FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 20, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
MYOUN L. SAWYER,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 08-3067
v. (D. of Kan.)
TAMIRA JEFFERIES, Classification (D.C. No. 08-CV-3016-SAC)
Supervisor, Wyandotte County Jail;
VICTOR CHAVEZ, Detective and/or
Investigator, Wyandotte County Jail;
RANDALL HENDERSON, Jail
Administrator, Wyandotte County Jail;
and LEROY GREEN, JR., Sheriff,
Wyandotte County Sheriff’s
Department,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. **
Myoun L. Sawyer appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
pro se complaint. 1 In the complaint, Sawyer alleged Defendants—jail and the
sheriff’s office employees in Wyandotte County, Kansas—violated several of his
constitutional rights during Sawyer’s confinement in a county jail. Because
Sawyer proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP) and was subject to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requirements, the district court sua sponte dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim.
We agree with the district court’s reasoning and therefore DISMISS this
appeal.
I. Background
Sawyer’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleges violations of several of his
constitutional rights, all stemming from the following incidents.
In August and October 2006, Sawyer, while incarcerated in a county jail on
felony charges, received citations for indecent exposure, a minor violation under
jail rules. On both occasions, however, Classification Supervisor Tamira Jefferies
imposed a 30-day segregation, a level of punishment jail rules reserve for major
violations. Jefferies explained she upgraded the sanctions because of prior
instances of similar violations by Sawyer. For these two incidents, plus six
others, Sawyer was charged in November 2006 with eight misdemeanor counts of
lewd and lascivious behavior, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3508(a)(2).
1
Because Sawyer is proceeding pro se, we review his filings liberally. See
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
-2-
As of February 2007, Sawyer was no longer in custody on the earlier felony
charges. Only misdemeanor charges remained. Despite this, Jefferies did not
reclassify Sawyer’s status and allowed him to remain in maximum custody.
While in maximum custody, Jefferies was attacked by another inmate and
suffered a broken jaw.
In September 2007, Sawyer complained to the sheriff’s office about jail
administration. In response, Detective Victor Chavez interviewed Sawyer, took a
formal statement, and allowed him to fill out a complaint. Chavez then left the
papers with Sawyer, promising to pick them up the next day as well as to bring
Sawyer more forms for additional complaints. When Chavez failed to return,
Sawyer filed grievances with Jefferies, Jail Administrator Randall Henderson, and
Sheriff Leroy Green, Jr.
Lastly, in October 2007, Sawyer apparently threw a meal tray at a jail
deputy. As a result, he was sanctioned with a loss of hot meal privileges. For
approximately two weeks, Sawyer received only bagged cold meals.
II. Discussion
Sawyer proceeded IFP below and is thus subject to the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), district courts must dismiss an IFP
complaint if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss an IFP complaint
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
-3-
“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where
it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it
would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“In determining whether a dismissal is proper, we must accept the allegations of
the complaint as true and construe those allegations, and any reasonable
inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Construing Sawyer’s complaint liberally, as we must, it can be read as
alleging the following claims: double jeopardy, discrimination, due process
violation, deliberate indifference, denial of access to the courts, and cruel and
unusual punishment. We discuss each claim in turn. In the end, we agree
Sawyer’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
A. Double Jeopardy
Sawyer’s double jeopardy claim rests on his twice receiving sanctions for
the August and October 2006 incidents of indecent exposure—first via
administrative sanctions imposed by jail authorities and then again via criminal
misdemeanor charges by a district attorney. This claim fails. “Because the
Double Jeopardy clause applies [only] to proceedings that are essentially criminal
in nature, . . . it is well established that prison disciplinary sanctions . . . do not
implicate double jeopardy protections.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1262
(10th Cir. 2006) (citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975)) (quotations
-4-
omitted). Sawyer cannot count his administrative sanctions for the purpose of
double jeopardy analysis.
