FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 25, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHN D. KELSO,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 08-6224
v. Western District of Oklahoma
CARLOS LUNA, EDMUND A. (D.C. No. 5:08-CV-00731-D)
BROWN and JERRY BROWN,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TACHA, KELLY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
John D. Kelso, a resident of California’s Patton State Hospital, proceeding
pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”), which would allow him to
appeal from the district court’s order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Because we conclude that Mr.
Kelso has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a COA and dismiss the
appeal.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
I. Background
Mr. Kelso filed this action pro se in the district court, seeking a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court dismissed, holding
that Mr. Kelso failed to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the
respondents. The district court further held that transferring this action to another
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 was inappropriate under the factors we
outlined in Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1223 n.16 (10th Cir. 2006).
II. Discussion
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may be appealed
only if the district court or this court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
District courts can grant habeas corpus relief only “within their respective
jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). This requires that a district court have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s custodian, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442
(2004), who in this case is Carlos Luna, the Executive Director of the Patton State
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Hospital. Mr. Kelso’s only jurisdictional arguments on appeal are that he is an
Oklahoma native and that there are a number of “Oklahoma defendants,” whom
Mr. Kelso names in his brief but who are not the defendants in this case. Whether
Mr. Kelso is an Oklahoma native is irrelevant to the question of whether the
district court has jurisdiction over the defendants in this matter. Likewise,
whether the third party “Oklahoma defendants” are somehow connected with
Oklahoma does nothing to establish jurisdiction over the defendants in this
matter. Therefore, having provided no evidence of any connection between the
defendants here and the state of Oklahoma, Mr. Kelso has failed to establish a
basis on which jurisdiction can be granted.
Mr. Kelso does not appear to make any argument on appeal as to why the
district court should have transferred this matter rather than dismissed it.
Transferring a case to another court rather than dismissing it is appropriate only
“if it is in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631; see also Trujillo, 465 F.3d at
1222 (“Although . . . § 1631 contain[s] the word ‘shall,’ we have interpreted the
phrase ‘if it is in the interest of justice’ to grant the district court discretion in
making a decision to transfer an action . . . .”). We have previously recognized
the broad support that exists for the proposition that “it is not in the interest of
justice to transfer where a plaintiff either realized or should have realized that the
forum in which he or she filed was improper.” Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench
Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1544 (10th Cir. 1996) (neither adopting nor
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rejecting this rule); see also Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1223 n.16 (noting that one of the
“factors warranting transfer rather than dismissal” is if “the original action was
filed in good faith rather than filed after ‘plaintiff either realized or should have
realized that the forum in which he or she filed was improper’” (quoting
Trierweiler)); Keaveney v. Larimer, 242 F.3d 389 (Table), 2000 WL 1853994, at
**1 (10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (relying exclusively on this rule to affirm a district
court’s dismissal rather than transfer of a case). There can be no doubt that Mr.
Kelso should have realized that Oklahoma was an improper forum because an
action he had previously filed against Mr. Luna in Oklahoma was dismissed, at
least in part, for lack of jurisdiction. See Kelso v. Miller, No. 5:08-cv-00366-F,
2008 WL 2961996, at *4–5 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2008), aff’d, 2008 WL 5220651
(10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2008). The district court therefore properly decided that this
was not an appropriate case for transfer.
III. Conclusion
Because reasonable jurists could not debate that the district court resolved
this matter appropriately and because the issues presented are not adequate to
support encouragement of further proceedings, we DENY Mr. Kelso’s request for
a COA and DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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