UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 98-50030
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RITA ALMANZAR
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(EP-97-CR-358-1-DB)
March 9, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge:*
Defendant-appellant Rita Almanzar (“Almanzar”) was convicted
by a jury of one count of knowingly and intentionally importing
marijuana into the United States from Mexico, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1); and one count of knowingly and
intentionally possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Almanzar challenges
her conviction with the sole argument that the Government failed to
present sufficient evidence that Almanzar knew that the car she was
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R.47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
driving had marijuana hidden in a secret compartment, an element
necessary to prove both the importation and the possession charges.
Based on our thorough review of the evidence presented to the jury,
we conclude that the evidence as a whole viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal
circumstantial support to a theory of innocence and a theory of
guilt, so that any reasonable juror necessarily must have
entertained reasonable doubt. Hence, the Government failed to meet
its burden of proof, so Almanzar’s conviction must be reversed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 5:10 a.m. on April 9, 1997, Almanzar, a 40-
year-old female U.S. citizen, drove a 1985 Honda Prelude into the
primary inspection lane at the Paso Del Norte port of entry in El
Paso, Texas. Almanzar was the sole occupant of the vehicle. The
bridge at the port of entry connects El Paso to Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico. Immigration inspector Gilbert Madriles (“Madriles”)
testified at trial that when he asked Almanzar for a declaration,
he received no answer. When he asked Almanzar her citizenship, she
told him she was a United States citizen. Madriles then asked
Almanzar who owned the car, and she told him that it belonged to a
friend. Madriles requested identification, and Almanzar said that
she had none. When Madriles asked Almanzar if there was anything
in the trunk of the car, she said no. Madriles admitted that he
did not smell marijuana or air freshener in the car.
Madriles testified that Almanzar was “nervous” and that her
behavior was “out of the ordinary.” Specifically, he stated that
2
when he asked Almanzar for a declaration, “she hesitated to roll
the window down.” Madriles also testified that he saw “some eye
contact” between Almanzar and the driver of a station wagon parked
in the secondary inspection area ahead of her. Madriles admitted,
however, that although the report that he prepared within one hour
after Almanzar’s arrest stated that she appeared nervous, his
report did not give any reasons for this conclusion. Madriles also
admitted that Almanzar maintained eye contact with him throughout
his questioning. He could not recall whether Almanzar’s hands were
shaking.
Madriles testified that he asked Almanzar to open the trunk
for a routine inspection, and inside the trunk he saw new rubber
molding and fresh paint applied to Bondo or fiberglass, leading him
to believe that the trunk had been altered. Madriles sent the car
to the secondary inspection area, where a drug-sniffing dog alerted
to the trunk.
Rolando Picazzo (“Picazzo”), a canine enforcement officer with
the U.S. Customs Service, testified that he opened the trunk and
saw that the spare tire well was covered by sheet metal. When he
drilled into the metal and then withdrew the drill bit, it was
covered with a green leafy substance that field-tested positive for
marijuana.
Maria Ramirez (“Ramirez”), a U.S. Customs inspector, testified
that she searched Almanzar and found no contraband or weapons.
According to Ramirez, Almanzar asked her “what was going on because
she had to go to work that day.” Ramirez also testified that a
3
team from the National Guard used a saw to remove the sheet metal
from the trunk, a procedure that took possibly as long as 45
minutes. Ramirez told the jury that under the sheet metal, agents
found 13 bundles of marijuana weighing 51.5 pounds wrapped in clear
plastic.
Ruben Atedero-Lopez (“Atedero-Lopez”), a special agent with
the U.S. Customs Service, testified that before Almanzar’s arrest,
he had been investigating the station wagon, which was known as a
load or spotter vehicle for drug smuggling. Atedero-Lopez
testified that he had placed a lookout record on the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (“TECS”) computer, requesting
that the inspectors send the station wagon to secondary inspection
and “also look for any associated vehicles that may be carrying a
load.” When Atedero-Lopez received notice that the station wagon
had been spotted at the port of entry, he went to the customs
headhouse, where he read Almanzar her Miranda rights and
interrogated her.