B. Discrimination
Sawyer next claims he was a victim of selective prosecution and invidious
discrimination when he was punished with a 30-day segregation for minor
violations, allegedly contrary to the jail rules. His claim amounts to an argument
that he was denied equal protection by being treated differently than other
inmates. To succeed on this claim, Sawyer has to show (1) he was being treated
differently from similarly situated inmates, and (2) the difference in treatment
was not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 1261
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
Sawyer cannot succeed on this claim for the simple reason that he, unlike
the general jail population, was “deemed a chronic discipline problem.” R., Doc.
1, Ex. 12. He appeared to repeatedly expose himself in the presence of female
guards. Because prison administrators enjoy broad discretion in determining
which inmates warrant administrative segregation—and for how long—we cannot
say “there are no relevant differences between [Sawyer] and other inmates that
reasonably might account for their different treatment.” Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1261
(quotation omitted).
Sawyer’s equal protection claim thus fails.
-5-
C. Due Process Violation
Apart from his equal protection challenge, Sawyer appears to argue he was
deprived of liberty without due process when, after his felony charges were
resolved and only misdemeanor charges remained, Jefferies failed to reclassify
him and remove him from maximum custody. “Changing an inmate’s prison
classification,” however, “ordinarily does not deprive him of liberty, because he
is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison.” Templeman v. Gunter,
16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225
(1976)). Thus, without more, Sawyer does not have a due process liberty interest
in a particular prison classification. That an inmate like Sawyer, who had chronic
discipline problems, continued to reside in maximum custody when only
misdemeanor (not felony) charges remained does not state a due process claim.
D. Deliberate Indifference
Sawyer alleges that an unprovoked attack against him by another inmate in
the maximum custody unit amounts to a breach of jail administrators’ duty to
protect him. “Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at
the hands of other prisoners,” and a “prison official’s deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”
Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 2001) (brackets and
ellipsis omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 833 (1994)).
Inmates state a cognizable failure to protect claim only when they show (1) they
-6-
were incarcerated “under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, the
objective component,” and (2) “the prison official was deliberately indifferent to
[inmates’] safety, the subjective component.” Id. at 1271 (quotation omitted).
This claim fails because Sawyer does not allege jail administrators knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837 (holding “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”). At
most, Sawyer’s allegations might support a claim of negligence by jail
administration, but negligence is not enough for constitutional liability. See
Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
deliberate indifference is a higher degree of fault than even gross negligence, let
alone ordinary negligence). Sawyer alleges nothing more than an unprovoked
attack by another inmate. Nothing in the record suggests jail administrators knew
of and disregarded the risk that such an attack might occur. They thus were not
deliberately indifferent to Sawyer’s safety, at least not in the constitutional sense.
E. Denial of Access to the Courts
Sawyer alleges his constitutional rights were violated when Chavez failed
to return to pick up Sawyer’s complaint against jail administration. We agree
with the district court’s interpretation of this allegation as an attempt to state a
violation of Sawyer’s right to access the courts. But while such a right certainly
-7-
exists under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d
1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)), we do
not see how it was violated in this case. Sawyer was able, without any apparent
impediment, to file the instant § 1983 complaint, which contains all the
allegations (and more) he wanted to bring to Chavez’s attention. We are thus
unable to see what consequences Chavez’s failure to return had on Sawyer’s right
of access to the courts. Accordingly, this claim fails.
F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Finally, Sawyer challenges deprivation of hot meals as a sanction for
throwing a meal tray at a deputy. However, “while prisoners are guaranteed a
nutritionally adequate diet under the Eighth Amendment, . . . there is no
constitutional right to hot meals.” Laufgas v. Speziale, 263 F. App’x 192, 198 (3d
Cir. 2008) (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980)); see also
Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 601 (1st Cir. 1974) (explaining the constitutional
requirement of adequate food in prisons does not include a right to hot meals).
Because Sawyer does not allege the cold meals were nutritionally inadequate, this
claim also must fail.
-8-
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS Sawyer’s appeal.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
-9-