FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 24, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 07-4248
MARCOS USCANGA-MORA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 1:06-CR-00118-DS-4)
Howard A. Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Raymond P. Moore,
Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (Brett L. Tolman, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
Marcos Uscanga-Mora appeals the district court’s imposition of a two-level
sentence enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(c). He argues
that the district court failed to explain adequately its reasons for imposing the
enhancement. Alternatively, he submits there is simply insufficient evidence
supporting the enhancement. Because Mr. Uscanga-Mora never objected in the
district court to the adequacy of the court’s explanation, our review of his first
argument is limited to plain error. Discerning none, and faced with ample
evidence to support the district court’s sentence, we affirm.
I
After Mr. Uscanga-Mora pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
at least 500 grams of methamphetamine, the probation office prepared a
presentence report. The government objected to the report, and sought an
additional two-level enhancement of the applicable offense level pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two level enhancement “[i]f
the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal
activity” involving fewer than five participants. Id. In support of its request, the
government asserted that certain “[t]ape recordings made of conversations
between defendant and others,” in particular Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s wife, Vere
Uscanga-Mora, and cousin, Jesus Uscanga-Cano, established that Mr. Uscanga-
Mora qualified for the enhancement. Vol. I, Doc. 77 at 1-2. By way of example,
the government cited the following conversations:
. . . [A]t 1:42 p.m. on June 25, 2006, Marcos Uscanga[-Mora]
spoke with his wife Vere and instructed her to give money to an
associate of Gabino Barajas-Torres’s. Marcos stated that the money
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was hidden behind the television set. Vere asked if she was to give
the man all of the money and Marcos said yes. He then instructed
Vere to count the money again.
During another call on June 25, 2006, at 4:50 p.m., Marcos
Uscanga[-Mora] called his cousin Jesus and told Jesus that “Brad”
didn’t have the money. Jesus told Marcos that Brad said he did have
the money and Marcos replied that if Brad didn’t have the money,
they would not be doing business. Jesus told Marcos that when he
saw Brad he would tell him not to play games. Jesus then
acknowledged that the business was not his, it was Marcos’s and he
would tell Brad. Numerous other calls were intercepted between
Marcos Uscanga[-Mora] and his cousin Jesus. In those calls Marcos
Uscanga[-Mora] is often heard giving Jesus instructions regarding
deliveries of narcotics or other related business matters.
Id. at 2.
In the end, the probation officer concurred with the government’s view and
modified the presentence report to reflect a two-level increase under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(c). The ultimate resulting offense level was 37; when combined with Mr.
Uscanga-Mora’s criminal history category of I, the Guidelines yielded a
recommended sentencing range of 210 to 262 months.
At the sentencing hearing before the district court, counsel for Mr.
Uscanga-Mora objected to the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. Counsel argued that the
content of the phone conversations cited by the government did not prove that Mr.
Uscanga-Mora was an organizer or leader of criminal activity. Vol. IV, Doc. 141
at 4. To this, the court replied that “from my reading of it, it seems to me that he
was more the individual that was directing the affairs.” Id. Counsel persisted,
contending that Mr. Uscanga-Mora and his cousin, Mr. Uscanga-Cano, had an
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“equal role and participation” in the drug scheme, and that “[t]he person
supplying the drugs and giving them the drugs, this gentleman, Gabino Barajas-
Torres, [was] the organizer of this group and not my client.” Id. at 5. The
government then responded that:
Mr. Gabino Barajas-Torres was a supplier to Marcos
Uscanga[-Mora]. Marcos Uscanga[-Mora], the wiretap clearly reveals,
directed his cousin, Jesus, and I do have the case agent here today,
and I am familiar with many of the tape recordings, but the case
agents indicated that for all intents and purposes Jesus Uscanga-Cano
was a user of drugs and was quite unreliable. A number of tape
recordings that have been intercepted have Marcos Uscanga[-Mora] talking
about his unreliability, but he did direct Jesus, and he also directed his
wife. Under the guidelines, Your Honor, that does give him the two-level
enhancement. We are not saying that he is a kingpin, but he
certainly directed others in this operation, and he was in charge of
this operation.
Id. at 5-6.
The district court expressed its agreement with this analysis, and then asked
the defense counsel if he had any “more information on the record.” Id. at 6.
