FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 19, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT
DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; SHANE
PAUL; STEVEN BUSSONE; DALE
STEWART; WILLIAM MECK; JEFF
MATHEWS; RICHARD LEE SISEMORE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 06-1430
USIS COMMERCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
doing business as DAC Services,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 04-CV-1384-REB-CBS)
Paul D. Cullen, Sr. (Randall S. Herrick-Stare and Paul D. Cullen, Jr., with him on
the briefs), The Cullen Law Firm, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Jennifer M. Palmer (Heather D. Jorgensen with her on the brief), Senter Goldfarb
& Rice, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs, Shane Paul, Steven Bussone, Dale Stewart, Kenneth
Hinzman, and William Meck, 1 are individual truck drivers. They brought suit
contending the defendant, USIS Commercial Services, Inc., violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, in its procurement and
dissemination of their employment histories. They claimed that USIS failed to
comply with FCRA’s notice and authorization requirement when it procured
information from former employers regarding their job performance. 15 U.S.C. §
1681b(b). The plaintiffs also charged the reports produced by USIS are routinely
inaccurate and USIS failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy, as required by FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). The plaintiffs
moved for class certification and the district court denied the motion.
The plaintiffs’ claims went to trial. The district court granted judgment as
a matter of law with respect to some of the plaintiffs’ accuracy claims. It also
determined that the information procured from former employers by USIS did not
constitute “consumer reports” as defined by FCRA and was therefore not
regulated by the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). During USIS’s presentation of its
case, the plaintiffs objected to the admission of evidence regarding the employer
trucking companies’ use of the reports they obtained from USIS. The objection
1
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc., was stricken as a
plaintiff for lack of standing. It does not appeal that decision.
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was overruled. The remaining accuracy claims went to the jury, which found in
favor of USIS.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s ruling that the disputed reports are not
consumer reports procured for employment purposes, its evidentiary ruling, and
its denial of class certification. Taking jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
this court AFFIRMS.
I. Background
The Department of Transportation requires motor carriers to investigate
drivers’ employment histories and driving records before hiring. See 49 C.F.R. §
391.23 (2008). USIS 2 sells a service to assist motor carriers in complying with
this requirement. USIS is an investigation and security services company that
compiles and disseminates truck driver employment histories. USIS gathers these
histories from individual motor carriers who subscribe to USIS’s service. The
companies providing the information to USIS fill out a Termination Record Form
(TRF) for truck drivers who have left the company. The TRF contains seventeen
different sections such as “eligible for rehire,” “reason for leaving,” and “work
record.” Each section lists several descriptors, which employers are instructed to
circle if applicable to the driver. For example, the “work record” section contains
twenty-eight descriptors, including “superior,” “outstanding,” “excessive
2
USIS does business under the name “DAC Services.”
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complaints,” “cargo loss,” “late pick up/delivery,” and “failed to report accident.”
The employer is permitted to circle as many descriptors as applicable. The
employer may choose to circle “other” and provide a short explanation, but the
form provides no mechanism for the employer to explain why they chose a given
descriptor.
The TRFs are transmitted to USIS by the motor carrier and USIS keys in
the codes associated with each descriptor. The TRFs are then compiled to form
the employee’s Employment History Report (EHR). For a fee, a potential
employer may request an applicant’s EHR. Employers also receive a credit
toward purchasing USIS services each time they submit a completed TRF.
The plaintiffs brought suit, alleging USIS’s practices violated FCRA.
Congress enacted FCRA in 1970 to protect consumer privacy and to ensure fair
and accurate credit reporting. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2205-06 (2007). FCRA regulates the distribution of
consumer reports and sets out certain procedures and standards that consumer
reporting agencies must comply with when preparing consumer reports. The
statute requires that in preparing a consumer report a consumer reporting agency
must “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). It also mandates that a consumer reporting
agency may only “furnish a consumer report for employment purposes” if the
entity obtaining the report has received the consumer’s authorization to procure
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the report. Id. § 1681b(b)(1). FCRA provides civil liability for willful or
negligent failure to comply with the statute. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
In the district court, the plaintiffs contended that the TRFs are “consumer
reports” obtained for “employment purposes” as defined by FCRA and that the
employers providing the TRFs to USIS must therefore comply with the statute’s
requirements. 3 They further alleged that USIS has not met the requirements of
FCRA in procuring TRFs from employers. In particular, the plaintiffs challenged
the TRFs’ accuracy and USIS’s failure to provide notice when procuring a TRF. 4
The plaintiffs moved for class action certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The
district court denied the motion. It concluded that questions of fact and law
affecting individual plaintiffs predominated over those common to the proposed
class.
