Shook v. Board of County Commissioners

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

PU B L ISH August 29, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
U N IT E D STA T E S C O U R T O F A PPE A L S Clerk of Court

T E N T H C IR C U IT

M ARK SHOOK and DENNIS JONES,
on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

and

JAM ES VAUGHAN; SHIRLEN
M OSBY; THOM AS REINIG; and
LOTTIE ELLIOTT,

Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COM M ISSIONERS OF THE
No. 06-1454
COUNTY OF EL PASO and TERRY
M AKETA, in his official capacity as
Sheriff of El Paso County,

Defendants-Appellees.

THE JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON
CENTER FOR M ENTAL HEALTH
LAW ; CENTER FOR CHILDREN’S
LAW AND POLICY; COLORADO
CENTER ON LAW AND POLICY;
COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY
COALITION; COLORADO
LAW YERS COM M ITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS; THE LEGAL
CENTER FOR PEOPLE W ITH
 DISABILITIES AND OLDER
PEOPLE; NATIONAL CENTER FOR
YOUTH LAW ; NATIONAL
DISABILITY RIGHTS NETW ORK;
NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS
LAW CENTER; PUBLIC JUSTICE;
COLORADO COUNTIES, INC.,

Amici Curiae.

A ppeal from the U nited States D istrict C ourt
for the D istrict of C olorado
(D .C . N o. 02-cv-00651-R PM -M JW )

M ark Silverstein, Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Foundation of
Colorado, Denver, Colorado (David C. Fathi, National Prison Project for the
ACLU Foundation, Inc., W ashington, D.C., and Thomas S. Nichols, Davis
Graham & Stubbs LLP, Denver Colorado with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.

Gordon L. Vaughan, Vaughan & DeM uro (Sara Ludke Cook, Vaughan &
DeM uro, and Jay A. Lauer, County Attorney of El Paso County, with him on the
brief), Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.

Thomas J. Lyons and Andrew D. Ringel, Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado,
for Amicus Curiae Colorado Counties, Inc.

Laura L. Rovner, Student Law Office, and Stephen Arvin, Stephanie W halum and
M argaret Yoder, Student Attorneys, University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
Denver, Colorado, for Amici Curiae.

Before T Y M K O V IC H , G O R SU C H , and H O L M E S , Circuit Judges.

G O R SU C H , Circuit Judge.

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 Plaintiffs M ark Shook and Dennis Jones, along with several intervenors,

appear before us for the second time to contest the district court’s denial of their

motion to certify a class action consisting of all present and future mentally ill

inmates at Colorado’s El Paso County Jail. In their first appeal, we held that in

denying class certification the district court erred by relying on the jurisdictional

limitations imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to the total

exclusion of the standards laid out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The

difficulty with the district court’s opinion, in our view, was that it conflated a

merits analysis of the relief available to plaintiffs – relief potentially curtailed by

the PLRA – with the threshold class certification requirements of Rule 23 – which

are not affected by the PLRA. On remand, the district court again denied class

certification, but did so this time with reference to Rule 23’s strictures. W e find

that the district court’s analysis of the Rule 23 framework is free of the legal

errors we identified in its first effort, and although we might reach a different

conclusion were we addressing the certification question in the first instance, we

are unable to say that the district court abused its discretion in declining to certify

the proposed class under Rule 23(b)(2).

I

Filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs’ suit seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief aimed at addressing a variety of conditions at the Jail alleged to

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violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual treatment, as

incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Among other

things, these alleged conditions include inadequate mental health care;

insufficient protections against self-inflicted injuries and suicides; inadequate

methods of distributing medication to inmates and screening for mental health

issues at the time inmates are committed to the Jail; and the improper and overly

broad use of special detention cells, restraints, and pepper spray against inmates.

Aplt. App. at 198-99.

Plaintiffs offer allegations about their own treatment at the Jail and claim

their treatment fairly represents the treatment class members generally receive at

the Jail. The nature of their individual conditions and treatment, however, also

serves to illustrate the range of the alleged mental health care issues at the Jail.

For example, M ark Shook suffers from both Asperberger’s Syndrome and bipolar

disorder. Prior to his incarceration at the Jail in 2001, M r. Shook regularly took

anti-psychotic medications prescribed by his psychiatrist. After being confined to

the Jail, M r. Shook alleges that he was denied access to his medications and

medical care for three weeks. Shirlen M osby, while suffering from mental

illnesses similar to M r. Shook, experiences suicidal tendencies apparently not

shared by him. She alleges that her problems at the Jail stemmed, not from the

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failure to provide her with her medications, but from a failure to monitor her for

potentially suicidal behavior.

Thomas Reinig, who is bipolar with schizoaffective disorder and is also a

paranoid schizophrenic, alleges yet a different set of violations by the Jail.

Specifically, M r. Reinig complains that he was confined in a special detention cell

multiple times, sometimes while restrained with handcuffs and leg irons.

Apparently unlike any of the other plaintiffs, he has also been subjected to

electric shocks from a taser on several occasions, and in other instances has been

threatened with similar treatment. Notably, although he has prescriptions for a

variety of medications and has been listed as a suicide risk, M r. Reinig does not

appear to allege that he was denied his medications or inadequately supervised.