Defense counsel answered that he had received the tapes, and that “[f]rom the
report before the Court and the presentence recommendation, you know, that
would be the evidence in front of Your Honor as to what their respective levels
were.” Id. He also added, as argument against imposition of the enhancement,
that “[y]ou can ask someone else to do something on your behalf . . . [and] that
does not necessarily indicate that he is an organizer or a director. . . . There are
various roles between equals, Your Honor, and I would submit that that is what
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we’re talking about here now.” Id. at 6-7. At this point, the government stepped
in to add “one other fact,” namely that Gabino Barajas-Torres “did not talk to
Jesus Uscanga-Cano, he talked to Marcos Uscanga[-Mora].” Id. at 7.
At the conclusion of this discussion, the district court found the two-level
enhancement warranted by the evidence, stating that
I think that is sufficient, counsel, to determine that the two-level
enhancement for his role in the offense is sufficient to determine
– let me turn to that paragraph. I think pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section
3B1.1(c) that there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish that the
defendant was either an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in this
activity. Accordingly, the Court finds that the two-level enhancement for
that role is appropriate.
Id. The court proceeded to calculate Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s total offense level to be
37, and asked counsel if there was “[a]nything else.” Id. at 7-8. To this both
counsel replied “No.” Id. at 8. Later in the hearing, the court again asked if there
was “[a]ny legal reason why sentence should not go forward at this time.” Id. at
11. Again, counsel said no. Id. The court then sentenced Mr. Uscanga-Mora to
210 months, at the bottom of the recommended Guidelines range. Id. at 12.
II
On appeal, Mr. Uscanga-Mora argues primarily that the district court did
not adequately explain its reasons for imposing the § 3B1.1(c) sentencing
enhancement. Alternatively, he submits, insufficient evidence exists in the record
to support the enhancement. We address each contention in turn.
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A
Our review of Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s first argument is shaped by the posture
of his appeal. Before the district court, counsel for Mr. Uscanga-Mora vigorously
disputed the government’s substantive claim that sufficient evidence existed to
support an enhancement under § 3B1.1(c). But at no point did he raise any
concern with the procedural adequacy of the district court’s explanation of its
decision to impose that enhancement. To the contrary, after the district court
finished explaining its analysis of the § 3B1.1(c) issue, it asked counsel whether
they had “anything else” to add, or whether there was “[a]ny legal reason why
sentence should not go forward.” Vol. IV, Doc. 141 at 7-8, 11. To both
questions, defense counsel said no. Id. at 8, 11. Because Mr. Uscanga-Mora did
not alert the district court that he considered its statement of reasons for issuing
the enhancement inadequate, his claim for relief on this procedural ground has
been forfeited. Reviewing his claim for plain error, we discern none.
1
That our review should be for plain error is compelled both by our
precedent and sound reason. Consider first our precedent. The requirement that
the district court articulate its reasons for imposing a § 3B1.1 enhancement stems
at least in part, we have said, from Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B), a rule requiring
the district court “for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other
controverted matter [t]o rule on the dispute.” United States v. Pena-Hermosillo,
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522 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (2008). It also surely stems in part from 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c)’s requirement that a sentence be accompanied by a statement of reasons.
See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (describing value of §
3553(c)’s statement of reasons requirement). But whether the duty arises from
Rule 32, § 3553(c), or some other source, we have consistently held plain error
review obtains when counsel fails to render a contemporaneous objection to the
procedural adequacy of a district court’s statement of reasons at sentencing. See,
e.g., United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2008) (Rule 32);
United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2008) (§ 3553(c));
United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (same).
Moreover, at least a pair of our sister circuits and two of our unpublished
opinions have already applied plain error review in the § 3B1.1 context. See,
e.g., United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Rhynes, 196 F.3d 207, 241 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated in part on other grounds by
218 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Begaye, 2006 WL
122462, at *1 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gordon, 1998 WL 704684, at *1
(10th Cir. 1998).
