FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 23, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 08-6242
v. (D.C. Nos. 91-CR-00052-R-1 and
97-CV-00657-R)
CHARLES EDWARD MCINTYRE, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Charles Edward McIntyre, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, seeks to
appeal the district court’s order denying his motions for a writ of audita querela
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. In 1991, Mr. McIntyre was convicted
of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); causing interstate travel to facilitate
unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3); and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2.
1 R. at 23. On direct appeal, we affirmed Mr. McIntyre’s conviction. United
States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1993). Mr. McIntyre then filed his
first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which we dismissed after denying Mr. McIntyre’s
application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”). United States v. McIntyre,
172 F.3d 63 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished). Mr. McIntyre subsequently filed a
motion for a writ of audita querela under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,
arguing that his sentence is unconstitutional and citing to Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 1
R. at 28-39. The district court concluded that Mr. McIntyre’s exclusive remedy
was a § 2255 motion, and construed his motion as such. 1 Id. at 40-42. The
district court also dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction because Mr.
McIntyre did not present any meritorious claims given that Booker does not apply
retroactively and Apprendi does not extend to second or successive habeas
motions. Id.
Mr. McIntyre now challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a
writ of audita querela. However, we agree with the district court that § 2255
provides the exclusive means for Mr. McIntyre to test his conviction in the
sentencing court. We have previously stated that “a writ of audita querela is not
available to a petitioner when other remedies exist, such as a motion to vacate
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,” United States v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1245
(10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that a petitioner cannot
1
We have instructed district courts not to re-characterize a prisoner’s
petition for post-conviction relief as a § 2255 motion without providing notice to
the petitioner. United States v. Kelly, 235 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2000).
However, that instruction is not applicable when the petitioner has previously
filed a § 2255 motion, as is the case here. United States v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241,
1245-46 (10th Cir. 2002).
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“avoid the bar against successive § 2255 petitions by simply styling a petition
under a different name,” id. at 1246. See also Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177,
1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that “the mere fact [a petitioner] is precluded from
filing a second § 2255 petition does not establish that the remedy in § 2255 is
inadequate” and therefore unavailable as a remedy). Accordingly, the district
court had the discretion to dismiss the second § 2255 motion for lack of
jurisdiction, given its determination that it was not in the interest of justice to
transfer the matter to this court. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir.
2008) (stating that, when a district court is presented with an unauthorized second
or successive § 2255 claim, it “may transfer the matter to this court if it
determines it is in the interest of justice to do so under [28 U.S.C.] § 1631, or it
may dismiss the motion . . . for lack of jurisdiction”).
Given the district court’s characterization of his petition, Mr. McIntyre is
required to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to proceed on appeal.
United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008). That means he
must demonstrate that jurists of reason would find the district court’s procedural
ruling reasonably debatable. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). After
considering his submissions, we conclude that he has not made that showing
because the district court was surely correct in holding that Mr. McIntyre has
failed to meet the standard of § 2255. His contentions are not based on newly
discovered evidence that, “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
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whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the offense” or on “a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). The
caselaw cited by Mr. McIntyre—Booker and Apprendi—does not apply
retroactively to final criminal judgments such as his. See United States v.
Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that Booker is not to be
applied retroactively); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding that Apprendi is not to be applied retroactively).
We DENY a COA, DENY IFP status, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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