Finally, Lottie Elliott’s allegations cut across the groups before us, alleging

denial and improper administration of prescription medication and improper

supervision in light of her suicidal tendencies, but also adding an allegation of

inadequate access to mental health professionals at the Jail itself. M s. Elliott

arrived at the Jail after spending three days on the psychiatric ward at St. Francis

Hospital after a suicide attempt. W hile at the hospital, a psychiatrist saw M s.

Elliott daily and prescribed an anti-psychotic medication called Seroquel, to be

taken morning, night, and “as needed.” Despite being released into the care of

the Jail with this prescription in hand, medical staff at the Jail changed M s.

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Elliott’s medications without consulting her or warning her of any possible side

effects, and without allowing her to see a psychiatrist or physician despite her

request. Eventually, M s. Elliott attempted suicide, and only after that attempt did

the Jail’s psychiatrist meet with her. 1

In due course after bringing this suit, plaintiffs moved for class

certification while defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court

ultimately denied both motions. W ith respect to the former, the district court

denied class certification without providing any analysis of the factors relevant to

class certification set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Instead, the court focused

entirely on the PLRA, reasoning that the relief plaintiffs sought was beyond its

jurisdictional competence after the passage of the PLRA and that class

certification is properly denied when the court lacks “the authority to order the

prospective remedy requested.” Shook v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of El

Paso, 216 F.R.D. 644, 647 (D. Colo. 2003). W e reversed. Noting that “[t]he text

of the PLRA says nothing about the certification of class actions,” though it does

contain provisions discussing the administration of class actions once certified,

we held that “the PLRA does not alter the class certification analysis under Rule

1
M r. Reinig and M s. Elliott did not intervene until after this case was
remanded to the district court, and thus their allegations were not before the
district court when it issued its first order. In addition to the details of the named
plaintiffs’ experiences at the Jail, the various complaints contain allegations about
a number of other inmates, some identified by name and others anonymous.

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23.” Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 970 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Shook I”).

And because the PLRA left the traditional Rule 23 class certification standards

intact, we held that the district court, which had neither analyzed Rule 23(a)’s

factors nor mentioned Rule 23(b)(2), “erred by not specifically addressing the

traditional Rule 23 factors in denying class certification.” Id. at 972. W e thus

remanded for the district court to apply the Rule 23 framework in the first

instance. Id. at 974. Furthermore, recognizing that courts have disagreed over

whether manageability, an explicit consideration under Rule 23(b)(3), may be

considered in determining whether to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), we

proceeded to hold that “manageability is not categorically barred in Rule 23(b)(2)

class certification decisions,”id. at 973, and we suggested that some of the

“concerns leading the court to consider problems of identifying and managing the

class” in its PLRA analysis might be relevant to considerations explicitly

identified in Rule 23 itself, such as, inter alia, Rule 23(a)’s commonality or

typicality requirements or Rule 23(b)’s requirements that defendants have acted

“on grounds generally applicable to the class” and that the court be able “to

provide injunctive relief to the class framed in the complaint,”id. at 973-74.

Before the district court again, plaintiffs renewed their motion for class

certification pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), proposing a class comprised of

“[a]ll persons with serious mental health needs who are now, or in the future will

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be, confined in the El Paso County Jail.” Aplt. App. at 193. Alternatively,

plaintiffs proposed an even broader class consisting of “all persons who are now,

or in the future will be, confined in the El Paso County Jail.” Id. In their prayer

for relief, plaintiffs sought an injunction establishing standards across a wide

range of areas affecting mentally ill inmates. They asked that the Jail be enjoined

to “provide sufficient numbers of mental health and custody staff, with adequate

training”; “provide safe and appropriate housing for prisoners with serious mental

health needs”; “discontinue the use of the ‘special detention cells’ to house

prisoners exhibiting signs of mental illness”; “provide inpatient psychiatric care”;

“cease using restraints, pepper spray, and electroshock weapons (‘tasers’) against

prisoners exhibiting signs of mental illness in circumstances that pose a

substantial risk of harm to such prisoners”; “implement an adequate system to

provide appropriate medication to prisoners whose serious mental health needs

require it and to monitor the effects of that medication”; and “provide adequate

screening and precautions to prevent self-harm and suicide.” Id. at 117-18.

The district court again denied class certification. This time, the court held

that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy either Rule 23(a)(2), (a)(3) or (b)(2). Shook v.

Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of El Paso, 2006 W L 1801379, at *1 (D. Colo.

2006) (“D. Ct. Op.”). W ith respect to this last provision, the district court held

that plaintiffs failed to bear their burden under Rule 23(b)(2) of showing that

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defendants acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, such that the

declaratory and injunctive relief sought is appropriate respecting the class as a

whole. Id. In particular, the district court noted the factual differences between

the individual named plaintiffs’ situations, suggesting that because some plaintiffs

were asserting claims for denial of medication, some for lack of supervision, and

others for use of excessive force, there was no single policy or procedure to

which all were subject. Similarly, the court held, this variation in fact patterns

made injunctive relief on a class-wide basis inappropriate. Id. at *11. The court

reasoned that many of the matters plaintiffs sought to have addressed, such as the

use of tasers or restraints, could not be dealt with prospectively on a class-wide

basis because the propriety of using such methods depended on the circumstances

in which they were used, and those circumstances necessarily varied among class

members. Id. And while some of the standards plaintiffs sought to have put in

place did not depend on individual circumstance, the court expressed concern that

it was not equipped to determine what constitutes “adequate” training or how

many employees are “sufficient” to deal with a shifting number of mentally ill

prisoners, id., and thus that it would be extraordinarily difficult to craft an

injunction satisfying the specificity requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). 2

2
Rule 65(d)(1) provides that:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must
(continued...)

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Plaintiffs now appeal this decision, contending that the district court’s second

order suffers many of the same defects as its first.

