FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 23, 2009
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 08-4009
v. (D.Ct. No. 07-CR-00256-DAK-1)
KERRY DEAN BENALLY,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, TACHA, KELLY, BRISCOE, LUCERO,
MURPHY, HARTZ, O’BRIEN, MCCONNELL, TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH,
and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Kerry Dean Benally’s petition for
rehearing en banc. The original panel considered the petition. Any implicit
request for panel rehearing is denied.
The en banc request was transmitted to all of the judges of the court who
are in regular active service. A poll was called and a majority of the active
judges voted to deny rehearing en banc. Chief Judge Henry, Judge Briscoe, Judge
Lucero, and Judge Murphy would grant the petition.
Entered for the Court,
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER
Clerk of Court
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No. 08-4009, United States v. Benally
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, joined by LUCERO, Circuit Judge, in Parts II and III,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:
At issue in this case is whether a Native American defendant, convicted by
a jury whose foreman and another juror knowingly concealed racist views and
stereotypes of Native Americans during voir dire and then later openly espoused
those views during deliberations, can properly rely on testimony from other jurors
in order to establish the existence of structural error, i.e., a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury, and, consequently, his right to a new trial.
Mr. Benally, a Native American, was charged with forcibly assaulting a
Bureau of Indian Affairs officer with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 111(b), a crime that carries a potential sentence of up to twenty years’
imprisonment. During voir dire, the district court, at Mr. Benally’s request, asked
the potential jurors if they had ever had any negative experiences with Native
Americans and, if so, whether those experiences would impact their evaluation of
the facts of the case. None of the jurors answered affirmatively to these
questions. The case proceeded to trial and the jury found Mr. Benally guilty.
The day after the verdict was announced, one juror (“Juror KC”) came
forward of her own volition and alleged that two of the jurors, including the
foreman, had made racist statements about Native Americans during
deliberations. According to Juror KC, the foreman purportedly “told the other
jurors that he used to live on or near an Indian Reservation, that ‘[w]hen Indians
get alcohol, they all get drunk,’ and that when they get drunk, they get violent.”
546 F.3d at 1231. Juror KC alleged that another juror purportedly “chimed in to
say that she had also lived on or near a reservation” and “‘agree[d] with the
foreman’s statement about Indians.’” Id. at 1231-32. Lastly, Juror KC alleged
that a discussion occurred “in which some jurors discussed the need to ‘send a
message back to the reservation . . . .’” Id. at 1232. After obtaining an affidavit
from Juror KC and another juror who confirmed that racially biased statements
were made during deliberations, Mr. Benally moved for a new trial, arguing that
his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury had been violated because some of
the jurors had lied during voir dire about their racial bias. The district court
found, on the basis of the affidavits submitted by Mr. Benally, that two of the
jurors had, in fact, lied during voir dire “when they failed to reveal their past
experiences with Native Americans and their preconception that all Native
Americans get drunk and then violent.” 546 F.3d at 1232. Accordingly, the
district court granted Mr. Benally’s motion for new trial. The government then
appealed.
The panel holds, in reversing the district court’s decision and reinstating
Mr. Benally’s conviction, that Rule 606(b) effectively prohibits “juror testimony
of racial bias in jury deliberations of the kind alleged [to have occurred] in Mr.
Benally’s trial, and [that] the Sixth Amendment does not require an exception.”
Id. at 1231. I am of the firm view, however, that the panel’s opinion
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misinterprets Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and, in doing so, erects an
improper and insurmountable barrier preventing Mr. Benally from enforcing his
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
I
“Inquiry into the validity of the verdict”?
Rule 606(b), entitled “Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment,”
provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the
juror’s mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may
testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury’s attention, (2) whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3)
whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict
form. A juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror
may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying.
Mr. Benally argued “that the testimony concerning racial bias f[ell] outside
the ambit of . . . Rule [606(b)] because it [wa]s not being offered in connection
with ‘an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment.’” 546 F.3d at 1235
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)). But the panel rejected this position. According to
the panel, “[a]lthough the immediate purpose of introducing the testimony may
have been to show that the two jurors failed to answer honestly during voir dire,
the sole point of this showing was to support a motion to vacate the verdict and
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for a new trial. That is a challenge to the validity of the verdict.” Id.