Atedero-Lopez testified that Almanzar told him that at 11:00
p.m. the previous night, she had taken a taxi to Ciudad Juarez, and
that she went to the Vertigo nightclub to meet her boyfriend of two
months, Sergio Segura. Almanzar told the agent that she did not
know where Segura lived and that she had no means of communicating
with him other than meeting him at nightclubs. Atedero-Lopez also
testified that Almanzar said that she had lost her purse, but she
did not say when or how. Atedero-Lopez told the jury that Almanzar
said that she had been “partying all night” with Segura, and that
4
at approximately 5:00 a.m. he had given her the key to his car so
that she could drive back to El Paso because she was worried about
going to work. He also testified that Almanzar said that she had
placed the car key on the key ring with her house key. Atedero-
Lopez admitted that he did not ask Almanzar whether she and Segura
had made arrangements to return the Honda to him.
Atedero-Lopez testified that in a second conversation with
Almanzar after her arrest, she told him that she had met Segura at
the XO nightclub in Ciudad Juarez. He did not ask Almanzar why she
initially said that she had met Segura at the Vertigo nightclub.
He also told the jury that he asked Almanzar’s daughter, Cynthia
Jimenez, to bring him identification for her mother, and that
Cynthia gave him an expired Texas driver’s license, a health
insurance card and a Social Security card. Atedero-Lopez admitted
at trial that he did not take fingerprints from inside the trunk or
from the plastic wrap covering the marijuana. He told the jury
that during the interrogation Almanzar insisted that she had
“nothing to do with this.”
Maria Sepulveda (“Sepulveda”), an office manager at Mid-
American Electro-Cords, where Almanzar had been employed as an
assembler since 1995, testified that Almanzar’s last day of work
was Saturday, April 5, 1997, and that she had unexcused absences on
April 7, 8 and 9. Sepulveda told the jury that a 24-hour written
warning was sent to Almanzar on April 11, and that if Almanzar had
responded within 24 hours, she would not have been fired.
Sepulveda said that because Almanzar never received the warning
5
letter, and did not respond, she was terminated on April 14, 1997,
effective retroactive to April 10, 1997. Sepulveda testified that
she had known Almanzar for a long time and considered her to be a
good employee.
Maribel Jimenez (“Maribel”), Almanzar’s daughter, testified
that her mother told her that she borrowed the Honda Prelude from
a friend she met in a nightclub in Ciudad Juarez. Maribel stated
that she had never heard of Sergio Segura.
Almanzar’s other daughter, Cynthia Jimenez (“Cynthia”), who
lives with Almanzar, testified that her mother previously had dated
men in Ciudad Juarez and that, although she had never heard of
Segura, she is usually familiar only with her mother’s steady
boyfriends. Cynthia also told the jury that when Agent Atedero-
Lopez asked her to bring him her mother’s identification, she gave
him her mother’s driver’s license, Social Security card and health
insurance card taken from her mother’s dresser drawer, not from her
purse. Cynthia testified that she too had been to the Vertigo and
XO nightclubs, which are only a block apart, and that it was
customary that if one club closed early, patrons could get into the
other club free by showing a wristband from the closed club.
Almanzar did not testify at trial and the defense presented no
witnesses. Almanzar moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end
of the government’s case-in-chief and at the close of evidence;
these motions were denied. The jury found Almanzar guilty on both
counts. The district court sentenced Almanzar to two concurrent
sentences of 24 months and three years of supervised release.
