FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 17, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CARL WILLIAM PURSLEY, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-1529
v. District of Colorado
AL ESTEP, Warden, L.C.F; (D.C. No. 1:05-CV-01767-PSF-MEH)
ATTORNEY GENERAL, State of
Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TACHA, KELLY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Carl William Pursley, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) to permit him to appeal from the district court’s order
denying his Rule 60(b) motion, which the court construed as a successive petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). Because we conclude that Mr. Pursley has failed to make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request
for a COA, and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Background
Mr. Pursley was convicted by a Colorado jury of one count of second
degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and two habitual
criminal counts. He is serving a sentence of ninety years’ imprisonment.
On September 13, 2005, Mr. Pursley filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado. The court dismissed the case because the application was
untimely. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus.”). He then submitted a Prisoner’s Motion
and Affidavit for Leave to Proceed on Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The
district court denied this motion on November 20, 2006, because Mr. Pursley had
not shown the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument in support of the
issues raised on appeal. This Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, agreeing
that the application was time barred and that Mr. Pursley had failed to present any
new evidence under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995), that made it “more
likely than not that no reasonable juror” would have convicted him. Pursley v.
Estep, 216 F. App’x 733, 735 (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 2007).
Mr. Pursley then filed a Rule 60(b) motion with the district court, arguing
that he did not have a fair opportunity to present evidence of his actual innocence.
The court determined that the motion was “no more than a successive habeas
petition addressing a merits determination . . . which in these circumstances must
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be dismissed as untimely under AEDPA.” Pursley v. Estep, No. 05-01767, 2007
WL 4322330, *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 7, 2007). Mr. Pursley seeks to appeal. Because
he has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right,” we deny his request for a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Discussion
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or Rule 60(b), if
made in a habeas proceeding, may be appealed only if the district court or this
Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order to make such a showing, a petitioner
must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the district court found that Mr. Pursley’s Rule 60(b) motion was
a successive habeas petition, it did not transfer the case to the court of appeals for
authorization to consider the application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
See Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006). Rather, the court
dismissed the motion as a successive habeas petition barred by § 2244(b).
Therefore, this case is presented to us not as a request for authorization for the
district court to consider a successive habeas petition, but as an appeal of a
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successive motion for habeas relief already considered and dismissed by the
district court.
When faced with a Rule 60(b) motion filed in response to the denial of a
petition for habeas relief, the court must first determine whether the motion
“should be treated as a second or successive habeas petition [or whether] it should
be treated as a ‘true’ 60(b) motion.” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215. Under Gonzales
v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), a 60(b) motion is a second or successive petition
if it “in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the
petitioner’s underlying conviction.” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215.
In his Rule 60(b) motion, Mr. Pursley contends that during his initial
habeas proceedings, the district court did not properly address his request to
develop a factual record. To the extent that Mr. Pursley is claiming a procedural
error by the district court, this claim is a “true” Rule 60(b) issue, and should be
brought as such. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 532. His argument lacks merit, however.
The evidence that Mr. Pursley sought to introduce through expansion of the
record was relevant only to state post-conviction claims that the district court was
barred from reviewing. Pursley v. Estep, No. 05-01767, 2006 WL 3097190 (D.
Colo. Oct. 31, 2006). As to Mr. Pursley’s request for an evidentiary hearing, the
district court is limited by AEDPA in its ability to grant such hearings. The
petitioner must show that “[the] factual predicate . . . could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. §
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2254(e)(2)(A). The evidence that Mr. Pursley sought to present had previously
been available to him and he had in fact presented it to the state court during
post-conviction proceedings.
To the extent that Mr. Pursley seeks through this motion to present new
evidence relevant to the merits of his claim for relief under Schlup or makes other
arguments relevant to the merits of his habeas petition, his 60(b) motion must be
construed as a successive habeas petition and is time barred.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Pursley’s request for a COA and DISMISS
this appeal. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also DENIED. All other
motions are DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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