FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 11, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 08-3042
v. D. Kan.
BOBBY G. PULLEN, (D.C. Nos. 06-CV-03095-JAR and
98-CR-40080-JAR-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND DISMISSING APPEAL
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Bobby Pullen, a federal inmate proceeding pro se 1 and in forma pauperis,
seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal from the district court’s
denial of his motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Because he has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2), we deny a COA.
In 1999, Pullen was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas (District of Kansas) of possession with intent to
1
We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,
Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
distribute marijuana. He was sentenced to 262 months in prison. We affirmed his
conviction and sentence on October 6, 2000; the mandate was issued on January
2, 2001. See United States v. Pullen, 232 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished).
Before serving his federal sentence, Pullen was transferred to the custody
of the State of Missouri to serve a state sentence. On October 20, 2000, while
serving his state sentence, Pullen filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri (Eastern District of Missouri) alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel during his federal drug trial. The Eastern District of
Missouri file-stamped the motion and returned a copy of it to Pullen with a letter
informing him his motion was being forwarded to the District of Kansas which
had jurisdiction over the federal case.
In early 2001, Pullen sent a letter to the District of Kansas inquiring about
the status of his § 2255 motion. After receiving no response, Pullen sought
assistance from the prison librarian. According to Pullen, the librarian told him
the District of Kansas had not processed his § 2255 motion because he was not
yet serving his federal sentence.
On March 25, 2006, Pullen began serving his federal sentence. Six days
later, Pullen filed another § 2255 motion in the District of Kansas, again alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel during his federal trial. The district court denied
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the motion as untimely on April 21, 2006. Judgment was entered on October 6,
2006.
Over a year later, on October 12, 2007, Pullen filed a motion for relief
under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He claimed he never
received the court’s April 21, 2006 order despite several written requests for the
status of his case. It was not until October 1, 2007, when the District of Kansas
responded to his September 25, 2007 request for a copy of the docket sheet, that
Pullen learned his motion had been denied. Pullen requested the court “allow
[him] to file his notice of appeal at this time so he may appeal the court’s
Judgment denying his § 2255 motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.” (R. Doc. 131 at 6.)
On January 17, 2008, the district court summarily denied Pullen’s Rule
60(b) motion in a docket text entry only. Pullen filed a motion for COA which
the court denied. Pullen renews his request for a COA with this Court, seeking to
appeal the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. 2
Mr. Pullen requires a COA to appeal from the denial of his Rule 60(b)
motion. 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); United States v. London, 248 Fed. Appx.
2
Pullen does not attempt to appeal the denial of his § 2255 motion and
rightly so. Because Pullen did not timely appeal the denial of his § 2255 motion
under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, we lack jurisdiction
to review it. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2007).
3
Pullen’s Rule 60(b) motion was a “true” Rule 60(b) motion, as opposed to
a second or successive § 2255 motion, because it challenged a “defect in the
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889, 890 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (§ 2255 proceeding); 4 Spitznas v. Boone,
464 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (§ 2254 proceeding). We will issue a COA
only if the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner
must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when
the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Id.
The district court did not state its reasons for denying Pullen’s Rule 60(b)
motion. Nevertheless, given the substantive standard of review is abuse of
integrity of his federal habeas proceeding,” i.e., the failure to receive the district
court’s April 21, 2006 order denying his § 2255 motion. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545
U.S. 524, 532 (2005); see also United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147-48
(10th Cir. 2006) (applying Gonzalez to a federal § 2255 case); Spitznas, 464 F.3d
at 1215-16.
4
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. App. P.
32.1(A). We mention London only because of its reasoned analysis.
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discretion, we see no error. See Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005,
1009 (10th Cir. 2000). Pullen’s Rule 60(b) motion essentially requested the
district court grant him leave to file a late appeal from the denial of his § 2255
motion because he never received notice of that denial from the court and did not
become aware of it until long after the time for filing a notice of appeal (or
request for COA) had passed. In doing so, he recognized that a motion to re-open
the time to file a civil appeal under Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure was unavailable to him because he could not satisfy one of the three
conditions necessary for the court to re-open the time to appeal. Pullen is correct
that the district court could not have granted relief under Rule 4(a)(6) because he
cannot meet its requirements. 5 However, Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent
the filing deadlines of Rule 4(a)(6), even in pro se cases. See Watson v. Ward,
404 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2005); Clark, 204 F.3d at 1039-41. Because
5
Rule 4(a)(6) allows a district court to re-open the time to file a civil
appeal for fourteen days if three conditions are met, one of which is that the
motion to re-open is “filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered
or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice . . . of the entry,
whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(B) (emphasis added); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2107(c). The first deadline—180-days after entry of the district court’s
judgment—elapsed on April 4, 2007; the second deadline—seven days after the
party receives notice—elapsed on October 11, 2007. Pullen had until the earliest
of these deadlines, April 4, 2007, in which to file a motion to re-open under Rule
4(a)(6); he never filed a motion to re-open. Rule 4(a)(6)’s deadlines, codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2107, are “specific and unequivocal” and may not be waived for
equitable reasons. See Clark v. Lavallie, 204 F.3d 1038, 1040 (10th Cir. 2000);
c.f. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366 (concluding fourteen-day time limit to file appeal
under Rule 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) once court re-opens time to file
appeal is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable exceptions).
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Pullen’s Rule 60(b) motion sought to do just that, it was properly denied.
We DENY a COA and DISMISS this nascent appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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