6
Almanzar appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light
most favorable to the government, “drawing ‘all reasonable
inferences and credibility choices made in support of the
verdict.’” United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543 (5th
Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Ivy, 973 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1022 (1993)). This standard of
review inquires whether any reasonable trier of fact could have
found that the evidence established the essential elements of the
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Anchondo-
Sandoval, 910 F.2d 1234, 1236 (5th Cir. 1990). “The evidence need
not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly
inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the
jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the
evidence.” United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 577 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1228 (1996). “If the evidence tends to give
‘equal or nearly equal circumstantial support’ to guilt and to
innocence,” however, a “‘reasonable jury must necessarily entertain
a reasonable doubt,’” so that reversal is required. Ortega Reyna,
148 F.3d at 543 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169,
1173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 918 (1992)); Lopez, 74 F.3d
at 577.
III. DISCUSSION
A. General Principles
7
To sustain a conviction for the offense of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) knowingly (2)
possessed marijuana (3) with intent to distribute it. Lopez, 74
F.3d at 577. In order to prove the crime of importation of
marijuana, the Government must establish that the defendant
knowingly played a role in bringing the marijuana into the country.
Id. To establish either crime, the Government must adduce
sufficient evidence of “guilty knowledge.” Id. Almanzar
challenges only the “knowledge” element, contending that the
Government failed to prove that she knew marijuana was concealed in
the car she was driving.
Rarely can the Government prove by direct evidence the
“knowledge” element of the crimes of possession or importation of
illicit drugs. Id. However, knowledge of the presence of
narcotics often may be inferred from the exercise of control over
the vehicle containing illegal drugs. Id. “[C]ontrol of the
vehicle will suffice to prove knowledge only where the drugs ‘are
clearly visible or readily accessible.’” United States v.
Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States
v. Richardson, 848 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1988)).
In secret compartment cases, however, generally the knowledge
element may not be inferred solely from the defendant’s control of
the vehicle in which the contraband is hidden because there “‘is at
least a fair assumption that a third party might have concealed the
controlled substances in the vehicle with the intent to use the
8
unwitting defendant as the carrier in a smuggling enterprise.’”
United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995)
(quoting United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 954 (5th Cir.
1990)). This assumption is heightened when, as here, the vehicle
is a “loaner” or otherwise has been in the possession of the
suspect for only a short time. Ortego Reyna, 148 F.3d at 544.
Therefore, in hidden compartment cases, “‘this Court has normally
required additional “circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in
nature or demonstrates guilty knowledge.”’” Id. (quoting Resio-
Trejo, 45 F.3d at 911 (quoting Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d at
1236)).
The Government presented no direct evidence that Almanzar knew
that marijuana was concealed in the car, such as Almanzar’s
fingerprints on the packets of marijuana or inside the trunk.
Instead, the Government relied solely on circumstantial evidence to
establish Almanzar’s guilty knowledge.
On appeal, the Government argues that the following
circumstantial evidence provides ample support for the jury’s
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Almanzar acted with
consciousness of guilt: (1) Almanzar appeared nervous when
initially approached by the customs inspector at the primary
inspection point; (2) Almanzar made frequent eye contact with the
driver of the station wagon being detained at the secondary
inspection point, a vehicle known by law enforcement officials to
have been a load and spotter car; (3) Almanzar had no
identification in her possession; (4) Almanzar provided conflicting
9
stories about which nightclub she had just left; (5) Almanzar was
worried about getting back to El Paso and her job, but her employer
reported that she had been missing without explanation for three
days prior to her arrest; (6) Almanzar claimed that the car
belonged to her boyfriend of two months, but she could not or would
not provide his address or phone number.
B. Circumstantial Evidence of Guilty Knowledge
1. Nervousness
Nervous behavior at an inspection station frequently
constitutes persuasive evidence of guilty knowledge. Diaz-Carreon,
915 F.2d at 954. Nervousness, however, also may be “a normal
reaction to circumstances which one does not understand,” and being
stopped at the border is certainly one of those situations. United
States v. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1986).
Evidence of nervousness is insufficient to support a finding of
guilty knowledge in the absence of facts suggesting that the
defendant’s nervousness or anxiety was other than a “normal
reaction to circumstances which one does not understand.” Id.;
United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1002 (1990).