This reasoning, in my view, is erroneous. If, as Mr. Benally asserts, one or
more jurors failed to honestly respond to the district court’s questions during voir
dire, then Mr. Benally would have established the existence of a structural defect
in his trial, i.e., the deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (“because the impartiality of
the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system, the Chapman
harmless-error standard cannot apply”). And, it is indisputable that such a defect
would have existed from the outset of his trial and would not be amenable to
harmless error review. Thus, contrary to being an “inquiry into the validity of the
verdict” rendered by the jury in his case, Mr. Benally’s claim is more properly
viewed as an inquiry into “the legitimacy of [the] pre-trial procedures,” and, in
turn, the constitutionality of the overall proceedings. 27 Charles Alan Wright &
Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 2d § 6074 at 516
(2007).
I would note, in passing, that the panel’s interpretation of Rule 606(b) in
this regard conflicts with that of the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits. See
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Where, as here, a
juror has been asked direct questions about racial bias during voir dire, and has
sworn that racial bias would play no part in his deliberations, evidence of that
juror’s alleged racial bias is indisputably admissible for the purpose of
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determining whether the juror’s responses were truthful.”); United States v.
Boney, 68 F.3d 497, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding, where jury foreman lied on
jury questionnaire as to whether he had ever been convicted of a felony, Rule
606(b) did not prohibit district court from conducting evidentiary hearing and
questioning foreman). Further, although the panel suggests its conclusion is
consistent with the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223
(3d Cir. 2003), that decision is distinguishable because it involved an appeal from
the denial of a state prisoner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, and decided only
that Supreme Court precedent did not “clearly establish[] that it [wa]s
unconstitutional for a state to apply a ‘no impeachment’ rule that d[id] not contain
an exception for juror testimony about racial bias on the part of jurors.” Id. at
239. In other words, the Third Circuit did not directly resolve the issue we now
face.
II
The “extraneous prejudicial information” exception
Even if Mr. Benally’s motion could be construed as an “inquiry into the
validity of the verdict” reached in his case, I believe, for several reasons, that the
panel opinion incorrectly concludes that the “extraneous prejudicial information”
exception to Rule 606(b) does not encompass the racist statements made by the
jury foreman and another juror during deliberations.
First, our prior decision in United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1199
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(10th Cir. 2000), effectively construes the “extraneous prejudicial information”
exception as encompassing statements made by jurors to each other regarding
matters that were not part of the trial record. In Humphrey, we held that a district
court, upon hearing rumors of improper juror discussion regarding a defendant’s
reputation, must investigate sufficiently to assure itself that the constitutional
rights of the criminal defendant were not violated. Id. at 1199-1209. Although
the Benally opinion cites the Humphrey case, it does not meaningfully distinguish
it.
Second, consistent with the Humphrey decision, the foreman’s statements
in this case fit precisely within the phrase “extraneous prejudicial information.”
To begin with, the statements in my view went beyond a mere expression of
“values or biases” and were intended to convey how, in the foreman’s view,
“Indians” act when they “get alcohol.” Thus, the statements clearly constitute
“information.” See Wright & Gold, supra § 6075 at 520-21. Further, the
statements were obviously “extraneous” because they were not “heard in open
court and . . . subject[ed] to adversarial challenge . . . .” Id. at 519. Lastly, it
appears the statements were “prejudicial” because they were clearly intended to
assist the jury in finding facts, i.e., in concluding how Mr. Benally, a Native
American, likely acted.
Third, the panel attempts to distinguish the foreman’s comments as
“generalized statements” and not “specific extra-record facts relating to the
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defendant.” 546 F.3d at 1237. To make this leap of logic, the panel opinion
suggests that the statement “[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk” does
not concern a specific fact about Mr. Benally, a Native American defendant. This
ignores the obvious syllogism. Additionally, the panel strains to conclude that the
need to “send a message back to the reservation” does not relate to the facts
underlying the charge, which involved Mr. Benally’s alleged assault of a law
enforcement officer. To me, it is vastly more reasonable interpretation of the
“extraneous prejudicial information” exception to acknowledge that a juror’s
statements that denigrate the defendant’s race concern supposed facts about this
specific defendant.