II

W hen reviewing a decision to grant or deny certification, we are cognizant

of the fact that, in this realm, the district court enjoys considerable discretion, and

we may reverse a district court’s decision only for an abuse of that discretion.

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d

668, 675 (10th Cir. 1988); Alba Conte and Herbert B. Newberg, 1 Newberg on

Class Action § 3:1 (4th ed.) (“Newberg”). W hen applying an abuse of discretion

standard of review, we necessarily recognize that there may be no single right

answer to the question at hand, but a range of possible outcomes sustainable on

the law and facts, and we will “defer to the district court’s judgment so long as it

falls within the realm of these rationally available choices.” United States v.

M cComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007); Big Sky Network Canada, Ltd. v.

Sichuan Provincial Gov’t, 533 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2008) (The abuse of

discretion standard “may appear opaque, but it is one we have long understood to

mean that we will reverse a district court’s determination only if the court

2
(...continued)
(A) state the reasons why it issued;
(B) state its terms specifically; and
(C) describe in reasonable detail – and not by referring to the complaint
or other document – the act or acts restrained or required.

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exceeded the bounds of the rationally available choices given the facts and the

applicable law in the case at hand.”); In re Bueno, 248 B.R. 581, 582 (D. Colo.

2000) (Kane, J.) (an abuse of discretion standard implies a degree of “[d]iscretion

invested in judges [to render] a decision based upon what is fair in the

circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law”).

In this case, we believe the district court’s decision fell within the

boundaries set out by Rule 23(b)(2), governing case law, and the facts as alleged. 3

W hile we very well may have made a different decision had the issue been

presented to us as an initial matter, and while other district courts perhaps could

have chosen, or could choose, to certify similar classes, we cannot say the district

court’s assessment was beyond the pale.

A

Rule 23(b)(2) provides that class certification is appropriate where “the

party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply

generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

By its terms, then, Rule 23(b)(2) imposes two independent but related

requirements. In the first place, the defendants’ actions or inactions must be

3
Because we hold the district court’s denial of certification under Rule
23(b)(2) did not amount to an abuse of discretion, we need not address its
alternative holding under Rule 23(a).

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based on grounds generally applicable to all class members. The second

requirement is more restrictive, and it is on this aspect of the Rule that we affirm

the district court’s ruling. The latter half of Rule 23(b)(2) requires that final

injunctive relief be appropriate for the class as a whole. The rule therefore

authorizes an inquiry into the relationship between the class, its injuries, and the

relief sought, and we have interpreted the rule to require that a class must be

“amenable to uniform group remedies.” Shook I, 386 F.3d at 973. Put

differently, Rule 23(b)(2) demands a certain cohesiveness among class members

with respect to their injuries, the absence of which can preclude certification.

M aldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2007); In re St.

Jude M ed., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th Cir. 2005); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co.,

161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Newberg § 4.11.

This cohesiveness has at least two aspects. First, the class must be

sufficiently cohesive that any classwide injunctive relief can satisfy the

limitations of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 65(d) – namely, the requirement that

it “state its terms specifically; and describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts

restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1); M onreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d

1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 2004). Second, “[a] class action may not be certified under

Rule 23(b)(2) if relief specifically tailored to each class member would be

necessary to correct the allegedly wrongful conduct of the defendant.” 5 M oore’s

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Fed. Prac. § 23.43(2)(b) at 23-195 (3d. 2000). So, if redressing the class

members’ injuries requires time-consuming inquiry into individual circumstances

or characteristics of class members or groups of class members, “the suit could

become unmanageable and little value would be gained in proceeding as a class

action.” Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143. Indeed, it is precisely these types of

manageability issues – relating to the district court’s “ability to provide injunctive

relief to the class framed in the complaint,” Shook I, 386 F.3d at 974, a textually

authorized consideration – that we held permissible in Shook I, id. at 973

(“Elements of manageability and efficiency are not categorically precluded in

determining whether to certify a 23(b)(2) class.”). And individual issues cannot

be avoided simply by formulating an injunction at a stratospheric level of

abstraction; as we have explained before, “injunctions simply requiring the

defendant to obey the law are too vague to satisfy Rule 65.” M onreal, 367 F.3d at

1236 (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver,

Colo., 895 F.2d 659, 668 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1990)). In short, under Rule 23(b)(2)

the class members’ injuries must be sufficiently similar that they can be addressed

in an single injunction that need not differentiate between class members.