Applying plain error here also makes sense. The Supreme Court has
recently cautioned us that “any unwarranted extension of the authority granted by
Rule 52(b),” which provides for plain error review in cases of unpreserved
challenges, “would disturb the careful balance it strikes between judicial
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efficiency and the redress of injustice; and . . . the creation of an unjustified
exception to the Rule would be even less appropriate.” Puckett v. United States,
— S. Ct. —, 2009 WL 763354, at *5 (2009) (citations, internal quotation marks,
and brackets omitted). Mr. Uscanga-Mora offers us no “conceivable reason . . .
for disregarding [the Rule’s] evident application” in this context, id., and neither
are we able to see one on our own. To the contrary, the benefits the judicial
system derives from a contemporaneous objection requirement in the sentencing
context outweigh the modest burden such a requirement imposes on counsel.
Romero, 491 F.3d at 1177. A district court alerted to the potential inadequacies
of its statement of reasons at sentencing is often in a position to remedy them
easily and quickly. Sometimes as little as an additional sentence or paragraph of
explanation, or a response to a question, will suffice to dispel any need for an
appeal. Meanwhile, without a contemporaneous objection requirement, many
cases will needlessly ping-pong back and forth between the district court and
court of appeals, with the parties expending substantial resources fighting over a
problem that could have been readily identified and cured up front. See Puckett,
— S. Ct. —, 2009 WL 763354, at *4 (Plain error review “serves to induce the
timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the district court the
opportunity to consider and resolve them. . . . In the case of an actual or invited
procedural error, the district court can often correct or avoid the mistake. . . .”);
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004) (stating that
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plain-error review “encourage[s] timely objections and reduce[s] wasteful
reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved error”);
United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A timely
objection to the method [used to calculate the sentence] can alert the district court
and opposing counsel, so that a potential error can be corrected, obviating any
need for an appeal.”).
Of course, plain error review should not be like a hidden mantrap,
encountered without warning yet often deadly. Precisely for this reason, the
federal rules provide for plain error review only when counsel has been given, but
has not taken advantage of, an opportunity to voice his or her objection; where no
such opportunity was afforded in the district court, our normal standards of
review pertain. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 51(b). Likewise, counsel will not be stuck
with plain error review for having failed to voice an objection when doing so
would have been futile. See United States v. Algarate-Valencia, 550 F.3d 1238,
1243 (10th Cir. 2008). Neither such circumstance, however, exists here. In this
case, the district court judge paused at the end of his discussion of the sentencing
enhancement and gave both parties the opportunity to raise any additional
concerns. The judge then proceeded to ask, specifically, whether either was
aware of any legal reason why sentencing ought not proceed. Under these
circumstances, the parties indisputably had the opportunity to raise any as-yet
unvoiced objection to the court’s statement of reasons for granting the
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enhancement. * We likewise have no indication that an objection would have been
futile; the district court here, unlike the court in Algarate-Valencia, did nothing to
indicate that it was no longer open to discussion about the need to clarify the
reasons supporting its sentencing decision.
One might ask whether Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s entreaties to the district court
that there was insufficient evidence to support a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement were
sufficient to preserve a procedural challenge to the adequacy of the district
court’s explanation for its decision. But Mr. Uscanga-Mora did not make this
argument to us, and there is good reason for him not having done so. In United
States v. Mendoza, we faced and rejected exactly such an argument from the
government. At sentencing, the government disputed vigorously the defendant’s
sentence on substantive grounds. 543 F.3d at 1191. On appeal, the government
challenged the procedural adequacy of the district court’s statement of reasons
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and, in an effort to avoid plain error review, argued that
its various substantive objections “encompass[ed] the required procedural
*
One of our sister circuits has gone so far as to exercise its supervisory
authority to require district courts to invite new objections before adjourning any
sentencing hearing, albeit over a concurrence arguing that such a rule is
unnecessary given Rule 51(b)’s assurance that plain error will not apply absent an
opportunity to raise an objection. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 871, 872
(6th Cir. 2004); id. at 878 (Ryan, J., concurring). See also United States v.
Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (extending Bostic to require district
court to state even more clearly that it was inviting objections not previously
raised). We have no occasion today to weigh in on this debate: whether or not an
invitation of objections by the district judge is required is immaterial because it
was afforded in this case.
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objection.” Id. We rejected this argument, holding instead that “[a] party must
specifically object to the district court’s procedure in order to preserve that issue
for review.” Id. We see no possible basis for reaching a different result in this
case. Mr. Uscanga-Mora surely alerted the district court of his substantive
objection that there was insufficient evidence to support his sentencing
enhancement, but just as surely his objection did not specifically alert the district
court that its statement of reasons was procedurally inadequate.
