FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 18, 2009
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-2011
(D.C. No. 1:09-CR-00041-JCH-1)
ERIC BEGAY, (D. N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Eric Begay appeals the district court’s order of detention
pending trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3145(c), and we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
On December 11, 2008, Mr. Begay was arrested based on a complaint filed
in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The complaint
accused Mr. Begay of assaulting Jane Doe (his nine-month-old daughter) with the
intent to do bodily harm resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6). The government filed a motion to detain
Mr. Begay under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), arguing that he was a
flight risk and a danger to the community.
On December 12, a magistrate judge held a detention hearing. The
magistrate judge found that Mr. Begay was a danger to the community but that
there were conditions of release that could ensure the safety of the community.
The magistrate judge ordered that Mr. Begay be placed in supervised release at
the La Posada Halfway House. On December 19, the government appealed the
magistrate judge’s detention decision to the district court.
On January 8, 2009, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment against
Mr. Begay. The indictment charged that Mr. Begay: (1) “with intent to maim and
disfigure, did put out and destroy the eye of Jane Doe”; (2) “knowingly,
intentionally, and without justification, tortured, cruelly confined, and cruelly
punished Jane Doe by putting out the eye of Jane Doe, such action resulting in
great bodily harm”; (3) “did assault Jane Doe by fracturing her skull, such assault
resulting in serious bodily injury”; and (4) “did assault Jane Doe by fracturing her
-2-
arm, legs, and ribs, such assault resulting in serious bodily injury,” in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 113(a)(6), 114 and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1-(D). Aplt. App.
at 45-46.
On January 14, the district court conducted a hearing on the government’s
appeal of the magistrate judge’s detention order. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court entered an order of detention pending trial. Mr. Begay
now appeals from that decision.
II.
Under the Bail Reform Act, a defendant must be released pending trial
unless a judicial officer finds “that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In making this
determination, the court must consider the following factors: “(1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged”; “(2) the weight of the evidence against the
person”; “(3) the history and characteristics of the person”; and “(4) the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be
posed by the person’s release.” Id. § 3142(g). We review de novo mixed
questions of law and fact concerning the detention decision. United States v.
Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2003). We review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error. Id.
-3-
III.
Mr. Begay argues that the district court’s detention order is not supported
by the evidence. We disagree. The district court’s written detention order states:
I find that the credible testimony and information submitted at the
hearing establishes by (clear and convincing evidence) that the
Defendant will endanger the safety of the community based upon the
following: the charge of Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury
is a crime of violence based upon the evidence that Defendant
fractured 9 month old Jane Doe’s skull, arms, legs and ribs and
ruptured her eyeball; the weight of the evidence is extremely strong
based upon the testimony of the FBI agent and statements made by
the Defendant admitting he caused the injuries and that the injuries
were caused over time; the Defendant’s past history includes one
juvenile conviction and two adult convictions and Defendant was on
supervised probation at the time of [the] conduct alleged here; and
evidence was presented that the Defendant has abused his
wife/girlfriend; based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that
there are no conditions of release that will reasonably assure the
safety of the community.
Aplt. App. at 106. The district court properly considered the evidence and the
§ 3142(g) factors in reaching its conclusion that Mr. Begay was a danger to the
community and that no condition or combination of conditions could reasonably
assure the safety of the community.
The first factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
weighs in favor of detention. In evaluating this factor, the court should consider
“whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . or involves a minor victim.”
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). The offenses charged in the indictment involve crimes of
violence and a minor victim, Mr. Begay’s infant daughter.
-4-
The second factor, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, also
favors detention. Mr. Begay admitted to law enforcement agents that at various
times when he was frustrated while caring for his daughter he would twist his
daughter’s limbs and that on one occasion he heard a “pop.” Aplt. App. at 58.
He further admitted to pressing his thumb on her eye and hearing a sound that he
described as the “squishing [of] a grape.” Id. at 59. Moreover, the doctor who
treated Mr. Begay’s daughter corroborated that the injuries sustained by the infant
were consistent with child abuse and that they had occurred over a period of
several months.
The third factor, the history and characteristics of the defendant, weighs in
favor of detention. By the age of 21, Mr. Begay had one prior juvenile conviction
and two adult convictions. At the time of the offenses charged in the indictment,
Mr. Begay was on probation related to a 2006 conviction in the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona. Mr. Begay also had a probation
violation in 2004 while on probation following his 2003 juvenile conviction.
Finally, for the fourth factor, the nature and seriousness of the danger to
any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release, there
was evidence presented that, in addition to physically abusing his daughter,
Mr. Begay also physically abused his girlfriend. Mr. Begay argues that this factor
does not support pre-trial detention because there is no evidence that he has acted
violently outside of this domestic situation and that during his stay at the halfway
-5-
house he abided by the orders prohibiting contact with his ex-girlfriend and his
daughter. We are not persuaded by this argument. As the district court
explained, “if he reacted to stressors in a manner that resulted in injury to his
daughter and some injury, perhaps a black eye to his . . . girlfriend, then I’m not
satisfied that given stressors, that other members of the public would be safe.”
Id. at 101-02.
Considering all of the evidence and the § 3142(g) factors, Mr. Begay has
not shown that the district court erred in concluding that he needed to be detained
pending trial. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
-6-