FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 15, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 08-5014
v. (N.D. of Okla.)
STEVEN LEVANDER WILLIAMS, (D.C. No. CR-97-109-002-HDC)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. **
Steven L. Williams appeals the denial of his motion to modify his sentence.
Proceeding pro se, 1 he claims the district court abused its discretion for the
following reasons: (1) the district court erroneously concluded a recent
amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) did not authorize
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Because Williams proceeds pro se, we review his pleadings and filings
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
the court to modify Williams’s sentence, (2) the district court failed to evaluate
whether certain findings made by the original sentencing court were erroneous,
and (3) Williams’s sentence violates United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), and Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and finding no error, we
AFFIRM the district court’s order.
I. BACKGROUND
Sentencing
In 1997, Williams pleaded guilty to (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, and (2) possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine. Prior to sentencing, the probation office prepared a presentence
investigation report (PSR). The PSR explained “[d]uring the twelve month period
ending August 1997, Steve Williams obtained, possessed with intent to distribute
or distributed not less than eighteen ounces of [crack cocaine] per month, for a
total of 216 ounces or 6.123 kilograms.” PSR at 6, ¶ 12. Based on this quantity
of drugs, the PSR recommended a base offense level of 38. See id. at 7, ¶ 18
(applying USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1) (1997)).
The PSR also recommended no enhancements to the base offense level and
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Because Williams’s total
-2-
offense level was 35 and he had a category III criminal history, the PSR
calculated a Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months for each count.
Williams objected to the amount of cocaine the PSR attributed to him. The
probation office responded with an addendum setting forth the proof supporting
the PSR’s conclusion. In February 1998, the sentencing court adopted the PSR’s
factual findings and Guidelines recommendations. The court then sentenced
Williams to a term of 210 months imprisonment for each count, with the two
terms running concurrently. Williams did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
Motion for Reduction of Sentence
Ten years later, Williams filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for
the modification of his sentence. He argued he was eligible for a reduced
sentence pursuant to Amendment 706 2 of the Guidelines, which applies
retroactively to sentences involving crack cocaine. 3 The district court denied
Williams’s motion, and this timely appeal follows.
II. DISCUSSION
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to deny a
reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Dorrough,
84 F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th Cir. 1996). We review a court’s interpretation of the
2
See USSG App. C. Supplement, Amendment 706 (Nov. 1, 2007).
3
See USSG App. C. Supplement, Amendment 713 (Mar. 3, 2008).
-3-
Guidelines and other legal issues de novo. United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539,
540 (10th Cir. 1997).
A. Application of Amendment 706
Williams first argues the district court abused its discretion because it
concluded USSG Amendment 706 does not authorize the court to reduce his
sentence.
According to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a “court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed except . . . in the case of a defendant who
has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . .” Williams
claims the Sentencing Commission retroactively reduced the sentencing range for
his offense involving crack cocaine when it passed Amendment 706. As his
argument goes, he is therefore eligible for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2).
Contrary to Williams’s assertion, however, Amendment 706 does not
authorize a reduction in his sentence. Amendment 706, which is retroactive to
previously imposed sentences, 4 modified the drug quantity thresholds in the Drug
Quantity Table of USSG § 2D1.1(c). When Williams was originally sentenced,
the Table indicated that a defendant responsible for 1.5 kilograms or more of
crack cocaine received a base offense level of 38. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1)
4
See USSG App. C. Supplement, Amendment 713 (Mar. 3, 2008).
-4-
(1997). Now, under Amendment 706, a defendant responsible for 4.5 kilograms
or more of crack cocaine receives a base offense level of 38. See USSG App. C.
Supplement, Amendment 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). Because the original sentencing
court concluded Williams was responsible for 6.123 kilograms of crack cocaine,
Amendment 706 does not alter Williams’s base offense level; his base offense
level remains at 38. Therefore, this amendment does not authorize a court to
reduce Williams’s sentence.
Because Williams is not eligible for a reduced sentence, we conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion.
B. Challenge to Drug Quantity
Williams nonetheless argues that he is eligible for a reduction in his
sentence because the sentencing court erred in finding he was responsible for
6.123 kilograms of crack cocaine.
As a threshold matter, Williams failed to raise this argument when he filed
his § 3582(c)(2) motion in district court, 5 and therefore we review this issue only
for plain error. See United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir.
2006); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
5
Williams also failed to file a direct appeal challenging the sentencing
court’s findings.
-5-
Here, we see no error, plain or otherwise, because Williams cannot use
§ 3582(c)(2) to collaterally attack his sentence. See Smartt, 129 F.3d at 542–43
(holding district court does not have jurisdiction under § 3582 to consider
collateral sentencing issues). A collateral attack “complain[s] about the substance
of, or proceedings that determined, a defendant’s original sentence or conviction.”
United States v. Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003). In
contrast, § 3582(c)(2) only gives district courts the authority “to modify a
sentence based on events occurring after the original sentence was imposed.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Torres-Aquino, 334 F.3d 939, 941
(10th Cir. 2003) (describing the difference between a § 3582(c)(2) motion and a
collateral attack). By challenging the quantity of drugs calculated by the
sentencing court, Williams is attempting to use his § 3582(c)(2) motion as a
vehicle to challenge the substance of, or the proceedings that determined, his
original sentence.
Because the district court lacks jurisdiction under § 3582(c)(2) to consider
this collateral attack, we conclude the district court did not err in denying
Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion.
-6-
C. Booker and Kimbrough
Williams also argues the district court’s denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion
violates United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Kimbrough v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
We rejected a similar argument in United States v. Price, 438 F.3d 1005
(10th Cir. 2006). As we explained, “even if Booker could be read to be an
implicit lowering of [a defendant’s] sentencing range, § 3582(c)(2) only expressly
allows a reduction where the Sentencing Commission, not the Supreme Court, has
lowered the range. We therefore agree with the district court that Booker does
not provide a basis for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c).” Id. at 1007. The
Sentencing Commission has not lowered the range that applies to Williams
sentence. Thus, because Booker—and by extension Kimbrough—does not provide
a basis for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), we conclude the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
denying Williams’s motion for modification of his sentence. We DENY
Williams’s motion for extension of time to file an untimely reply brief.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M. Tymkovich
United States Circuit Judge
-7-