FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 25, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-5184
BRIAN KELLY RAUCH, (D.C. No. CR-07-101-F)
(N. D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Brian Rauch entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of
being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
§ 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ninety months.
Rauch now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
I.
At approximately 8 p.m. on May 11, 2007, Tulsa police officer Danielle
Bishop prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of
defendant Rauch, located at 1511 North Kingston Avenue in Tulsa. The affidavit
alleged that Rauch was in possession of, among other things, methamphetamine,
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and firearms. In support of this allegation, the
affidavit first noted that a reliable confidential informant (RCI), who had
“provided officers reliable information no less than seven different times,”
informed officers that an individual named “Brian Rouch [sic]” “was selling
quantities of methamphetamine and marijuana from the residence to be searched.”
ROA, Vol. I, Doc. 24, Affidavit at 2. More specifically, the affidavit stated that
the RCI “drove officers to the residence to be searched,” “pointed it out as the
residence from which Brian was selling methamphetamine and marijuana,” and
“stated that they had observed methamphetamine packaged for sale within the
residence . . . .” Id. The affidavit further stated that “a second person ha[d] come
forward in a confidential capacity” and “stated that they had information
regarding a subject identified as Brian Rouch [sic], who was selling large
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quantities of methamphetamine from the residence to be searched.” Id. In
addition, the affidavit stated that “a search of the Tulsa Police Department records
computer revealed that on 3/22/07 Brian Rouch [sic] listed the residence to be
searched as his home address,” and that the “[r]ecords also revealed that Brian
ha[d] multiple previous felony arrest[s] and . . . convictions,” including “previous
drug arrests for Trafficking Controlled Dangerous Substances and Possession of
Marijuana with intent on 7/10/04, Possession of Marijuana on 6/27/04 and
9/8/03.” Id. Lastly, the affidavit stated “that within the last 72 hours” Bishop
“ha[d] conducted surveillance at the residence to be searched and ha[d] observed
short term pedestrian and vehicular traffic” “indicative of drug sales.” Id.
Bishop presented her affidavit to a state district judge who, at 9:20 p.m.
that evening, after reviewing the affidavit and concluding that it established
probable cause, issued a search warrant for Rauch’s residence. Id., Search
Warrant at 1. The search warrant was executed shortly after its issuance. After
entering the residence, law enforcement officers identified three occupants: Rauch
and two females. One of the females “was located in the bathroom of the house
and was seen flushing the toilet repeatedly . . . .” Id., Vol. II, PSR at 6. “A small
amount of marijuana was found in the trash in the bathroom where [this female]
was located.” Id. The ensuing search of the remainder of the residence produced
four firearms, two of which were loaded and one of which was stolen, additional
ammunition, approximately $6,900 in cash, and a digital scale. Id.
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On June 7, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Rauch on one count of being
a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Rauch moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of
his residence, arguing that the supporting affidavit “wholly fail[ed] to state when
the reliable confidential informant (“RCI”) was at the residence and purportedly
saw methamphetamine or when the confidential informant (“CI”) somehow
learned that . . . Rauch was selling drugs from the residence.” ROA, Vol. I, Doc.
21 at 1-2. The district court denied Rauch’s motion, concluding that affidavit
gave the state district judge “probable cause to believe that the search of
[Rauch]’s residence would uncover illegal drugs.” Id., Vol. III. at 40.
Alternatively, the district court concluded “that the [executing] officers’ reliance
on the [search] warrant was objectively reasonable . . . .” Id. at 41.
On August 8, 2007, Rauch entered a conditional plea of guilty to the single
count alleged in the indictment. The district court subsequently sentenced Rauch
to a term of imprisonment of ninety months.
II.
Rauch now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress,
arguing that “[t]he affidavit submitted in this case was wholly lacking in indicia
of probable cause because it completely failed to establish any time frame
between when drugs were allegedly at the residence and May 11, 2007, the date
of the search.” Aplt. Br. at 22. “Determinations relating to the sufficiency of a
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search warrant and the applicability of the good-faith exception are conclusions of
law . . . which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d
1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 2000). “[W]hile we review the district court’s ruling on the
sufficiency of a search warrant de novo, we do not review de novo the
determination of probable cause by the issuing judge or magistrate.” United
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2008). “Rather, a state judge’s
decision to issue a warrant is entitled to great deference, and we need only ask
whether, under the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit, the
[state] judge had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that we were to agree with
Rauch that the affidavit failed to provide sufficient probable cause for issuance of
the search warrant, we would nonetheless affirm the district court’s alternative
conclusion that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. The
good faith exception was recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The exception applies where “an officer acting with
objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and
acted within its scope.” Id. at 920. In such situations, the Court explained, “an
officer cannot be expected to question the [issuing] magistrate’s probable-cause
determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically
sufficient,” and thus, “[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error . . .
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cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”
Id. at 921.
After reviewing the record on appeal, we are persuaded that those are
precisely the circumstances presented here. That is, even if the state district
judge who issued the search warrant erred in his probable cause determination,
the record firmly establishes that affiant Bishop was acting in good faith when she
sought the search warrant. Further, nothing in the record indicates that Bishop
and her fellow officers who executed the search warrant acted outside the scope
of the search warrant. Although Rauch argues that Bishop and her fellow officers
lacked reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued, we
disagree. The statements in the affidavit established that two confidential
informants, including one of whom had a history of providing reliable
information, had observed Rauch selling methamphetamine from the residence
identified in the affidavit, and that the police themselves had surveilled the
residence shortly prior to preparation of the affidavit and observed a volume and
pattern of foot and automobile traffic consistent in their experience with drug
distribution. In our view, nothing about this information would have caused a
“reasonably well trained officer” to question the legality of the warrant. Id. at
922.
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AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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