FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 18, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ADBU-LATIF K. ABU-NANTAMBU-
EL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FRED J. OLIVA, Director, Denver
Sheriff Department; GARY WILSON,
Major; CHAPLAIN SCOTT; D.
McCALL, Captain; CAPTAIN
No. 07-1357
WOODS; SERGEANT ROBBINS;
(D.C. No. 06-CV-945-WDM-CBS)
DEPUTY FLINK; DEPUTY
(D. Colo.)
SCHAEFER; CAPTAIN BLAIR; P.
DEEDS, Major; R. FOOS, Chief;
SERGEANT GABEL; BILL
LOVINGIER, Director, Denver Sheriff
Department; M. MALATESTA;
DEPUTY MARIN, Unnamed Deputy
Defendants 1-4; CAPTAIN MEYER;
SERGEANT MURPHY; SERGEANT
SHELLY,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the parties’ briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Before O’BRIEN, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Abu-Nantambu-El, proceeding pro se, sued members of
the Denver Sheriff’s Department and an investigator for the Denver Office of
Independent Monitor, alleging those Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights while
he was incarcerated in the Denver County Jail. Plaintiff appeals from the district
court’s decisions to dismiss his claims without prejudice and to deny him relief
from that decision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 1 Defendants contend that this
court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider this appeal and that Plaintiff has, in
any event, waived appellate review. Although we are satisfied that we have
appellate jurisdiction to consider most of the issues Plaintiff raises on appeal, we
agree that he has waived appellate review of the district court’s decision to
dismiss his claims without prejudice. Further, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Plaintiff Rule 59(e) relief from that dismissal. We,
therefore, AFFIRM.
I. Appellate jurisdiction
Defendants assert this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal
because Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was untimely. That is not the case.
The district court entered its final judgment on March 5, 2007. Within ten
1
We DENY Plaintiff’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2
days of that judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), however, Plaintiff filed a “motion
for reconsideration” that tolled the time for him to file a notice of appeal. See
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). The district court denied that tolling motion on June
12, 2007. Plaintiff then had thirty days from that date to file his notice of appeal.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Admittedly, he did not do so. Nevertheless, on
July 25, 2007, Plaintiff did timely file a motion to extend the time to file his
notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(I). Further, because that motion
was entitled “Notice of Appeal and Request for Extension of Time to File
Appeal,” it also served as a notice of appeal that ripened when the district court
granted Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time. See Hinton v. City of
Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 777-79 (10th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Smith,
182 F.3d 733, 735-36 (10th Cir. 1999) (treating motion to file notice of appeal out
of time as functional equivalent of notice of appeal). 2 Plaintiff’s notice of appeal
was thus timely filed and sufficient to give this court jurisdiction to consider his
2
A notice of appeal must 1) specify the party taking the appeal; 2) designate
the judgment or order from which that party is appealing; and 3) name the court
to which the appeal is taken. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). Plaintiff’s “notice of
appeal and request for an extension of time” did not identify to which court he
was appealing. Nevertheless, “we have long held that a defective notice of appeal
should not warrant dismissal for want of jurisdiction where the intention to appeal
to a certain court of appeals may be reasonably inferred from the notice, and
where the defect has not materially misled the appellee.” United States v. Garcia,
459 F.3d 1059, 1062 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, “because [Defendants] timely
filed a response brief in this court without even discussing the defect in
[Appellant’s] notice of appeal, the [Defendants-Appellees] clearly [were] not
prejudiced or materially misled.” Id. (quotation omitted).
3
appeal.
Further, because the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court’s
decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s action and the district court’s decision denying
Plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have
jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (construing pro se
litigant’s pleadings liberally).
In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s
decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration.
Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have
no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366
(2007) (holding timely notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) is
jurisdictional); see also Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1171-72 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding district court’s decision to deny a Rule 60(b) motion is a
separately appealable decision requiring a new notice of appeal).
One additional jurisdictional concern that we raise sua sponte, see Kennedy
v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 2001), is the fact that the district court
dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice. This court has indicated that a
district court’s decision dismissing a complaint without prejudice may not always
be a final appealable decision. See Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444,
448-49 (10th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, in this case, the district court dismissed
4
Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice because Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. This court has consistently treated such dismissals as
final decisions appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 See Whitington v. Ortiz, 472
F.3d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 2007); Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th
Cir. 2002); Enlow v. Moore, 134 F.3d 993, 994 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Moya,
465 F.3d at 449-50.
We, therefore, are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to consider this timely
appeal from the district court’s final judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims
without prejudice and the court’s decision denying Plaintiff Rule 59(e) relief.
II. Whether Plaintiff waived direct review of the district court’s decision
to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice
It was the magistrate judge, in his January 17, 2007 report and
recommendation, who recommended that the district court dismiss Plaintiff’s
3
The district court additionally dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Mary Malatesta pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding
Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Malatesta upon which relief could be
granted. But the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Malatesta
without prejudice because the district court could not “discount completely the
possibility that Plaintiff can correct the pleadings defects” to state a proper claim
against Malatesta. Ordinarily, this court might treat such a dismissal order as
non-final and, therefore, not yet appealable. See Moya, 465 F.3d at 450-51.