III
Sixth Amendment rights versus the values embodied in Rule 606(b)
Lastly, I also disagree with what I view as the panel’s efforts to subordinate
Mr. Benally’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury to the values
supposedly embodied in Rule 606(b). Most notably, the panel attempts to
compare Mr. Benally’s case to Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). In
my view, however, the two cases are factually and analytically distinct. In
Tanner, two criminal defendants who were jointly tried and convicted moved for
an evidentiary hearing and a new trial, citing information obtained after trial
indicating that several of the jurors ingested alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine on
various occasions during the trial. The district court denied the defendants’
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motion. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
ruling. In doing so, the Court emphasized that the focus of the defendants’
motion, i.e., impeachment of the jury’s verdict based on juror incompetence
resulting from alcohol and/or drug intoxication, placed the case squarely within
the language of Rule 606(b). Further, the Court noted that “the legislative history
[of Rule 606(b)] demonstrate[d] with uncommon clarity that Congress specifically
understood, considered, and rejected a version of [the Rule] that would have
allowed jurors to testify on juror conduct during deliberations, including juror
intoxication.” 483 U.S. at 125. Lastly, the Court concluded that the defendants’
Sixth Amendment right to a competent, unimpaired jury could be adequately
protected “by several aspects of the trial process,” including (a) voir dire, (b)
observations of the jury during trial by the trial court, counsel, and court
personnel, (c) jurors’ pre-verdict observations of each other, and (d) impeachment
of the verdict “by nonjuror evidence of misconduct.” Id. at 127.
In contrast, the focus of Mr. Benally’s motion for new trial was not on
establishing the jury’s incompetence or impeaching the jury’s verdict, but rather
on establishing that one or more of the jurors lied during voir dire regarding their
impartiality. To be sure, Mr. Benally, and in turn the district court, relied on
affidavits from two of the jurors. As I have already explained, however, this did
not, in my view, amount to an “inquiry into the validity of [the] verdict” for
purposes of Rule 606(b). Moreover, I am not persuaded that the alternative
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safeguards cited by the Court in Tanner for protecting a defendant’s right to a
competent jury are sufficient to adequately protect a defendant’s right to an
impartial jury. Unlike jurors’ ingestion of alcohol or drugs, the act and effect of
which can be observed by others and brought to the attention of the district court,
jurors’ racial biases can be much more easily hidden from observation. Indeed,
that appears to be precisely what occurred here: despite the district court’s best
efforts at protecting Mr. Benally’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury,
the jury foreman clearly lied during the voir dire proceedings about his ability to
be impartial.
The distinction between an “impartial jury” and a sober one is the confining
characteristic that the panel opinion ignores in its effort to grease the proverbial
“slippery slope.” The panel cannot see “how the principle . . . that Rule 606(b) is
unconstitutional as applied in a case where it prevents rectification of a Sixth
Amendment violation – could be confined to the context of racial prejudice . . .
But once it is held that the rules of evidence must be subordinated to the need to
admit evidence of Sixth Amendment violations, we do not see how the courts
could stop at the ‘most serious’ such violations.” 546 F.3d at 1241. The clear
stopping point, in my view, rests in the Sixth Amendment requirement of juror
impartiality.
Further, instead of addressing head-on whether Mr. Benally’s jury was
impartial, the panel attempts to rationalize its result by emphasizing the right to a
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“fair trial” rather than a “perfect trial.” In particular, the panel postulates,
“[w]here the attempt to cure defects in the jury process–here, the possibility that
racial bias played a role in the jury’s deliberations–entails the sacrifice of
structural features in the justice system that have important systemic benefits, it is
not necessarily in the interest of overall justice to do so.” But that disregards two
important and indisputable facts: that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury is itself a “structural feature” of the justice system, and that, as a
consequence, a violation of this right is not susceptible to harmless error review.
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No. 08-4009, United States v. Benally
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, joined by LUCERO, Circuit Judge, dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc.
I wholly agree with Judge Briscoe that the racist statements made by two
jurors during deliberations in Benally’s trial fall within the “extraneous
prejudicial information” exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Op. of
Briscoe, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc at 5-7. I likewise agree
that the panel’s contrary conclusion raises serious questions about the
constitutionality of Rule 606. Id. at 7-10. Although I harbor some doubt about
Judge Briscoe’s confident assertion that the testimony at issue here falls outside
the ambit of Rule 606, id. at 3-5, the issue is undoubtedly worthy of en banc
review as the only other two circuits to directly address this issue have reached a
conclusion contrary to that adopted by the panel and consistent with the view
expressed by Judge Briscoe. Id. at 4-5 (discussing cases from Ninth and D.C.
circuits); Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2), (b)(1)(B) (providing that circuit splits satisfy
the question-of-exceptional-importance predicate to en banc review).
Accordingly, but for the small caveat set out above, I join Judge Briscoe’s dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc.