FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 19, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CHRISTOPHER C. CARSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-6199
(D.C. No. 07-CV-421-T)
CUDD PRESSURE CONTROL, INC., (W.D. Okla.)
a foreign corporation; RPC INC.,
a foreign corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN, McCONNELL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Christopher C. Carson was employed as a well control specialist at
Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. for twenty years. In 2002, he was diagnosed with a
chronic condition and began taking a prescription medication that limited his
ability to function. Mr. Carson was relieved of his job duties, placed on
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
disability, and finally terminated from his employment. In submissions to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Mr. Carson claimed that
his discharge violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. He filed this suit upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC.
The district court determined that Mr. Carson’s EEOC filing was untimely,
calculating from the date the EEOC issued its formal Charge of Discrimination,
rather than the date Mr. Carson initiated the administrative process. It dismissed
the case for failure to demonstrate timely exhaustion of administrative remedies.
After reviewing the district court’s order de novo, see Harms v. IRS, 321 F.3d
1001, 1009 (10th Cir. 2003), we reverse and remand for further proceedings based
on the principles expressed in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct.
1147 (2008).
I.
For Mr. Carson’s ADA claims to be timely, he must have filed an
administrative “charge” within three hundred days after his November 30, 2004,
discharge: that is, by September 26, 2005. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 1 In
1
The ADA incorporates § 2000e-5(e)(1), which is a Title VII provision
applicable to deferral states like Oklahoma. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); see also
Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1206 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2007)
(explaining filing times in deferral states, which are those states that have “an
agency empowered to investigate employment discrimination”).
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his complaint, Mr. Carson alleged that he had “exhausted his administrative
remedies by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, the Charge being
issued on February 3, 2006.” Aplt. App. at 7.
Defendants moved for dismissal. They argued that, according to the plain
language of the complaint, Mr. Carson’s EEOC charge was filed after the 300-day
deadline. 2 Thus, they asserted, Mr. Carson’s case was time-barred and should be
dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Mr. Carson responded by submitting additional background information on
the filing of his charge. He proffered documents indicating that, on September 9,
2005 (within 300 days of his discharge), he had completed, signed, and delivered
three verified EEOC questionnaires and an affidavit stating claims of
discrimination based on a disability or a perceived disability. To augment and
clarify his complaint, Mr. Carson stated that “the EEOC charge was not filed with
2
Defendants’ motion also noted that the EEOC formal charge did not name
defendant RPC, Inc., Cudd’s parent company, and did not mention a failure-to-
accommodate theory. According to defendants, these omissions meant that the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims against RPC and
any claims against Cudd except for wrongful termination. Although these issues
are discussed in the parties’ appellate briefs, the district court reached its decision
without analyzing them. Particularly in the absence of a developed record, we do
not “examin[e] and resolv[e] the merits of these contentions.” Evers v. Regents of
Univ. of Colo., 509 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 2007). Instead, “we adopt the
better practice of leaving the matter to the district court in the first instance.” Id.
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the EEOC on February 3, 2006. Rather, the EEOC charge was issued” on that
date. Aplt. App. at 38. He also provided instances in which the EEOC referred to
his September 2005 filing as a “charge.” Id. at 40-41.
The district court ruled in favor of defendants. Although the district court
order discussed the initial EEOC documents, it nevertheless found that
Mr. Carson had not filed a timely charge. 3 Based on that finding, the district
court dismissed the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 4
II.
After the district court issued its order, the Supreme Court resolved two
issues directly relevant to this case: “what is a charge” in an
3
In his response, Mr. Carson asked the district court to treat the dismissal
motion as a summary judgment motion and to consider his proffered EEOC
documents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or
12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56,”and the parties must be given “a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion”.). The district court did not follow the
general rule that “a motion to dismiss should be converted to a summary judgment
motion if a party submits, and the district court considers, materials outside the
pleadings.” Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted). This procedural issue, however, is not specifically raised on
appeal.
4
The district court also dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). As we have previously stated, the filing of a charge is
jurisdictional, but the timeliness of that charge is not. See Beaird v. Seagate
Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]imely filing of a
discrimination charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit
in federal court;” instead, “it is best likened to a statute of limitations . . . subject
to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.”).
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employment-discrimination matter “[a]nd were [the plaintiff’s EEOC intake
documents] a charge?” Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. at 1153. On the first issue, the
Court gave deference to the EEOC’s statutory interpretation and determined that,
to be considered a charge, a plaintiff’s documents must provide “the information
required by the regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charged party,”
and also “it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take
remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute
between the employer and the employee.” Id. at 1157-58. The Court
acknowledged “that under this permissive standard a wide range of documents
might be classified as charges,” but found this result “consistent with the design
and purpose of the ADEA,” particularly because most charges were filed by
laypersons. Id. at 1158. The standard would also serve to “separate information
requests from enforcement requests.” Id. at 1157.
The Court resolved the second question in favor of the Holowecki plaintiff,
determining that his completed intake form and accompanying affidavit provided
all of the necessary information and, properly construed, amounted to “a request
for the agency to act.” Id. at 1159-60. It did not matter that the plaintiff
subsequently filed a formal, but untimely, charge. Id. at 1160.
In this case, Mr. Carson filled out forms similar to those discussed in
Holowecki. His EEOC submissions included his allegations of discrimination and
the name of his employer. Additionally, his stated “expectations” of “back pay,
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front pay, reinstatement of stock incentives,” demonstrate an intent to seek EEOC
assistance in enforcing his perceived rights. Aplt. App. at 52. Under the
Holowecki standard, Mr. Carson’s intake forms constitute a charge.
And we are unpersuaded by defendants’ argument that we should disregard
these forms because the complaint did not mention them. This court has noted
that “it might be appropriate for a court to consider additional facts or legal
theories asserted in a response brief to a motion to dismiss if they were consistent
with the facts and theories advanced in the complaint.” Hayes v. Whitman,
264 F.3d 1017, 1025 (10th Cir. 2001). Mr. Carson’s allegation that the charge
“was issued” on February 3, 2006, does not contradict or rule out the later
assertion that the EEOC received his intake forms on September 9, 2005. In light
of the significance that the Supreme Court has accorded these documents, it is
appropriate to consider them in our review of the district court’s ruling.
“Dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint, viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, lacks ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., 543 F.3d
1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974 (2007) (further quotation omitted)). Mr. Carson’s complaint, along with his
filing in response to defendants’ dismissal motion, set out plausible indications of
timely exhaustion of administrative remedies. We conclude that the district court
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erred in dismissing Mr. Carson’s action and therefore REVERSE and REMAND
for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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