B

In their prayer for relief in this case, plaintiffs seek to have seven acts

enjoined, see supra Section I, but a review of these acts illustrates how the

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district court could (and did) reasonably conclude the putative class fails to

satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)’s standards. The chief difficulty the district court identified

is that much of the relief plaintiffs seek would require the district court to craft an

injunction that distinguishes – based on individual characteristics and

circumstances – between how prison officials may treat class members, rather

than prescribing a standard of conduct applicable to all class members. For

example, plaintiffs ask for an injunction compelling defendants to “cease using

restraints, pepper spray, and electroshock weapons (‘tasers’) against prisoners

exhibiting signs of mental illness in circumstances that pose a substantial risk of

serious harm to such prisoners.” Aplt. App. at 118. But by its very terms, this

prayer for relief asks the district court to craft an injunction that takes into

account the specific circumstances of individual inmates’ plights. W hat specific

mental illnesses place a prisoner at an inordinate risk from the use of the named

implements? And under what circumstances is this risk exacerbated? Presumably

the “circumstances that pose a substantial risk of serious harm” depend on the

nature and severity of the individual’s illness, but where a practice may only be

enjoined by reference to circumstances that vary among class members – such as

whether an individual inmate is both showing signs of mental illness and at

particular risk from the use of tasers – class-wide relief may be difficult to come

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by. Instead, different injunctions would be required to establish the appropriate

behavior towards different groups of class members.

This same difficulty pervades many of plaintiffs’ claims for relief. For

example, plaintiffs seek an order requiring defendants to “provide safe and

appropriate housing for prisoners with serious mental health needs.” Id. But, as

the district court observed, what is “safe and appropriate” depends on the nature

and severity of an individual’s mental illness, not simply on the fact that he is

mentally ill. W hat is safe for M s. M osby, who is suicidal, may not be the same as

for M r. Shook, who merely requires delivery of his medication. Similarly,

“adequate screening and precautions to prevent self-harm and suicide,” id., does

not address a cohesive injury suffered by the class. Not all mentally ill people are

suicidal, and so this form of relief is overly broad relative to the class as defined,

and what constitutes “adequate” precautions against self-harm will necessarily

turn on how and in what ways individual inmates are predisposed to harm

themselves.

To be sure, plaintiffs also seek relief that in its implementation would not

necessarily depend on individual circumstances. They seek an injunction aimed at

requiring increased staffing levels, for example, as well as screening procedures

to identify at-risk inmates. Id. at 117-18. They also seek an “adequate” system to

provide “appropriate” medication to inmates and to monitor the effects of that

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medication. Id. at 118. But it is here that plaintiffs run into the horn of Rule

65(d)’s specificity requirement. At the class certification stage, the injunctive

relief sought must be described in reasonably particular detail such that the court

can at least “conceive of an injunction that would satisfy [Rule 65(d)’s]

requirements,” as well as the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). M onreal, 367 F.3d

at 1236.4 The problem in our case is that plaintiffs have eschewed any effort to

give content to what it would mean to provide adequate mental health staff,

adequate screening, or an adequate system for delivering medication. In order to

satisfy Rule 65(d), the levels of services must ultimately be capable of description

in a sufficiently objective way that both the defendant and the court can determine

if the former is complying, see Keyes, 895 F.2d at 668, and a class certification

motion requesting injunctive relief that simply prescribes “adequate” or

“appropriate” levels of services fails to indicate how final injunctive relief may be

4
Of course, this is not to say that plaintiffs are required to come forward
with an injunction that satisfies Rule 65(d) with exacting precision at the class
certification stage. M onreal, 367 F.3d at 1236 n.11. If anything, the degree of
specificity with which plaintiffs must describe the injunctive relief requested
becomes more exacting as the litigation progresses: the complaint need only be
specific enough to satisfy our notice pleading standards; the class certification
motion must be more specific, sufficient to allow the district court to see how it
might satisfy Rule 65(d)’s constraints and thus conform with Rule 23(b)(2)’s
requirement; and the motion for relief or proposed injunction must of course itself
be specific enough to comport with Rule 65(d).

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crafted to “describe[] in reasonable detail . . . the acts . . . required.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(d).

Plaintiffs’ effort is further complicated by the fluid nature of the class. The

proposed class includes not only current inmates but future ones as well. In order

to craft an enforceable injunction aimed at ensuring “adequate” staffing levels or

medication delivery procedures, the district court would have to be able to

ascertain the aggregate characteristics of the class as whole, and enforcing the

injunction would require monitoring changes to those characteristics over time.

Determining what constitutes adequate staffing and training at any given time,

however, requires a wealth of information about the class not necessary in many

other Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. How many inmates suffer from serious mental

illness at any particular time? W hat specific illnesses are represented in the class,

and in what numbers? W hat type of staffing and training is necessary to provide

“adequate” care for the range of illnesses existing (or likely to exist) in the Jail

population at any given time?

Of course, the sorts of problems highlighted by the district court may have

been mitigated, or perhaps avoided, by the use of subclasses. Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(c)(5) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses

that are each treated as a class under this rule.” Plaintiffs could have sought to

define subclasses that were “amenable to uniform group remedies,” and in so

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doing, might have been able to create the cohesion among subclass members

required by Rule 23(b)(2). For example, a subclass consisting of all inmates with

a known history of suicidal tendencies that sought an injunction requiring visual

or video monitoring might possibly solve some of the problems present in this

case. Instead, by choosing to seek certification of a single broad class (all Jail

inmates with mental health needs) and supplementing that proposed class

definition with only one, even broader alternative (all Jail inmates) – without

explaining how injunctive relief could deal with many variations within the class

– plaintiffs effectively invited the district court’s concerns about the

appropriateness of class-wide relief.5 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A

Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 2020 (2007)

(“Significant heterogeneity is generally thought to undermine class treatment and

trigger stronger individual participation demands because it makes the class less

cohesive. And one way to reduce heterogeneity is to create subclasses.”). W hile

5
In broadening the scope of the class, plaintiffs’ alternative proposed class
moves in the wrong direction. A class consisting of all present and future inmates
introduces considerably more variation into the class with respect to the relief
sought, raising further questions about whether injunctive relief is justified for the
class as a whole. For example, injunctive relief aimed at more closely monitoring
prisoners for risks of self-imposed harm seems overbroad when the class includes
a majority of people who are not at risk from self-imposed harm. The broader
class also raises concerns about whether defendants acted on “grounds that apply
generally to the class,” since many inmates presumably do not suffer from mental
illness and thus are not subject to defendants’ policies governing treatment of the
mentally ill in any meaningful way.