The trial began on August 21, 2006. As provided in the Final Pretrial
Order, the plaintiffs presented four statutory claims: unlawful procurement of
3
The parties do not dispute that the EHRs are consumer reports and USIS
must comply with FCRA in their preparation and dissemination. See Cassara v.
DAC Servs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002).
4
The complaint listed four counts: declaratory and injunctive relief for
violations of FCRA (count 1), unlawful procurement and use of consumer reports
(count 2), compensatory and punitive damages (count 3), and unjust enrichment
and restitution (count 4). USIS filed a motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, and 4
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court concluded that equitable
relief is not available under FCRA and accordingly dismissed counts 1 and 4.
The plaintiffs do not appeal this dismissal. The court, however, denied the
motion as to count 2.
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consumer reports, taking adverse action by receiving inaccurate TRFs without
discharging notice obligations, willfully or negligently taking adverse action by
selling inaccurate EHRs without discharging notice obligations, and willfully or
negligently failing to assure maximum possible accuracy in its TRFs and EHRs.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b). At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, USIS moved to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). USIS argued that the plaintiffs had not shown that
the TRFs were consumer reports. USIS also argued that the plaintiffs had not met
their burden with respect to the inaccuracy claims.
The district court concluded that as an essential element of the first three
claims, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate USIS procured the TRFs for
“employment purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B). FCRA defines
“employment purposes” as “a report used for the purpose of evaluating a
consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention as an employee.”
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h). The district court determined that because USIS did not
intend to evaluate the consumer, it did not procure the reports for “employment
purposes,” even though USIS anticipated such future use. The district court also
concluded the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that information in their
TRFs or EHRs were inaccurate. It determined that there was no evidence of any
inaccuracy in plaintiffs Bussone’s and Stewart’s TRFs and EHRs. With respect to
plaintiffs Paul, Mathews, Sisemore and Meck, the district court determined they
had established an evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could conclude
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their EHRs contained inaccuracies, that USIS negligently or willfully failed to
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of these
EHRs, and that USIS’s negligence caused actual economic damages. It also
determined, however, that those plaintiffs did not establish an evidentiary basis
sufficient for a reasonable jury to award damages for emotional distress based on
the alleged inaccuracies. Accordingly, the district court granted USIS judgment as
a matter of law as to the first three claims, Bussone’s and Stewart’s inaccuracy
claims, and all plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress damages.
After the district court’s ruling, the plaintiffs moved to amend their
complaint. They argued that FCRA provides that a consumer reporting agency
may only furnish a consumer report under specific conditions. 15 U.S.C. §
1681b(a) (authorizing procurement of consumer reports for only enumerated
purposes). They claimed USIS’s procurement of TRFs from the employers did
not fall under any of the statutory authorizations. The district court denied the
motion. It concluded that while FCRA’s general definition of “consumer report”
applied to the TRFs, 5 TRFs fall under a statutory exclusion. The statute lists
5
Under FCRA,
The term “consumer report” means any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation,
personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or
(continued...)
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several “exclusions” to the term “consumer report,” including any “report
containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the
consumer and the person making the report.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(I). The
parties contested who had the burden of proof regarding the application of the
exclusion. The district court concluded the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving
the exclusion did not apply. It then found that no reasonable jury could conclude
the TRFs at issue contained information that did not solely relate to the
experiences of the person making the report.
During the course of the trial the plaintiffs objected to evidence elicited and
presented by USIS regarding trucking company hiring practices. USIS presented
testimony relating to steps that companies take after receiving an EHR to follow
up on the information in the report. The plaintiffs argued this evidence was
irrelevant and should not be heard by the jury. The district court overruled the
objection.
5
(...continued)
expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the
purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s
eligibility for—
(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes;
(B) employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of
this title.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
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At the close of trial, USIS moved for dismissal of the remaining claims.
The district court granted the motion as to the negligence claims. It found the
plaintiffs had failed to establish evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude USIS negligently failed to follow reasonable procedures to ensure
accuracy of the EHRs. It sent the remaining claims, willful failure to ensure
accuracy of the EHRs, to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants on the remaining claims.
II. Discussion
The plaintiffs present three challenges to the district court’s rulings. First,
they argue the district court erred when it found that TRFs are not consumer
reports. Second, the plaintiffs contest the district court’s evidentiary rulings on
how employers use EHRs. Finally, they claim the district court committed error
when it denied the plaintiffs certification as a class.