Immigration inspector Madriles testified that Almanzar acted
“nervous” at the primary inspection checkpoint. In a report
written one hour after the seizure, however, Madriles did not
document any reasons for his belief that Almanzar was “nervous.”
At trial, he admitted that Almanzar maintained eye contact with him
throughout the questioning. See Richardson, 848 F.2d at 511
10
(inferring guilty knowledge in part from testimony that an “agent
observed that Richardson was ‘very uneasy, he wouldn’t look at me,
he wouldn’t make any type of eye contact with me.’”). Inspector
Madriles could not recall whether Almanzar’s hands were shaking.
See United States v. Galberth, 846 F.2d 983, 985 (5th Cir.)
(physical signs of nervousness include shaking, quivering voice and
throbbing artery in neck), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 865 (1988).
Moreover, there was no testimony that Almanzar’s nervousness
increased as the search progressed. See McDonald, 905 F.2d at 873
(McDonald was nervous when the inspector looked at the back seat,
he relaxed when the inspector found nothing, and then his
nervousness returned when the inspector turned his attention to the
gas tank); Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d at 952 (“[a]s the customs
inspector continued her questioning, Diaz-Carreon’s previously
friendly demeanor deteriorated into extreme and noticeable
nervousness. He became increasingly agitated and unable to
communicate”).
In explaining Almanzar’s “nervousness,” Madriles told the jury
that “she hesitated to roll the window down” and “kept looking at
the other fellow from secondary who was driving the station wagon.”
An equally plausible inference to be drawn from these facts is that
an innocent woman, who had been driving a borrowed car for only a
brief period, hesitated momentarily while trying to locate the
button or the handle to lower the window. See Ortega Reyna, 148
F.3d at 545 (defendant’s “single [15 second] hesitation and
downward glance fall well short of the generalized hesitancy to
11
answer questions or delayed responses that we [have] accepted as
circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge”).
There was no testimony showing that the agents asked if
Almanzar knew the driver of the station wagon or if the driver knew
Almanzar. There was no evidence that any contraband was found in
the station wagon, or that the driver was arrested for suspected
criminal activity. The only “connection” between Almanzar and the
driver was fleeting “eye contact.” The Government presented no
evidence of “connecting factors” recognized by this court as
permitting an inference that two cars are traveling in tandem, with
the first car acting as a “lead” or “spotter” car for the “load”
car carrying contraband. Such “connecting factors” include the
presence of two-way radios, similar license plates, or two vehicles
traveling near each other in a sparsely populated area. See United
States v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389, 392 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1998). In the
absence of such factors, Almanzar’s eye contact with the driver of
the station wagon was at least as consistent with innocence as with
guilt.1 In sum, there is no evidence that Almanzar’s nervousness
or anxiety derived from an underlying consciousness of criminal
behavior.
2. Implausible Explanations
1
It is just as reasonable to conclude that Almanzar’s
attention was directed to the station wagon because it was
immediately in front of her. Observing law enforcement officials
question the driver of another vehicle, in the absence of any other
connection between the two drivers, is at least as likely to be a
case of “rubbernecking.”
12
“‘[A] less than credible explanation’ for a defendant’s
actions is ‘part of the overall circumstantial evidence from which
possession and knowledge may be inferred.’” Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d
at 955 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 496 F.2d 1395, 1398 n.6
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1056 (1975)). The
Government argues that Almanzar’s story that her boyfriend of two
months loaned her his car containing a large amount of contraband,
without making arrangements for returning the car, is not credible.
Significantly, however, no one asked Almanzar if she and Segura had
a plan for returning the car to him. Customs agent Atedero-Lopez
simply asked Almanzar if she knew how to contact Segura.
Furthermore, Atedero-Lopez testified that he could not remember if
Almanzar told him whether Segura knew how to get in touch with her.
Had Segura known where Almanzar lived or worked, he could have
picked up the car himself or arranged for others to do so without
requiring Almanzar to contact him. Such an explanation was found
to be plausible in Ortega Reyna, in which the defendant explained
at trial that, although he did not know the address or phone number
of the truck’s owner, they had made arrangements for the owner to
pick up the truck in Houston. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d at 542-43.
