IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-60610
JARVIOUS COTTON, LARRY P. JACKSON, ROBERT BRENT LAYNE,
RONNIE SMITH and KENNETH W. GARRISON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
SHIRLEY TAYLOR, BRENDA BROWN, WILLIAM HOSKINS,
STEVE W. PUCKETT, RALPH HAMES, LEE ROY BLACK,
and WILLIE BROWN,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(4:92-CV-63-D)
March 9, 1999
Before DAVIS, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This case requires us to determine whether the district court committed clear error or
otherwise misapplied the law in finding that the plaintiffs were deprived the minimum standard of
confinement required under the Eight Amendment. We must also determine whether the district
court erred in awarding plaintiff, Larry P. Jackson, damages after Jackson signed a notice voluntarily
dismissing himself as a party. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.
Factual and Procedural Background
Jarvious Cotton, Mississippi prisoner # 34463; Larry P. Jackson, # 48890; Robert Brent
*
Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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Layne; Ronnie Smith, # 37556; and Kenneth Garrison, # 73717, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against Shirley Taylor, correctional officer; Brenda Brown, correctional officer; William Hoskins,
Associate Warden of Unit 29 at Parchman; Steven Puckett, Superintendent of the Mississippi State
Penitentiary; Ralph Hames, Assistant Unit Administrator of Unit 29; Lee Roy Black, Commissioner
of the Mississippi State Penitentiary; Ronald Welch, the class litigation counsel for the Mississippi
State Penitentiary; and Willie L. Brown, State Health Inspector. In their second amended complaint,
the plaintiffs alleged claims relating to the opening of their mail, the policy concerning how many
packages they could receive, and a leaking roof in Unit 29 where they were housed.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on t he mail and package
claims, and the case proceeded to a trial on the leaky roof claim. A trial was held before the
magistrate judge. The magistrate judge recommended that judgment be entered for the defendants.
The magistrate judge stated that the evidence showed that the consensus of the witnesses was that
the ten-year-old roof of Unit 29 leaked during every heavy rain sometime during 1991.1 The leaking
was so severe that sleeping bunks, clothing, and other personal possessions became saturated,
electrical outlets sparked, and water collected on the floor. At least one correctional officer testified
that he wore a raincoat when working in Unit 29 during this period. The five plaintiffs testified that
they lost personal property, suffered recurring colds, lost sleep, and suffered emotional distress.
Although the staff physician testified that only one plaintiff, Smith, sought medical attention for cold
or flu-like symptoms, the plaintiffs testified that they bought over-the-counter medications every
month from the canteen. The magistrate judge found that the roof problem was severe and deprived
the plaintiffs of minimally safe housing.
The magistrate judge stated that the physical plant director of the prison, Jim Harman,2
became aware of the problem at Unit 29 in December 1991. Because the roof was still under
1
Aside from the duration of the conditions, the facts relating to the leaking roof, the conditions
created in the cells, and the defendants’ repair efforts are not in dispute.
2
Jim Harman was not named as a defendant.
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warranty, notice was given to the company who had installed the roof, and the company had 30 days
to respond under the contract. Three crews worked on the roof, attempting to repair it with felt and
plastic roof cement yet their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. Unit 29 needed a new roof which
would cost an estimated $400,000.00. The Bureau of Buildings requested bids and awarded a
contract. The new roof was installed in May 1992. In the interim, inmate crews worked to repair
the leaks with tar. Harmon testified that the authorities at the prison encouraged him to do whatever
was necessary and to work as quickly and efficiently as possible. The magistrate judge found that the
evidence demonstrated the defendants’ efforts to remedy the problem effectively and expeditiously.
The magistrate judge further found that because of limited space at the Mississippi State Penitentiary,
the defendants had no meaningful alternative but to continue to house the prisoners in that unit. The
magistrate judge concluded that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the living
conditions of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report. The district court judge
ordered transcription of the trial for his review. The district court did not adopt the recommendation
of the magistrate judge, stating that the magistrate judge did not correctly assess the facts in evidence
when reaching his conclusions. The district court found that the leaky roof condition existed from
sometime late in 1991 to May 1992. Id. The district court briefly summarized the severity of the
leaks and the efforts of the defendants to repai r it. The district court acknowledged that the
magistrate judge had correctly stated the applicable deliberate indifference standard for analyzing the
plaintiffs Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim and agreed with the magistrate judge
that the conditions deprived the plaintiffs of minimally safe housing.
However, the district court did not agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the
defendants were not deliberately indifferent. According to the district court, there was insufficient
evidence to support this finding. The district court reasoned:
In light of the defendant’s knowledge of the housing dilemma and of
their inability to remedy the problem, the court finds that the plaintiffs
have made a prima facie showing that the defendants’ decision to
continue housing the plaintiffs in Unit 29K was unreasonable, and
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evinced a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.
5 Record 1072. The district court explained that the defendants had failed to rebut this prima facie
case with any evidence to support a finding of reasonableness. “While there was sufficient evidence
placed before the Magistrate Judge concerning efforts to repair the roof of Unit 29K, there is nothing
before the court which indicates that the state penitentiary was so crowded during the time period
in question that the defendants `had no meaningful alternative’ but to continue housing inmates in
Unit 29K.” 5 Record 1072-73. The district court stated that there was no evidence placed before
the court regarding the availability or expense of temporary housing such as a “quick-bed” facility,
the renting or purchasing of manufactured housing, or even tents. Also, there was no proof regarding
the feasibility of converting the use of other buildings at the penitentiary for use as temporary housing
until the roof leak was fixed. The district court opined that the defendants had the opportunity to
present such evidence to rebut the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing but did not do so.
The district court observed that it could take judicial notice of generally overcrowded
conditions at Parchman throughout the years yet declined to do so. According to the district court,
judicial notice was an incomplete substitute and could not be stretched to protect the defendants in
this case. The district court held:
The undersigned cannot take judicial notice of the fact that the state
penitentiary was so financially and logistically constrained during the
time period at bar that no alternative space was reasonably available
for the inmates of Unit 29K. In light of the admitted knowledge on
the part of the defendants regarding the living conditions in Unit 29K,
this court sees no alternative but to find that the defendants
subjectively knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiffs
in this case and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.
5 Record 1073. The district court found for the plaintiffs and entered judgment for them in the
amount of $2,000 each for a total verdict against the defendants of $10,000. The defendants
appealed.
Discussion
On appeal from a bench trial, this court reviews factual findings for clear error and issues of
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law de novo. Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1993). If the factfinder's account of the
evidence is plausible, this court may not reverse it. Also, when two views of the evidence are
permissible, "the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment as a condition of imprisonment. Consequently, the conditions
under which prisoners are confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Prison officials must provide humane conditions of confinement,
including adequate shelter, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.
Id. To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must first show that the deprivation
alleged, viewed objectively, is sufficiently serious. Specifically, a prison official’s act or omission
must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834. Next, the prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id.
This court reviews a prisoner's allegations challenging the conditions of confinement under
the "deliberate indifference" standard. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991). To establish
deliberate indifference in the context of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that the
defendants (1) were aware of facts from which an inference of an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety could be drawn; and (2) drew an inference that such potential for harm existed. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment "only
if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to
take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847. Prison officials who actually knew of a substantial
risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the
risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. Prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found
liable under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 844-45.
The appellants argue that the district court erred in finding that they violated the plaintiffs’
Eighth Amendment rights by not providing them with minimally safe housing. They contend that the
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district court could have taken judicial notice of severe overcrowding at the State Penitentiary.
Appellants further emphasize that they explained during trial that prison officials have no authority
to house inmates in facilities not approved by the court and that all approved places were full. They
challenge the district court’s finding that they continued to house the plaintiffs in Unit 29K and failed
to present evidence at trial to show that there were no feasible housing alternatives. They argue that
the evidence of their repairs upon becoming aware of the pro blem proves that they were not
deliberately indifferent. They also dispute the district court’s finding that the leaking roof caused
Unit 29K to be unsafe to the extent that the plaintiffs were deprived of a basic human need. While
appellants concede that they could be considered negligent at most, they request reversal of the
district court’s decision.
Appellants also raise other errors in the district court’s judgment. They argue that the district
court erred in holding all the defendant s liable without making findings of individual culpability.
They correctly point out that the only allegations made by the plaintiffs against correctional officers
Shirley Taylor and Brenda Brown related to the mail policy. They note that the basis of the district
court’s finding of liability was the failure to make a housing change, and they argue that the district
court failed to make any findings, and that the record does not contain any evidence, as to which
defendants, if any, had the authority to make such a housing change. Finally, appellants point out an
error in the district court’s judgment involving plaintiff Larry P. Jackson. Jackson filed a voluntary
motion to dismiss which was granted before the district court entered final judgment in the case.
Jackson was no longer a party to the case when the district court granted judgment in his favor.
Both the magistrate judge and the district court found that the prisoners’ testimony about the
conditions created by the water leaks were sufficiently serious as to deprive the plaintiffs of minimally
safe housing. We agree. The plaintiffs testified that there was so much water on the floor at times
that the electrical receptacles would spark and smoke and that they feared electrocution. Based on
this testimony, the district court’s finding that the conditions were sufficiently serious as required to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation was not clearly erroneous.
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However, the district court’s finding that the prison officials failed to present evidence to
show that they took reasonable measures to abate the problem must be reversed. We are mindful that
the prison officials must take reasonable efforts to abate the problem even if harm is ultimately not
averted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. It is undisputed that from the time prison officials became aware
of the leaking roof at Unit 29K in December 1991, they began measures to repair the leaks. They
continuously performed in-house repairs, which stopped most of the leaks, up until the time the roof
was replaced in May 1992.
Conclusion
For the reasons ascribed, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court.
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