United States v. Hahn

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

December 18, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 07-5117

VINSON L. HAHN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 4:06-CR-00167-001-CVE)

James Fatigante of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.

Charles M. McLoughlin, Assistant United States Attorney (David E. O’Meilia,
United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Before HARTZ, SEYMOUR and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
 Vinson L. Hahn pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 656, the misapplication

of financial institution funds, and was sentenced to eighteen months incarceration

and a five-year term of supervised release. He appeals, challenging the

calculation of loss, restitution order, consecutive sentence, and application of

special sex offender conditions. We affirm.

I.

Mr. Hahn began his employment with the Bank of Oklahoma (BOK) in

October 1999 as a Transfund ATM technician. In February 2002, following a

discovery of shortages in the automated teller machines (ATMs), BOK began an

investigation. ATMs are stocked with “straps” of cash, with each strap containing

100 bills of varying denominations. The machines were reporting straps

containing only seventy-nine or eighty bills. Investigators learned that the

problem appeared to result from someone taking bills out of the straps used to

refill the ATM and then putting a “short” strap into the machine.

Authorities subsequently initiated a formal investigation focusing on Mr.

Hahn after discovering a strap on his route with only forty-eight bills in it. They

found additional shortages after a change in his regular route. Then, on January

27, 2004, Mr. Hahn was detected by a surveillance camera installed by

investigators. The method Mr. Hahn used to take the money — removing part of

a strap of bills taken from the replenishment stash — was consistent with the

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previous thefts. He was found to have $640 on his person and he admitted to

having taken money on several prior occasions. He was terminated from his

employment at BOK.

Several months later, Mr. Hahn was arrested for an unrelated state offense,

two counts of lewd and indecent proposal to a child. He was found guilty on

April 6, 2006 and sentenced to consecutive seven and twelve year sentences.

The one-count information in the present case charged Mr. Hahn with the

misapplication of financial institution funds between November 22, 1999 and

January 27, 2004. He pled guilty and was sentenced to eighteen months

incarceration followed by a five-year term of supervised release, to run

consecutive to the nineteen-year state sentence. The court also ordered restitution

in the amount of $53,392.75. The court imposed the standard conditions of

supervised release as well as several additional ones including special sex

offender conditions.

II.

Mr. Hahn argues that the district court incorrectly calculated the amount of

loss, and that his sentence under the guidelines is therefore in error. The district

court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the loss to BOK was

$55,782.64, which increased Mr. Hahn’s offense level under the guidelines by 6

levels. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).

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 We review the district court’s calculation of loss for clear error. United

States v. Leach, 417 F.3d 1099, 1105 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005). “To reverse under this

standard requires that, based on the entire evidence, we have a ‘definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman

Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532

U.S. 234, 242 (2001)). The applicable guidelines’ commentary notes that the

sentencing court “need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss,” explaining

that “[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and

estimate the loss based upon that evidence.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. cmt. n.3(C).

Witnesses for the prosecution testified that Mr. Hahn told investigators he

deposited the cash he took from ATMs into his bank account. 1 According to

investigators, Mr. Hahn admitted to having a gambling problem, but said that he

kept his gambling winnings at home. Mr. Hahn did not identify any other sources

of income to explain the cash deposits. The government presented evidence

showing there were between two and seven cash deposits into Mr. Hahn’s account

each month, and that withdrawals from ATMs located in or near casinos occurred

more frequently and for larger amounts over time. The district court based its

calculation of loss on the evidence showing the amount of cash deposited into Mr.

Hahn’s checking account during his employment with BOK. The government

1
Mr. Hahn’s paychecks from his Transfund employment and the National
Guard were deposited directly into his bank account.

