FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 12, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MARIO WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-7037
(D.C. No. 6:06-CV-00460-JHP-SPS)
ERIC FRANKLIN, Warden; (E.D. Okla.)
MARTY SIRMONS; SGT. SUTER;
J. PARKER,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, EBEL and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Mario Williams, an inmate in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary
(“OSP”), appeals the district court’s dismissal of this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We agree with the district court as to two of
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Williams’s claims but conclude his Eighth-Amendment claim was properly
exhausted. Because that claim plainly lacks merit, however, we exercise our
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to AFFIRM.
I.
A.
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement dictates that “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “This
exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1281
(10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2008).
Proper exhaustion under the PLRA contemplates full compliance with all
agency deadlines, including, as relevant to this appeal, the deadlines enumerated
in a prison’s grievance procedures. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006)
(“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other
critical procedural rules”). Thus, we have held that “a claim that has been
properly rejected by the prison grievance system on procedural grounds [such as
untimeliness] should be dismissed from the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.”
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Kikumura, 461 F.3d at 1290. The PLRA does not, however, require complete
exhaustion. Therefore, if a prisoner brings an action asserting both exhausted and
unexhausted claims, the district court should dismiss the unexhausted claims and
proceed with the rest. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220-24 (2007).
B.
OSP’s Policy and Operations Manual sets forth a grievance system for
inmates who seek to challenge their conditions of confinement. Initially, an
inmate must attempt to resolve the issue informally by talking to an appropriate
staff member. Thereafter, he may initiate a complaint by completing and
submitting a short form entitled a Request to Staff (“RTS”). “The [RTS] must be
submitted within 7 calendar days of the incident” about which the inmate
complains. R. at 121. The rules require prison staff to respond to the RTS in
writing, informing the inmate of any action taken and applicable department
procedures. If the inmate is not satisfied with the response, he may then file a
formal grievance. This requires the submission of an Inmate/Offender Grievance
Report Form, along with the RTS, to the reviewing authority. The deadline to
submit a formal grievance is fifteen calendar days from the date of the incident or
the date of the response to the RTS, whichever is later. In addition, the RTS must
have been timely submitted.
In responding to the grievance, the reviewing authority first determines
whether the grievance was timely, and if not, whether to handle it as a
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“sensitive/emergency” grievance. Id. at 124. “The reviewing authority will
either grant or deny the grievance in whole or in part, and if granted will fashion
the appropriate remedy and due date.” Id. at 125. If the grievance is denied, an
inmate with proper grounds may appeal to the administrative review authority or
chief medical officer, whose decision is final. At this stage, the inmate will have
exhausted all internal administrative remedies for purposes of the PLRA.
II.
With this framework in mind, we review the dismissal of Mr. Williams’s
claims de novo. Kikumura, 461 F.3d at 1282.
A.
Count I concerns the loss of Mr. Williams’s fan. On March 16, 2006, he
was transferred from the Oklahoma State Reformatory to OSP. Upon his arrival,
he noticed his fan was not among his personal items. He submitted at least two
RTSs complaining that his fan had been lost or stolen. After receiving
unsatisfactory responses, he filed a formal grievance. The reviewing authority
denied relief in part because it found he had failed to submit a timely RTS. This
decision was affirmed by the administrative review authority. Mr. Williams then
filed this lawsuit, alleging a deprivation of his property without due process.
The deadline for Mr. Williams to file an RTS concerning the loss of his fan
was March 23, 2006, seven calendar days from his arrival at OSP. He did not file
the first RTS until April 4. Accordingly, the prison properly rejected this
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complaint on procedural grounds, and the district court was correct to dismiss
count I for failure to exhaust under the PLRA. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91;
Kikumura, 461 F.3d at 1290.
B.