2
Our plain error standard is satisfied “when there is (1) error, (2) that is
plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Cook, 550 F.3d
at 1298. At the very least, Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s appeal cannot satisfy the third of
these requirements.
To show that an error affected his substantial rights, Mr. Uscanga-Mora
must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. This he cannot do. Whatever
the perceived inadequacy of the district court’s recitation of its reasons, the
district court’s sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the
government proffered at sentencing – evidence that was neither contested nor
countered by the defense. The defendant thus received a sentence merited by the
evidence, and we cannot say – as we would have to in order to find plain error –
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that, but for the claimed error, the defendant’s sentence would have been any
different. See id. at 1298 (defendant could not meet the third prong of plain error
in his challenge to the adequacy of findings under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) given the
presence of sufficient evidence to support the enhancement); United States v.
Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (“If the defendant does not object and
there is evidence to sustain the enhancement, the error [under § 3553’s open court
provision] is not reversible under the plain error standard.”); United States v.
Orlandez-Gamboa, 2006 WL 1668055, at *1 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) (no plain error in
failure to make adequate findings in support of enhancement under § 3B1.1
because “there is evidence to sustain the enhancement”); see also United States v.
Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating defendant can meet
his burden on prong three “by demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the
district court applied the [proper] sentencing framework, he would have received
a lesser sentence”).
Before us, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Uscanga-Mora “led,
managed, or supervised” at least his cousin, Mr. Uscanga-Cano, in criminal
activity, and, by dint of this, was eligible for a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. The
government offered, and the defendant did not contest, evidence of numerous
conversations between the two in which Mr. Uscanga-Mora gave Mr. Uscanga-
Cano orders about their narcotics business. Vol. I, Doc. 77 at 2. By way of
example, the government explained that Mr. Uscanga-Mora instructed his cousin
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not to do business with a particular customer who lacked sufficient money to pay
for drugs. Id. In this same conversation, as well, Mr. Uscanga-Cano
acknowledged that the drug selling business was Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s, not his
own. Id. The government also presented uncontested evidence that Gabino
Barajas-Torres, the individual the defense conceded was an organizer and supplier
of the drug ring, dealt directly with only Mr. Uscanga-Mora, not Mr. Uscanga-
Cano. Id.
While Mr. Uscanga-Mora protests, and we agree, that this evidence hardly
paints him as a drug kingpin, that is not required to support a § 3B1.1(c)
enhancement. We have explained that “the sentencing court should remain
conscious of the fact that the gravamen of this enhancement is control,
organization, and responsibility for the actions of other individuals because
§ 3B1.1[] is an enhancement for organizers or leaders, not for important or
essential figures.” United States v. Sallis, 533 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2008).
Toward this end, we have identified several factors that might point to a
defendant’s control over others, including that “other sellers worked for him,
were recruited by him, or had their activities controlled by him; he paid others for
their efforts on behalf of the conspiracy; he restricted the people to whom other
coconspirators could sell their drugs; and he controlled the manner of sales, set
prices, or claimed the right to a larger share of proceeds.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. These factors are present in this case:
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At the least, Mr. Uscanga-Mora controlled the activities of his cousin and
restricted the people to whom his cousin could sell drugs, and we have
previously, and regularly, held evidence along these lines sufficient to place a
defendant within the ambit of § 3B1.1(c). See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 919
F.2d 1471, 1477 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding enhancement warranted where
defendant exercised control over the doorman to the house from which he sold
drugs); United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1529-30 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).
B
We turn at last to Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s sufficiency of the evidence
challenge, but need not linger long here. When evaluating sentence enhancements
under the Sentencing Guidelines, we review the district court’s factual findings
for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v. Mozee, 405 F.3d
1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2005). “If the district court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence differently.” United States v. Spears, 197 F.3d
465, 469 (10th Cir. 1999). For the reasons we have already fully detailed above
with respect to Mr. Uscanga-Mora’s first challenge, we cannot say that the district
court’s determination that he was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor”
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was based on insufficient evidence. The record evidence supports, even if it does
not compel, the district court’s determination. No more is required by law.
Affirmed.
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