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concedes that it does not have direct evidence of the actual amount of loss to

BOK, which it believes to be much higher. 2

The government presented an exhibit comparing actual losses from the

ATMs to expected or “baseline” losses, with expected losses based on average

loss per ATM machine prior to Mr. Hahn’s employment with BOK. The total

above-baseline loss to the Tulsa region from 2000 to 2004 was $203,690. The

loss jumped from $18,664 in 1998 and $19,918 in 1999 to $41,039 in 2000,

$50,972 in 2001, $77,155 in 2002, and $104,954 in 2003. The most damaging

circumstantial evidence came from 2004, when Mr. Hahn only worked for twenty-

seven days in January before being dismissed. The loss for that one month was

$22,033, while the total loss for the remainder of the year was only $7,707. One

witness’s conclusion when asked about the figures was that “[the losses] started

ramping up at the time of the first cash deposit last November [1999] and came to

a screeching halt in the month of January of 2004.” Rec., vol. III at 79 (testimony

of Mr. Bourgeois). The government introduced several additional pieces of

evidence, including Mr. Hahn’s admissions to investigators regarding the amount

2
The court found the loss was $55,782.64 but noted that it “believe[d] that
the amount of that loss actually sustained as a result of thefts by this defendant
[was] much higher, but that the defendant has benefitted from the fact that
perhaps only a portion of his thefts were deposited into his checking accounts.”
Rec., vol. III at 96.

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of the thefts 3 and audits of losses on Mr. Hahn’s route. 4

Defendant argues that the government failed to present evidence sufficient

to support the court’s finding. He points to the lack of evidence linking the cash

deposits in his account to BOK’s losses and to the 2000 and 2001 audits that

failed to reveal problems with his route. Mr. Hahn also challenges the

government’s calculation of losses based on the entire Tulsa region, rather than

on Mr. Hahn’s routes specifically. 5

The district court relied on the “credibility of the witnesses called by the

government and [] the strength of the pattern evidenced in [the] Government’s

Exhibits.” Rec., vol. III at 95. The court noted the pattern and frequency of cash

deposits (which were often in round numbers), Mr. Hahn’s gambling habit and

“financially precarious position,” and his admission that he deposited the stolen

3
When he was first apprehended in January 2004, Mr. Hahn told
investigators that he had stolen from ATMs on two or three occasions during the
past year, taking a total amount of between six and eight thousand dollars. Mr.
Hahn later told investigators that the total could be between ten and twelve
thousand and that he was unsure of the exact amount, as “he would just take cash
out and put it in his pocket.” Rec., vol. III at 15. He said that he first began
taking money out “around 1999 or 2000.” Id.
4
Audits performed in 2000 and 2001 did not reveal a problem with Mr.
Hahn’s route. Audits in 2002 and 2003 did reveal shortages in his route, although
only in the amount of a few thousand dollars. Following Mr. Hahn’s
apprehension in early 2004, investigating officers performed a full audit on his
route and found five ATMs with shortages.
5
It is not clear from the record why the government did not provide data
specific to the route that Mr. Hahn serviced.

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cash into his checking account but kept his gambling winnings at home. Id. at 95-

96. Mr. Hahn is correct to note there is no evidence directly linking the deposits

made to his account to the losses recorded by the bank. There are, however,

possible explanations for this apparent discrepancy, such as difficulty in

detection 6 and the likelihood that Mr. Hahn did not immediately deposit all of the

money he took. Audits of Mr. Hahn’s routes revealed shortages, the losses to the

Tulsa region dropped off drastically following his termination, and Mr. Hahn

admitted he deposited cash from the ATM thefts into his account and was unable

to name any other source for the cash deposits. In short, under a clear error

standard, the record contains evidence sufficient to support the sentencing court’s

findings. We therefore affirm the district court’s calculation of loss.

III.

We review the factual findings underlying the district court’s restitution

order for clear error and the amount of restitution for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 676 (10th Cir. 2002). As discussed above, the

record contains sufficient evidence to support a finding that the BOK sustained a

6
Witnesses for the prosecution explained that detection was made difficult
by the lack of surveillance cameras in the ATMs and that fact that ATMs are
stocked with a nine-day supply, which means that irregularities are not noticed
until a week or more after the ATM was stocked. Piece count audits–where each
bill is counted–are done only once at year. They also noted that all teams have
access to all of the ATMs in the area, further complicating detection.

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loss of $55,782.64. Accordingly, the evidence is also sufficient to support the

restitution order based on that finding of loss. 7

IV.

Mr. Hahn contends the district court erred in sentencing him consecutively

to his state sentence. We review the district court’s decision for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002).

Section 5G1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines governs the imposition of a

sentence where the defendant has an undischarged term of imprisonment.