A. TRFs and Consumer Reports
FCRA includes in its definition of a “consumer report” any communication
bearing on a consumer’s “character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
or mode of living” which is used to establish eligibility for “employment
purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). The statute, however, under a section titled
“exclusions,” explains “the term ‘consumer report’ does not include . . . any . . .
report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the
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consumer and the person making the report.” Id. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(I). The
parties contest whether TRFs fall under this exclusion. 6
As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs also argue that the exclusions are
affirmative defenses that must be plead pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 7 Because
the defendants did not plead § 1681a(d)(2) as an affirmative defense, the
plaintiffs maintain it was waived. Even assuming that the provisions of §
1681a(d)(2) are affirmative defenses, the issue was tried by the implied consent of
the parties and the plaintiffs’ argument is waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2)
(“When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or
6
There is a serious question of whether the motor carriers even meet the
threshold statutory definition of a “consumer reporting agency.” 15 U.S.C. §
1681a(f). FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency as “any person which, for
monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties.” Id. (emphasis added). The district court
concluded the motor carriers met this broad definition. A principled argument
could be made, however, that the motor carriers do not maintain records of their
employees’ tenure for the purpose of providing information to USIS. See
Ollestad v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1978) (“It cannot be contended
seriously that agencies such as the F.B.I. compile information on persons,
particularly on former employees as is the appellant, for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties.”). This argument, however, was not adequately
raised on appeal.
7
The plaintiffs also argue the district court erred when it determined the
plaintiffs bore the burden of showing that FCRA’s exclusions to the definition of
“consumer report” did not apply. USIS maintains that FCRA lists exclusions, not
exceptions, and that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the exclusion does
not apply. We decline to reach this issue. Even if USIS had the burden of
proving the exclusion, it met this burden. Regardless of which party bore the
burden of proof, the result would be the same.
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implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.”)
USIS first raised the statutory exclusion in its motion to dismiss. It revived this
argument when it moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the
plaintiffs’ case. The plaintiffs responded to this argument on the merits in its
responses to both motions. In addition, this issue was preserved in the Final
Pretrial Order and was addressed by both parties in their trial briefs. The
plaintiffs were fully aware of USIS’s intention of raising this issue and had a full
and fair opportunity to defend against it. By responding to the defendant’s
arguments in this way, the plaintiffs consented to the litigation of the applicability
of the exclusion. Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275,
1279-80 (10th Cir. 1998).
The district court concluded that, based on the evidence presented at trial,
no reasonable juror could have found the TRFs contained information about
anything other than the experiences between the drivers and the motor carriers.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s entry of judgment under Rule 50(a).
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj Int’l Inv. Corp., 315 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th
Cir. 2003). In reviewing the grant of judgment as a matter of law, “[t]he question
is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the nonmoving party but
whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find for that party.”
Id. (alterations and quotation omitted).
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The plaintiffs argue the evidence at trial demonstrated TRFs routinely
referred to interactions that could not be categorized as solely between drivers
and their former employers and the exclusion, therefore, cannot apply. 8 This
argument fundamentally mischaracterizes the nature of the exclusion. Under the
plaintiffs’ construction, the exclusion’s application would be limited to incidents
involving only the employer and the employee. It is not necessary, however, that
the experience must be exclusively between the employer and employee. Rather,
the exclusion applies to any first-hand experiences. Hodge v. Texaco, Inc., 975
F.2d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1992).
The plaintiffs point to evidence at trial that they “routinely interacted with
a wide variety of third parties” in the course of their employment. The drivers
testified that they interacted with many people other than their employers, such as
8
The plaintiffs also argue the trial court reversed its earlier determination
that the employer trucking companies supplying TRFs are “consumer reporting
agencies.” This argument is without merit. First, a district court is free to revisit
its interlocutory orders prior to the entry of a final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n.14
(1983). Furthermore, the district court did not reverse its earlier ruling. The
definitions of “consumer report” and “consumer reporting agency” are circular. A
person cannot be a consumer reporting agency unless it issues consumer reports.
15 U.S.C. 1681a(f). The district court’s ruling that the TRFs are not consumer
reports, therefore, did implicate whether the employer trucking companies are
consumer reporting agencies. In ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion, however, the
district court explained that, it could not determine whether the TRFs were
consumer reports under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Its later ruling, issued after
the plaintiffs had presented their evidence at trial, cannot be characterized as a
reversal.
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shippers, receivers, Department of Transportation officials, and the public. As
USIS acknowledges, information regarding these interactions are implicated in
some of the descriptors, such as “company policy violation,” “cargo loss,” and
“late pickup and delivery.” That the drivers interacted with these third parties
does not, however, demonstrate that these were not the experiences of the
employers. For example, the plaintiffs elicited testimony on redirect examination
from USIS senior manager Kent Ferguson that “cargo loss” refers to cargo that
belongs to a third party, i.e. the customer of the motor carrier. As such, its loss
implicated the third party. As Ferguson explained, however, the cargo was also
the responsibility of the motor carrier which contracted with the cargo owner for
its transport. Its loss, therefore would also be the first-hand experience of the
motor carrier.
