FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 19, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 08-2027
(D. New Mexico)
JORGE CABANILLAS, (D.C. No. 07-1412 JB)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Jorge Cabanillas pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States
after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and (b), and the district court
sentenced him to forty-six months’ imprisonment. Mr. Cabanillas now appeals
his sentence, arguing that it was substantively unreasonable due to the district
court’s failure to grant a downward variance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(f); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with F ED . R. A PP . P. 32.1 and 10 TH C IR . R. 32.1.
have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and affirm the district court’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1990, Mr. Caballinas, a citizen of Mexico who had lived in the United
States since childhood, pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the Superior Court
of California, in Los Angeles, and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.
After his release, Mr. Cabanillas violated the conditions of his parole and was
sentenced to one year of imprisonment. After he served this sentence,
immigration officers deported Mr. Cabanillas to Mexico, but he illegally returned
to California soon thereafter. Years after his illegal reentry, Mr. Cabanillas
voluntarily testified for the prosecution in a high profile murder trial against
members of a gang to which he had once belonged. He later relocated to
Chaparral, New Mexico, where he lived with his wife and five children, all of
whom are American citizens, until his arrest for illegal reentry in June 2007.
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for
illegal reentry is 8. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Mr. Cabanillas received a 16-level
enhancement because the district court concluded that he had previously been
convicted of a “crime of violence” as U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 defines that term, see
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (defining “crime of violence”), but
he received a 3-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1. In combination with Mr. Cabanillas’s criminal history category III, the
total offense level of 21 yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’
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imprisonment.
Before sentencing, Mr. Cabanillas filed a motion requesting a downward
variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) based upon cultural assimilation and his
vulnerability to retaliation in prison due to his prior testimony against gang
members. With respect to cultural assimilation, Mr. Cabanillas contended that his
continued presence in the United States as well as his family ties here, rendered
him less blameworthy for illegally reentering and remaining in the country.
The district court determined that a variance was not appropriate and
sentenced Mr. Cabanillas to 46 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory
Guidelines range. Further, the court announced that “even were a departure
warranted under the facts of this case, the Court would not exercise its discretion
to depart.” Rec. doc. 26, at 2. Mr. Cabanillas timely filed this appeal, arguing
that, in light of the court’s denial of his requests for a variance, his sentence was
substantively unreasonable.
II. DISCUSSION
We review district court sentencing decisions for reasonableness, applying
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, — U.S. — , 128 S. Ct.
586, 594 (2007); United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2008). As
we have explained, reasonableness has both a procedural and a substantive
component. United States v. Sutton, 520 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2008).
Procedural reasonableness is attained when a district court correctly calculates
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the advisory Guidelines range and applies the factors set forth in § 3553(a). See
id. A sentence is substantively reasonable if “it ultimately reflects the gravity of
the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the case.” United States v.
Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled in part on other
grounds by Irizzarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2203-04 (2008). “If the
district court correctly calculates the Guidelines range based upon the facts and
imposes sentence within that range, the sentence is entitled to a presumption of
reasonableness.” Sutton, 520 F.3d at 1262. To rebut this presumption, a
defendant must show that in light of the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 2006).
Mr. Cabanillas concedes that the district court correctly calculated his
advisory Guidelines range, but he seeks to rebut our presumption of the
sentence’s substantive reasonableness by arguing that he has culturally
assimilated to the United States and by asserting that his prior cooperation with
law enforcement creates a risk of retaliation by his fellow prisoners. We first
consider Mr. Cabanillas’s cultural assimilation claim and then turn to his
retaliation argument.
A. Cultural Assimilation
Mr. Cabanillas’s contention that his extensive ties with the United States
warranted a “modest downward variance,” Aplt’s Br. at 2, relies primarily on the
reasoning of one of our sister circuits, which we have not expressly adopted.
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Before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
the Ninth Circuit recognized “cultural assimilation” as an appropriate basis for
departure from the mandatory Guidelines sentencing range, reasoning that it was
“akin to the factor of family and community ties” and could appropriately be
considered as part of a defendant’s personal history. United States v. Lipman,
133 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). In the context of illegal reentry, the court theorized, an
individual is less culpable when he has come back to the United States to join his
family, and not to engage in criminal or economic activity. Lipman, 133 F.3d at
730. At least two other circuits adopted an approach similar to that of the Ninth
Circuit. United States v. Rodruiguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Sanchez-Valencia, 148 F.3d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 1998).
But see United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding family
ties to the United States to be a “discouraged factor” under the Guidelines).
Without rejecting or endorsing the reasoning of our sister circuits, we have
observed that “in the altered post-Booker sentencing landscape[,] . . . family and
cultural ties, however the factor is characterized, will [] be part of tailoring an
appropriate sentence.” United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 889 (10th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, “a particular
defendant’s cultural ties must be weighed against other factors such as (1)
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar backgrounds and
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characteristics, and (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
crime and promote respect for the law.” Id. at 889-890 (citing § 3553(a)(2), (6)).
Notwithstanding Mr. Cabanillas’s extensive ties to the United States, the
district court’s denial of a downward variance in this case was reasonable,
particularly in light of countervailing factors. Expressing a concern for
sentencing disparities, the court observed that Mr. Cabanillas’s status as a long
term illegal resident in the United States was not unique: “Many people in [Mr.]
Cabanillas’s situation come to the United States at a young age and have spent
considerable time, if not most of their lives, here, so his situation is not
distinguishable from others that have been before the Court.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 26,
at 2. Moreover, the court noted that much of Mr. Cabanillas’s purported
assimilation was not “of a law-abiding nature,” as he had been convicted of
several crimes in the United States. Id. In light of this analysis, we are
convinced that the court properly considered Mr. Cabanillas’s personal history
and reached the reasonable conclusion that a variance based upon cultural
assimilation was not warranted.
B. Retaliation
While we have not considered this issue at length since the Supreme Court
decided Booker, we have recognized that, in certain limited circumstances, a
defendant’s susceptibility to retaliation in prison may be an acceptable basis for
downward adjustment. See United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 708 (10th
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Cir. 2006) (upholding a downward departure based on the defendant’s
susceptibility to abuse in prison). Here, the court acknowledged that Mr.
Cabanillas put himself at risk by cooperating with the government in the
prosecution of a fellow gang member, but stated that “it is not uncommon for
persons to cooperate with the government and thereby put their lives in jeopardy.”
Rec. vol. I, doc. 26, at 3. The court noted, “[T]he Bureau of Prisons is
accustomed to handling prisoners who previously belonged to gangs and is
capable of ensuring [Mr. Cabanillas’s] safety as much as it is of any former gang
member.” Id. The court further observed, “[Mr. Cabanillas’s] life is in danger
whether he is imprisoned or not.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Like the district court, we acknowledge “that [Mr.] Cabanillas played an
important role in the conviction of a person involved in the gang-related murder
of a woman and her child. There is no doubt that his cooperation with
government officials in Los Angeles has placed his life in jeopardy.” Id. at 3.
However, the district court was correct to observe that the incarceration of former
gang members who have testified on behalf of the government is not uncommon.
We note the district court’s firm confidence that the Bureau of Prisons to ensure
Mr. Cabanillas’s safety, and we are of the belief that the Bureau will take all steps
necessary to justify the district court’s confidence. Therefore, we cannot say that
the district court’s denial of a variance was unreasonable in this case.
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III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court. The motion to
seal the briefs and the record is granted.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Chief Circuit Judge
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