Nevertheless, in this case, the district court later also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Malatesta, along with his claims against the other defendants,
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. And that determination represents
a final, appealable decision.
5
claims without prejudice because Plaintiff had failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies. 4 In that report and recommendation, the magistrate
judge informed Plaintiff that he had ten days from the date of service of the report
to file objections, and that if Plaintiff did not object, he would waive de novo
review by the district court and “the right to appeal from a judgment of the
district court based on the proposed findings and recommendations of the
magistrate judge.” Plaintiff did not file any written objections. By failing to do
so, he has waived his right to appellate review of both legal and factual issues.
See Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007).
Although this waiver rule is firm, it will “not apply (1) when a pro se
litigant was not notified of the time period for filing an objection and the
consequences for failing to do so, (2) when the interests of justice warrant, or
4
The magistrate judge issued three reports and recommendations, one on
January 3, 2007, and two on January 17, 2007. The first report recommended that
the district court grant Defendant Malatesta’s motion to dismiss without prejudice
Plaintiff’s claims against her for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The second recommended denying
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief as moot, because at that time Plaintiff had
been released from jail. Alternatively, the magistrate recommended denying
those claims on their merits because Plaintiff had failed to establish the
requirements necessary for injunctive relief. The magistrate judge’s third report
recommended dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice, because
Plaintiff had not established that he had completely exhausted his administrative
remedies. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s pleadings, see Haines, 404 U.S. at 519,
it appears that on appeal he challenges only the third report and recommendation.
Even if he does challenge the other recommendations, however, Plaintiff has
waived appellate review of those determinations as well.
6
(3) when the party that failed to object makes a showing of plain error.” Diestel
v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1279 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2008 WL
857024 (U.S. June 2, 2008) (No. 07-1236). None of these exceptions to the
waiver rule, however, apply here.
Plaintiff argues that he had no notice of the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation because he was never served with it. The magistrate judge,
however, did properly serve Plaintiff when the court mailed the report and
recommendation to the address Plaintiff had given the court. See Theede v. U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, 172 F.3d 1262, 1265-67 (10th Cir. 1999). That report was never
returned to the district court as undeliverable. Plaintiff, nevertheless, asserts that,
at the time the district court mailed the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation to him, Plaintiff had been “arrested,” reincarcerated, and then
transferred between three or four jails and correctional facilities. He did not
inform the district court of his change of address until February 28, 2007, five
weeks after the magistrate judge served the report and recommendation on
Plaintiff by mailing it to his old address.
“[T]he District of Colorado Local Rules place the burden on the parties to
formally direct the attention of the court to any change of address. . . . The fact
that [Plaintiff] is acting pro se does not eliminate this burden.” Theede, 172 F.3d
at 1267; see also Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 958 (10th Cir. 2006)
(declining to overlook waiver where plaintiff asserted that he was unaware of the
7
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and his need to make timely
objections to that report, because the court had sent the report to a prison from
which the plaintiff had since been transferred); Aceves v. Jeffers, 196 Fed. App’x
637, 638 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (declining to overlook waiver where the
plaintiff had been released from prison and deported and did not inform the court
of his change of address for eight months).
Plaintiff also argues that the district court’s decision to dismiss his action
was plain error, enabling this court to overlook his waiver of review, because that
decision was contrary to Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). “Plain error occurs
when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and
which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Wardell, 470 F.3d at 959 (quotation omitted). Here, however,
there was no error.
The Supreme Court decided Bock after the magistrate judge recommended
dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, but before the district court accepted that
recommendation. Bock held, among other things, that a prisoner’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be raised by the
defendant. See 549 U.S. at 918-19, 921. In this case, however, Defendants did
raise failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. And the court ruled on that
defense as the result of Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment.
8
Bock further held that a district court could not dismiss an entire action
because only some of the plaintiff’s claims remained unexhausted. See 549 U.S.
at 923-24. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, however, that is not what the district
court did here. Although the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
applied pre-Bock law, the district court, in adopting the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, specifically applied Bock. There was, therefore, no error, let
alone plain error.
Two additional reasons further persuade us that none of the exceptions to
our firm waiver rule apply here. First, on the merits, Plaintiff does not have a
strong argument that he has as yet established that he fully exhausted his
administrative remedies as to any of his claims. See Theede, 172 F.3d at 1268
(considering strength of plaintiff’s claims before concluding court would not, in
the interests of justice, overlook plaintiff’s waiver of appellate review). And
second, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice to refiling
them. We express no opinion, however, as to whether he will be able to do so
now.
For all of these reasons, we conclude Plaintiff has waived appellate review
of the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
III. Denial of Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion
After the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice for
9
failure to exhaust, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district
court treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment made pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e). In that motion, Plaintiff informed the district court that he had not
been receiving Defendants’ pleadings. The district court denied the motion, in
part because Plaintiff had not asserted any explanation for failing to file any
objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. That was not an
abuse of discretion. See Rogers v. Andrus Transp. Servs., 502 F.3d 1147, 1153
(10th Cir. 2007) (reviewing denial of Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion).
Even assuming that the district court could have liberally construed Plaintiff’s
Rule 59(e) motion to inform the court that Plaintiff had never received the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, for the reasons stated above, the
district court still did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 59(e) relief.
IV. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the decisions of the district court. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
10