FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 12, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DONNA J. NEALEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 08-3144
v. (D.C. No. 2:06-CV-02237-CM)
(D. Kan.)
WATER DISTRICT NO. 1 OF
JOHNSON COUNTY, KANSAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Donna J. Nealey appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of her former employer, Water District No. 1 of Johnson County, Kansas
(WaterOne), on her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
§§ 2601-54. Reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo
and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Nealey, we
affirm. See Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1167
(10th Cir. 2007).
BACKGROUND
Ms. Nealey began her employment with WaterOne in 1988 as a support
clerk in the Engineering Department. By 1994 she was working as an
administrative assistant to Dan Smith, who later became director of distribution.
From 1994 to 2003, Mr. Smith gave Ms. Nealey positive performance appraisals,
rating her as satisfactory or better.
While under Mr. Smith’s supervision, Ms. Nealey had health problems,
resulting in the need for occasional FMLA leave. Because of lung-cancer surgery
on June 29, 2000, she took about 11 weeks of FMLA leave. In June 2002 she
took a second 11-week FMLA leave of absence for neuropathic pain. Although
Ms. Nealey exhausted her available FMLA leave by August 2002, WaterOne, with
Mr. Smith’s approval, provided an additional two months of leave. She returned
to full-time work as Mr. Smith’s administrative secretary in the fall of 2002.
In the spring of 2004 several circumstances combined to affect
Ms. Nealey’s employment situation. Ms. Nealey continued to have health issues.
On March 29 an administrative-support clerk injected Ms. Nealey with Toradol®,
a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug prescribed for pain, in the bathroom at
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WaterOne. Mr. Smith, unaware of the Toradol incident, informed Ms. Nealey on
April 16 that he was frustrated with her absenteeism and was going to discuss her
unsatisfactory attendance with individuals in the human-resources department.
He drafted a memorandum to Ms. Nealey dated April 22 summarizing the effects
of her unreliable attendance and stating that he was placing her on six-months
probation as of April 22.
Meanwhile, the relationship between Ms. Nealey and the
administrative-support clerk had deteriorated. On April 22 the clerk reported the
Toradol incident to her supervisor, Mr. Smith, and members of the legal
department. Mr. Smith did not send Ms. Nealey his memorandum concerning
probation for absenteeism. Instead, Ms. Nealey was placed on paid administrative
leave pending WaterOne’s investigation into a possible violation of its
drug-and-alcohol policy. Ms. Nealey hired an attorney.
On May 24, WaterOne informed Ms. Nealey and her attorney that it had
found no policy violation arising from the Toradol injection. It determined,
however, that Mr. Smith had lost confidence in Ms. Nealey and that he should not
continue as her direct supervisor. An individual younger than Ms. Nealey was
hired as Mr. Smith’s administrative secretary.
Ms. Nealey’s attorney and WaterOne continued to negotiate her return to
work, with the attorney demanding that Ms. Nealey be restored to her former
position. WaterOne responded by offering two alternative positions. It also
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provided information about long-term disability benefits available from its
insurance carrier.
Eventually, Ms. Nealey accepted WaterOne’s offer of an administrative
assistant/analyst position at her current pay grade, reporting to Greg Johnson, who
was supervised by Mr. Smith. She started work on September 7, 2004. The next
day, she left work early and began an FMLA leave of absence until October 2004.
Later in September, Ms. Nealey filed an EEOC charge alleging age and disability
discrimination, along with FMLA interference and retaliation. Without keeping a
similar log for other employees and on advice of counsel, Mr. Johnson began a
log of incidents relating to Ms. Nealey.
Ms. Nealey was unhappy with the duties and conditions of her new job.