In count II, Mr. Williams claims his Eighth-Amendment rights were
violated when he was assaulted by defendant Bradley Suter on July 28, 2006, and
subsequently denied adequate medical care. On July 31, he submitted an RTS
concerning the incident. Crysta Pink responded on behalf of the prison on August
3, stating that the incident had been documented. She noted that Mr. Williams
had been seen by medical staff, who reported no injuries, and also that he was
seen boxing and running in the exercise yard on August 2. Dissatisfied with this
response, Mr. Williams submitted a grievance-report form on August 14. The
reviewing authority denied the grievance on August 29 based on Ms. Pink’s
response. Mr. Williams filed a final appeal on September 6.
On September 8, the administrative review authority returned the appeal
unanswered, explaining in a boilerplate letter that the grievance was “out of time
from the date of response to request to staff until filing of grievance with
reviewing authority.” R. at 157. This was incorrect. The response to
Mr. Williams’s RTS is dated August 3. He filed his grievance on August 14, well
within the fifteen-day deadline set forth in OSP’s procedures. Accordingly, it is
clear Mr. Williams complied with the requisite administrative deadlines and his
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obligations under § 1997e(a). The district court therefore erred in dismissing his
Eighth-Amendment claim for failure to exhaust.
We nonetheless decline to reinstate this claim, as there is no record support
for Mr. Williams’s contention that he was seriously injured or in need of medical
care as a result of the alleged assault. See Dummar v. Lummis, 543 F.3d 614, 618
(10th Cir. 2008) (“We may affirm a district court decision on any grounds for
which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not
relied upon by the district court.”) (quotation omitted). The incident reports and
medical records submitted with the Martinez 1 report and defendants’ motion for
summary judgment confirm that Mr. Williams was touched by Officer Suter on
July 28. Whether he was tickled, as Officer Suter claims, or touched in some
other fashion is, we suppose, a subjective determination. The medical reports,
however, including nurse Mary Reasoner’s notes made right after the incident, are
not subject to interpretation. She described Mr. Williams’s injury as a “speck” on
his left arm the size of a “pin head,” R. at 187, which is consistent with
defendants’ description of the incident as a brief tickling episode. Mr. Williams
was later seen by Dr. R. Doyle Stewart, whose examination notes likewise reflect
no more than trivial complaints.
1
See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1978) (sanctioning
district-court practice of ordering prison officials to conduct an investigation into
prisoner’s claim and prepare special report before answering complaint).
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“[P]rison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if their deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Kikumura, 461 F.3d at 1291 (quotation omitted). The
threshold requirement for such a claim is the showing of a harm “‘sufficiently
serious’ to implicate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Id. “[T]he
purpose for this requirement is to limit claims to significant, as opposed to trivial,
suffering[.]” Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2005). Despite
Mr. Williams’s claims of serious injury, all of the evidence, including the notes
from the examining nurse and doctor, points to the conclusion that he suffered
minor injuries as a result of horseplay with defendant Suter. Officer Suter may
have deserved the administrative reprimand he received for his part, but under the
circumstances of this case, he may not be held liable under § 1983 and the Eighth
Amendment.
C.
Finally, in count III, Mr. Williams accuses defendants of violating his
First-Amendment rights by consistently denying him permission to attend Islamic
services. In August 2006, he was transferred from the A unit to C unit. He
immediately submitted an RTS requesting that the C unit begin offering the
Islamic congregational prayer, Jumu’ah, on Friday afternoons. The prison
responded to the RTS on August 22, stating that it was compiling a list of Muslim
inmates but that the service would be timed to accommodate prison-security
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concerns. In September, Mr. Williams filed two additional RTSs concerning who
should lead the weekly prayer under Islamic law. He received responses to those
RTSs on September 18. The parties dispute whether Mr. Williams was ever
actually allowed to attend Jumu’ah. By his own admission, however, he did not
file a grievance with respect to this issue until October 6, more than fifteen days
after receiving a response to his last RTS. The reviewing authority denied the
grievance as untimely under its grievance procedures and declined Mr. Williams’s
request to treat it as an emergency. Having reviewed the record, we agree that
Mr. Williams is procedurally defaulted from asserting this claim. It was therefore
properly dismissed under Woodford and Kikumura.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and all pending motions
are DENIED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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