and backseat passenger, and Hickey received a green card from Pasillas-Castanon.
Ashley and Hickey, however, could not effectively communicate with the
occupants—none of the officers spoke Spanish, and the occupants did not speak
English.
To facilitate their questioning, Hickey decided to obtain the assistance of a
Spanish speaking officer. He contacted Corporal Eric Nelson, who was riding
with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent James Van
Stephens. Hickey knew Van Stephens spoke Spanish, and he asked them to come
to the scene of the traffic stop.
When Van Stephens arrived, he reviewed the three green cards from
Ashley. He quickly realized they were counterfeit. Van Stephens then asked the
three occupants about their immigration status, and they all conceded they were
illegally in the United States. Van Stephens arrested Pasillas-Castanon. The
other two occupants were also arrested.
Immigration officials commenced administrative removal proceedings
against Pasillas-Castanon. While the proceedings were pending, he was placed in
the Oklahoma County jail, without bond.
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A month later, on September 13, 2006, the United States filed a criminal
complaint against Pasillas-Castanon, alleging he knowingly possessed a
counterfeit green card. A grand jury indicted him on October 4, 2006, and two
days later Pasillas-Castanon was removed from ICE custody by the U.S.
Marshals. Because Pasillas-Castanon had been transferred to the custody of the
U.S. Marshals, the Immigration Court terminated the administrative removal
proceedings against him.
Pasillas-Castanon moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging the
government failed to charge him within thirty days of his arrest in violation of the
Speedy Trial Act. The district court denied this motion, and a jury convicted him
for possession of a counterfeit green card. He was sentenced to six months’
imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release.
II. Standard of Review
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Abdush-Shakur,
465 F.3d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court’s compliance with the
legal requirements of the Act are reviewed de novo and the district court’s factual
findings are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. “[W]hen the
statutory factors are properly considered, and supporting factual findings are not
clearly in error, the district court’s judgment of how opposing considerations
balance should not lightly be disturbed.” Id. (quoting United States v.
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Cano-Silva, 402 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
III. Discussion
Pasillas-Castanon argues his indictment should be dismissed and his
conviction overturned because his deportation proceedings were a mere ruse to
keep him incarcerated until the United States could obtain an indictment.
Because he believes the proceedings were a ruse, he argues the Speedy Trial Act
was violated when he was indicted more than thirty days after his civil arrest on
August 5, 2006.
We disagree. First, the Speedy Trial Act generally does not apply to
detentions based on civil deportation charges. Second, the “ruse exception” to the
Speedy Trial Act does not apply in the present case.
A. Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act requires that “[a]ny information or indictment
charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within
thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a
summons in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (emphasis
added). An “offense” refers to “any Federal criminal offense.” Id. § 3172(2)
(emphasis added). If the government fails to comply with the thirty-day time
limit, the Act requires the dismissal of charges in the complaint, with or without
prejudice. Id. § 3162(a)(1).
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Most courts interpreting this language do not apply it to arrests and
detentions based on civil offenses. See United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374
F.3d 440, 450–51 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that unless the ruse exception
applies, arrests and detentions made in connection with civil deportation
proceedings do not trigger the Speedy Trial Act); United States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d
464, 468 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 254 F.3d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Drummond, 240 F.3d 1333, 1335–36
(11th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d 594,
597–98 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Grajales-Montoya, 117 F.3d 356,
366 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 355 (9th
Cir. 1993) (same). We likewise conclude, based on the plain language of the
statute, arrests connected to civil matters do not trigger the Speedy Trial Act.
Deportation proceedings are civil matters. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d at 451; Dyer, 325 F.3d at
468; Garcia-Martinez, 254 F.3d at 19; Drummond, 240 F.3d at 1336 n.3; De La
Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d at 597–98; Grajales-Montoya, 117 F.3d at 366;
Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d at 355. Van Stephens arrested and detained Pasillas-
Castanon on August 5, 2006, because he was “an alien present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled.” R., Vol. I, Doc. 19, Ex. 3 (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I)). Three days later, Van Stephens served Pasillas-
Castanon with a formal document charging him with this civil offense. As a
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result of this offense, ICE initiated deportation proceedings against him, and
detained him until completion of these proceedings. Because Pasillas-Castanon’s
arrest on August 5, 2006 was for a civil matter, the arrest did not trigger the
Speedy Trial Act. The thirty-day time limit instead was triggered on October 4,
2006, when the U.S. Marshal’s Service arrested Pasillas-Castanon in connection
with the criminal offense of illegally possessing a counterfeit green card.
In sum, federal officials complied with the Speedy Trial Act because
Pasillas-Castanon was indicted within thirty days of this arrest—in fact, he was
indicted the same day he was arrested for the federal criminal offense.
B. Ruse Exception
While civil arrests and detentions do not ordinarily trigger the Speedy Trial
Act, they may activate it when law enforcement authorities collude with state or
civil officials to detain a defendant as a mere ruse for later prosecution. See, e.g.,
De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d at 598 (“[T]he requirements of the Speedy Trial Act
. . . would lose all meaning if federal criminal authorities could collude with civil
or state officials to have those authorities detain a defendant pending federal
charges solely for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of the Speedy Trial
Act.”).