From May to December 2005 she requested and received periods of FMLA leave
for various reasons, including pneumonia. She informed WaterOne that her
doctor had prescribed narcotic medication, but that he had not placed any
restrictions on her work duties. Beginning in July 2005, Johnson logged a
number of reports of Ms. Nealey’s sleeping at work. There were descriptions of
her snoring at her desk, sleeping standing up, sleeping with her finger on the
computer keyboard (which caused a beeping noise), and acting disoriented and
unresponsive when a fire alarm sounded. In one remarkable occurrence reported
by a benefits administrator, Ms. Nealey fell asleep during a private session
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concerning her FMLA leave. A video filmed by Mr. Johnson showed Ms. Nealey
with her head on her desk for several minutes.
On several occasions Ms. Nealey was sent home and on other occasions she
was counseled to remain at home if she could not stay awake and alert.
Ms. Nealey, however, often denied that she had been asleep, asserting that she
had been listening with her head down, closing her eyes to focus, or practicing
biofeedback. Mr. Johnson’s review of Ms. Nealey for April 22 through October
27, 2005, commented on “numerous errors or omissions,” and noted that she
often “appear[ed] sleepy and confused” and had been found “asleep at her desk on
several occasions.” Id. at 751-52. Her 2006 goals were to “[i]mprove accuracy
of work,” and “[n]o sleeping during work day.” Id. at 752.
The day after her review, Ms. Nealey’s counsel sent an e-mail asserting that
WaterOne’s practice of sending her home amounted to retaliation. WaterOne
retained a law firm to investigate the complaint. After interviewing the persons
involved and viewing a video showing Ms. Nealey with her head on her desk for
several minutes, the firm’s investigator found that Ms. Nealey had been either
sleeping or unable to function at an acceptable level. His conclusion was that
WaterOne’s employees made sensible decisions in dealing with an employee who
could not perform her duties.
Reports of Ms. Nealey sleeping at work continued into 2006. She
complained to WaterOne about alleged discrimination and retaliation in sending
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her home involuntarily and in joking by fellow employees about sleeping on the
job. WaterOne conducted investigations into Ms. Nealey’s allegations but found
no wrongdoing.
Mr. Smith sent an e-mail to human resources describing the frustration of
Mr. Johnson in dealing with Ms. Nealey. Mr. Smith opined that Ms. Nealey
“ha[d] done a masterful job . . . to manipulate all of us into a[n] impossible
situation” and “ha[d] the District doing investigation after investigation for the
most trivial incidents or comments.” Id. at 757. In February some unidentified
WaterOne managers attended audio conferences on “Terminating Employees
Without Getting Sued” and “FMLA Abuse: Fight Back and Win.” Id. at 569-70.
On March 7, 2006, Mr. Johnson and the WaterOne director of human
resources both observed Ms. Nealey sleeping on the job. They met with her and
reminded her of previous warnings about sleeping on the job. At the end of the
meeting they gave Ms. Nealey a disciplinary-action form and suspended her
without pay through March 9. On March 10 she disclosed a new medical
condition that would require surgery and medical leave. On March 14 Ms. Nealey
was again seen asleep at her workstation. She was suspended without pay until
further notice. By letter dated March 17, WaterOne advised her that it was
terminating her employment as of March 31.
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Ms. Nealey filed her lawsuit on June 8, 2006. The district court granted
summary judgment to WaterOne on all claims. Ms. Nealey now appeals the
district court’s decision.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On appeal Ms. Nealey asserts error in the district
court’s disposition of her claims of age discrimination under the ADEA; disability
discrimination under the ADA; retaliation for her exercise of rights under the
FMLA, the ADEA, and the ADA; and interference with the FMLA. Ms. Nealey’s
only EEOC claim was filed in September 2004, so her discrimination claims are
limited to events occurring by that date. Jones v. U.P.S., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176,
1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]ny adverse employment actions occurring after
[plaintiff] submitted [her] administrative charge . . . would not fall within the
scope of [her] charge.”).
Because Ms. Nealey lacks direct evidence of age or disability
discrimination or of retaliation under the FMLA, the ADEA, or the ADA, these
claims are properly analyzed under the burden-shifting framework described in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Sanders v.
Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 544 F.3d 1101, 1106 (10th Cir. 2008) (ADEA discrimination);
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Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2008) (ADEA
retaliation); Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007)
(ADA retaliation); Jones, 502 F.3d at 1189 (ADA discrimination); Metzler v.
Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2006 ) (FMLA
retaliation). Under this scheme the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie
case and, if she does so, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Rivera v. City & County of
Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 920 (10th Cir. 2004) (age discrimination) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff
must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). For FMLA interference claims, the analysis is different and will be
discussed later.
ADEA Claim
According to Ms. Nealey, WaterOne discriminated against her based on
age in 2004 by investigating the Toradol incident and refusing to let her return to
her previous position as Mr. Smith’s administrative secretary. The parties agree
that she established a prima facie case and that WaterOne stated legitimate
reasons for its actions. They part ways, however, on whether Ms. Nealey met her
burden of producing evidence from which one could infer that WaterOne’s
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reasons for changing her position were pretextual. Ms. Nealey asserts that pretext
is established by (1) her vindication in the investigation of the Toradol incident;
(2) the “after-the-fact” nature of Mr. Smith’s “loss of confidence” explanation;
and (3) Mr. Johnson’s keeping of a log on her work activities.
On the question of pretext, “we consider the facts as they appeared to the
person making the decision, and we do not second-guess the employer’s decision
even if it seems in hindsight that the action taken constituted poor business
judgment.” Riggs v. AirTran Airways, 497 F.3d 1108, 1119 (10th Cir. 2007).
The court does not “act as a super personnel department, second guessing
employers’ honestly held (even if erroneous) business judgments.” Young v.
Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). WaterOne has explained the procedure and results of the
alcohol-and-drug-policy investigation and also the basis for its decision to
transfer Ms. Nealey from the position of Mr. Smith’s confidential assistant.
Further, Mr. Johnson’s log did not exist until well after the events Ms. Nealey
identifies as discriminatory. Viewing the evidence as a whole, we see no genuine
issue of material fact on the issue of whether WaterOne’s decision was a pretext
for age discrimination.
ADA Discrimination Claim
Ms. Nealey claims that WaterOne’s 2004 actions likewise violated the
ADA. An essential element of a prima facie ADA case is a showing that the
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plaintiff is a disabled person within the meaning of that statute. Jones, 502 F.3d
at 1189. Ms. Nealey asserts that she is protected by the ADA because WaterOne
regarded her as having an impairment substantially limiting the major life activity
of working. For ADA purposes, an individual is disabled if he is “regarded as
having” “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (C). “[A]
person is ‘regarded as having’ an impairment that substantially limits the person’s
major life activities when other people treat that person as having a substantially
limiting impairment.” Lanman v. Johnson County, 393 F.3d 1151, 1157
(10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Working qualifies as a major
life activity. Id.
For Ms. Nealey to survive summary judgment on this claim, she “must
present some evidence that [WaterOne] believed that [s]he was significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills, and abilities.” Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080, 1086
(10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]ur focus is on
[WaterOne’s] subjective state of mind: did [it] mistakenly believe that
[Ms. Nealey] was substantially limited in performing a major life activity?” Id.
Ms. Nealey argues that her evidence satisfies this standard. She points to
events that occurred in 2004: WaterOne’s drug-and-alcohol-policy inquiry,
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approval of her requests for FMLA leave, and provision of information on
disability coverage. In addition, she relies on events well after the decision not to
let her return to work for Mr. Smith: later FMLA leave, Mr. Johnson’s
maintenance of a log after she began working for him, and a human-resources
employee’s expressed concern about Ms. Nealey’s capacity to work in December
2005.
We are not persuaded. The record does not support an inference that in
2004 WaterOne perceived Ms. Nealey as being significantly restricted from
performing a class of jobs or range of jobs. Most tellingly, WaterOne
consistently offered Ms Nealey other full-time positions (at the same level of pay
and benefits as her previous position) after she was told that she could not return
to work for Mr. Smith. Neither the approval of her FMLA requests nor the
suggestion of disability insurance can in themselves support an inference that
WaterOne regarded her as disabled for ADA purposes. See Berry v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 & n.8 (10th Cir. 2007). Finally, we do not
believe that the events after Ms. Nealey started at her new position in any way
supports her contention that WaterOne believed her to be disabled in 2004. In
sum, Ms. Nealey’s evidence does not establish genuine questions of material fact
relating to her prima facie case of disability discrimination.
