FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 1, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
FREDRICK ABRAM,
Petitioner–Appellant,
No. 08-1119
v.
(D.C. No. 08-CV-00169-ZLW)
(D. Colo.)
KEVIN MILYARD; JOHN W.
SUTHERS,
Respondents–Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Fredrick Abram, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition for habeas relief. Because reasonable jurists would not find it debatable
whether the district court erred in its procedural ruling, we deny a COA and
dismiss the appeal.
I
On January 10, 2008, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Abram filed a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) before the district court. On
January 28, Abram filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254. On
the same day, the district court denied Abram’s motion to proceed IFP and
ordered that Abram pay the $5.00 filing fee within 30 days or his petition would
be dismissed. On February 4, Abram filed a response to the district court’s
January 28 order. In the response, Abram claimed he lacked sufficient funds to
pay the $5.00 filing fee and moved the court to reconsider its decision denying
him leave to proceed IFP. The response stated that a copy of his inmate trust
fund account statement was attached, but no such attachment was included in the
filing. Abram later filed a copy of his account statement on February 14.
On March 7, the district court denied the motion to reconsider and
dismissed Abram’s petition without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee.
The district court concluded, based on its review of Abram’s account statement,
that Abram had sufficient resources to pay the required filing fee. In particular,
the district court found that Abram had a balance of $71.03 when he filed his
petition, that he had a balance of $6.12 on February 11, and that a total of $55.37
had been deposited into his account between February 4 and February 6.
Accordingly, the court found no reason Abram could not have paid the filing fee
within 30 days of the January 28 order.
On March 20, Abram filed a “motion to have civil action number 08-cv-
00169 BNB re-instated,” which the district court construed as a timely motion to
reconsider. Abram conceded he had $6.12 in his inmate account on February 11,
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but he argued that it was immediately removed to cover hygiene items. On April
3, the district court denied the motion to reconsider its March 7 dismissal.
On April 4, Abram filed a notice of appeal, a motion for a COA, and a
motion to proceed IFP on appeal. On April 8, the district court denied a COA,
and on April 29, the court denied Abram’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal,
certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith. See § 1915(a)(3). Abram
now seeks a COA in this court so that he may appeal the district court’s dismissal
of his § 2254 habeas petition. He also moves for leave to proceed IFP.
II
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “‘This standard
requires an applicant to show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.’” Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). When a district court
dismisses a state prisoner’s § 2254 habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claims, we will only grant a
COA if two conditions are met. First, the petitioner must show that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Second, the petitioner
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must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id. “Where a plain procedural
bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a
reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in
dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed
further.” Id.; Laurson v. Leyba, 507 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007). In such a
circumstance, no appeal is warranted. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Abram cannot meet his burden as to the second requirement. See id. at 485
(“Each component of the § 2253(c) showing is part of a threshold inquiry, and a
court may find that it can dispose of the application in a fair and prompt manner
if it proceeds first to resolve the issue whose answer is more apparent from the
record and arguments.”). Before this court, Abram reiterates the argument he
made before the district court that he lacked sufficient funds to pay the required
filing fee. Moreover, he contends that the district court deliberately
misrepresented the contents of his inmate trust fund account statement. In
particular, he argues that although his account statement reflects the various
balances identified by the district court in its March 7 order, in reality his
available balances demonstrate he lacked sufficient funds to pay the filing fee.
It appears the district court misread Abram’s account statement. As Abram
points out, the account statement reflects both a “balance” and an “available
balance,” which appears to reflect the actual amount of money subject to
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withdrawal. The district court’s erroneous reading of the account statement,
however, does not change the fact that Abram had sufficient resources to pay the
$5.00 filing fee. On February 6, after Abram had notice that his motion to
proceed IFP had been denied, Abram had more than a $5.00 available in his trust
account. The reasons for Abram’s spending do not change the fact that he had
sufficient resources to pay the required filing fee. See Cosby v. Meadors, 351
F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2003). Therefore, jurists of reason would not find it
debatable whether the district court erred in dismissing Abram’s petition for
failure to pay the required fee.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We
GRANT Abram’s motion to supplement the record. Because we agree with the
district court that this appeal is not taken in good faith, we DENY Abram’s
motion to proceed IFP on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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