In contrast, in Diaz-Carreon, the defendant told customs officials
that a man that he had met a few days earlier named “Ruben” had
loaned him a truck so that he could find employment in New Mexico.
Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d at 953. Unlike Almanzar, Diaz-Carreon
testified at trial that he could not explain how “Ruben” would
recover the pickup truck. Id. Unlike Diaz-Carreon, who borrowed
13
a truck from a virtual stranger he had met a few days earlier,
Almanzar had been dating Segura for two months. It is not
implausible that Segura loaned Almanzar his car for the short trip
back to El Paso so that she could get to work on time.
This case also is distinguishable from United States v.
Molina-Iguado, in which the driver of a vehicle containing nine
kilograms of marijuana concealed inside a tire in the trunk told
customs officials that her boyfriend, whom she refused to identify,
had borrowed her car while she was in Mexico. United States
Molina-Iguado, 894 F.2d 1452, 1456 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 831 (1990). In Molina-Iquado, agents also found additional
marijuana of the same “texture and color” inside personal effects
in the car driven by the defendant.2 Id. at 1457. The court
concluded that this “additional quantity of very similar marihuana
found concealed inside women’s clothing in a totebag in the car,”
together with the defendant’s “inability to verify in any way her
story about her boyfriend,” was indicative of knowing possession.
Id. Unlike Molina-Iguado, Almanzar identified her boyfriend by
name and told customs agents the nightclubs that he frequented;
moreover, no marijuana was found on Almanzar or inside the
passenger compartment of the car that might have permitted an
inference that she knew about the marijuana hidden in the trunk of
2
Similarly, in United States v. Olivier-Becerril, customs
agents found a small quantity of cocaine in the defendant’s wallet,
an additional factor considered by this court in concluding that
the defendant knew that cocaine was hidden in a secret compartment
in the trunk. United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424, 427
(5th Cir. 1988).
14
the car.
Without any evidence that Almanzar could not explain how the
vehicle would be returned to Segura, Almanzar’s story that her
casual boyfriend loaned her his car for the short trip across the
border to El Paso, so that she could get to work on time, is at
least as consistent with innocence as guilt.
The Government also argues that Almanzar’s story that she was
worried about getting back to work is implausible given that she
had three unexcused absences from work immediately before her
arrest. However, Almanzar’s employer’s office manager, Sepulveda,
testified that Almanzar missed work on April 7, 8 and 9; Almanzar
was arrested on the morning of April 9. Sepulveda also testified
that the company’s attendance policy provided that after three
consecutive absences without notification, a written warning would
be given, and if the employee responded within 24 hours, he or she
would not be fired. Thus, it is entirely plausible that although
Almanzar had missed work for three days, she knew that she could
keep her job if she reported to work within the 24-hour period.
Therefore, Almanzar’s statement that she was concerned about
getting back to work is not implausible. The Government also
suggests that Almanzar’s three-day absence from work was connected
to drug-trafficking activity. No evidence supports this assertion.
In the absence of evidence that Almanzar could not have
explained how Segura’s car would be returned, and in light of the
testimony that Almanzar could have kept her job had she returned to
work on the morning she was arrested, the circumstances surrounding
15
Almanzar’s borrowing of her boyfriend’s car to return to work after
a date are not implausible.2
3. Inconsistent Statements
This court has declared that “perhaps the strongest evidence
of a criminal defendant’s guilty knowledge is inconsistent
statements to federal officials.” Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d at 954-55
(citing Richardson, 848 F.2d at 513; Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d
at 501). Because inconsistent statements are inherently
suspicious, a fact finder reasonably could conclude that they mask
an underlying consciousness of guilt. Id. at 955. The Government
argues that Almanzar’s initial statement that she went to the
Vertigo nightclub, and her later statement that she went to the XO
nightclub, provide circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.