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Retaliation Claims
Ms. Nealey also makes a series of retaliation claims, asserting that
WaterOne retaliated against her for seeking FMLA leave and for filing claims of
age and disability discrimination with the EEOC. For a prima facie case of
retaliation, Ms. Nealey must show that “(1) she engaged in protected [activity];
(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
Fye v. Okla. Corp. Com’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). No causal connection is apparent between
Ms. Nealey’s filing age and disability charges and the adverse employment
actions that took place over a year later. The ADEA and ADEA retaliation claims
fail for lack of a prima facie case.
As for FMLA retaliation, temporal proximity exists between Ms. Nealey’s
leave requests and her termination. Ms. Nealey therefore established a prima
facie case. WaterOne then satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate reason for
its actions by pointing to her sleeping on the job. As a result, Ms. Nealey had to
show pretext. “To raise a fact issue of pretext,” Ms. Nealey must “present
evidence of temporal proximity plus circumstantial evidence of retaliatory
motive.” Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1172. “[T]his court has refused to allow even very
close temporal proximity to operate as a proxy for the evidentiary requirement
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that the plaintiff demonstrate pretext.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
As additional circumstantial evidence of pretext, Ms. Nealey stresses
WaterOne’s knowledge that she was taking pain medication that could cause
drowsiness and Mr. Johnson’s “keeping a secret log on her – and only her.”
Aplt. Br. at 29. But these two facts, even considered in conjunction with
evidence argued as pretext in other sections of Ms. Nealey’s brief, do not suggest
that WaterOne’s expressed reasons are unworthy of credence. Ms. Nealey has not
raised a genuine issue of material fact undermining WaterOne’s stated reasons for
disciplining her and terminating her employment.
FMLA Interference Claim
“Under the FMLA’s terms, covered employees are entitled “to take
reasonable leave for medical reasons. . . ,’ and affected employers may not
interfere with or discriminate against an employee seeking to exercise those
rights.” Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 531 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(2), 2615(a)). Ms. Nealey asserts that she has made
a sufficient showing that WaterOne interfered with her FMLA rights when it
disciplined and discharged her.
To prevail on this theory, she “must demonstrate: (1) that . . . she was
entitled to FMLA leave, (2) that some adverse action by the employer interfered
with . . . her right to take FMLA leave, and (3) that the employer’s action was
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related to the exercise or attempted exercise of [her] FMLA rights.” Metzler,
464 F.3d at 1180 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The
employer’s actual intent is not relevant. Id.
Ms. Nealey has demonstrated the first two elements of her claim--she was
entitled to FMLA leave and she was disciplined and discharged before she could
take all her accrued leave. Thus, our analysis centers on whether she has come
forward with evidence of a causal relationship between her termination and her
FMLA leave. Ms. Nealey argues that she “has easily raised genuine issues of
material fact for a jury on . . . her claim.” Aplt Br. at 28. But the record shows
that WaterOne consistently authorized extensive FMLA leave over the course of
Ms. Nealey’s employment, and that she was frequently advised to take FMLA
leave rather than sleep on the job. Moreover, the record of poor performance
(sleeping on the job) was remarkable. An employee who requests FMLA leave
has “no greater protection against . . . her employment being terminated for
reasons not related to . . . her FMLA request than . . . she did before submitting
the request” and “has no greater rights than an employee who remains at work.”
Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). We do
not think that it would be reasonable to infer from the record in this case that
Ms. Nealey was fired because she requested or took FMLA leave. Summary
judgment is the appropriate disposition of Ms. Nealey FMLA-interference claim.
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CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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