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the district court could have sua sponte suggested subclassing as a possible

solution to Rule 23(b)(2) problems, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts

do not bear any obligation to do so: the district court does not “bear the burden

of constructing subclasses. That burden is upon the [party seeking certification]

and it is he who is required to submit proposals to the court.” United States

Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408 (1980).

C

That the district court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in this case

is borne out by the fact that we and other circuits have upheld highly similar

decisions in the past. In M onreal, the plaintiffs, management-level Hispanic

employees of the U.S. Postal Service, brought suit in their individual capacities

alleging discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. 367 F.3d at 1226.

They also claimed that the Postal Service engaged in a pattern or practice of

discrimination against management-level Hispanic employees and that the

application of Postal Service policies had a disparate impact on those employees.

Id. In pursuit of the latter set of claims, plaintiffs sought to certify a class

consisting of “all Hispanic persons who, at the time the discrimination occurred,

were employees of the U.S. Postal Service . . . , who have suffered from race

discrimination with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment.” Id.

at 1234. In their class action complaint, plaintiffs sought, among other things,

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“appropriate declaratory and/or injunctive relief, including final injunctive relief”

for a host of alleged discriminatory practices, including, to name a few, unjust

promotion practices, inequity in compensation, unjust evaluations, and inequity in

training. Id. at 1234-36 (emphasis added).

On appeal, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) because, due to “the breadth

of the discriminatory actions alleged by Plaintiffs, we [could not] conceive of an

injunction” that would be sufficiently specific to be enforceable. Id. at 1236.

And while we went on to note that a plaintiff need not plead the relief he or she

seeks with sufficient specificity to satisfy Rule 65(d), we held that the district

court did not abuse its discretion because the “breadth and discontinuity of the

acts” at issue made the case “ill-suited” for class-wide relief, particularly where

the injunctive relief sought was only described as “appropriate.” Id. at 1236 &

n.11. The same critiques apply in this case. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin a wide range

of behavior without having carried their burden of demonstrating that the acts to

be enjoined do indeed have application to the very broad class framed in the

complaint. And plaintiffs further phrase much of the injunctive relief sought in

terms of “appropriateness,” a term that gives neither a district court nor a

reviewing court any indication as to how injunctive relief can be crafted to satisfy

the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d).

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 Similarly, in M aldonado, our sister circuit affirmed a district court’s

decision not to certify under Rule 23(b)(2) a class consisting of uninsured patients

challenging the billing and collection practices of a non-profit health care

provider. 493 F.3d at 523. The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claim was that it was

“unreasonable” for the health care provider to charge uninsured patients like the

plaintiffs standard rates while offering discounts to patients with private

insurance plans, M edicare, or M edicaid. Id. Noting that class-wide injunctive

relief requires both that “class members must have been harmed in essentially the

same way” and that “the injunctive relief sought must be specific,” id. at 524, the

court went on to hold that individualized issues relating to class members’

injuries “overwhelm[ed] class cohesiveness,” id. The difficulty the court

identified related to the injunction the plaintiffs sought, which would have

required the defendant to provide “mutually affordable health care” to class

members and to refrain from charging uninsured patients a higher amount than

that charged insured patients. Id. But, the court held, plaintiffs failed to carry

their burden of identifying a method of determining, at a class level, what

constituted a reasonable charge for a given service, let alone for the wide range of

services encompassed by the plaintiffs’ suit. Id. W hether a charge was

reasonable would impermissibly depend on “the specific circumstances of each

class member,” and plaintiffs were “unable to explain how a court could define or

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enforce meaningful injunctive relief,” without getting into the weeds of individual

circumstance. Id. at 524-25.

Our case presents exactly these same problems. Like the plaintiffs in

M aldonado, plaintiffs here seek an injunction ordering a wide range of behavior

conformed to an essentially contentless standard, bounded only by reference to

ambiguous terms like “reasonable” behavior or “adequate” treatment. W hile we

do not propose that plaintiffs must come forward with a finished injunction at the

class certification stage, they must be able to demonstrate that such injunctive

relief – relative to the class – is conceivable and manageable without embroiling

the court in disputes over individualized situations and constantly shifting class

contours. See also Angela C. Zambrano & Kent Barnett, Putting the Cart Before

the Horse: Should a Court Certify a Class of Residential Consumers Seeking a

Declaration that the Consumers – If They Later Choose – Are Entitled to Rescind

for a TILA Violation?, 125 Banking L. J. 160 (2008) (arguing that individual

issues destroy the necessary class cohesiveness in a (b)(2) action when class

members’ entitlement to the relief sought depends on individual circumstance);