The Government did not ask Almanzar to explain why she
initially told customs officials that she had been to Vertigo, and
2
In comparison, this court has rejected as implausible the
following dubious explanations given by defendants. In Resio-
Trejo, the defendant told customs officials that someone had taken
his truck without his knowledge, spent several days constructing
secret compartments in the gas tanks, loaded these compartments
with $130,000 worth of marijuana, and then returned the truck to
him. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d at 913. In Richardson, this court found
“clearly suspicious” the defendant’s story that on the day he
arrived in Los Angeles to visit his ill mother, he “ran into” a
female named “Rhonda” whom he had known for four or five years, but
whose last name he could not recall. Richardson, 848 F.2d at 512.
Richardson told a DEA agent that because he did not have enough
money to fly back to Dallas, he asked “Rhonda” to rent him a car.
Id. The evidence showed that someone named “Cassandra Rodney” paid
a cash deposit of $370 for the rental car; a return ticket to
Dallas would have cost only $60. Id. Richardson claimed that
“later that evening someone dropped off a car in front of his
mother’s house and dropped the key to it through the mail slot,”
and he returned to Dallas at 2 o’clock the morning after his
arrival. Id. at 512, 513.
16
later told them that she had been to XO. Almanzar’s daughter
testified that the two clubs are across the street from each other
in the same block and that when one club closes, patrons often walk
across the street to the other club using the same wristband to
gain free admission. Almanzar’s statements are not necessarily
inconsistent because it is possible that she may have gone to both
neighboring nightclubs with Segura that evening. In Ortega-Reyna,
148 F.3d at 547, the defendant first stated that he was going to El
Campo and later said he was traveling to Houston; however, we
concluded that these statements were not inconsistent given his
explanation that he planned to pick up equipment in El Campo and
continue to Houston to enroll his children in school. Similarly,
Ortega Reyna’s statement that he was coming from Miguel Aleman,
Mexico, and his wife’s statement that they were coming from Roma,
Texas, were not inconsistent because these were “simply sister
cities on the opposite sides of the Rio Grande River – two
municipalities comprising a single metropolitan area.” Id. at 546.
In contrast, in Anchondo-Sandoval, the defendant initially
told authorities that he had been in Mexico visiting friends or
relatives, and that he was returning to Phoenix, Arizona to look
for work as a field hand; he later stated that he was in Mexico to
live cheaply while looking for work in El Paso, Texas and that he
intended to return to Albuquerque, New Mexico to look for work in
construction. Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d at 1237. See also
United States v. Del Aguila-Reyes, 722 F.2d 155, 156 (5th Cir. 1983)
(defendant initially told customs officials that this was the first
17
time that his brother had accompanied him on a trip to the United
States, but he later said that his brother had accompanied him on
a previous trip to Miami); United States v. Martinez-Mercado, 888
F.2d 1484, 1491 (5th Cir. 1989) (defendant initially told customs
officials that an unidentified “they” had loaned him the truck to
cross the border to look for work, even though he had no work
permit; later, defendant asserted that “they” had paid him $300 to
drive the truck to the United States to retrieve a semitrailer).
Unlike these defendants’ stories, Almanzar’s two statements were
not necessarily inconsistent because both could be true.
4. Exclusive Possession and Control
For a Lengthy Time and Over a Great Distance
This court has permitted an inference of guilty knowledge when
a defendant has possessed and controlled a vehicle containing
hidden contraband for a long period of time and over a considerable
distance, reasoning that the defendant likely would have detected
the contraband. For example, in Resio-Trejo, this court concluded
that a jury reasonably could infer that the defendant knew that
marijuana was concealed in the gas tanks of a truck he was driving
in part because the defendant had possession and exclusive control
of the truck for ten months preceding the discovery. Resio-Trejo,
45 F.3d at 912. Likewise, in Richardson, 848 F.2d at 512, 514 n.4,
we declared that “[t]he fact that Richardson had exclusive
possession of the car, driving it alone [for seventeen hours] on a
trip of over a thousand miles, is some evidence from which it might
ordinarily be inferred that he was aware of the some two pounds of
18
cocaine in the wrapped packages sitting in the trunk.” See also
McDonald, 905 F.2d at 874 (“McDonald owned the car and had had
possession for some time, facts which can suggest guilty
knowledge”).