Subsection § 5G1.3(a) does not apply because the instant offense was not

committed while the defendant was serving a time of imprisonment. Likewise, §

5G1.3(b) does not apply because the undischarged state sentence was not relevant

conduct to the instant offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a)-(b). We therefore look to

§ 5G1.3(c)’s Policy Statement, which applies to all cases involving an

undischarged term of imprisonment not falling within subsections (a) or (b). See

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). The Policy Statement grants the sentencing court discretion

to determine whether the sentence should be concurrent, partially concurrent, or

consecutive in order to “achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.”

Id. The Application Note instructs the sentencing court to consider, inter alia, the

7
The court subtracted $2,389.89, the amount of restitution Mr. Hahn had
already paid BOK, to arrive at the total restitution ordered, $53,392.75.

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factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. n.3(A).

The district court provided a statement of reasons, as required under our

case law. Hurlich, 293 F.3d at 1230. 8 The court was not required to make

specific findings, as Mr. Hahn argues. Id. at 1230. The sentencing court did not

abuse its discretion in giving Mr. Hahn a consecutive sentence.

V.

Mr. Hahn challenges the imposition of special sex offender conditions,

arguing that the conditions do not meet 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)’s requirements for

conditions of supervised release. We review the district court’s decision to

impose special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Bartsma, 198 F.3d 1191, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999).

The district court gave Mr. Hahn prior notice of its intent to impose sex

offender conditions as required under our prior holdings. See Bartmsa, 198 F.3d

at 1200 (holding as matter of first impression that district court must give

“reasonable presentence notice” before ordering sex offender registration as a

special condition), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Atencio, 476

F.3d 1099, 1105 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007). Mr. Hahn filed a notice of objection to

8
“The Court has considered the need for this sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, provide for just
punishment, avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants, and to afford
adequate deterrence to protect the public. Based on those factors, the sentence
imposed in this case shall run consecutively to the undischarged terms of
imprisonment imposed in the state court case.” Rec., vol. IV at 20.

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those conditions. At the final sentencing hearing, after hearing argument from

both sides, the court imposed the special sex offender conditions. 9

The district court is required to give reasons on the record for the

imposition of special conditions of supervised release. See United States v.

Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2003). The court need only provide a

“generalized statement of its reasoning.” United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044,

1049 (10th Cir. 1996). Here, the sentencing court provided an explanation of its

decision at the final sentencing hearing:

9
The special sex offender conditions, pursuant to General Order 99-17
(Northern District of Oklahoma, July 13, 1999), mandate that the defendant (1)
register as a sex offender in accordance with state law; (2) participate in sex
offender and/or mental health treatment as directed by probation officer,
including submission to risk assessment and psychological testing; (3) not have
contact with children under the age of eighteen without prior written permission
of probation officer and immediately report any unauthorized conduct; (4) not
engage in any occupation, business, or profession with access to children under
the age of eighteen without prior written approval of probation officer; (5) not
loiter within 100 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, arcades, or other places
frequented by children under the age of eighteen; (6) not possess sexually
stimulating or sexually oriented material as deemed inappropriate by probation
officer and/or treatment staff, or patronize any place where such material or
entertainment is available; (7) maintain an appropriate appearance at all times; (8)
not enter the premises or loiter near where the victim resides, is employed, or
frequents except under circumstances approved in advance and in writing by
probation officer; (9) at the discretion of probation officer, post a sign, mounted
on any entrance to the residence, stating “(defendant’s name), who resides in this
residence, will have no contact with person(s) under the age of 18”; (10) at the
discretion of probation officer, reside in and successfully participate in a
Community Corrections Center for up to one year or until discharged by
probation officer; (11) not subscribe to or use any Internet service without first
receiving written permission from probation officer; (12) not consume or possess
alcohol or any other intoxicating beverage.

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 [T]he Court finds that the history and characteristics of this
defendant, the fact that the [sex] crimes occurred immediately . . .
after cessation of the activity in this case, and the fact that the United
States probation officer is supervising the defendant and not the
particular crime of which he is convicted, the Court finds that the
imposition of the sex offender conditions . . . is appropriate and
reasonable.

Rec., vol. IV at 24. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Hahn’s claim that the sentencing

court erred by not providing specific factual findings.

