FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 9, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-6281
JASON A. DEJEAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 5:07-CR-00032-R-1)
Paul Antonio Lacy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for the Defendant-Appellant.
Edward J. Kumiega, Assistant United States Attorney (John C. Richter, United
States Attorney with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, and BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Chief Judge.
On January 8, 2007, Oklahoma City police officers discovered a handgun
and marijuana in a car in which the defendant Jason DeJear was sitting. The
government subsequently charged Mr. DeJear with firearm and drug offenses, and
a jury convicted him of (1) possession of marijuana (a violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1)); and (2) possession of a firearm after a felony conviction (a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 24
months (on the possession of marijuana count) and 120 months (on the possession
of a firearm count), followed by a three-year term of supervised release.
In this appeal, Mr. DeJear argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the evidence that the officers discovered in the car because
they (1) lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him; (2) failed to administer
Miranda warnings before questioning him; and (3) failed to obtain a warrant
before searching the car. We are not persuaded by these arguments and therefore
affirm Mr. DeJear’s convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are not disputed. On January 8, 2007, Oklahoma City
Police Officers Morrison, Stephens, and Doyle were on patrol in the Springlake
district of Northeast Oklahoma City in three separate cars. At about 4:55 p.m., the
officers drove by 2305 N.E. 22nd Street. According to the officers, that house was
at an intersection that had a history of criminal activity.
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As they approached the house, the officers saw three people sitting in a
Chevrolet Caprice in the driveway. They parked their patrol cars, and Officer
Morrison walked toward the Caprice. He noticed a man in the backseat on the
passenger side holding a baseball bat in his hands. Mr. DeJear was sitting
sideways in the front passenger seat, with the door open and his feet outside the
door.
According to Officer Morrison, Mr. DeJear then looked at him “in a very
nervous state.” Rec. vol. II, at 28 (Tr. of April 26, 2007 Hr’g). In Officer
Morrison’s words, “[Mr. DeJear’s] eyes widen. He takes his hands–in the back
part of the front seat towards the bottom, he starts stuffing both hands down there
in a very erratic and nervous state. He keeps looking up at me.” Id.
Officer Morrison asked Mr. DeJear to show his hands. When Mr. DeJear
did not comply, Officer Morrison drew his weapon and yelled the command for
Mr. DeJear to show his hands. When Mr. DeJear again did not comply, Officer
Morrison yelled the command again. At that point, Mr. DeJear complied–showing
the officer his hands. Officer Morrison asked what Mr. DeJear had been stuffing,
and Mr. DeJear replied, “Some weed.” Id. at 31.
The officers arrested Mr. DeJear, placed him in handcuffs, and searched his
car. They found four bags of marijuana and a gun.
In February 2007, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment
against Mr. DeJear, charging him with (1) possession of marijuana with intent to
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distribute it; (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime;
and (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, Mr. DeJear filed a
motion to suppress.
In support of his motion, Mr. DeJear argued that Officer Morrison lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain him (by pointing his gun at him and telling him to
show his hands). Secondly, he argued that Officer Morrison violated his Fifth
Amendment rights by asking him the question about what he was stuffing without
first giving Mr. DeJear proper Miranda warnings. Finally, Mr. DeJear contended
that the officers’ search of the car (which revealed the marijuana and the gun)
violated the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted without a warrant.
The district court rejected all three arguments. As to the initial detention,
the district court said:
Before he could initiate the voluntary contact, the encounter escalated
into a Terry stop. Officer Morrison noticed [Mr. DeJear’s] unusual
actions, the stuffing of an item or items into the space between the seat
back and the seat bottom, and his nervousness. [Mr. DeJear’s actions]
coupled with his refusal to show his hands, considered in conjunction
with Officer Morrison’s knowledge regarding the high incidence of
crime, including the dealing of narcotics, in this area, were sufficient to
give Officer Morrison reasonable suspicion that [Mr. DeJear] was
engaged in criminal activity.
Rec. vol. I, doc. 20, at 3-4 (Order filed April 30, 2007).
Second, as to Officer Morrison’s question about “stuffing,” the district court
applied the exception to Miranda set forth in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984). The district court stated that, in Quarles, “the Supreme Court crafted a
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‘narrow exception’ so that in certain situations a police officer may question a
suspect in custody before giving a Miranda warning without running afoul of the
constitution.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 20, at 4-5. In order to fall within the exception,
the question must arise out of “an objectively reasonable need to protect the police
or the public from any immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.” Id. at 5
(quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8). “The exception allows officers to ‘follow
their legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the
public safety.” Id. (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659). In the Supreme Court’s
view, “‘[w]e think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively
between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public
and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.’” Id.
(quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658-59).
Applying Quarles to the facts here, the district court found:
The question asked by Officer Morrison addressed a real and substantial
risk to the safety of the officers. Indeed, although [Mr. DeJear] did not
admit to stuffing a gun, there was a handgun in the car, available to the
other occupants to be used against the officers.
Id. at 5.
Finally, the court ruled that because there was probable cause to arrest Mr.
DeJear (once he admitted that he was stuffing “some weed” into the seat), there
was probable cause to search the car and no warrant was needed. The court relied
on the Supreme Court’s holding in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623
(2004) that “‘[o]nce an officer determines that there is probable cause to make an
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arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve
evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment.’” Rec. vol. I, doc. 20, at
6 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623).
After the district court denied the motion to suppress, the case proceeded to
trial. A jury acquitted Mr. DeJear of the first two counts of the indictment
(possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute and possession of a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime). It convicted him of the lesser-included
offense of possession of marijuana and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The district court sentenced Mr. DeJear to a term of 24 months’
imprisonment on the possession of marijuana count and to a concurrent term of
120 months’ imprisonment on the felon-in-possession count. The court also
imposed concurrent terms of one and three years’ supervised release.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. DeJear now argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. In reviewing the district court’s decision, we examine its factual
findings for clear error and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. See United States v. Patterson, 472 F.3d 767, 775 (10th Cir. 2006).
We review de novo the reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1234 (10th Cir. 2007). The
credibility of witnesses, the weight accorded to evidence, and the reasonable
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inferences drawn therefrom fall within the province of the district court. United
States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004).
A. Reasonable Suspicion for the Initial Detention
Mr. DeJear first argues that Officer Morrison lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain him. He observes that the officer had not received any information
indicating that illegal activity was occurring. Moreover, as they first approached
the scene, none of the officers saw anything suspicious. “In sum, officers saw
three people in a car lawfully parked in a private residence in a high crime area.”
Aplt’s Br. at 18.
Mr. DeJear acknowledges that Officer Morrison saw him make stuffing
movements toward the seat. But, he contends, these furtive movements were also
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. He cites a Tenth Circuit decision,
United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 1969), which contains
the statement that “the allegedly furtive movements alone establish nothing.” Mr.
DeJear also invokes a district court case, United States v. Smith, 614 F. Supp. 25,
28 (D. D.C. 1984), in which an officer saw a driver make furtive movements as
though trying to hide something under the seat. Mr. DeJear observes that the
furtive movements were viewed by the D.C. district court as part of the totality of
the circumstances that supported reasonable suspicion but that the furtive
movements were not sufficient, standing alone, to establish such suspicion.
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Mr. DeJear’s arguments are not persuasive. Under the Fourth Amendment,
an investigative detention such as the one that occurred here is reasonable if it is
(1) “justified at its inception” and (2) “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United States v.
Johnson, 364 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). A detention is justified at its inception if “the specific and
articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a
reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.” United States v.
Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)). “[I]nchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches” are not
sufficient. United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1237 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the level of suspicion required for
reasonable suspicion is ‘considerably less’ than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence or that required for probable cause.” United States v. Lopez, 518 F.3d
790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989)).
Here, as the district court reasoned, the totality of the circumstances
provided the officers with a reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. DeJear. In
particular, before the detention began (by Officer Morrison telling Mr. DeJear to
show his hands), the officer observed that Mr. DeJear appeared nervous and that he
had begun stuffing both hands down into the car seat as though he was trying to
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conceal something. In addition, the house was in an area known for criminal
activity, and, on previous occasions, Officer Morrison had seen people standing
outside of it wearing colors affiliated with local gangs. Rec. vol. II, at 21
Moreover, Officer Morrison saw the backseat passenger was holding an object that
could be used as a weapon–a baseball bat. Furtive movements, nervousness, and
the fact that conduct occurs in an area known for criminal activity are all
appropriate factors to consider in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.
See United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that
“furtive gestures in response to the presence of the police can serve as the basis of
an officer’s reasonable suspicion”) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 2095 (2008); United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir.
