FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 4, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 08-8034
v.
ROBERT HARRISON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. No. 2:07-CR-00139-WFD-1)
Ian Sandefer, Krampner, Fuller & Associates, L.L.C. (Michael J. Krampner, with
him on the briefs), Casper, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant.
Stephanie I. Sprecher, Assistant United States Attorney (Kelly H. Rankin, United
States Attorney, with her on the brief), Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, McKAY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Chief Judge.
Following the execution of a search warrant for Robert Harrison’s home
and computer, a grand jury indicted Mr. Harrison on charges of receipt and
possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1),
(a)(5)(B), and (b)(2). Mr. Harrison filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the
search warrant, contending that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant
impermissibly relied on “unnamed sources” and “deliberately ambiguous,”
“equivocal” and “stale” “third party information.” Aplt’s App. at 38-40. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that the issuing magistrate relied on
“pooled information” in making its determination, which was properly considered
in making a finding of probable cause. Id. Because executing officer Randy
Huff, Special Agent of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, relied on
the search warrant in good faith, we affirm.
~~~
Upon the denial of his motions to suppress, 1 Mr. Harrison entered a
conditional plea of guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography. On
appeal, he argues that the affidavit in support of the search warrant “had severe
problems with veracity, reliability and foundational facts,” which are insufficient
to support a finding of probable cause, and that the absence of probable cause is
so egregious that the good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply. Aplt’s Br. at 7.
We need not address Mr. Harrison’s probable cause arguments because, as
1
Mr. Harrison moved to suppress the items seized pursuant to the warrant
on June 27, 2007. The district court denied the motion on August 29, 2007. Mr.
Harrison renewed his motion to suppress on January 22, 2008.
2
the Supreme Court held in Leon, reviewing courts may “reject suppression
motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions by turning
immediately to a consideration of the officers’ good faith.” 468 U.S. at 925; see
also United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212, 216 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[R]esolution of
whether there was probable cause supporting the warrant is not necessary to our
decision affirming the district court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion
because, as discussed below, the agents’ conduct clearly falls within the ‘good
faith exception’ to the exclusionary rule.”). A defendant challenging a search
pursuant to a warrant has the burden of proof. United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d
1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994).
“The first notion to be remembered in considering the good faith principle
is the presumption created in Leon that when an officer relies upon a warrant, the
officer is acting in good faith.” United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133
(10th Cir. 1985). This presumption, though not absolute, “must carry some
weight.” Id.; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (“Searches pursuant to a warrant will
rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a
magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted
in good faith in conducting the search.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
“It is only when [an executing officer’s] reliance was wholly unwarranted
that good faith is absent.” Cardall, 773 F.2d at 1133 (emphasis added); United
3
States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 409 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding officers’ reliance on
warrant was objectively reasonable because warrant affidavit was not devoid of
facts); United States v. Wright, 791 F.2d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding
that where the affidavit was not “devoid of factual support,” officers who
executed the search warrant were “entitled to rely in good faith upon the decision
of that magistrate as provided in Leon and Cardall.”); see also Herring v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (“[S]ince Leon, we have never applied the
[exclusionary] rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, where the police conduct was [merely negligent].”).
Obviously, the good faith presumption is not without limits. An officer
who knows or should have known that a search warrant was invalid may not rely
upon the good faith exception to immunize his subsequent seizure of evidence.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (“If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be
suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge,
or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.”) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,
542 (1975)).
It is undisputed that “a law enforcement agent’s opinion, based upon his
professional expertise, that evidence of illegal activity will be found in the place
to be searched, is entitled to consideration in our determination of whether
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probable cause existed at the time a warrant issued.” United States v. Mathis, 357
F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004). Mr. Harrison challenges Agent Huff’s
affidavit, while singing praises of his expertise: “[H]e has over two decades of
law enforcement experience, special training in the use of computers to commit
crimes of child exploitation, and he has personally written or participated in
hundreds of search warrants in Wyoming.” Aplt’s Br. at 25. Yet Agent Huff’s
affidavit contains much more than a “bare bones” statement, Leon, 468 U.S. at
915, but is supported by Agent Huff’s factual testimony linking Mr. Harrison’s
internet protocol address with two separate offerings of unlawful files containing
a digital signature identified with 99.99% certainty. See Aplt’s App. at 31-33.
We see nothing in the record indicating that Agent Huff would have had
any reason to believe the affidavit was constitutionally infirm or even
questionable. Given the strong presumption in favor of warrant searches, the
“great deference” accorded to a magistrate’s probable cause determination,
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983), and the fact that the warrant affidavit
was not “devoid of factual support,” Wright, 791 F.2d at 135, we conclude that a
reasonable officer in Agent Huff’s shoes would have assumed the search was
valid.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Mr. Harrison’s motion to suppress and AFFIRM Mr. Harrison’s conviction.
5