We have not dealt squarely with the imposition of sex offender special

conditions where the underlying offense was not a sex crime. 10 We have dealt,

however, with the case of nonmandatory special conditions imposed for conduct

unrelated to the underlying offense. See United States v. Barajas, 331 F.3d 1141,

1143 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant convicted for firearms offense challenged

special conditions requiring counseling and child support payments); Edgin, 92

F.3d at 1046-47 (defendant convicted of making threatening telephone call

challenged special condition prohibiting communication with son). The general

rule from these decisions applies to sex offender special conditions: while the

sentencing court has broad discretion in setting the conditions of supervised

release, those conditions must satisfy the three statutory requirements laid out in

10
We addressed a challenge to sex offender registration requirements in
Bartsma, 198 F.3d at 1200. In that case, however, we remanded on the basis of
lack of notice and so did not reach the issue of whether the court abused its
discretion by imposing the registration requirement on a defendant convicted of a
firearm offense.

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18 U.S.C § 3583(d). Edgin, 92 F.3d at 1048.

Section 3583(d) provides in pertinent part:

The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to
the extent that such condition--(1) is reasonably related to the factors
set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); (2)
involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and (3) is consistent with any pertinent
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 994(a); any condition . . . it considers to be appropriate
....

Read together with the cross-references to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), then, the

condition must (1) “be reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” and (2) “involve no

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary given the needs to

afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further

crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most

effective manner.” Edgin, 92 F.3d at 1048 (internal citations, quotation marks

omitted). 11 While the condition must satisfy both § 3583(d)(1) (requiring

reasonable relationship to the § 3553 factors) and § 3583(d)(2) (involve no

greater deprivation of liberty than necessary), id. at 1049 n.5, it does not need to

be reasonably related to all of the factors in § 3553. See Barajas, 331 F.3d at

11
Section 5D1.3(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines mirrors 18 U.S.C. §
3583(d). See id.; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b).

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1146 (“[E]very circuit to have decided the issue has held that a condition of

supervised release may be imposed despite not being related to every enumerated

factor, so long as it is reasonably related to one or more of the factors. . . . We

agree with these decisions.”).

Other circuits addressing this issue have followed the rule that special

conditions may be imposed notwithstanding the conduct at which they are

targeted is unrelated to the offense of conviction. See, e.g., United States v.

McKissic, 428 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding ban on alcohol use where

defendant had not been diagnosed as alcoholic and offense was unrelated to

alcohol use); United States v. Camp, 410 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding

child support payments and employment requirement where underlying offense

was felon in possession of a firearm). More to the point here, courts have

rejected the argument that sex offender conditions are limited to cases where the

underlying offense is a sex offense. United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 20 (1st

Cir. 2004) (“[N]othing in [18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)] limits the special condition of

sex-offender treatment to defendants under prosecution for sex crimes.”); see also

United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming sex offender

mental health assessment and treatment where offense of conviction was making

false statements to the FBI); United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2006)

(affirming imposition of sex offender special conditions where defendant’s

underlying crime was felon in possession of a firearm). Indeed, the First Circuit

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upheld special conditions mandating sex offender treatment and prohibiting the

defendant from engaging in an occupation involving supervision of minors even

though the defendant, who was convicted of credit card fraud, had not been

convicted or accused of sexual misconduct, and “the record contain[ed] no direct

evidence that [he] ha[d] engaged in inappropriate conduct with minors.” United

States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2005). The evidence there

supporting the condition was the defendant’s journal, which indicated that he

“may have had, or, at minimum, desired to have, sexual relationships with

adolescent males,” and a mental health evaluation suggesting that he had “a

potential problem with adolescent males.” Id. at 64.

While the sex offender conditions imposed on Mr. Hahn do not relate to the

nature and circumstances of his offense, they do relate to his history and

characteristics, given his recent conviction for a sex offense involving minor

children. The conditions are also reasonably related to the need “to protect the

public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).

Mr. Hahn’s argument focuses on the fact that the sex offender conditions

will not take effect until eighteen years after the state offense, upon his release

from prison. 12 We find this argument unpersuasive. Because conditions of

12
Under state law, Mr. Hahn is required to serve at least eighty-five percent
of his consecutive twelve and seven year state sentences. See O KLA . S TAT . tit. 21,
§ 13.1.