The evidence indicated that Almanzar’s boyfriend loaned his
car to her in Ciudad Juarez at approximately 5:00 a.m., and that
Almanzar was stopped at the Paso Del Norte port of entry in El Paso
at approximately 5:10 a.m. In ten minutes, Almanzar drove only a
short distance in crossing the bridge separating the border cities
of Ciudad Juarez and El Paso. The Government presented no proof of
ownership of the Honda. Because Almanzar possessed and controlled
the Honda for a very brief period and she traveled a very short
distance, no inference can be drawn that Almanzar was aware of
marijuana hidden in the trunk of the vehicle. See United States v.
Tolliver, 780 F.2d 1177, 1184 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting the “paucity
of evidence indicating awareness by [the defendants] of the
contraband’s presence in a vehicle they did not own and were not
shown to have controlled for more than a brief period”), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987).
5.Odor of Marijuana or Scent Masking Odor
In Lopez, this court held that, although the bulk of the
evidence adduced at trial was at least as consistent with innocence
as it was with guilt3, an inspector’s testimony that he smelled a
strong odor of marijuana in the vehicle “must tip the scales in
3
This additional evidence in equipoise in Lopez was: (1)
changing lanes prior to inspection; and (2) appearing nervous when
asked to open the car trunk. Lopez, 74 F.3d at 578.
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favor of providing a basis for affirming the verdict.” Lopez, 74
F.3d at 578 (”a reasonable jury could rationally infer beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] had knowledge of the hidden
marijuana because its odor was present in the passenger compartment
of the car he was driving”). See also United States v. Gomez, 776
F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1985) (“renting and driving the truck,
loaded with over a thousand pounds of marijuana, smelling of
marijuana and having marijuana debris on the tailgate[,] suffice to
allow an inference that [the defendant] was aware of the presence
of marijuana”).
In Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d at 427, this court found that
coffee and a fresh garlic wreath placed in a trunk to mask the odor
of narcotics permitted an inference that the defendant was aware of
the presence of marijuana in the vehicle. See also Del Aguila-
Reyes, 722 F.2d at 156 (noting that “perfume is often used to mask
the odor of drugs”); Phillips, 496 F.2d at 1398 (moth balls
concealing scent of marijuana).
Inspector Madriles testified that there was no odor of
marijuana in the Honda and that he did not recall smelling air
freshener. Thus, the Government has produced no such “additional
indicia that [Almanzar] was aware of the presence of drugs.” See
Lopez, 74 F.3d at 577-78.
6. Possession of Large Amounts of Cash
Possession of large amounts of cash may be circumstantial
evidence of guilty knowledge, indicating that a defendant might
have been compensated for his role in the attempt to smuggle
20
contraband into the country. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d at 548; see
also United States v. Crooks, 83 F.3d 103, 107 (5th Cir. 1996) (when
stopped, defendant had $1,400 in cash); Del Aguila-Reyes, 722 F.2d
at 156 ($900 in cash); Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d at 425 ($500 in
cash).
The Government presented no evidence that agents found any
cash on Almanzar or in the Honda when she was stopped at the
border. Thus, no inference can be made that she was being paid to
smuggle marijuana into the United States. Indeed, the lack of
evidence that Almanzar had cash when she entered the checkpoint
tends to support her story that she borrowed her friend’s car to
return to El Paso. If Almanzar had money, she could have returned
to El Paso as she had arrived, by taxi cab.
7. Obvious or Remarkable Alterations to the Vehicle
This court has permitted an inference of guilty knowledge of
hidden contraband when the alterations to the vehicle are so
obvious or remarkable that they easily would be discovered by a
person in possession or control of the vehicle.