Thomas M . Byrne, Class Actions, 58 M ercer L. Rev. 1171, 1173 (2007) (noting

that where “differences in proof or individualized issues exist pertaining to each

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class member, courts have rejected certification . . . [for] failure to meet Rule

23(b)(2)’s requirement that relief apply to the class as a whole.”). 6

It is precisely these features that distinguish our case from the many and

diverse civil rights cases whose certifications we have upheld and will continue to

uphold. For example, in M ilonas v. Williams, we affirmed the district court’s

certification of a class consisting of all current and future students at the Provo

Canyon School. 691 F.2d 931, 936 (10th Cir. 1982). The plaintiffs in M ilonas

sought to enjoin a number of practices used at the school, including excessive

force and the use of isolation cells, and the district court granted the injunction.

6
Similarly, in In re M ethyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“M TBE”) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the district court denied class
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class consisting of private residential well owners
scattered across four states claiming that the defendant oil companies had
contaminated their well water. Id. at 328. The plaintiffs’ requested injunctive
relief included requiring the defendants to provide “clean water” to class members
and “provide remediation of contaminated wells.” Id at 344. Reasoning that if
individual issues pervade the entire action “the suit could become unmanageable,”
id. at 343, the court proceeded to identify multiple individual issues that would
have to be addressed by any injunction. For example, what constituted “clean”
water would necessarily depend on the individual plaintiffs’ intended use for the
water as well as “how the contamination affects each plaintiff.” Id. at 344.
Similarly, successful remediation pursuant to an injunction would necessarily
depend on the individual circumstances resulting in contamination. Id. The
plaintiffs attempted to get around this problem by arguing that the court could
“fashion an order setting forth broad guidelines” for the defendants to follow. Id.
at 345. But, just as here, such “broad guidelines” failed to satisfy the limits on
injunctive relief contained in Rule 65(d). Id. See also Heffner v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 443 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2006) (vacated a class
certification order because the proposed class failed to satisfy the second half of
Rule 23(b)(2)).

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Id. at 935. Similarly, in Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir.

1975), we reversed a district court’s denial of class certification in a case alleging

that a hospital denied Native Americans medical care on account of their race. Id.

at 1183. In both cases, the relief the plaintiffs sought did not require the district

court to ascertain detailed information about class members. For purposes of

designing and enforcing an injunction, whether someone was a member of the

class and had been subject to, for example, confinement in an isolation room, was

easily determinable. Neither did the injunctions fail for lack of specificity; the

plaintiffs did not describe the acts to be enjoined in terms of “adequacy” or

“reasonableness,” but concretely asked that the defendants be ordered to cease

certain behaviors, such as confining students in isolation cells or considering race

in deciding whether to treat a patient. It is precisely the lack of such concrete

characteristics that distinguishes our case from the mine run of civil rights class

actions we have upheld under Rule 23.

Plaintiffs point out that in cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice

contesting mental health treatment in certain jails, other district courts have

granted injunctive relief similar to the relief they seek. See, e.g., United States v.

Terrell County, No. 04-cv-00076-W LS (M .D. Ga. Dec. 21, 2007); United States v.

Dallas County, No. 307-cv-1559-N (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2007). But these cases, in

which the United States is the plaintiff, do not as a threshold matter have to

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satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirements. Such suits are instead brought pursuant to

the Attorney General’s statutory authority to pursue cases involving “egregious or

flagrant conditions which deprive [institutionalized] persons of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States” and which result from a “pattern or practice of resistance to the

full enjoyment of such rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997a. W hile the statute places some

preconditions on the Attorney General’s ability to bring suit, such as, inter alia, a

requirement that the Attorney General first notify state officials of the allegedly

illegal conditions, 42 U.S.C. § 1997b, the statute places no conditions similar to

those placed on private class actions by Rule 23. M oreover, the statute in

question explicitly disclaims any effort to “expand or restrict the authority of

parties other than the United States to enforce the legal rights which they may

have,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997j, highlighting the fact that the United States’ ability to

bring such suits cannot lift the restrictions imposed by Rule 23 on private

plaintiffs’ ability to bring suit. Simply put, the salutary fact that other avenues

may be available to address inappropriate mental health conditions does not mean

that Rule 23 class actions must also always be available.

In a similar vein, plaintiffs point out that another district court judge in the

same district in which plaintiffs filed their suit has recently certified a class

similar to the one plaintiffs seek to have certified in a suit challenging similar

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practices at a different institution. See Vandehey v. Vallario, 2008 W L 697428

(D. Colo. M arch 13, 2008), appeal docketed, No. 08-502 (10th Cir. M arch 28,

2008). W ithout in any way commenting on the merits of the appeal in that matter,

the fact that other courts might reach conclusions different from that reached by

the district court in this case is not dispositive in our case. Our inquiry is limited

to asking whether the district court’s decision “exceeded the bounds of

permissible choice,” a standard that, as we have already emphasized,

acknowledges the possibility that polar opposite decisions may both fall within

the “range of possible outcomes the facts and law at issue can fairly support.”

M cComb, 519 F.3d at 1053. And, as we have indicated, there is sufficient support

in the Rule and applicable case law to indicate that the district court’s decision in

this case, while perhaps not the only tenable one, or one even we would ourselves

have made, was permissible.