2005) (“[The defendant’s] presence in a high-crime area is not, standing alone,
enough to provide reasonable suspicion, but it may be a relevant contextual
consideration in a Terry analysis.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson,
364 F.3d at 1192 (“[N]ervousness, even if it may be a normal reaction, is still
among the pertinent factors a reasonable law enforcement officer would analyze in
investigating possible crimes and should not be completely disregarded.”); United
States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that “furtive
movement provided a legal basis for the protective search”).
Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Officer Morrison had
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. DeJear.
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B. Questioning Without Miranda Warnings
Next, Mr. DeJear argues that Officer Morrison violated his Fifth Amendment
rights by asking him what he was stuffing in the car without first giving him the
proper Miranda warnings. Again, we are not persuaded by his arguments.
As we have noted, the district court rejected this argument by applying
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Under Quarles, an officer may
question a suspect in custody without first giving the Miranda warnings if the
questions arise out of “an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the
public from any immediate danger associated with a weapon.” Id. at 659 n.8.
This circuit has applied the Quarles public safety exception to allow an
officer to ask a suspect, “Do you have any guns or sharp objects on you,” without
first giving the Miranda warnings. United States v. Lackey, 334 F.3d 1224, 1225
(10th Cir. 2003). We reasoned that the question “addressed a real and substantial
risk to the safety of the officers and Defendant: If Defendant was carrying such an
item, he could use it against the officers or, perhaps more likely, someone could be
seriously injured when Defendant, who was already under arrest, was routinely
searched or frisked.” Id. at 1227 (emphasis deleted); cf. United States v. Holt, 264
F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that, during a routine traffic
stop, an officer may ask whether loaded weapons are present “[g]iven the dangers
inherent in all traffic stops”). However, we have not yet adopted a generally
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applicable standard for determining whether a sufficient threat to officer safety
exists under Quarles.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has announced such a standard. Under
Quarles’s public safety exception, “[f]or an officer to have a reasonable belief that
he is in danger, at minimum, he must have a reason to believe (1) that the
defendant might have (or recently have had) a weapon, and (2) that someone other
than police might gain access to that weapon and inflict harm with it.” United
States v. Williams, 483 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2007). We agree with the Sixth
Circuit’s formulation and apply it here.
Mr. DeJear contends that the Quarles exception is not applicable because “all
the occupants of the vehicle had their hands raised with firearms pointed at them.”
Aplt’s Br. at 23. In our view, that argument unfairly minimizes the potential
dangers confronted by the police officers here. When Officer Morrison asked Mr.
DeJear what he was stuffing into the seat, Mr. DeJear had twice refused to show his
hands, as Officer Morrison had requested. The combination of Mr. DeJear’s
attempts to stuff something into the seat and his initial refusal to comply with the
officer’s request to show his hands established objectively reasonable grounds for
the officers to believe that Mr. DeJear (1) “might have (or recently have had) a
weapon” and that “someone other than police might gain access to that weapon and
inflict harm with it.” Williams, 483 F.3d at 428. Thus, under Quarles, Officer
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Morrison could ask Mr. DeJear about what he was stuffing without first
administering the proper Miranda warnings.
C. Warrantless Search of the Car
Finally, Mr. DeJear argues that even after he stated that there was “some
weed” in the car, the police could still not search the car without first obtaining a
warrant. He maintains that “the warrant requirement applies to vehicles in private
driveways.” Aplt’s Br. at 25.
Mr. DeJear’s argument is not persuasive. Since Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925), the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement when there is probable cause that a car contains
contraband. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). The exception is based upon (a) mobility (which
makes the delay imposed by the warrant requirement too great an obstacle to
effective law enforcement) and (b) reduced expectations of privacy. Carney, 471
U.S. at 390-93; United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2002).
The police may also search an automobile’s passenger compartment without first
obtaining a warrant if there is probable cause to arrest one of its occupants. See
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623 (stating that “[o]nce an officer determines that there is
probable cause to make an arrest [of an occupant of an automobile], it is reasonable
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to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the
entire passenger compartment”).
We acknowledge that some courts have concluded that “the automobile
exception [to the warrant requirement] may not apply when it is parked at the
residence of the criminal defendant challenging the constitutionality of the search.”
United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524-25 (5th Cir. 2006). However, Mr.
DeJear does not contend that the car was parked outside his residence. As a result,
the principle set forth in Thornton establishes that the search of the car comported
with the Fourth Amendment. In particular, once Mr. DeJear told Officer Morrison
that he was stuffing “some weed” into the seat, there was probable cause to arrest
Mr. DeJear. Thus, the police could search the passenger compartment without first
obtaining a warrant.
III. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM Mr. DeJear’s convictions.
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