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supervised release always follow an individual’s release from prison, those who

serve lengthy terms of incarceration are necessarily subject to conditions of

release that were first imposed many years before. 13 Accepting Mr. Hahn’s

argument would require invalidating such provisions. The “temporal proximity”

cases upon which Mr. Hahn relies all involve situations where the conduct that

formed the basis for the special condition occurred many years prior to the

sentencing, which is a different matter altogether than the length of time between

sentencing and the defendant’s anticipated release from prison. See United States

v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 2001) (vacating sex offender conditions where sex

offense was fifteen years old and instant offense involved unrelated conduct);

United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) (vacating special condition

requiring mental health counseling where abuse occurred thirteen years before

hearing and instant offense involved unrelated conduct); see also United States v.

Carter, 463 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (vacating special condition requiring

participation in sex offender treatment program where sex offense was seventeen

years old and recent stalking conviction not clearly sexual in nature). Temporal

proximity is not a problem in Mr. Hahn’s case: the underlying conduct that led to

the imposition of special sex offender conditions occurred just five weeks after he

13
Moreover, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the district court may modify the
conditions of supervised release “at any time prior to the expiration or termination
of the term of supervised release.” Nothing in this opinion precludes Mr. Hahn
from renewing his objection to the sex offender conditions at a later time.

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was terminated from BOK and three years before his federal sentencing. 14

Mr. Hahn points out that despite his being free on bond between his arrest

in 2004 and his conviction in state court in 2006, the government did not present

evidence of any sexually inappropriate behavior since 2004. He argues, “[o]nly if

it was shown that there was a problem at the time of sentencing could the

Conditions imposed by appropriate.” Aplt. Br. at 27 (emphasis in original).

While this statement is truer to the law than his more sweeping temporal

proximity argument, it nonetheless misses the mark. The very language of the

statute instructs the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s “history and

characteristics.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). It is not uncommon for sentencing to

occur several years after the problematic conduct apparently ceased, and courts

have not previously considered this a problem in the imposition of special

conditions. See York, 357 F.3d at 17-18, 21 (upholding sex offender conditions

based on prior convictions for indecent assault on minors, nine years and three

years before sentencing, respectively); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 84

(2d Cir. 2001) (holding four-year-old state conviction for sexual abuse provided

sufficient basis for mandatory sex offender therapy; vacating and remanding for

excessive delegation of discretion to probation officer). Here, where Mr. Hahn

14
Mr. Hahn was apprehended stealing from an ATM on January 27, 2004.
The charges in the state case result from conduct occurring between March 1 and
March 31, 2004.

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committed the state sex offense just weeks after his termination from BOK as a

result of the ATM thefts, the state offense is relevant to his history and

characteristics for the purpose of imposing special conditions.

Mr. Hahn also argues that the sex offender conditions are an improper

infringement on his liberty. Section 3583(d)’s second prong requires that the

condition “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary

for the purposes” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).

While Mr. Hahn names conditions three, four, five, six, seven, and eleven as

affecting his liberty, see note 9 supra, he does not specify why those conditions

are particularly problematic. Nor did Mr. Hahn direct his argument in his notice

of objection or at the sentencing hearing to specific conditions, other than to note

that the first condition (requiring sex offender registration) could be valid if

required under state law. Had Mr. Hahn objected to specific conditions, the

district court would have had the opportunity to address each condition

specifically and to tailor it as necessary.

As additional support for his claim that the sentencing court abused its

discretion, Mr. Hahn points to the failure of the state court to add sex offender

conditions and the fact that the PSR did not recommend them. Neither fact

affects our disposition here. Mr. Hahn will be in federal, not state, custody

during the period of supervised release, and it is the sentencing judge’s

responsibility to sentence the individual, not the offense. Likewise, we have

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previously upheld conditions that were not recommended by the PSR. See

Barajas, 331 F.3d at 1143; Bartsma, 198 F.3d at 1199.

We conclude that Mr. Hahn’s special sex offender conditions satisfy the

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). They are related to his history and

characteristics and the need to protect the public, and there is no evidence in the

record that they impose a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary to deter him from further criminal conduct or to protect the public.

AFFIRMED.

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