Plaintiffs also place significant reliance on the argument that Rule 23(b)(2)

classes are generally “well suited” to civil rights cases. W e agree entirely. Rule

23(b)(2) was drafted in significant measure to enable civil rights class actions.

See Rules Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.

69, 102. And we have upheld and will frequently uphold such lawsuits. But the

Supreme Court has also instructed us that, while “[w]e are not unaware that suits

[alleging violations of civil rights] are often by their very nature class suits,

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involving classwide wrongs. . . .[,] careful attention to the requirements of Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere fact that a

complaint alleges [violation of a civil right] does not in itself ensure” that Rule

23's requirements are satisfied. East Texas M otor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez,

431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). In other words, that many civil rights actions may

properly proceed under Rule 23(b)(2) does not mean that we may assume that all

such actions should so proceed; putative class actions still must satisfy the

express requirements of Rule 23, and the district court reasonably held that this

class action was more like our decision in M onreal than those in M ilonas or Penn.

Neither does the inability of plaintiffs to have this particular class certified

defeat their ability to have these issues reviewed either individually or even

through the class action mechanism. Individually or in joined actions, see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 19-20, prisoners remain free to bring damages claims against defendants

for unconstitutional harm they suffer while in custody of the Jail. Such actions

would allow a court to pass judgment on whether defendants’ conduct amounted

to deliberate indifference with respect to individual inmates. And, to be sure,

damages actions, by sanctioning past conduct, can incentivize a defendant to

modify its future conduct. Different named plaintiffs are of course also free to

pursue another class action, defining a class (or subclasses) for whom relief is

deemed more manageable, within the bounds of the district court’s discretion.

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After all, to the extent that the denial of class certification can have preclusive

effect on unnamed class members, see In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires

Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (giving preclusive effect to the

denial of class certification as against unnamed class members); Bailey v. State

Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 414 F.3d 1187, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that

“[m]any of the principles articulated in Bridgestone/Firestone are sound”), the

failure to certify this specific class hardly has preclusive effect on different

plaintiffs in a future suit seeking certification of a different class or seeking

different relief. The only question we pass on today is the narrow question

whether the relationship between the class proposed and the relief sought in this

suit satisfies Rule 23(b)(2).

III

Despite the district court’s express consideration of Rule 23’s requirements,

plaintiffs assert that the district court included extraneous and legally erroneous

discussion in its opinion, the inclusion of which amounts to reversible error.

Specifically, they charge that the district court disregarded our opinion in Shook I

by (A) relying on the difficulties in identifying members of the class as a basis for

denying certification; (B) prematurely evaluating the merits of plaintiffs’ claims;

(C) and continuing to rely on the PLRA’s limitations on relief as an alternative

basis for denying certification. W hether the district court applied the correct

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legal framework in its class certification decision is a legal question, and thus we

review plaintiffs’ claims on this score de novo. Shook I, 386 F.3d at 967. And of

course, as we have explained many times, even when a decision – such as class

certification – is committed to the district court’s discretion, the district court

necessarily abuses that discretion when its decision depends on a legal error.

M cComb, 519 F.3d at 1054. W e address each of plaintiffs’ claims below and

conclude that – while the district court should have excised the PLRA from its

discussion of class certification – it also amply explained how its concerns

intersect with the constraints of Rule 23. W e therefore find that the district court

did not commit the same legal errors for which we reversed its prior order.

A

In Shook I, we held that difficulties identifying class members could not

defeat certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because, while Rule 23(c)(2) explicitly

authorizes courts to consider problems identifying class members in (b)(3) class

actions insofar as such difficulties are relevant to providing notice to class

members, there is no similar authorization for (b)(2) actions. 386 F.3d at 972.

The difference, we observed, is that Rule 23(c)(2) makes notice mandatory for

(b)(3) classes but optional for (b)(2) classes, and thus concerns relevant to

providing notice – such as identifiability – are not properly part of the (b)(2)

calculus. Id. W e went on to hold, however, that “the factual and legal concerns

- 29 -
leading the court to consider problems of identifying” the class could be relevant

to, among other things, whether final injunctive relief was appropriate within the

meaning of Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 973-74.

Our holding reflected how difficulties in determining the contours of a

class can be relevant to both parts of Rule 23(b)(2)’s test. For example, where the

outer boundaries of a class are indefinite, a court may not be able to ascertain

whether a defendant acted on generally applicable grounds. Similarly, if

determining whether the injunctive relief sought is appropriate for the class as a

whole requires some knowledge about the characteristics of the class or variation

within the class – such as, for example, its approximate size or the distribution of

individuals within the class possessing certain traits – difficulties in estimating

these characteristics may properly preclude certification. Put differently,

difficulties in identifying characteristics of the class can prevent plaintiffs from

carrying their burden of showing that “final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate

respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

Here, the district court’s order evinces just these sorts of concerns. It

expressed concern not with potential problems identifying individual class

members for purposes of notification – a consideration relevant only to Rule

23(b)(3) actions – but with problems associated with identifying characteristics

of the class essential to determining whether class-wide relief is appropriate. For

- 30 -
example, given the “many varieties and degrees of mental disorders,” the district

court expressed concern with how the Jail, not the court, would be able to

identify members of the class, and the specific treatments their individual

maladies required, in a way that would allow the Jail to comply with any relief

obtained or the court to monitor the Jail’s compliance with such relief. D. Ct. Op.

at *7-8. Considerations along these lines are permissible under Rule 23 and

consistent with our decision in Shook I.

