UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 98-40352
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JAMES TERRELL DURHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(1:97-CR-74-1)
March 1, 1999
Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
James Terrell Durham appeals his jury conviction for
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and conspiracy
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine.
He argues that the district court violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause by admitting hearsay statements of a
confidential informant and abused its discretion by denying his
motion to compel the Government to disclose the confidential
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
informant’s identity and by admitting evidence of Durham’s prior
felony drug conviction.
The district court did not violate the Confrontation Clause by
admitting testimony regarding the confidential informant’s
statements. The evidence that was offered to show only why law
enforcement officials took certain actions was not hearsay. See
United States v. Evans, 950 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1991).
Although the informant’s description of Durham was hearsay, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that
evidence because Durham opened the door to the question on cross-
examination and, if admitted erroneously, the evidence did not have
a substantial impact on the verdict. See id.; United States v.
Walker, 613 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1980).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Durham’s request for the disclosure of the informant’s identity.
The informant’s testimony would not have helped Durham’s defense
significantly, and Durham does not dispute the Government’s
interest in nondisclosure. See United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d
1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence of Durham’s prior state felony conviction for delivery of
cocaine. The district court determined that the evidence was
material to an issue other than Durham’s character and that its
probative value outweighed its potential prejudice. See United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
2