In Resio-Trejo, this court concluded that because the border
patrol agent discovered secret compartments built in the fuel tank
of a vehicle “simply by inserting a coat hanger in the gas tank, .
. . the jury could reasonably infer that Resio would have made a
similar discovery during his daily inspections or while refueling
his truck [in the ten months that he possessed the vehicle].”
Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d at 913. See also Martinez-Mercado, 888 F.2d
at 1491 (knowing possession inferred in part from “the fact that
21
the unusual nature of the fuel tanks and their special fittings
were observable on exterior inspection”).
Immigration inspector Madriles, who had 14 years experience,
testified that when he opened the trunk, he saw new rubber molding
and fresh paint applied to Bondo or fiberglass, leading him to
believe that the trunk had been altered. Canine enforcement
officer Picazzo testified that in order to reach the marijuana, he
had to drill through sheet metal covering the spare tire well.
Customs inspector Ramirez testified that a National Guard team took
as long as 45 minutes to cut through the sheet metal with a saw.
Thus, considering the short time that Almanzar was in
possession of the vehicle, the hidden compartment beneath freshly
painted Bondo and sheet metal in the trunk was not necessarily
obvious or readily accessible to her. Furthermore, the Government
presented no evidence that Almanzar was familiar with the
construction of the trunk of a Honda Prelude so that she would
notice the alteration, if indeed she ever looked inside the trunk
at all. In Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d at 954 n.4, this court rejected
the Government’s argument that the defendant should have suspected
that the atypical freshly painted and swollen sideboards of the
pickup truck concealed contraband because “the Government failed to
introduce at trial any evidence demonstrating that Diaz-Carreon
himself was familiar with the type of stake bed truck involved in
this case.”
Moreover, Almanzar did not admit that she knew that the trunk
had been altered, or that she knew that “something” was in the
22
hidden compartment. See McDonald, 905 F.2d at 873 (after the
inspectors found marijuana in the gas tank, the defendant admitted
that “he had known ‘something’ was in the tank”); United States v.
Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 1998) (defendant “admitted that
he was aware that the bed [of the motor home] under which the drugs
were later found had been modified”).
In sum, the alterations to the trunk were not so obvious, or
the hidden compartment so readily accessible, that an inference
could be drawn that Almanzar had discovered the marijuana during
the ten minutes that she drove the vehicle from Ciudad Juarez to El
Paso.
8. Other Alleged Evidence of Guilty Knowledge
The Government argues that Almanzar’s lack of identification
permits an inference of guilty knowledge. Almanzar told customs
officials that she had no identification because her purse had been
lost and the Government offered no evidence that this statement was
false or implausible.4 Finally, the Government suggests that
Almanzar was lying when she said that the Honda belonged to her
boyfriend, pointing out that the Honda key was found on Almanzar’s
key ring. However, the Government did not present any evidence as
to the ownership of the Honda. Furthermore, it is just as
reasonable to infer that Almanzar placed a loose key on her own key
4
Agent Atedero-Lopez testified that Almanzar’s daughter gave
him her mother’s expired driver’s license for identification after
Almanzar’s arrest, which her daughter said she found in her
mother’s dresser drawer, and not in her purse. This evidence tends
to confirm Almanzar’s statement that she lost her purse, which
presumably would contain her current driver’s license.
23
ring to avoid losing it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although we recognize that our review is limited to
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence presented
by the Government as a whole would support an equal or nearly equal
theory of guilt and a theory of innocence5, so that a reasonable
jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. See Sanchez,
961 F.2d at 1173. Hence, as a matter of law, the evidence is
insufficient to support a jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that Almanzar had knowledge of the marijuana in the hidden
compartment of the vehicle she was driving. See Ortega Reyna, 148
F.3d at 545, 547.
Accordingly, Almanzar’s conviction must be reversed.
REVERSED.
5
“[F]or every inference of guilt that may be drawn from the
evidence, there is an equal and opposite benign inference to be
drawn.” Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d at 545.
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