B

Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court prematurely considered the

merits of their claims fails for similar reasons. It is of course true that Rule 23

does not give “a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the

merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class

action.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). The Supreme

Court has been equally clear, however, that there is not an impermeable wall

between the substance of a cause of action and the decision to certify the class.

“[T]he class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in

the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Gen. Tel.

Co. Of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). In other words, while a

district court may not evaluate the strength of a cause of action at the class

certification stage, it must consider, without passing judgment on whether

- 31 -
plaintiffs will prevail on the merits, whether remedying the harm alleged can be

done on a class-wide basis in conformity with Rule 23(b)(2). See Eisen, 417 U.S.

at 178 (“In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether

the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the

merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.”); Gariety v.

Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W ]hile an evaluation

of the merits to determine the strength of plaintiffs’ case is not part of Rule 23

analysis, the factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be addressed through findings,

even if they overlap with issues on the merits.”). But see Robert G. Bone &

David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive M erits, 51 Duke L. J.

1251 (2002) (arguing that because the decision to certify a class is often

effectively dispositive by forcing settlement, district courts should be authorized

to consider the merits of class claims at the certification stage).

The district court in this case cited precisely these types of concerns,

averring to the “highly individualistic and case specific” nature of the inquiry it

was being asked to undertake, D. Ct. Op. at *5, as well as its view that

“[c]ompliance with class-wide injunctive relief would be impossible to monitor, if

it would even be possible to enter an order meeting the requirements of Rule

65(d),” id. at 7. Such concerns, far from impermissibly touching on the merits of

plaintiffs’ suit, go directly to the heart of the inquiry under Rule 23(b)(2) into the

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relationship between the class proposed and the relief sought. Indeed, to the

extent that the district court commented on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims at all,

it was to express the view that on the facts alleged the individual plaintiffs have a

strong case: “The facts alleged in the complaints could support individual claims

for relief, but those allegations do not show that final injunctive relief or

declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole is appropriate.” D. Ct. Op.

at 11. The difficulty, then, in the district court’s view was not the likelihood of

success on the merits, which the district court seemed to feel was relatively high –

it was a deficiency in plaintiffs’ showing under Rule 23(b)(2).

C

Finally, we confess that we are as surprised as plaintiffs that on remand the

district court continued to rely as an alternative ground for denying class

certification on “the inability of the court to fashion the remedy requested, given

the . . . the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the [PLRA].” Id. at 4. Our

holding in Shook I was plain: “Congress did not intend the PLRA to alter class

certification requirements under Rule 23.” Shook I, 386 F.3d at 971. In light of

Shook I, any reference at the class certification stage to the PLRA’s limitations on

the district court’s ability to grant relief was error. Having said that, however, we

are nevertheless obliged by our own case law to consider all of the district court’s

alternative holdings. See, e.g., M urrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 (10th Cir.

- 33 -
1994). As we have said before, “[w]hatever the particular result in any given

case, the use of alternative dispositions generally benefits everyone; [it] relieves a

pressing work load by resolving cases thoroughly once; the courts avoid

successive, piecemeal appeals; and litigants are spared the protracted delays that

result when a case drags on incrementally.” 7 Id. Thus, no matter how erroneous

one alternative disposition, we still must bring our dispassionate analysis to each

alternative ruling made by the district court.

And here, the district court’s independent analysis of Rule 23, separate and

apart from its continued reliance on the PLRA, stands as a sufficient and

appropriate basis for affirmance. In Shook I, we identified the district court’s

error as “not specifically addressing the traditional Rule 23 factors in denying

class certification,” 386 F.3d at 972, noting that the district court “did not address

Rule 23(b)(2)” in its order at all, id. at 968. As we have discussed above, the

district court remedied that deficiency in its second order, extensively analyzing

the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) and finding those requirements not met.

M oreover, in its latter opinion the Rule 23 discussion constituted the bulk of the

7
Indeed, we have gone so far as to hold that where a district court’s
disposition rests on alternative and adequate grounds, a party who, in challenging
that disposition, only argues that one alternative is erroneous necessarily loses
because the second alternative stands as an independent and adequate basis,
regardless of the correctness of the first alternative. M urrell, 43 F.3d at 1389-90;
Berna v. Chater, 101 F.3d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1996).

- 34 -
district court’s analysis; its discussion of the PLRA was limited to stray

references. Such an effort is starkly different from that offered by the district

court in support of its first order. It demonstrates an engagement with the

analytical framework set up by Rule 23, and as we have said before, “[t]here is no

abuse of discretion when the trial court applies the correct criteria [under Rule

23] to the facts of the case.” J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1287

(10th Cir. 1999). W e thus are constrained to affirm the district court based on the

legal adequacy of its Rule 23 analysis, despite its erroneous alternative PLRA

discussion.

***

Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes an inquiry into the relationship between the class

framed in the complaint and injunctive relief requested. A district court does not

abuse its discretion in denying class certification where providing the requested

relief at the level of specificity required by Rule 65(d) would render a class action

unmanageable – either because of difficulties in determining relevant aggregate

characteristics of the class or because factual differences between class members

require different standards of conduct for undefined groups within the class. The

judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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