FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 27, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
NATHAN OZELL GRIFFIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 08-5150
RANDY WORKMAN, Warden, (D.C. No. CV-04-345-JHP-PJC)
Oklahoma State Penitentiary, (N. D. Oklahoma)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Nathan Griffin, an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se, 1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to challenge the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for federal habeas relief. Because
Griffin has failed to satisfy the standards for the issuance of a COA, we deny his
request and dismiss the matter.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
1
As he is proceeding pro se, we have construed Griffin’s pleadings
liberally. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004).
I.
Griffin was tried by jury and found guilty of driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-902(A),
and possession of a firearm after former conviction of a felony, in violation of
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1283. Based upon jury recommendations, Griffin was
sentenced to ten days in jail with a $250 fine on the driving under the influence
conviction, and thirty years’ imprisonment with a $5000 fine on the firearm
possession conviction.
On direct appeal, Griffin claimed: (1) prosecutorial misconduct during
cross-examination of Griffin and during closing argument; (2) error by the trial
court for using Griffin’s prior convictions in sentencing; and (3) error by the trial
court for not applying an Oklahoma statutory sentencing change retroactively.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Griffin’s convictions and
sentences. Griffin v. Oklahoma, No. F-2001-1312 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 21,
2003). Griffin did not seek state post-conviction collateral relief.
Before the federal district court, Griffin raised the same claims in his §
2254 petition as he raised in his direct appeal to the Oklahoma courts. The
district court denied Griffin’s petition. Griffin has since filed a timely notice of
appeal, as well as an application for a COA.
II.
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
2
336 (2003). In other words, a state prisoner may appeal from the denial of federal
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if the district court or this court first
issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA may be issued “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order to make that showing, a prisoner must
demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter,
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
III.
Griffin seeks a COA with respect to the three issues raised in his federal
habeas petition. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that he has failed to
satisfy the standards for issuance of a COA with respect to any of these issues.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Griffin argues that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of due process
and a fair trial, based on the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument and
the prosecutor’s cross-examination questioning of Griffin. Griffin raised the
same claims of prosecutorial misconduct in his direct appeal. We apply the
standard articulated in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), to claims
of prosecutorial misconduct when a petitioner does not allege the prosecutor’s
argument directly affected a specific constitutional right. Under Donnelly, habeas
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relief is available for prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct is so
egregious that it renders the entire trial fundamentally unfair. 416 U.S. at 642-48.
Inquiry into the fundamental fairness of a trial requires examination of the entire
proceedings. Id. at 643.
The district court found that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly rejected Griffin’s prosecutorial misconduct claims based on its finding
that it found no error in the prosecution’s statements. The district court noted the
strength of the evidence against Griffin at trial, which included the testimony of
three state troopers and the firearm and casings recovered from or near Griffin’s
vehicle. After review of the evidence, the district court found that there was no
reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict and its recommended sentence were
rendered fundamentally unfair by prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (concluding that a criminal conviction should
not be readily overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments alone;
statements must be viewed in context of entire proceeding to determine whether
conduct affected fairness of trial). After examining the record on appeal, we
agree with the district court, and conclude that Griffin is not entitled to a COA on
this claim.
Matters of State Law
Griffin’s final two claims focus exclusively on the proper interpretation of
Oklahoma state law. Griffin claims the trial court erred by permitting the
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prosecution to use contemporaneous felonies to establish both an element of the
crime charged and the basis for sentence enhancement. Griffin also claims that an
Oklahoma statutory sentencing amendment, which lowered the minimum sentence
for his firearm possession offense should have been applied retroactively to
reduce his sentence.
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-
68 (1991), however, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine
state court determinations on state-law questions.” Rather, the Court stated, “[i]n
conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a
conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. at
68. Because Griffin’s claims involve purely matters of state law, they cannot
serve as grounds for federal habeas relief.
A petitioner may also be entitled to habeas relief if he shows that the
alleged violations of state law resulted in a denial of due process. Hicks v.
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). The district court found, however, and
after examining the record on appeal we agree, that Griffin has not demonstrated
that he was convicted or sentenced in violation of Oklahoma’s laws. Griffin has
not shown, by clearly established Supreme Court precedent, that Oklahoma’s
decision on direct appeal resulted in any fundamental unfairness or otherwise
denied him due process of law. Griffin is not entitled to a COA on these claims.
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IV.
After carefully reviewing Griffin’s appellate pleadings and the record on
appeal, we conclude he has failed to establish that “reasonable jurists could
debate whether” his habeas petition “should have been resolved in a different
manner or . . . w[as] adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
We therefore DENY Griffin’s request for a COA and DISMISS the matter.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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