UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-30421
KERRY VILLARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, on behalf of
UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(96-CV-2353)
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March 8, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges
Per Curiam:*
In this contest for lien priority between (1) Plaintiff-
Appellant Kerry Villard, as a judgment creditor against Whitehall-
Windermere Company, Inc., the alter ego of Ms. Villard’s ex-
husband, Joseph Villard, Jr., and (2) the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), as federal tax lien holder against “White-Hall Windermere,
Company, Inc.” [sic], for federal taxes owed by Mr. Villard, Ms.
Villard asserts that the government’s mis-hyphenation of the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
corporation’s name produced an error in the index to the applicable
2
public records of Rapides Parish, Louisiana, identifying the tax
lien debtor as “White-Hall Windermere, Company, Inc., Nominee of
Joseph Villard, Jr.” rather than Whitehall-Windermere Company, Inc.
This, she urges, caused the failure of the IRS to meet its own test
for determining whether a prior recorded federal tax lien primes a
subsequently recorded judgment lien. Specifically, Ms. Villard
insists that the name differences and the resulting mis-indexing of
the tax lien does not satisfy 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4), which
requires the IRS to file a Form 6681 in the office designated under
state law for the filing of liens “in such a manner that a
reasonable inspection of the index would reveal the existence of
the lien.”2 The IRS, of course, insists that the misplaced hyphen
produced an indexing discrepancy that was not so extreme as to
evade a reasonable inspection.
We have carefully reviewed the opinion of the district court
(which agrees with the position of the IRS), have familiarized
ourselves with the operable facts of this case (which are
essentially undisputed) and have studied the arguments and
applicable law as advanced by able counsel for the parties in their
respective appellate briefs and in their oral arguments to this
court. As a result, we conclude that the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the IRS and adverse to Ms. Villard is
correct, essentially for the reasons set forth in the court’s
1
See 28 C.F.R. § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2).
2
26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(f).
3
opinion. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is, in all
respects,
AFFIRMED.1
1
We do not address Villard’s alternative argument grounded
in retroactivity of the judgment against the tax debtor’s alter
ego corporation as we find it to be unmeritorious under the
established jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and this court.
4