FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 30, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 08-7054
(D. Ct. Nos. 6:07-CV-0405-RAW and
MARCUS TARIN ELLIS, CR-05-53-RAW)
(E.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before TACHA, KELLY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Marcus Ellis, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal from the district court’s denial of his
habeas corpus petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We take jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we DENY Mr. Ellis’s request for a COA, and we DISMISS this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
A jury convicted Mr. Ellis of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, cocaine, and cocaine base, as well as possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of five or more grams of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §
846; § 841(a)(1); § 841(b)(1)(B). He was sentenced to 361 months in prison, followed by
eight years of supervised release. On appeal, this court affirmed the conviction and the
sentence. United States v. Ellis, 193 Fed.Appx. 773, 2006 WL 2411461, at *5 (10th Cir.
Aug. 22, 2006). Mr. Ellis then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the district court,
seeking to have his conviction overturned or his sentence vacated. The district court
denied the habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing and did not rule on Mr. Ellis’s
request for a COA. As a result, Mr. Ellis now seeks a COA from this court.
II. DISCUSSION
We will issue a COA to appeal from the denial of a habeas petition “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies the petitioner’s claim on the merits,
“[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). When the petition is denied on procedural grounds,
the petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.
In his § 2255 petition and subsequent application to this court for a COA, Mr. Ellis
argues that the district court violated his due process rights during sentencing and that he
was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney did not move to dismiss
the case for a Brady violation. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding
that the prosecution’s suppressing material evidence that is favorable to the defendant is a
due process violation). We will address Mr. Ellis’s two arguments individually.
-2-
The district court determined that Mr. Ellis’s sentencing claim was procedurally
barred. Thus, Mr. Ellis must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether he
has stated a valid claim and whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct.
See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. The sentencing claim was procedurally barred because Mr.
Ellis did not raise the sentencing issue on direct appeal. Petitions under § 2255 “are not
available to test the legality of matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.”
United States v. Cook, 997 F.2d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 1993). In order to raise this issue
in his § 2255 petition, Mr. Ellis must demonstrate good cause for the issue not being
presented on appeal, as well as prejudice resulting from the alleged errors; or, Mr. Ellis
must show that the court’s failure to address the claim would be a “fundamental
miscarriage of justice.” Id. Mr. Ellis cannot meet this burden.
Mr. Ellis argues that he was unlawfully sentenced above the twenty-year statutory
maximum set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). He claims that for a sentence to be
increased above that maximum, the jury must find a specific drug quantity beyond a
reasonable doubt. This court has ruled, however, that a district court may impose a higher
sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), which set forth particular sentences based on
benchmark quantities of drugs, so long as a jury finds the benchmark is met. United
States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000). In this case, the jury found in its
special verdict that the conspiracy offense involved at least five grams of
methamphetamine, at least five grams of cocaine base, and at least 500 grams of cocaine
powder; the jury also found that the distribution offense involved at least five grams of
-3-
methamphetamine. Both findings thus supported a maximum sentence of forty, rather
than twenty, years in prison on each count of conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
Mr. Ellis points to no good cause for failing to raise this due process issue on
appeal. Although good cause may be shown by demonstrating ineffectiveness of
counsel,1 see Jones, 235 F.3d at 1236, there is no evidence that Mr. Ellis’s counsel was
ineffective on this issue. His counsel objected to the sentencing conclusions in the pre-
sentence report, but the district court overruled the objection. Counsel’s decision not to
appeal the issue was entirely appropriate, given that the district court’s application of the
drug enhancement was in line with our precedent. In addition, the analysis above
demonstrates that failing to address this issue would not be a “miscarriage of justice.”
We hold, therefore, that reasonable jurists would not “find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” or whether the district
court properly deemed the claim procedurally barred. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
The second issue raised in Mr. Ellis’s § 2255 petition and application for a COA is
the alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel in not moving to dismiss the case. Mr. Ellis
claims his counsel should have moved for dismissal based on a Brady violation. See
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that where the prosecution
withholds evidence from the defense that is material to guilt or punishment, the
1
Mr. Ellis’s allegations of ineffective counsel are addressed specifically to the
Brady claim. However, we liberally construe the arguments of a pro se petitioner. See
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1029 (10th Cir. 2008). We will
therefore consider whether the petitioner’s counsel was so ineffective as to warrant
consideration of the sentencing issue.
-4-
government violates the defendant’s due process rights. Id. The issue in this case,
however, was a minor discovery matter that did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.
At trial, a Bureau of Indian Affairs agent testified on cross-examination that a
certain informant had been paid for his cooperation in assisting the government with
controlled drug purchases from Mr. Ellis. The fact that the informant had been paid was
previously unknown to both the government and the defense. Defense counsel moved for
a mistrial. The court denied the motion but gave defense counsel a day to revise his
cross-examination. Counsel renewed the motion for a mistrial at the close of the
government’s evidence, and again at the close of all evidence. He did not move to
dismiss the case against his client.
To be entitled to relief on this claim, Mr. Ellis must show that his counsel fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, resulting in prejudice to Mr. Ellis. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). Mr. Ellis has not demonstrated
that his counsel’s performance was deficient. The underlying issue was, at most, a
discovery violation. We have held that a case should not be dismissed for a discovery
violation in the absence of bad faith or prejudice. See United States v. Dennison, 891
F.2d 255, 260 (10th Cir. 1989). In this case, there was no evidence of bad faith by the
government or prejudice to the defendant. The Bureau of Indian Affairs agent said he had
not revealed to either side that the informant had been paid, and defense counsel had
ample time to revise his cross-examination based on the new information.
-5-
With no grounds for dismissal, Mr. Ellis’s counsel acted appropriately in moving
for a mistrial. The district court concluded that Mr. Ellis’s counsel was effective, and Mr.
Ellis has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find that conclusion to be
“debatable or wrong.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
III. CONCLUSION
On the sentencing issue, Mr. Ellis has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists
could debate whether he has stated a valid claim or whether the claim was procedurally
barred. On the ineffective assistance of counsel issue, Mr. Ellis has failed to demonstrate
that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s conclusion that his counsel was
effective. We therefore DENY the appellant’s request for a COA and DISMISS the
appeal. Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
-6-