This approach also comports with the Federal Trade Commission’s
interpretation of this provision. 9 In its Commentary on FCRA, the Federal Trade
9
FCRA gives the Federal Trade Commission primary enforcement
responsibilities. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) (“The Federal Trade Commission shall
have such procedural, investigative, and enforcement powers, including the power
to issue procedural rules in enforcing compliance with the requirements imposed
under this subchapter and to require the filing of reports, the production of
documents, and the appearance of witnesses as though the applicable terms and
conditions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were part of this subchapter.”)
Eight other agencies also have enforcement powers under the Act. 15 U.S.C. §
1681s(b). The Federal Trade Commission was not given the authority to
promulgate regulations under FCRA. See Equifax Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
678 F.2d 1047, 1049 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Commission noted that § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(I) “applies to reports limited to
transactions or experiences between the consumer and the entity making the
report (e.g., retail stores, hospitals, present or former employers, banks, mortgage
servicing companies, credit unions, or universities).” 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App. D §
603(d)(7)(A) (emphasis added). The Federal Trade Commission also issued a
Staff Opinion Letter in response to an inquiry from a public school district
conducting reference checks of prospective employees. That letter explained
“FCRA would not apply to any communication by a previous employer about the
applicant’s job performance because [§ 1681(d)(2)(A)(I)] specifically exempts
‘experiences between the consumer and the person making the report’ from the
definition of ‘consumer report’ in the FCRA.” Staff Opinion Letter from Fed.
Trade Comm’n (July 10, 1992), 1998 WL 34323734. The Commentary and Letter
are not formal rulemakings and not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Such documents, however, may be
considered for their persuasive value. Id.
That the experiences of the motor carrier may involve third parties does not
mean they are no longer the first-hand experiences of the carrier. Employers
completing TRFs were asked questions that only pertained to their first-hand
knowledge gained by employing the consumer. The TRFs contain the same kind
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of information found in a typical letter of reference from a former employer and
are not subject to the requirements of FCRA. 10
B. Evidence of Industry Practice
FCRA requires that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the
report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). The Federal Trade Commission has
explained “when a consumer reporting agency learns or should reasonably be
aware of errors in its reports that may indicate systematic problems . . . it must
review its procedures for assuring accuracy.” 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App. D, §
607(b)(3)(A). To demonstrate a “willful” violation pursuant to § 1681n(a), a
plaintiff must prove the defendant demonstrated a “reckless disregard of statutory
duty.” Safeco Ins. Co., 127 S. Ct. at 2208.
At trial, the plaintiffs argued the defendants violated FCRA by willfully
disseminating inaccurate EHRs, which the parties stipulate are consumer reports,
and failing to take measures to ensure their maximum possible accuracy. 11 15
10
The plaintiffs also dispute the district court’s conclusion that TRFs are
not procured for “employment purposes.” Because this court holds TRFs are not
consumer reports, we need not reach this issue.
11
Only the plaintiffs’ claims of willful violations went to the jury. 15
U.S.C. § 1681n. The district court granted USIS’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law with respect to the plaintiffs’ negligence claims. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.
The plaintiffs do not contest this ruling.
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U.S.C. § 1681e(b). This court determined in Cassara that, under FCRA,
important data must be communicated in “categories about which there is genuine
common understanding and agreement.” 276 F.3d at 1225. The plaintiffs argue
that the descriptors used by USIS are so vague as to lack any precise
understanding and therefore fail the test of accuracy. For example, the plaintiffs
point to the term “cargo loss,” which may be selected by a motor carrier to
describe a former employee. The plaintiffs argue the term tells the potential
employer nothing about the extent of the loss, the reason for the loss, or whether
it was the driver who was responsible for the loss. This lack of precision, they
contend, constitutes a violation of FCRA.
In response, USIS sought to introduce evidence regarding how motor
carriers used the EHRs they received. Specifically, they presented evidence that
motor carriers considering a potential hire will frequently call the former
employers on the EHR for more information regarding the driver’s work
performance. The defendant claims the USIS system was designed to provide
motor carriers with brief, categorical data that can be investigated if the carrier
would like more information. Because trucking industry practices are so varied,
they maintain this type of system was necessary to meet the needs of the industry.
USIS claims this evidence of industry practice was relevant to the question of
whether a willful violation occurred because it offered a rational explanation for
the USIS system pertinent to the claims of willful FCRA violations.