Most circuits recognize the ruse exception. See United States v. Woolfolk,
399 F.3d 590, 596 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005); Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d at 451;
Dyer, 325 F.3d at 468–69; Garcia-Martinez, 254 F.3d at 19–20; Drummond, 240
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F.3d at 1336; United States v. Jones, 129 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1997);
Grajales-Montoya, 117 F.3d at 366–367; Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d at 357. We
agree with those courts that the Speedy Trial Act cannot be evaded through sham
civil proceedings.
Pasillas-Castanon argues the ruse exception should apply here because
although he “was being held for deportation, the evidence was unequivocal that
he was also being held for purposes of criminal prosecution.” Aplt. Br. 13–14.
He cites various evidence from the record supporting this conclusion. For
example, ICE Special Agent Munson testified that at the time Pasillas-Castanon
was arrested, it was the intention of ICE to pursue criminal charges against him.
Furthermore, additional paperwork prepared by ICE on November 16, 2006,
stated “[a]t the time of processing, prosecution for possession of false
immigration documents is being requested from the Northern District of
Oklahoma.” R., Vol. I, Doc. 29, Ex. 5.
The ruse exception is not easily triggered. We agree with the majority of
courts that apply it only when a defendant demonstrates that the “primary or
exclusive purpose” of a civil detention was to hold the defendant for future
criminal prosecution. Dyer, 325 F.3d at 468; Drummond, 240 F.3d at 1336; De
La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d at 598; see also Garcia-Martinez, 254 F.3d at 20
(holding ruse exception applies when the “sole or primary purpose” of the civil
detention is to hold defendant for future criminal prosecution); United States v.
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Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding ruse exception applies when
civil detention is “solely for the purpose of bypassing” the Speedy Trial Act).
The mere fact that the detaining authorities are aware other potential
criminal charges are available does not trigger the exception. There must be
evidence showing the detention is for the primary or exclusive purpose of
furthering the criminal prosecution. Without evidence of wrongful collusion for
this purpose, the exception does not apply. 1 In short, if the detaining authorities
have a lawful basis for their civil detention, a defendant is not entitled to invoke
the exception.
The evidence here shows that ICE had a lawful basis for holding Pasillas-
Castanon and actively pursued deportation proceedings against him. The
government produced substantial evidence demonstrating ICE diligently processed
Pasillas-Castanon’s administrative removal case. On August 17, 2006, for
example, ICE transferred Pasillas-Castanon’s file to Dallas where the immigration
court was located. Attorneys for ICE then received his file on September 1, and
reviewed the charges for legal sufficiency. The immigration court received his file
1
Pasillas-Castanon also argues the district court incorrectly required the
defendant to prove bad faith. See Aplt. Br. 19–20. We see no error. The test is
whether the government officials wrongfully detained or colluded with other
officials to detain a person in civil proceedings to evade the Speedy Trial Act.
That fact determination inherently raises questions of bad faith that are a part of
the determination of the officials’ “primary or exclusive” purpose. See, e.g.,
Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d at 357–58 (holding ruse exception did not apply because
there was no evidence of government bad faith); United States v. Orbino, 981
F.2d 1035, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
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on September 5, and scheduled an initial hearing for September 25, 2006 and a
deportation hearing for October 6, 2006. The government demonstrated below that
these steps were consistent with a typical deportation proceeding in the Dallas
region.
The record thus refutes any inference that criminal prosecution was the
primary or exclusive purpose of Pasillas-Castanon’s detention. See, e.g., United
States v. Noel, 231 F.3d 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding evidence showing that
the federal government actively pursued deportation proceedings against the
detainee strongly supports the conclusion that criminal prosecution was not the
primary purpose of the alien’s detention); United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 24 F.3d
53, 55 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). Moreover, even the fact that criminal law
enforcement officials “are aware of, and perhaps slightly involved in, the
deportation proceedings . . . would not establish, as a matter of law, the requisite
collusion” to trigger the exception. Grajales-Montoya, 117 F.3d at 366–67.
Pasillas-Castanon nonetheless alleges ICE officials deliberately delayed his
custody redetermination hearing to give federal prosecutors more time to file
criminal charges against him. The district court found otherwise. Government
witnesses testified that ICE made no deliberate effort to delay this hearing. In
fact, any delay was the result of oversight or a backlog of cases. Based on this
testimony, the district court concluded this hearing was not intentionally delayed,
thus rebutting any inference of bad faith on the part of the officials.
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Because Pasillas-Castanon failed to show the primary or exclusive reason
ICE detained him was to hold him for future criminal prosecution, we see no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s determination that the ruse exception did not
apply.
IV. Conclusion
Because the district court properly concluded Pasillas-Castanon’s arrest and
indictment did not violate the Speedy Trial Act, we AFFIRM Pasillas-Castanon’s
conviction.
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