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The evidence was introduced over the plaintiffs’ objection and the plaintiffs
contend this constituted reversible error. They argue FCRA’s accuracy
requirements deal exclusively with the quality of the information in a consumer
report, not how the information is used. Plaintiffs further contend the evidence
could only be relevant to the causation element of the negligence claims and the
district court’s refusal to give a limiting instruction to that effect constituted an
abuse of discretion.
Evidence is considered relevant under the federal rules if it has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “The determination of whether the
evidence is relevant is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
we will not disturb that decision on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion.” Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir.
1995) (quotation omitted). The admission of evidence “may constitute an abuse
of discretion only if based on an erroneous conclusion of law, a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or a manifest error in judgment.” Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc.,
155 F.3d 1230, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the party asserting error in
the admission of evidence must demonstrate that its substantial rights were
affected by the wrongful admission. Gomez, 50 F.3d at 1518. We likewise
review a district court’s decision to decline to issue a limiting instruction for
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abuse of discretion. Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d
1434, 1441 (10th Cir. 1992).
The trial court did not err in admitting the subject evidence or in refusing to
give a limiting instruction. USIS sought to introduce the evidence to show that
any ambiguity in the EHRs was not in reckless disregard of statutory duties, but a
reasonable accommodation designed to meet the needs of the industry by
providing them with a tool from which to conduct further investigations. The
evidence of industry practice was relevant to the question of willful
noncompliance with the statute because it bears directly on the question set out as
dispositive in Cassara, i.e., whether the trucking companies were confused about
the meanings of the terms used in the EHRs. The Rules of Evidence provide a
liberal standard for relevance and this court cannot say the district court
committed a clear abuse of discretion in the evidence’s admission. See Gomez, 50
F.3d at 1518.
C. Class Action Certification
The plaintiffs also claim the district court erred when it denied their motion
for class certification. 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded the
plaintiffs’ accuracy claims were not amenable to a class action. It determined
12
Because this court holds that TRFs are not consumer reports, the
plaintiffs’ arguments concerning class certification for their improper
procurement of consumer reports claim is moot.
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that the accuracy of each individual’s EHR, an essential element of a § 1681e(b)
claim, required a particularized inquiry. The plaintiffs contend that they were
asserting systemic flaws in the EHRs, arising out of the vagueness of the work
record descriptors. These systemic problems with accuracy, the plaintiffs
maintain, make this issue appropriate for class certification.
When a district court has applied the correct legal standard in its decision
to deny class action status, this court will reverse that decision only for abuse of
discretion. Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006). The
procedural history of this case demonstrates that the district court did not abuse
its discretion. To prevail in a § 1681e(b) suit, the plaintiff must show “(1) the
consumer reporting agency failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the
accuracy of its reports; (2) the report in question was, in fact, inaccurate; (3) the
plaintiff suffered an injury; and (4) the consumer reporting agency’s failure
caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Cassara, 276 F.3d at 1217. As the district court
noted, whether a report is accurate may involve an individualized inquiry. For
example, plaintiff Stewart testified that his EHR report is accurate. The district
court also explained that factual disputes regarding whether an individual EHR
was accurate existed for other plaintiffs. Furthermore, the jury concluded the
named plaintiffs’ claims were without merit. This demonstrates the necessity of
an individualized inquiry into each claim. As a result, denial of class certification
was not an abuse of discretion.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district
court.
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No.0-1430, Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. USIS Commercial Servs., Inc.
EBEL, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I am pleased to concur in the majority’s opinion. I write separately only to
emphasize that the FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information”
contained in the published consumer report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) 1; cf. Guimond
v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1995) (“An inquiry
into the reasonableness of the procedures utilized by the agency in acquiring
information belies a claim that liability under § 1681e(b) must be predicated on
the effect of that information once disseminated.”). Accordingly, in other
circumstances, a consumer reporting agency could be held liable under the FCRA
even if recipients of the consumer report commonly follow up on information in
that report to clarify or supplement that information.
Here, however, this nuance arises as an evidentiary matter. The industry
practice evidence at issue was arguably relevant when the plaintiffs’ negligence
claims, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681o, were extant. But even after the trial court
1
In pertinent part, this section provides:
(b) Accuracy of report
Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it
shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the
report relates.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
dismissed the negligence claims, one could reasonably argue that the evidence
was relevant to plaintiffs’ claims that USIS wilfully violated the FCRA. See id. §
1681n. And the jury instructions adequately explained that the jury was to focus
on the accuracy of the published EHRs. Therefore, I am satisfied that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion and there was no prejudicial error.
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